Chinese stocks rise by most in a week as trade war with US fuels stimulus hopes
Chinese stocks rose by the most in a week on Monday amid expectations of stimulus measures from Beijing to offset the impact of the trade war with the US.
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The CSI 300 Index, a gauge of the nation's biggest companies, advanced 0.2 per cent to 3,778.18 at the trading break, after jumping as much as 0.5 per cent to log the best intraday gain since April 14. The Shanghai Composite Index added 0.3 per cent. Hong Kong's stock market is closed for the Easter holiday and will reopen on Tuesday.
The gains were led by tech firms. Artificial intelligence chip designer Cambricon Technologies jumped 5.7 per cent to 707.60 yuan, while high-end processor maker for servers and computers Hygon Information Technology advanced 2.1 per cent to 152.82 yuan. Electric vehicle battery maker Contemporary Amperex Technology rose 3.3 per cent to 232.78 yuan.
Limiting gains, Chinese baijiu maker Luzhou Laojiao fell 1.8 per cent to 129.43 yuan, while property developer China Vanke eased 1.9 per cent to 7.17 yuan.
Traders are betting on bolder stimulus in the coming months to help mitigate risks amid intensifying trade tensions between China and the US, according to global investment banks. While UBS, Goldman Sachs, Nomura and others have cut their forecasts for China's economy, they expect more measures from Chinese policymakers to underpin the economy.
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'We expect the government to accelerate bond issuance and the spending of proceeds in the coming months,' Andrew Tilton, an economist with Goldman Sachs, said in a note over the weekend.
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Asia Times
8 hours ago
- Asia Times
Hot race for Pacific's deep sea mineral wealth
The seabed is legally designated as the 'common heritage of mankind,' but in practice, it has become a hotly contested frontier. This is exemplified by the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), a vast expanse of international seabed located between Hawaii and Mexico rich in polymetallic nodules that contain critical minerals such as nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. These resources are more than mere commodities; they are vital components of national strategies for energy independence, technological leadership and strategic deterrence. Unlike land-based domains, where national borders delineate access, the seabed remains governed by a patchwork of international conventions and non-binding regulatory frameworks. This legal ambiguity, combined with the CCZ's sheer scale (approximately 4.5 million square kilometers), recasts geography as a determinant of power. Here, the terrain imposes its own rules: no nation can claim legal sovereignty, yet every technologically capable actor can exert functional control. The strategic function of the seabed lies not in symbolic possession, requiring engagement with multilateral bodies like the International Seabed Authority (ISA), but in continuous operational oversight enforced through submersibles, dredging platforms and state-backed maritime infrastructure. Through these instruments, nations could transform the legal status of the seabed from a global commons into de facto geopolitical claims, not to share, not to protect, but to secure. No rivalry illustrates the emerging dynamics of seabed geopolitics more vividly than that between the United States and China. These two powers approach deep-sea mining from fundamentally different institutional positions, strategic cultures and timelines. China, with its disciplined alignment of state power and long-term industrial planning, has embedded itself within ISA's multilateral framework. It holds more seabed exploration licenses than any other country and has cultivated influence within ISA rulemaking bodies. Chinese actors do not rely on rhetorical commitments to international law; instead, they utilize procedural participation as a mechanism to steer the outcome of regulatory frameworks. Their objective is clear: to shape the rules before they are finalized, ensuring that China's technological, legal and operational advantages are permanently encoded into the structure of global seabed governance. The US, in contrast, approaches the seabed from a structurally distinct position. Excluded from ISA by virtue of not ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the US has pivoted to a strategy of unilateralism, issuing domestic legal authorizations and executive directives to fast-track seabed mining. This approach reflects a response to structural vulnerability, namely, dependence on adversarial supply chains for critical minerals. Where China exerts slow, cumulative influence through institutional immersion, the US acts with urgency, deploying private capital and regulatory agility to compensate for its formal absence from multilateral governance. This creates a bifurcated architecture: China seeks to control the framework, while the US seeks to operate around it. Yet the underlying motive is the same: strategic insulation from resource dependence and competitive positioning in a rapidly hardening world order. Neither strategy is inherently more subversive, but each perceives the other as destabilizing. Thus, the arena of deep-sea governance becomes not a neutral venue for coordination but a contested space where procedural legitimacy and strategic autonomy collide. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone spans an area nearly equivalent to the contiguous US, lying beneath international waters between Hawaii and Mexico. It is home to the planet's richest known reserves of polymetallic nodules, mineral formations laden with cobalt, nickel, and manganese. What makes this zone strategic is not its legal status but its vast, flat and sediment-stable characteristics. It is ideally suited for industrial-scale extraction. The CCZ is administered by ISA, which has parceled the zone into discrete license blocks awarded to sponsoring states and corporate entities. On paper, this fragmentation allows for coordination and environmental oversight. In reality, it institutionalizes competition. Each block becomes a fiefdom of strategic value where companies and their state sponsors conduct exploration, environmental assessments and, soon, large-scale extraction. States and corporations with deep technological capabilities, including China, Canada (via The Metals Company), Belgium (GSR), and Norway (Loke), have already deployed robotic vehicles, data-gathering systems and prototype harvesting equipment in the CCZ. These activities are not speculative; they are strategic acts of presence. By maintaining operational continuity and exclusive data on their contract areas, these actors secure a level of control that resembles territorial influence, even in the absence of sovereignty. States with territorial assets proximate to the CCZ, such as France's Clipperton Island, gain further leverage by using these holdings as logistical hubs or jurisdictional springboards. Thus, the geography of deep-sea mining is simultaneously physical, institutional and infrastructural. It maps the extension of national strategy into an unbounded, submerged arena. Pacific Island nations occupy a pivotal yet precarious position in the geopolitical structure of deep-sea mining. These states are not themselves extractive powers, but their legal status as coastal states and ISA members renders them indispensable intermediaries in the resource acquisition strategies of others. Countries like the Cook Islands, Nauru and Tonga act as sponsor states for foreign companies, enabling exploration contracts under ISA rules. In exchange, they receive royalties, infrastructure aid, and diplomatic engagement. Yet the leverage they wield, rooted in legal procedure rather than material capacity, is increasingly fragile. As major powers deepen their technological reach and begin to act outside ISA frameworks, the value of these sponsorships diminishes. The internal divisions within the Pacific region, between those pursuing economic opportunity and those advocating environmental caution, further fracture the negotiating position of these states. Their collective influence diminishes as they are drawn into opposing alignments. This allows external actors to extract favorable terms while offering minimal safeguards in return, rendering the Pacific not just a zone of opportunity but a laboratory for strategic experimentation by larger powers. These microstates thus find themselves navigating between alignment and autonomy. While they have used their position to secure economic rents and international attention, their ability to influence outcomes is limited by their institutional capacity and the asymmetry of power in these relationships. As multilateral governance erodes, their role risks shifting from active intermediaries to passive theaters of external ambition. Environmental damage from seabed mining is not only likely, but, under current practices and regulatory frameworks, virtually inevitable. The ecological consequences (destruction of benthic habitats, disruption of deep-ocean food chains, and disturbance of carbon sequestration processes) are well-documented yet remain politically unpriced. These effects unfold on spatial and temporal scales that transcend immediate accountability. Damage incurred in the hadal depths will not register in electoral cycles or quarterly earnings. This externalization of environmental costs is structurally embedded. States and corporations reap concentrated benefits (strategic minerals, technological primacy, economic gain), while the ecological liabilities are diffused across a global commons and deferred into an indeterminate future. The legal framework that will govern these activities, particularly ISA's provisional mining code, lacks both clarity and enforceability. In this vacuum, environmental safeguards function less as constraints than as negotiable instruments. Where conservation discourse exists, it is often instrumental. Calls for moratoriums or environmental safeguards serve as tools of diplomatic leverage or political differentiation rather than as expressions of systemic restraint. The logic of extraction, once engaged, prioritizes continuity; regulatory caution is outpaced by technological momentum. This is a structurally induced outcome of a system where access is governed less by rules than by capabilities. Control over seabed minerals is increasingly a function of who can act first, remain longest and extract most efficiently. Precedent supplants principle. The seabed will be shaped through deployments, licenses and machinery already descending into the depths. For states seeking mineral security and strategic autonomy, the calculus is clear: defer the ecological reckoning and secure the resource base now. Paulo Aguiar earned a master's degree in International Relations from NOVA University Lisbon, specializing in Realism, Classical Geopolitics and Strategy. As a professional in geopolitical risk analysis and strategic foresight, Paulo regularly shares his insights through various publications and on his own Substack.
RTHK
a day ago
- RTHK
Hang Seng Index ends day on a weak note
Hang Seng Index ends day on a weak note The Hang Seng Index ended trading for the day down 114 points at 23,792. File photo: AFP Hong Kong and mainland Chinese stocks ended slightly lower on Friday, as investors remained cautious after a call between President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart, Donald Trump, failed to provide clear signals of progress in easing trade tensions. Trump and Xi confronted weeks of brewing trade tensions and a battle over critical minerals in a rare leader-to-leader call on Thursday, leaving key issues unresolved for future talks. "If you look at the conversation between the Chinese and US presidents, there's nothing concrete that's positive. So little impact on stocks," said Guo Jianwen, partner at Shanghai-based hedge fund Haiyi Capital. In Hong Kong, the benchmark Hang Seng Index ended trading for the day down 114.43 points, or 0.48 percent, at 23,792.54. The Hang Seng China Enterprises Index fell 0.63 percent to end at 8,629.75 while the Hang Seng Tech Index fell 0.63 percent to end at 5,286.52. Across the border, the blue-chip CSI300 Index fell 0.1 percent. The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index ended up 0.04 percent at 3,385.36, while the Shenzhen Component Index closed 0.19 percent lower at 10,183.70. The ChiNext Index, tracking China's Nasdaq-style board of growth enterprises, lost 0.45 percent to close at 2,039.43. For the holiday-shortened week, the CSI 300 Index gained nearly 1 percent, while the Hang Seng Index rose 2.2 percent. (Agencies)
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Xi calls Trump's bluff and wins, time and time again
China's Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump spoke over the phone Thursday (June 5), the first known formal contact of the Trump 2.0 era. Though signs of détente were few, the fact that the leaders of the world's two biggest economies are speaking at all marks progress. Essentially, the two presidents talked about talking more down the line to lower the temperature on tariffs and access to rare earth minerals. The exchange fueled hope on Wall Street that a trade war truce might be in the cards. 'The US and China appear to have stepped back from their latest brink,' says analyst Bill Bishop, who writes the Sinocism newsletter. 'Trump and Xi finally had their call, the Geneva 'truce' may be back on track, and to listen to Trump, the [China] halt in exports of rare earth magnets may be ending.' Trump told reporters that the 'very good' call 'straightened out any complexity, it's very complex stuff. I think we're in very good shape with China and the trade deal.' Yet the 'grand bargain' global markets hoped Trump would strike with China still risks becoming more like a grand flop. The Chinese side, for example, seems far less impressed by the Thursday call, which officials suggested was perfunctory and vague. As Cornell University economist Eswar Prasad puts it, the 'asymmetry' in Beijing's and Washington's reporting of the call suggests that Xi held to a tough line and Trump 'didn't get much acquiescence' to his demands. Odds are good that Xi will continue to drag things out, believing time is on China's side. By appearing above the fray, Xi continues to outmaneuver Trump, who often seems to be negotiating with himself. China is also having some success positioning itself as the adult in the room as Trump lurches from one trade stance to another, hour by hour. 'The overall objectives of the trade aggression, other than the display of raw power, are as muddled as ever,' says Arthur Kroeber, an analyst at Gavekal Research. Kroeber adds that 'fresh hostilities between the US and China show that the many questions left hanging after the Geneva ceasefire in mid-May still have no satisfactory answers. It's not clear whether US trade policy is being run by Trump, his trade negotiators or his national security team.' So far, Xi has taken a go-slow approach to trade deal negotiations. Efforts by US Treasury Scott Bessent and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer to convince markets that a pact was in the works, imminent even, haven't been reciprocated from the Chinese side. China has reason to tread carefully. On April 10, Trump hiked China tariffs to a cartoonishly high 145%. Such a levy is 'effectively an embargo,' notes University of Michigan economist Justin Wolfers. It's also an action likely to turn off the other side, squandering any remaining goodwill between governments. By the time Trump backed down, cutting the tax to 30% on May 12, it was too late. This likely explains why Team Xi came forward with zero concessions in the days that followed what Trump World called a 'truce' between the two biggest economies. On May 30, Trump declared that Beijing had 'totally violated its agreement with us.' But then on June 4, Trump made it clear Xi's inscrutability is keeping him up at night. In a thirsty 2:17 a.m. social media rant, Trump declared: 'I like President XI of China, always have, and always will, but he is VERY TOUGH, AND EXTREMELY HARD TO MAKE A DEAL WITH!!!.' Gita Gopinath, the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) first deputy managing director, warns that the shock from Trump's trade war is worse than Covid-19. 'This time the challenge is going to be greater for them compared to the pandemic,' Gopinath tells the Financial Times. 'During Covid, central banks were moving in the same direction… easing monetary policy very quickly.' At this point, she adds, monetary authorities are 'steering through the fog' without coordination or a shared crisis playbook. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) thinks global growth will now slow to 2.9% in 2025 from 3.3% in 2024, the weakest pace of expansion since the pandemic. It sees US growth slowing to 1.6% from an earlier forecast of 2.8%. 'Weakened economic prospects will be felt around the world, with almost no exception,' says OECD chief economist Alvaro Pereira. 'Lower growth and less trade will hit incomes and slow job growth.' In a report on Tuesday, OECD said that 'agreements to ease trade tensions and lower tariffs and other trade barriers will be instrumental to revive growth and investment and avoid rising prices. This is by far the most important policy priority.' On the US economy, OECD Secretary General Mathias Cormann told reporters that 'the main headwinds are lower export growth as a result of retaliatory measures from trading partners, the impact of high policy uncertainty, and a marked slowdown in net immigration.' Yet the uncertainty factor is just as bad as Trump's tariffs themselves. Particularly as one US court reverses Trump's taxes on the grounds that he lacks the authority to impose them and another keeps them in place. 'I'm operating under the assumption that some major elements of Trump's tariff policies will remain intact in one form or another,' says Stephen Roach, economist at Yale University. 'Hopefully, they won't be as severe as threatened earlier, but they will nonetheless impose meaningful taxes on most US imports, with an especially steep penalty on those coming from China.' Roach adds that 'I still suspect that tariffs surviving the current legal skirmishes are likely to be onerous enough to have negative impacts on global trade, with especially adverse implications for the US and China.' Trouble is, Roach says, 'in this climate, companies have no idea how to scale and source inputs for their multinational production platforms. The planning exercise has become an oxymoron, with serious consequences for the real economy.' The bottom line, Roach notes, is that a 'protracted period of policy uncertainty essentially freezes business decision-making on capital spending and hiring, with negative repercussions for income generation and consumer demand; consumer purchasing power should be further constrained by tariff-related price shocks. Uncertainty remains the enemy of decision making.' As Xi slow-walks Trump's desire for a big, splashy trade deal, the odds of this fragile truce holding are dwindling even after Thursday's call. For one thing, headlines about Trump's having caved on tariffs as Wall Street stocks plunged are grating on the president and his inner circle. So is the #TACO narrative — the idea that Trump Always Chickens Out on import taxes. Beijing 'successfully called Trump's bluff,' notes Mark Williams, economist at Capital Economics. Eurasia Group founder Ian Bremmer notes that Trump's talk of a 'total reset' with China is really his 'biggest climbdown to date.' Since the 1980s, Trump observers have known that nothing angers him more than being perceived as the 'loser' in any negotiation. This partly explains why he signed — and loudly touted — a trade agreement with the UK, an economy with which Washington has a trade surplus. It betrayed a desperation to highlight a trade deal of any kind, no matter how minor. Japan is proving to be in no hurry to negotiate a bilateral pact, just six years after the last one with Trump 1.0. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has made it clear Tokyo will negotiate at its own pace — not in haste. Over in Seoul, South Korea's new president, Lee Jae-myung, says he has no intention of rushing to the negotiating table. He's far more liberal than his predecessor Yoon Suk Yeol. Pundits call him Korea's answer to US Senator Bernie Sanders. As such, Lee is unlikely to make quick concessions at the expense of workers' rights in a nation where labor unions wield real power. At the same time, Xi's strategy of playing the long game and not flinching is offering the rest of Asia a playbook for fending off Trump's negotiating team. His tactical retreat sends a message that plunging markets will change Trump's mind in an instant. First, it was swooning stocks that had Trump delaying his 'reciprocal' tariffs. Then, the chaotic surge in US Treasury yields forced Trump to step back from the brink once again. Yet tensions are almost certain to flare up anew once Trump realizes that Beijing isn't coming forward with the concessions Trump thinks he deserves for cutting his China tariff by 79%. From Beijing's perspective, Trump backed off because he'd overreacted in the first place. As JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon puts it, the tariffs were 'too large, too big and too aggressive' for the US economy's own good. Trouble is, Trump has a 40-plus-year track record of arguing that tariffs are the answer to virtually every economic problem imaginable. Trump's most consistent economic view through the decades is that Asia is exploiting the US and only import taxes can save the day. He's called tariffs 'beautiful' and claimed they will 'supercharge' the US economy. Yet as economists know, sizable tariffs can also be stagflationary. Team Xi appears to be following a blueprint provided by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In 2018 and 2019, Abe slow-walked negotiations with Trump 1.0. No doubt, Team Xi is busily strategizing on their own Abe-like dodge, minus the aggressive flattery. Xi's Communist Party, of course, does not have to contest mid-term elections 18 months from now. And Xi knows it. As such, Beijing is in no hurry to sign a 'Phase Two' trade agreement with a US leader sure to demand a 'Phase Three' round of talks a year from now. At the same time, US officials are learning that Trump's chaotic Phase One process prompted China to pivot to other markets. Today, China's top trading partner is the 10 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, followed by the European Union. Also, China is actively growing its market share among the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa – and the Global South. Xi's 'Made in China 2025' strategy has been quietly making the nation more self-sufficient. All of which means Trump's hopes of pulling off a massive, world-changing trade deal are slipping away, even after his declaration after Thursday's call that such a deal is on the horizon. And if he's wondering who's to blame, all Trump needs to do is look in the mirror. Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
