Pics: Air India Cabin Crew Member's Funeral In Manipur, Thousands Mourn
The 26-year-old was among the 241 passengers and crew aboard Air India Flight AI 171, which crashed just seconds after takeoff in Ahmedabad last week.
Thousands gathered in her home town to pay tribute and their final respects.
Originally from Old Lambulane colony in Imphal, Singson's family relocated to Kangpokpi in 2023 following ethnic violence between the Meitei and Kuki communities in the state.
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NDTV
12 hours ago
- NDTV
Row Over No Mention Of Kuki Militants In Answer Choices On Manipur Crisis, Assam Panel Points At Question Setters
Guwahati: The Assam Public Service Commission (APSC) has on its part denied any mala fide intent in including a controversial question on the Manipur violence in a paper for selecting agricultural development officer, and identified the Principal Controller of Examination as the right official who should look into allegations of "one-sided portrayal" by a top Meitei civil society organisation. "We don't set the question papers. They are given to different setters. Then they are sent to moderators. Question setters and moderators are not our people, but all from different universities and reputed colleges," APSC Chairman Debaraj Upadhaya told news agency PTI on Monday. "We cannot see the questions as these are locked by the moderators," he said, adding the APSC is a neutral body. "There is no politics involved in it." The APSC chairman's clarification has now shifted the focus to those in some colleges and universities who set the question papers and who are not part of the APSC. A meeting is likely to be held in the APSC to discuss the matter on Tuesday, sources in Guwahati told NDTV on Monday. The APSC is also expected to inform the question setters about the huge controversy, the sources said. One of the questions in the paper "selectively maligns the Meitei community by portraying Meitei groups as perpetrators of rights abuses, while ignoring the grave atrocities, killings, and displacements suffered by Meiteis at the hands of Chin-Kuki militants and their CSOs [civil society organisations]," the Meitei Heritage Society said in a letter to the APSC chairman. "Why were these militant groups and CSOs not listed as options in the question, despite being named by the country's top investigative agencies?" the Meitei Heritage Society said, and enclosed a list of cases handled by the country's top anti-terror body National Investigation Agency (NIA). Several Chin-Kuki militants have been arrested for heinous crimes, and kidnapping and killing of Meitei civilians including women and children; some arrests were made by the Assam Police, and trials are ongoing in Assam, the Meitei Heritage Society said in the letter to the APSC chairman. It said the reality - as documented in multiple public records - is that the violence in Manipur has tragically claimed lives across both Meitei and Chin-Kuki communities, displacing over 60,000 individuals. "To single out Meitei groups in an examination question - while ignoring documented atrocities committed by armed Chin-Kuki militants - reflects bias and creates a misleading narrative for aspirants preparing for public service," the Meitei Heritage Society said. It asked the APSC to issue a clarification on the matter and to declare the question "null and void, ensuring it is not used for evaluation purposes." The APSC has no grounds to clarify as it did not set the questions; however, since the paper for all practical purposes was for an APSC examination, it is expected to get in touch with the question setters and moderators in colleges and universities, sources said. Mr Upadhaya, the APSC Chairman, said it is a neutral body and has no view on any community. "We do not have any mala fide intention, everything is bona fide. We don't have any view on any community because we are a neutral body. There is no politics involved in it. I cannot comment on the particular question as I have not seen it. The principal controller of examination will be able to talk about it," he said. Ethnic clashes began in May 2023 between the valley-dominant Meitei community and the Kukis including Any Kuki Tribes (AKT), who are dominant in some hill areas of Manipur, over a range of issues such as land rights and political representation. Over 260 have died in the violence and nearly 50,000 have been internally displaced.
Time of India
13 hours ago
- Time of India
Boatmen go on strike in Barak to protest NIA arrest of two launch drivers
Silchar: An indefinite suspension of motor launch services along the Barak river from Fulertal Ghat in Assam's Cachar district to Tipaimukh in Manipur's Jiribam has thrown life out of gear for thousands of daily commuters and traders since Sunday. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The Barak Valley Boat Association (BVBA), which announced the strike, is demanding the immediate release of launch driver Thanglienlal Hmar alias Boya and his brother Lalrosang Hmar, who were arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) in connection with the abduction and murder of six Meitei women and children during the last year. Addressing the media at Fulertal, association president Kosang Hmar, secretary Jowelsanglien Hmar and other members claimed the arrested men were innocent. "We had earlier staged protests but the authorities did not respond. Left with no option, we decided to suspend launch services indefinitely," Kosang said. The association argued that boatmen were often caught between the threat of armed extremists and law enforcement agencies. "We are simple launch drivers, ferrying passengers from one point to another. When extremists force us at gunpoint, we have no choice. Thanglienlal is a religious man with no criminal background. He too was a victim of such threats," the leaders said. According to NIA, the two brothers were arrested on July 31, allegedly for being "active conspirators" in the abduction and killings in the Borobekara area of Jiribam on Nov 2024. Thanglienlal was apprehended soon after his boat docked at Fulertal ferry ghat and later shifted to Manipur after a brief interrogation at Cachar's Lakhipur police station. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The association said nearly 150 launches operate daily on this river stretch between Fulertal and Tipaimukh, carrying 2,000–3,000 passengers. "It is impossible for us to check what passengers are carrying. Many times criminals throw away contraband to evade security, leaving innocent boatmen to face arrest," said launch driver Sushendra Das. BVBA leaders reiterated that the strike would continue indefinitely until the two arrested drivers were released unconditionally. The shutdown has already caused significant hardship for traders and residents of remote Manipur villages who depend on the Fulertal–Tipaimukh route for markets, medical treatment and essential supplies.
The Print
21 hours ago
- The Print
Indian aviation has a ‘safety culture' problem. Airline carriers, training institutes share blame
SpiceJet, the inquiry found, had not 'meticulously' followed procedures for monitoring and controlling recurring defects. Sixty such defects were reported in its Boeing 737 fleet equipped with the Honeywell RDR-4B weather radar system, 15 of which occurred prior to the 1 May incident. Three years later, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) in its final report put out in May pointed at poor crew coordination, erroneous decision-making by pilots and passengers ignoring seat belt signs among other factors for the episode. But, it also flagged deeper issues—recurring maintenance lapses and non-compliance with basic reporting protocol. New Delhi: On 1 May 2022, a regular flight from Mumbai to Durgapur turned into a mid-air nightmare for the passengers and crew of the SpiceJet plane as it flew into a storm while landing. The severe turbulence jolted several passengers who were not wearing seat belts. One passenger succumbed to a spinal injury later, while three others too were grievously hurt. Notably, three defects involving the weather radar system were reported just days before, between 14 and 30 April, although none of them officially pertained to that particular aircraft. Several media reports suggested that pilots had raised doubts on the dependability of the weather radar system of this fleet. Moreover, post the May incident, SpiceJet had returned the aircraft to its lessor without obtaining the necessary clearance from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) or AAIB, and before complete information from the airline could be obtained regarding repeated weather radar related snags, the final report said. Such lapses and violations are not one-offs. Oversight failures by aircraft operators, glider clubs, etc are as endemic as they are persistent. And the picture is no better in the training ecosystem. The 12 June crash of Air India flight 171—one of the worst civil aviation disasters in the country in decades—has put an uneasy spotlight on the airline industry. After the AAIB released its preliminary report—which put both Air India and Boeing in the clear for now—questions about safety, protocol, pilot and crew training, maintenance of aircraft and previously reported snags, etc took centrestage. Last month, the AAIB drew flak over its preliminary findings. A particular point of contention was a brief mention about a conversation between the two Air India pilots on the fuel switches, wherein one of them asks the other on why he cut off fuel supply to the engines, and the latter denies doing so. After the report was released, there have been many takes on what exactly happened, including several questions on Boeing and Air India. The AAIB had slammed several Western media reports suggesting pilot error or deliberate action by one pilot. ThePrint has analysed 68 AAIB final reports on aircraft accidents since 2012. Part 1 of this three-part series looks at how the investigating body has repeatedly flagged violations by both airline operators and Flight Training Organisations (FTOs). 'AAIB does not classify occurrences immediately unless there are casualties. The first responders which may comprise DGCA and/or AAIB officials, tasked by the DG AAIB, then reach the spot and an initial report is prepared in case there is no clarity on the nature of the occurrence. The DG, AAIB has the final say in which classification the occurrence will fall under and that is binding. If there are casualties, then the AAIB team reaches the spot directly,' Group Captain Aurobindo Handa (retired), a former director general of the AAIB, told The Print. 'The responsibility of cobbling up the investigating team rests with the DG, AAIB. Aviation crash investigators are a scarce resource not just in India but also across the world. The DG, AAIB decides the composition of the team and is empowered to pick people—domain experts from different domains as deemed necessary. The investigator in charge may also be called from outside the investigating body,' he added. Overall, 101 AAIB investigation reports, including 27 of helicopters (both preliminary and final reports) and six preliminary reports of fixed aircraft accidents, are in the public domain. An analysis of the final reports show that in at least 47 percent of the cases, the AAIB has found out violations or lapses by operators and made remarks about them. These, however, may or may not have been found to be directly linked to aircraft accidents. In at least a dozen accidents, mechanical failures were reported even if they weren't cited as direct causes and in at least five of them, the AAIB couldn't even conclude what led to the failure or the chain of events. Some form of pilot action or decision leading up to the accident are mentioned in nearly 67 percent of these final reports by the AAIB. Even though these reports put some spotlight on inflight erroneous actions or judgements by pilots, they don't necessarily attribute or directly link all of these accidents to pilot errors. A detailed report on this aspect will be taken up in Part 2 of this series. ThePrint's analysis of the AAIB findings point to a broader pattern of not just irregular oversight by aircraft operators, but also of them often neglecting SOPs and guidelines. Other issues that find mention are ambiguous tech logs, maintenance issues, serious lapses in procedures such as maintaining fuel and oil consumption records, outdated regulations, non-adherence to safety recommendations cited in earlier accidents, lack of discipline, poor safety culture, and even inefficient training of pilots. A similar pattern is seen with FTOs—DGCA-approved institutes that impart training to those looking to secure pilot licences. This pertains to oversight including improper briefing procedures, vague tech logs, substandard training, lack of weather monitoring mechanisms, faulty maintenance, flying instructors not sticking to SOPs, not incorporating night flying SOP, non-existent SOPs for radio telephony communications between ground and flight staff, lack of CCTV inside FTO premises, etc. Take for example the 2016 accident of a glider aircraft during a routine flight: the AAIB had flagged various concerns about the Hadapsar Gliding Centre, that was run by the DGCA till December last year. The centre didn't have SOPs in place for emergency situations, the Bureau said in its report, adding that the DGCA hadn't uploaded its own glider circulars on the website to be readily accessed by glider training institutes. ThePrint reached AAIB, DGCA, and airlines—Air India Express, Air India, SpiceJet, and IndiGo—via email and messages for comments. This report will be updated as and when responses are received. Also Read: 'No mechanical, maintenance issues with aircraft'—Air India CEO tells employees post prelim crash probe Pressure, poor training & safety warnings ignored 'Safety culture' finds mention multiple times in the AAIB inquiry report of the Air India Express plane crash at Kozhikode in August 2020. Nineteen passengers as well as both pilots were killed after the Boeing 737 skidded off the wet runway, fell down an embankment, and broke into three sections. Though pilot errors were listed as the probable cause, the AAIB also observed that Air India Express had a 'faulty' HR policy, which it said placed undue pressure on the pilots. Originally on standby, the pilot in command (PIC) was reassigned last-minute due to shortage of captains. His flight next morning was delayed to fit duty hours, putting pressure on him to land in Kozhikode on time. The captain has the final say over aircraft operation, while the first officer assists throughout all phases of the journey. Air India Express's HR policy failed to align crew base assignments with operational needs, leaving just one captain against 26 first officers at Kozhikode. The PIC's decision to return to Kozhikode was driven by a misplaced urgency to operate the next morning's flight, the AAIB report said. 'In case of diversion of flight AXB 1344, the PIC would have exceeded his Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) and would not have been available for the following day morning flight. This would have resulted in shortage of PIC at Kozhikode for operating the three scheduled flights ex-Kozhikode the next day.' 'AIXL (Air India Express Limited) policies of upper level management have led to a lack of supervision in training, operations and safety practices, resulting in deficiencies at various levels causing repeated human error accidents,' it further noted, adding that although poor crew resource management had emerged as a major contributor in a previous major accident and serious incidents involving Air India Express, CRM training failed to generate its desired results and continued to be the causal factor in this crash as well. Data from cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed that the plane's windshield wiper wasn't working properly and that the crew was aware of it but the malfunction wasn't mentioned in the technical log. The report notes probably a verbal briefing about it could have taken place which highlights the non-standard practice of reporting on snags. Training standards were also flagged: simulator maintenance was substandard, and mandatory exercises weren't always checked. Pilots lacked access to Onboard Performance Tool (OPT) for quick landing calculations. Despite Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs) and repeated DGCA audits, Air India Express also failed to fully monitor Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data—a crucial factor to avoid accidents. Issued by the DGCA, CARs are a set of mandatory standards and procedures laid down for aviation operations which include flight data monitoring, maintenance, safety management, training among other things. While probing an accident reported at Mumbai airport in July 2019, the AAIB noted that SpiceJet hadn't adhered to the safety recommendations in spite of incidents and accidents under similar conditions including similar errors by the flight crew. The plane had overshot the main runway while landing amid heavy rains. 'In the past, there have been occurrences (incidents and accidents) to the aircraft operated by the organisation under similar circumstances and more or less due to the same inactions/errors by the flight crew,' the AAIB said. 'The investigation of these occurrences and those to the aircraft operated by other organisations had given recommendations to obviate these occurrences in future. It was observed that the majority of the safety recommendations were either not implemented in true letter and spirit or the action taken has withered away with passage of time.' SpiceJet, the Bureau found, also didn't have an active flight watch or monitoring programme. 'It is vital that AAIB closes the loop with critical recommendations and directives post incident and accident investigation to all operators and such directives enforced with stringent regulations by the DGCA so as to ensure minimal compromise in safety in aviation. Safety culture, which is reporting culture, is virtually non-existent in India. Aircraft operators along with helicopter operators are the worst offenders of safety and airworthiness norms,' said Mark D. Martin, CEO of Martin Consulting, an aviation advisory and risk firm. Also Read: Too much traffic & too little control, why Char Dham route is a hotbed for chopper crashes Faulty fuel checks & on-paper maintenance In another instance reported in May 2021, an uninsured aircraft operated by the Directorate of Aviation (DoA), Madhya Pradesh, had incorrect CAR references in the operator's Operations Manual. The DoA had also not sought exemption from the DCGA to carry a passenger in cargo and not in the cabin of the Beechcraft King Air 250 aircraft that crash-landed at Gwalior airport and injured all three occupants, including the two pilots. Another violation of basic protocols was reported in a case from June 2020 in which an IndiGo aircraft flying from Dammam, Saudi Arabia encountered turbulence during descent to Cochin. A cabin crew member had sustained serious injuries. IndiGo, the AAIB noted, hadn't preserved the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, which is crucial to analyse the causes behind accidents. In March 2023, a 'joy ride sortie' conducted by the Jharkhand Flying Institute ended in a crash after engine failure due to fuel starvation. Joy ride sorties can be conducted either on smaller aircraft or helicopters for sightseeing or recreational purposes. Both fuel valves located inside the cockpit were found unnoticed, left in closed positions. Both the pilot and the 14-year-old passenger suffered injuries after the Sinus 912 motor glider crashed-landed at a residential area in Dhanbad. While the AAIB noted that the flight was initiated in haste, with no pre-flight inspection, it also mentions that there was a lack of safety culture in the organisation, among other things. Fuel starvation leading to engine starvation isn't really uncommon, the AAIB investigation reports show. Such a situation refers to the engines not being fed with fuel, leading them to either shut down or go into some sort of mechanical failure. This can have catastrophic consequences. In its final report on a February 2019 accident in Baramati during a solo training sortie of a Cessna 172S aircraft, the AAIB mentioned that fuel and oil records were not maintained according to the CAR guideline, and that the pilot was not imparted adequate training in fuel assessment. Fuel assessment is the process of calculating the amount of fuel required to complete the trip, the quantity on board and then accessing it with the route vis-à-vis how much will be needed to complete the flight. The process includes checking the fuel quantity as well as quality (for contamination), functioning of the fuel system for checks on any leaks, fuel pumps, routing of the fuel without any blockades to the engines and proper valve positions. For modern commercial aircraft, there are fuel quantity indication systems and pilots also check cross-check dispatch fuel slips. This is a critical task done not just before but also during the flight, as part of routine checks/monitoring during intervals. The FTO in this case was Academy of Carver Aviation. A similar case was reported in May 2016 when an air ambulance with five people on board, crash-landed at Delhi's Najafgarh area. The operator, Alchemist Air Pvt. Ltd, had not followed established procedures in assessing fuel consumption of aircraft, the AAIB found. Last year, the DGCA cancelled the FTO approval of Alchemist after audits revealed serious lapses in compliance of regulatory provisions. The action came after an instructor and a trainee pilot were killed in an air crash near Jamshedpur in August, 2024. Another accident involving an air ambulance was reported at Mumbai airport in May 2021. The inquiry revealed that the positions of quality manager and the chief of flight safety have been at a 'higher attrition rate than the others within the company — Jet Serve Aviation'. 'The chief of flight safety post has been inconsistent since 2019 and was lying vacant as on the date of the accident,' the AAIB noted. Jet Serve Aviation also had approval to operate as an FTO. While the AAIB noted that the aircraft suffered a mechanical failure, it couldn't ascertain the root cause of this failure. Both cases involved Beechcraft King Air C90 A aircraft. In January 2023, Falcon Aviation Academy lost a chief flight instructor in a crash at Rewa while the trainee pilot was grievously injured. Investigators found the Cessna 152 aircraft had taken off in night conditions in spite of the stipulated visuality. Falcon had no local visibility arrangements in Rewa and didn't follow set protocols for coordination with ATC in Varanasi. Notably, in an accident in February 2022 wherein a trainee pilot lost his life in Nalgonda, the AAIB found out that the FTO—Flytech Aviation Academy—during maintenance and inspections failed to detect the deteriorated conditions of control cables and other instruments of the Cessna 152 aircraft. But the operator's records showed all scheduled inspections had been completed, the inspection of the wreckage showed that the aircraft was not maintained as those records claimed. The AAIB couldn't fully ascertain the exact cause of the accident, but suggested that it was due to technical faults with the aircraft. 'While no snag was documented pending on the aircraft prior to the accident flight, the investigation team found a number of deficiencies in maintenance,' the report said. 'As per the documents maintained by the operator, all Inspection Schedules (Operations) were compiled on the aircraft. However, wreckage examination revealed that aircraft condition prior to the accident was not in line with work completed under those schedules. Conditions of a few control cables and associated components were found beyond the limits. Lack of lubrication, corrosion and groove marks were noticed on a few pulleys,' the AAIB said. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Recurring aircraft defects to faded runway lines, DGCA check reveals safety lapses at key airports
