Iran's axis 'can be stopped here,' general of Yemen's anti-Houthi forces tells 'Post'
ADEN, Yemen – 'We just need a green light, and we'll drive back the Houthis – and Habrish too,' Maj.-Gen. Salah al Hassan tells me, as we sit in his office in Aden, southern Yemen. 'Habrish' is Amr Bin Habrish, deputy governor of Hadramout Province, who is widely suspected of collaboration.
The Houthis need no introduction. We are in the headquarters of the Yemeni Southern Transitional Council, or STC. I have come here to look into the question that the general has sought to answer – namely, whether there are potential ground partners available to the West in Yemen, to help undertake the urgent task of pushing back the Ansar Allah ('Partisans of God,' the Houthis' official name) from the Red Sea coast area.
The importance and the urgency of this question require little explanation. Of the pro-Iran forces mobilized by Tehran to take part in the regional war against Israel under way since October 2023, the Houthis are unique in that they have not yet suffered any serious setback, and have not yet blinked.
Across a regional landscape where the main strategic lesson of recent months has been the relative weakness and vulnerability of Iran and its allies, the Houthis stand out in their durability.
Aden, under the de facto control of the STC, is ramshackle and poverty-stricken. The apartment buildings built by the British to house imperial officials and their families have long since fallen into decay. The Soviet-supported People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, now South Yemen) appears to have left little architectural memory.
Here and there, one may see faded Soviet-style murals. Like similar displays in Syria and Egypt, these seem to be the work of North Korean artists, and depict heroic Arab fighters of oddly East Asian appearance. The British fought a doomed colonial counter-insurgency here, in the late 1960s. The Soviets are long gone, too.
BUT THE thing that brought them both to South Yemen – the crucial strategic waterway that runs past the Bab el Mandeb Strait between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and then on to the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean – remains. Today, new forces are fighting over it.
The Houthis' campaign against international shipping on the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea route recommenced this month, with the targeting and sinking of two Greek owned, Liberian-flagged vessels.
This is despite a supposed ceasefire concluded with the US regarding this front on May 6. Ansar Allah's launching of ballistic missiles and drones at Israel is ongoing. Large-scale US and Israeli counterattacks from air and sea on the Hodeidah and Salif ports and the airport at Sanaa have so far failed to deter them.
What more might be done?
GEN. MOHSEN DERAI, Yemen's defense minister, told us that he and the government he serves were 'shocked' at the US decision to conclude a ceasefire with the Houthis in May.
Speaking in his office in Aden, the defense minister said that on the one hand, he had regretted that no ground operation had taken place to take advantage of the US air activity.
But on the other hand, he was relieved, 'because the US was going to abandon us…. When the Americans decided to begin those operations against the Houthis, they didn't coordinate with us and didn't notify us, and when they decided to cease, they also didn't coordinate with or notify us.'
'We had a strategic plan we had devised together with STC leader Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, which was supposed to involve the US, UK, UAE, and Saudi Arabia… a coordinated effort to bring down the Houthis.'
Darei's words are notable given reporting at the time in April by The Wall Street Journal, suggesting that a ground operation had been in preparation.
Such an operation to push north into Hodaidah Province – taking the ports of Hodeidah and Salif, and the Ras Issa oil terminal – would with one stroke deprive the Houthis of a massive part of their revenue, their ability to bring in weaponry and goods, and much of the infrastructure used for attacks on shipping in the Red Sea. But it didn't take place.
THE ISSUE, in part at least, is one of will. In 2019, an agreement brokered in Stockholm prevented a military offensive by the internationally recognized government of Yemen and the STC on the crucial Houthi-held port of Hodeidah. Now in 2025, the enemies of the Houthis have hesitated again.
But there are other complicating factors. The CIA estimates that anti-Houthi forces number around 300,000 fighters, which is only a little less than the number commanded by their enemies. But the anti-Houthi camp remains bitterly divided. The internationally recognized government of which Defense Minister Da'eri is a part wants to reunite the country after the destruction of the Houthis.
Who is the Southern Transitional Council, and what is their goal?
The separatist Southern Transitional Council favors recreating a separate state in South Yemen, with Aden as its capital. In our talks with STC officials, this issue was paramount.
The Southern Transitional Council emerged in 2017, following a successful defense of the southern provinces against the Houthis, and the clashes with Saudi-linked forces.
Led by Zoubaidi, the STC was backed from the outset by the United Arab Emirates. Today, it constitutes probably the dominant military force in South Yemen, with its associated militias holding the main fronts against the Houthis in Daleh, Abiran/Shabwa, and Lahej.
The STC aligned decisively with the US-led coalition following the commencement of attacks on international shipping in November 2023. In interviews, Zoubaidi noted that air action against the Houthis would not be enough. 'What we need,' he said at that time, 'is military equipment, capacity building, and training for ground forces, as well as intel sharing.'
These requests were echoed by STC fighters and commanders when we visited the Daleh and Shabwa fronts in the course of our visit. The situation on the frontlines is one of 'no war, no peace,' as one commander at Daleh described it. There are near daily exchanges of fire, involving small arms and mortars, and regular attempts by the Houthis at incursion. The Daleh front is the most active.
STANDING ON a mountain facing the Houthi lines in Daleh, Gen. Abdallah, the local STC commander, outlined the tactical situation facing his forces near the city of al-Fakhr: 'What's happening is skirmishes, sometimes sniper fire, drones. Sometimes the enemy tries to infiltrate behind our lines, but he doesn't succeed.
'We and the US are in the same boat – against Iran,' Abdallah said. 'And the Houthis are an arm of Iran. The Iranian project succeeded in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, but it can be stopped here, in this area. If you want to ensure maritime security at Bab el Mandeb and the Red Sea, you need to support us.'
The central issue facing both the STC and the various other forces aligned with the internationally recognized government, appears to be a chronic lack of equipment. The list of their needs, as related to us in Aden, included: drones for reconnaissance (they appear to lack any capacity in this area), night vision equipment, light and heavy machine guns, and medium range artillery.
Political and military will, and manpower, are not lacking in southern Yemen. But the STC's regional patrons, and their Western allies, at the moment appear to see no reason to convert their allies on the ground in Yemen into a force that could pose a genuine challenge to the Houthis.
The result is that, for now, the Iran-supported militia looks set to remain free to commit piracy and murder on the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea route whenever it chooses to do so. Its opponents will continue to hold the line against them with the meager resources available to them.
But real change is likely to come only when the Western and regional enemies of the Houthis decide that the situation is intolerable, and begin to build and equip a force capable, with air support from outside, of pushing the Iran-supported militia back from the coast – hopefully soon.
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