UN honors Moroccan diplomat Halima Ouarzazi at International Day of Women in Diplomacy
«Women, in all their diversity, have been working in diplomacy for generations. Halima Ouarzazi from Morocco and Belela Herrera from Uruguay, both recently deceased, are two cherished examples among many», said Nada Al-Nashif, Deputy High Commissioner, at the opening of an event marking the International Day of Women in Diplomacy during the 59th Human Rights Council (HRC) session.
Ouarzazi represented Morocco with distinction, serving as Chair of the UN Third Committee, an expert with the UN Committee against Apartheid and Racial Discrimination, and a member of both the Council and Executive Committee of the International Institute of Human Rights. She also sat on the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities.
Her legacy was also honored through a photography exhibition titled Women Leaders in Multilateralism and Diplomacy, held at the Palais des Nations from June 24 to July 4.
This year marks the first observance of the International Day of Women in Diplomacy, focused on removing barriers to women's leadership in peace and diplomacy. The event follows HRC Resolution 58/15, led by Morocco during the Council's 58th session.
Backed by a cross-regional group including Chile, the Maldives, Mexico, Slovenia, Spain, and Mauritius, the resolution reflects a core priority of Moroccan foreign policy: advancing gender equality and promoting women's leadership in diplomacy and multilateral spaces.
The group also called for stronger recognition of women's contributions in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, humanitarian response, and decision-making, including within the Human Rights Council itself.
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Morocco World
4 hours ago
- Morocco World
Interpreting TICAD Through Japanese Political Culture
Since its inception in 1993, TICAD has evolved from a donor-recipient model into a structured platform for multilateral cooperation. To understand this transformation, culminating into TICAD 9, we must look beyond policy statements and development metrics. Japanese cultural concepts, such as honne , tatemae , and wa, offer a powerful interpretive lens for decoding both the tone and structure of Japan's engagement with Africa. Japan's engagement in Africa, particularly through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), is often viewed through the perspective of comparative diplomacy measured against actors whose approaches are less subtle. Yet this framing misses the essence of Japan's approach. To understand this reality, one must first decode the cultural grammar that underpins the country's diplomatic style. Japan's diplomacy is shaped by three interlocking concepts: tatemae (public façade), honne (true intent), and wa (harmony). These are not mere social customs, they are strategic tools that guide negotiation, consensus-building, and international engagement. In forums like TICAD, they manifest as quiet leadership, indirect signaling, and a preference for non-confrontational dialogue. 'Tatemae' as Strategic Diplomacy Goals Japan's public stance throughout TICAD has emphasized mutual respect, co-ownership, and African agency. This reflects tatemae , a socially acceptable posture that avoids transactional aid and the neo-colonial stigma often attached to it. Even when Japan pursues strategic interests, such as securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, counterbalancing China's influence, or securing resource partnerships, it frames its actions in terms of shared prosperity and inclusive development. The diplomatic language is carefully curated to avoid confrontation and foster trust. Wa' as Multilateral Harmony TICAD's format is deliberately multilateral and inclusive, involving co-organizers such as IMF, World Bank, UNDP, UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, and the African Union Commission. This reflects wa , the pursuit of harmony through layered participation. Japan avoids unilateral declarations, instead cultivating platforms like Africa-Converse and youth innovation hubs. These initiatives embody a philosophy of consensus-building, where dialogue replaces dominance and diversity becomes a source of strength. 'Honne' Beneath the Surface Japan's true strategic interests, its honne , are subtly embedded in TICAD's framework. From securing African support for Japan's UN Security Council bid to promoting Japanese technology and supply chain resilience, these priorities are present but never openly. TICAD 9's emphasis on AI governance, climate resilience, and digital transformation mirrors Japan's internal concerns, yet they are presented as collaborative solutions. This duality, between visible altruism and invisible strategy, is a hallmark of Japan's diplomatic style. Understanding the Diplomatic Blind Spots Through Culture These cultural variables that shape Japan's diplomatic style are often misunderstood. Their subtlety, though deliberate, can lead to unfortunate misinterpretations . Yet these concepts reflect a deeply rooted political philosophy, one that privileges harmony over confrontation, and quiet influence over open assertion. To engage meaningfully with Japan, one must read not only the official communiqués, but the cultural grammar beneath them. This cultural grammar is especially relevant in the context of Japan's engagement with Africa. In TICAD, Japan's approach is often misread as passive or overly cautious. Japan's diplomacy favors indirectness and layered meaning . Therefore, to interpret Japan's role in TICAD, one must learn to listen to what is not articulated. Japan's strategic stance also reflects its historical memory and geopolitical positioning. As a non-colonial power in Africa, it carries less historical baggage, allowing it to engage according to a carefully calibrated approach with a diplomatic bottom line 'zero enemy.' A Personal perspective During a Development Management course I took at the American University in Washington, D.C., my professor, Dr. Stephen C. Smith, reminded us that the poor in underdeveloped countries often improve their lives using the means at their disposal, despite limited government resources. At the time, dominant development theories, modernization and dependency among others, offered binary strategies. Structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF and World Bank were seen as panaceas, yet often led to unemployment, reduced access to services, and social unrest. Against this backdrop, Japan launched TICAD in 1993, marking a departure from 'checkbook diplomacy' toward a more structured and socially resonant approach. TICAD's emphasis on African ownership and inclusive governance echoes the ideas articulated in the book 'Direct to the Poor' by T. K. Oommen, which advocates for empowering local institutions and culturally sensitive, community-driven strategies. This convergence suggests that diplomatic frameworks, like TICAD, when attuned to grassroots realities, can evolve into collaborative platforms grounded in consensus-seeking strategies. The Participation Format: TICAD's Achilles' Heel Despite TICAD's principled emphasis on neutrality and partnership, its participation format has become a source of ambiguity and arguably its Achilles' heel. This vulnerability was exposed during recent Ministerial Meetings and Summits, where confusion arose over the presence of representatives from the so-called 'sadr.' Although Japan does not recognize this entity and has never formally invited its 'delegates' to TICAD, individuals have entered Japan to attend TICAD's meetings using Algerian diplomatic passports, exempt from visa requirements. This maneuver, orchestrated by Algeria and South Africa, under the umbrella of the African Union Commission, circumvents Japan's official stance and disrupts the clarity of TICAD's invitation protocol. Such actions risk politicizing a forum that was designed to foster inclusive, development-focused dialogue, free from divisive geopolitical agendas. Clarifying Japan's Position: A Disclaimer Rooted in Principle I recall that in the lead-up to TICAD 2019, concerns over the participation of the so-called 'SADR' against Japan's will prompted reflection about how to neutralize any potential diplomatic gains sought after by the enemies of Morocco's territorial integrity. At that time, I advocated for the inclusion of a preemptive disclaimer to be delivered by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to reaffirm Japan's principled neutrality and clarify that the presence of the so-called 'SADR' did not imply recognition or legitimacy. The adoption of this disclaimer marked a subtle but strategic shift, aligning Japan's posture with the growing international support for Morocco's Autonomy Initiative . It was more than procedural. It was a gesture of diplomatic clarity, preserving the integrity of TICAD's founding spirit while quietly reaffirming Japan's respect for Morocco's territorial integrity. Yet disclaimers, however well-intentioned they may be, cannot mask deeper concerns. Tolerating 'officials' of a non-state entity to enter the Japanese territory under Algerian diplomatic cover, while openly declaring themselves as representatives of the so-called 'SADR', amounts to bypassing Japanese law and protocol by these intruders. I believe that this practice undermines the very neutrality the disclaimer seeks to uphold. It is not enough to state non-recognition; Japan could ensure that its legal and diplomatic frameworks are not abused by Algeria and South Africa in an attempt to confer rampant implicit legitimacy on entities it does not recognize. Strategic coherence, in my view, is best served not only through disclaimers, but through a careful alignment of principle and practice. Japan's longstanding commitment to neutrality and procedural integrity remains highly commendable. Yet as diplomatic realities evolve, so too must the mechanisms that uphold them in ways that strengthen Japan's role as a principled and pragmatic actor in international development. Between Technocracy and Politics: The Co-organizer Debate The ambiguity of the participation format is partly rooted in a deeper institutional shift. The decision to include the African Union Commission (CUA) as a co-organizer, while intended to reflect continental ownership, was not universally welcomed. Several international partners had favored the African Development Bank (AfDB), valuing its technocratic neutrality over the political posture of the AUC . This shift introduced new complexities into TICAD's format, blurring the lines between development dialogue and geopolitical signaling. The shift toward a political body like the AUC introduced complexities, particularly in maintaining TICAD's founding principles of neutrality and inclusive development. This divergence in preference underscores a deeper tension: whether TICAD should remain a pragmatic, partnership-driven forum or evolve into a more politically symbolic platform. Yet this arrangement also serves Japan's strategic interests. The AUC's political weight within the African Union makes it a crucial channel for Tokyo's broader diplomatic agenda , particularly its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By maintaining the AUC's co-organizer status, Japan secures access to continental consensus mechanisms even as it risks diluting TICAD's original focus. Unlike China's FOCAC and the Korea-Africa Forum, the US-Africa Forum, the Russia-Africa Forum and others, which maintain clear boundaries between political agendas and development cooperation, TICAD, in my humble opinion, has allowed the African Union Commission to exert disproportionate and undue influence over a platform originally designed for development partnership. This has made TICAD vulnerable to agenda hijacking, where political disputes risk overshadowing developmental priorities. The Duality of TICAD: Development Platform and Diplomatic Springboard TICAD stands at the intersection of principle and strategy. On one hand, it offers a structured platform for African development grounded in partnership, capacity-building, and inclusive dialogue. On the other, it serves as a diplomatic springboard for Japan, enabling it to cultivate influence, build coalitions, and quietly advance its global aspirations . This dual vocation is neither contradictory nor opportunistic. It reflects Japan's layered diplomatic culture, where 'tatemae' and 'honne' coexist, and where clarity is pursued not through simplification, but through intentional complexity. TICAD's architecture invites us to see development not as a technical fix, but as a prudent political process. In other words, TICAD is not merely a development conference. It is a strategic platform where Japan engages Africa not only through cooperation, but through diplomacy aimed at reshaping its global governance. By cultivating support from Africa, the largest voting bloc within the United Nations, Japan seeks to quietly advance its longstanding bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Furthermore, among TICAD's foundational pillars is Peace and Security in Africa , reflecting Japan's commitment to stability and its recognition of Africa's central role in shaping the global peace architecture. This is not incidental. It is a deliberate alignment of values and interests, expressed through a diplomatic grammar that is uniquely Japanese. TICAD deserves to remain apolitical, anchored in partnership, not entangled in contested representation. Japan's continued tolerance of the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab democratic republic 'SADR' sits uneasily within this principle. Though Japan does not formally recognize the so-called 'sadr,' its participation in TICAD events, justified by African Union membership, raises legitimate concerns. That membership, granted through an administrative maneuver in 1984 rather than a political consensus, remains a point of contention across the continent. It should be underscored that major actors, including the United States, Russia, South Korea, India, and Turkey, have excluded the so-called 'SADR' from their Africa Ministerial meetings and summits, citing concerns over legitimacy, governance, and regional coherence. Japan's continued divergence, however well-intentioned, risks being perceived not as neutrality but as strategic misalignment, especially as Africa's diplomatic landscape evolves. Recent developments in the U.S. Congress, notably the proposed ' Polisario' Front Terrorist Designation Act , underscore rising concern over the group's ties to Iran and Hezbollah. Japan's own intelligence services were ahead of the curve, having classified the Polisario as a terrorist entity in 2011 and 2013 due to its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and AQAP. These assessments are echoed by testimonies from former Polisario founders who returned to Morocco, revealing the movement's origins in Soviet-aligned revolutionary networks sponsored by Algeria and Libya. Japan is not alone in reassessing its stance. A growing coalition of 38 African countries refrains from recognizing the so-called 'SADR', with many going further by opening consulates in Morocco's southern provinces Laayoune and Dakhla. These diplomatic gestures reflect a continental shift toward pragmatic engagement and support for Morocco's Autonomy Plan as a credible path to regional stability. This African momentum, rooted in sovereignty and realism, offers Japan an opportunity to recalibrate TICAD's posture, aligning it with the principles of constructive diplomacy and shared development. Japan's current positioning may be construed as unintended legitimization, an outcome shaped less by deliberate endorsement than by procedural entanglement. Morocco's diplomatic momentum offers a compelling alternative. Through initiatives like the Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline and the Atlantic Initiative for landlocked Sahel countries, Rabat is actively reshaping Africa's development architecture, grounded in connectivity, pragmatism, and regional solidarity. These projects are not mere infrastructure; they are strategic lifelines, linking energy, trade, and opportunity across borders. Morocco's absence from recent TICAD sessions was met with regret by several African nations, underscoring its central role in the continent's future. For TICAD to sustain its undisputed relevance, Japan may benefit from a quiet recalibration, one that aligns more closely with current developments surrounding the Moroccan Sahara issue. This would involve gently distancing itself from patterns imposed by outdated alignments and geopolitical reflexes, shaped by Cold War legacies sustainably promoted by Algeria. Such a shift would not signal rupture, but renewal: an opportunity to reaffirm Japan's commitment to partnership, pragmatism, and regional resonance. In this light, Morocco's vision offers a promising horizon. Grounded in cooperative pragmatism and continental integration, Rabat's initiatives invite a shared path where Japan and Morocco could work hand in hand to support Africa's development architecture with joint clarity, mutual respect, and strategic coherence. Japan's approach is not loud or transactional. It is layered, principled, and deeply cultural. Through tatemae , it offers respectful partnership; through wa , it builds inclusive platforms; and through honne , it quietly pursues strategic interests. This triad reveals a diplomacy that performs with intentional subtlety where meaning is often found not in declarations, but in the choreography of engagement. And those subtleties, rooted in Japan's cultural grammar, are not merely academic. They are essential for those entrusted with stewarding Japan–Africa relations. To misread them is to risk compromising the very architecture that differentiates TICAD within the global development landscape. The TICAD process invites us to rethink development not as a formula, but as a dialogue where meaning lies in a way outcomes are genuinely pursued by those entrusted to achieve them. Its strength lies in pioneering clarity. And clarity, in diplomacy, is not the absence of complexity, but the ability to navigate it with lucidity, dedication, and insight. Tags: JapanPolisariopoliticsTICAD
Morocco World
4 hours ago
- Morocco World
Refusal Rate at 20% as Moroccans Received 606,000 Schengen Visas in 2024
Marrakech – Morocco received more than 606,000 Schengen visas from European Union countries in 2024, with a refusal rate of approximately 20%, according to Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Bourita. France alone issued about 284,000 visas to Moroccan citizens, representing nearly 46% of the total visas granted and marking a 17% increase compared to the previous year. 'The countries of the European Union issued more than 606,000 visas to Moroccans last year, while the refusal rate did not exceed 20% of submitted applications, which is an average rate compared to other countries,' Bourita stated in a written response to a parliamentary question. The top Moroccan diplomat noted that relations with Europe have shown notable improvement, as evidenced by the visa issuance figures. This improvement reflects 'a shared political will between both parties to overcome the problems and tensions that marked their relations in this field during the previous period,' Bourita explained. Morocco now ranks fourth globally for Schengen visa applications in 2024, following China, India, and Turkey, according to data released by SchengenVisaInfo in May. Moroccans have surpassed Russians, who were once the largest group of Schengen visa applicants. With 282,153 applications submitted to France in 2024, Moroccans constitute the second-largest group of applicants for French visas, after Algerians. France remains the top destination for Schengen visa seekers worldwide, receiving over a quarter of all applications. Visa policy is a sovereign decision Bourita said that visa policies represent a sovereign right of each state. 'Morocco's choice to impose or exempt entry visas to its territory remains a sovereign decision that does not respond to moods or circumstantial reactions,' he said. The minister stated that Morocco's approach is based on 'three objective considerations: reciprocity, political and economic imperatives, as well as the context of bilateral relations with each country.' 'Moroccan practice in this area is based on a comprehensive strategy that takes into account the balance of interests, distinguishing between countries based on the nature of cooperation, shared history, and signed agreements,' Bourita added. He also remarked that 'the adoption of modern electronic visa systems reflects this same approach aimed at strengthening the Kingdom's openness through digitizing its services, without giving up national sovereignty.' According to the minister, the Moroccan passport has shown continuous improvement in international rankings, now figuring among the 70 most powerful passports worldwide. Indeed, Morocco's passport has climbed to 67th place globally in the latest Henley Passport Index, marking its best performance in a decade. The new ranking represents a four-position jump from last year's 71st place, allowing Moroccan citizens visa-free access to 73 destinations worldwide. This achievement is Morocco's strongest showing since 2006, when the passport ranked 66th globally. Morocco now ranks first among all North African countries in passport mobility. A study from SchengenVisaInfo compiled in August 2024 identified Switzerland as the Schengen country with the highest approval rate for Moroccan applicants at 83.9%, followed by Poland (83.1%), France (81.3%), Portugal (80.05%), and Czechia (75.60%). Visa system dysfunctions must be corrected Bourita also addressed the issue of visa application processing, stating that his ministry 'firmly calls on foreign embassies and consulates in Morocco to process visa applications within reasonable timeframes, with constant respect for Moroccan citizens and their dignity, particularly for urgent humanitarian requests such as those related to medical care or studies.' He mentioned that during bilateral meetings with representatives of diplomatic missions and consular centers accredited in Morocco, the ministry 'consistently raises the issue of visa systems, their dysfunctions, and urges corrections to avoid exploitation by some illegal intermediaries or brokers.' Data shows that 11,716,723 Schengen visa applications were submitted to EU countries in 2024, representing a 13.5% increase compared to the previous year. Despite this growth, numbers remain below pre-pandemic levels of nearly 17 million in 2019. Overall, the Schengen visa rejection rate decreased to 14.8% in 2024, down from 16% in 2023 and the all-time high of 17.9% in 2022. Despite the positive trends, challenges remain, including the black market for visa appointments, which has seen intermediaries exploiting online systems and reselling appointments for up to MAD 10,000 (approximately $1000). Read also: Bourita: Morocco's Visa Policy Based on Reciprocity, National Interest
Ya Biladi
5 hours ago
- Ya Biladi
SADC summit in Madagascar backs Polisario
DR During the Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit on August 17 in Madagascar, the organization reaffirmed its commitment to the memorandum of understanding signed on April 2 with the Polisario. «The Summit reiterated its solidarity with the people of Western Sahara in their quest for self-determination. In this regard, it welcomed the signing of the agreement between the SADC and Western Sahara/Democratic Sahrawi Arab Republic (RASD)», stated paragraph 15 of the joint communiqué. The summit also underscored «the complementarity of the United Nations-led process for the self-determination of Western Sahara» and stressed the importance of aligning the implementation of the SADC-RASD protocol with the efforts of both the United Nations and the African Union. This position echoes the communiqué from the SADC foreign ministers' meeting held on July 24 and 25 in Tanzania. On April 2, Elias M. Magosi, Secretary-General of the SADC, and Bah El Mad Abdellah, Polisario's representative in Botswana, signed a memorandum of understanding aimed at «realizing the decisions adopted by the SADC heads of state and government in August 2019, as well as the Declaration on the SADC Solidarity Conference with the RASD held in March 2019 in Pretoria, South Africa». However, this agreement faced immediate condemnation from Malawi, the Union of Comoros, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Eswatini. These nations are seeking to distance themselves from South African influence, having recognized Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara by establishing consulates in Laâyoune or Dakhla. This renewed support from the SADC comes just three weeks after a meeting on July 27 in South Africa, held on the sidelines of the «summit of liberation movements», between the Polisario representative and the presidents of South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.
