‘Birds of a feather': Yuan Zheng on Trump's China hawks and US rivalry endgame
Yuan Zheng is deputy director of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He is also the vice-president and secretary general of the Chinese Association for American Studies. This interview first appeared in SCMP Plus. For other interviews in the Open Questions series, click here .
You said that China should maintain communication with the US, including [Donald] Trump himself, his family and the people around him. How difficult do you expect that will be over the next four years?
Engagement is necessary.
Engagement can be both public and private. Right now, the most appropriate form might be private. Direct contact is certainly better, but if that is not possible, then indirect contact, such as through intermediaries, is the way to go. As for connecting through Elon Musk , I think if people talk about it too much, it will become problematic and Musk will also be cautious. Some things can only be done and not talked about. If they are over-discussed, they will not work.
Perhaps we could look for people similar to Musk, or Trump's major sponsors, or big American businessmen and entrepreneurs – people who can have a say.
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