Angered by Trump's ‘unjustified' tariffs, Australia chases new trade deals
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Australia is a close US ally but has been slugged with a blanket 10 per cent tariff on goods exported to the US, rising to 50 per cent on steel and aluminium, as part of
Trump 's sweeping global duties.
'I'm hopeful that those countries around the world who do believe in free and fair trade can reach an agreement to extend free-trade agreements across the globe, so that irrespective of what the Americans might choose to do, we have a greater diversity of trading partners,' Farrell told Sky News.
He was speaking after talks last week in Paris with the World Trade Organization, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and other countries which he said had focused on preventing 'protectionism' and encouraging free and fair trade.
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US appeals court allows Donald Trump's tariffs to stay in effect
US appeals court allows Donald Trump's tariffs to stay in effect
Trade between Australia and the US is worth an estimated A$100 billion (US$65 billion) a year, with Australia buying more from the US than it is selling, Farrell said.
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