Fragmented governance in Somalia a breeding ground for al-Shabaab's growing influence and power

Daily Maverick

28-07-2025

Cyclical rivalries between the federal government, states and the political opposition have undermined the counter-terrorism strategy's early successes.
Despite having a robust, multifaceted counter-terrorism strategy, Somalia's gains against the al-Shabaab terror group are losing momentum due to political instability. Each time elections approach, attention is diverted from curbing terrorism to power struggles.
After liberating parts of Somalia from al-Shabaab in 2022 and making significant strides against the group, government offensives have slowed since 2024. This year, al-Shabaab retook key areas in central Somalia, tried to assassinate President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and is threatening the capital, Mogadishu.
The country's counter-terrorism strategy involves security force operations, prevention through social and economic development, and institution building in the Somali National Army and police. Achievements have included recovering territory from al-Shabaab and increasing Somali security force participation in operations to contain the group.
While Somalia leads the strategy, external actors such as the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), US, European Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and neighbouring countries like Kenya and Ethiopia have played a crucial role. They provide military support through peacekeeping, funding, training Somali security forces, and diplomatic assistance to political and peacebuilding efforts.
However, Somalia struggles to effectively implement its counter-terrorism strategy due to political instability, resource constraints, reliance on donor funding, and the evolving nature of the terror threat. Stability is vital for the plan to work, and that requires strong institutions, political reconciliation and integrated governance. Instead, political ructions create conditions favourable for al-Shabaab's resurgence and consolidation.
Since 2012, successive Somali administrations have battled to sustain counter-insurgency operations – mainly due to the cyclical nature of Somalia's politics. Each new administration begins with intensified anti-terror efforts, but these diminish as political tensions rise before the next election, shifting attention and resources to other priorities.
Election-related violence
Before the February 2017 polls, Somalia experienced considerable election-related violence between government forces and various clan-aligned opposition militias — a situation al-Shabaab exploited.
Leading up to the 2022 election, the president, prime minister, member states and opposition disagreed over the electoral process, causing a 15-month delay. Tensions culminated in fighting between troops loyal to then-president Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed and the opposition. In 2022, al-Shabaab clashes with security forces increased by 19% compared with 2021, while attacks on civilians rose by 41%.
In a similar cycle, tensions are escalating under the current administration as the 2026 national election approaches. There is also conflict over the constitutional review process that began in February 2024.
The constitutional amendment replacing the long-standing 4.5 clan power-sharing system with a one-person-one-vote election intensifies opposition. This is especially true for dominant clans like the Darod, and Darod-dominated states like Puntland and Jubaland, who see the electoral system as threatening their autonomy and resource base.
Opposition groups have questioned the transparency and inclusivity of the electoral process, deepening political divides and raising the risk of the 2026 polls being boycotted.
To resolve these tensions, the government tried engaging the political opposition in dialogue in mid-June to create a unified roadmap for Somalia's governance, focusing on security, democratisation and elections. But states like Jubaland and Puntland, and the opposition, boycotted the dialogue over concerns that it lacked inclusivity and transparency.
These disputes result in an inconsistent security strategy, weakening the coordination of operations and allowing al-Shabaab to expand beyond its rural strongholds. In an example of how political rivalries undermine counter-terrorism, the Puntland Ministry of Information recently accused the federal government of destabilising the state while Puntland was fighting insurgents.
Leadership disputes and weak institutions distract from the provision of governance and security, especially in areas liberated from al-Shabaab. The group then asserts itself as a parallel authority, delivering mediation, security and justice services and collecting taxes.
Security vacuums exploited
In this way, al-Shabaab exploits security vacuums and recaptures areas previously lost. In July, it reclaimed the strategic district of Moqokori, which had been liberated by government forces in 2022. Weak leadership also facilitates al-Shabaab's infiltration into government structures, like the army.
Decreased external support from the AU and UN — some of which Somalia has requested — worsens political instability and will create a security vacuum. Both the UN and AU have voiced concern about Somalia's ongoing political disputes and insecurity.
Al-Shabaab has adapted to these developments. Tactically, its approach now is to win over civilians in areas under its control, re-establish local administrations, avoid retribution against former government supporters, and reduce civilian harm in attacks. Strategically, the group allows people and goods to pass checkpoints, enables civilian protests and projects an image of accountability and governance.
These changes are shifting public perception, including among the elite, who now see al-Shabaab as one actor among many competing for influence and legitimacy in a fragmented political landscape. As this view spreads, the group's ability to build local alliances and embed itself into clan structures may deepen in urban areas.
The fragmentation of the Somali government will probably worsen if political divisions continue and upcoming elections become exclusionary or disputed. The further weakening of state authority could accelerate al-Shabaab's expansion from rural areas into cities, leading to two possible outcomes.
First, al-Shabaab ultimately takes full power. This is however unlikely due to clan disagreements, opposition from nations like Ethiopia and Kenya, which view the group as a regional threat, and global condemnation of the group.
The second outcome is that al-Shabaab becomes the dominant de facto authority on the ground, while a nominal government remains in Mogadishu. This could allow the militants to infiltrate state institutions and integrate into official governance structures. This scenario appears more likely given the lack of a strong political and governance capability to counter its influence.
Political fragmentation hinders the fight against al-Shabaab. The government must prioritise resolving federal-regional tensions and disagreements with the opposition. It must capitalise on ongoing talks with the opposition and expand them to member states to garner consensus and ensure inclusivity. DM