Nowhere to turn but toward future: Seoul and Tokyo 80 years after liberation

Korea Herald

21 hours ago

Calls grow for fresh Korea-Japan declaration to tackle shared challenges absent from 1998 agreement
Eighty years after the end of Japan's 35-year colonial rule, South Korea and Japan remain locked in an uneasy duet — pulled together by the inescapable demands of geopolitics, yet held apart by the deep, unhealed wounds left by Japan's occupation of the Korean Peninsula.
As Korea marks its 80th National Liberation Day on Friday, the question has never felt more urgent.
Can Seoul and Tokyo — tethered by geography and facing many shared challenges — forge a genuinely future-oriented partnership despite historical disputes so deeply ingrained that they have outlived generations?
The stakes are raised by the rapidly shifting global order under US President Donald Trump's 'America First' foreign policy. Washington is recalibrating its alliances with both South Korea and Japan, pivoting toward the China threat in the Indo-Pacific region.
As the region's strategic map is redrawn, Seoul and Tokyo are left with fewer and fewer exits from each other's orbit.
'Future-oriented relations are not about people-to-people exchanges or building mutual trust. Rather, they require a fundamental discussion of how Korea and Japan must inevitably cooperate to survive in a profoundly transformed global environment,' Yang Kee-ho, professor of Japanese studies at Sungkonghoe University, told The Korea Herald.
'This is the moment when Korea and Japan must envision a new phase of cooperation.'
The list of pressures is long: the intensifying US-China strategic competition, Trump's go-it-alone diplomacy, and for Seoul, the challenge of navigating Washington's push to 'modernize' the alliance and grant greater strategic flexibility to US Forces Korea.
Add to that North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile programs, and Beijing's ambitions — from dominating global high-tech manufacturing through its 'Made in China 2025' initiative to becoming a 'fully developed, rich, and powerful' nation by 2049.
'Such developments carry a considerable risk of disrupting the status quo in Northeast Asia, which is why it is necessary to build sufficient, shared deterrence through joint discussions,' said Yang, highlighting the need for coordination between Seoul and Tokyo.
South Korea and Japan have cogent reasons to work in tandem for better outcomes for both countries in the face of parallel challenges, including 'mounting Trump-origin risks' such as tariff negotiations with the US, said Choi Eun-mi, a research fellow at the Center for Regional Studies at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
'The merits of Korea-Japan cooperation, in my view, are very significant in that regard,' Choi said. 'At present, cooperation between Korea and Japan has become nothing short of indispensable, both domestically and internationally.'
Symbolically, President Lee Jae Myung is set to visit Tokyo from Aug. 23 to 24 for a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba before heading to Washington for his first in-person meeting with Trump. Foreign Minister Cho Hyun also opted for Tokyo for his first overseas trip before flying to Washington.
Korea-Japan cooperation is also imperative, given the breadth of shared future-oriented challenges.
'Between Korea and Japan, there are numerous common challenges,' Lim Eun-jung, professor in the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University, told The Korea Herald.
'Population decline, a super-aged society, labor shortages, regional extinction, industrial transformation, cybersecurity, the utilization of AI and the proliferation of humanoid robots, and energy security are all areas that show the structural similarities of the two countries.'
Closer, yet still divided
Even as pressing shared challenges bring Seoul and Tokyo closer, major obstacles, including potential discrepancies in their foreign policy approaches to China and North Korea, still stand.
'In dealing with North Korea, South Korea favors dialogue, while Japan has traditionally prioritized sanctions over engagement,' said Lee Ki-tae, director of the Center for Diplomatic Strategy at the Sejong Institute, discussing the Lee Jae Myung administration's inter-Korean policy.
'That said, the Ishiba administration appears to place somewhat greater weight on dialogue, aligning its stance more closely with ours and reducing the potential for friction.'
Lee, however, noted, 'On China policy, Japan remains firmly in step with the US, whereas South Korea prefers not to be drawn into (the US-China competition) — a subtle divergence in perception.'
Historical disputes, which are ingrained in the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations that formally normalized diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan, remain intact as a major obstacle.
Despite the general positive assessment of the Lee administration's Japan policy in its early stages, experts point out that the current tendency of both the Lee and Ishiba administrations to leave historical disputes off the agenda also poses a significant hurdle.
'The overall start has been good. Given how difficult things are right now for both Korea and Japan, avoiding conflict is important, so the direction itself has been well set,' Yang said. 'However, the current situation is a disguised peace or a postponed conflict.'
Yang pointed out that the Lee administration's 'pragmatic diplomacy' cannot replace a guiding principle for historical disputes, urging Seoul to go beyond pragmatism by establishing clear rules for dealing with and managing these issues with Japan.
Without such principles in place, Yang warned, Seoul and Tokyo risk letting conflicts accumulate. In that scenario, the ruling Democratic Party of Korea could be tempted to bash Japan to boost support for the party or President Lee, repeating a familiar vicious cycle.
History still under the surface
Echoing those concerns, Choi underscored that Seoul and Tokyo 'need to discuss how they will live with and manage historical issues, given that they are difficult to resolve, impossible to simply erase, and, in truth, extremely hard to settle completely.'
'Yet that discussion is entirely absent, which is regrettable. It's not that we've solved this issue and therefore no longer talk about it — it clearly remains beneath the surface, but it's just not showing right now,' Choi explained.
'Japan doesn't want to bring it up, and Korea isn't talking about it either, which means the issue could resurface at any time. I'm not sure if I should call it a 'risk,' but I would describe it as one factor that makes cooperation more difficult.'
Lee Ki-tae pointed out that sustainable ties require political will.
'It is most important for the leadership in both countries to demonstrate the will not to exploit negative public sentiment toward each other for domestic political purposes,' he said.
Lee also underlined the significance of Seoul and Tokyo in forging public discourse on the indispensability of bilateral cooperation.
'Beyond that, the leadership must recognize that Korea-Japan cooperation is, in a sense, essential for the survival of both countries, and they should communicate this effectively to their citizens,' Lee added.
'It is also important to explain clearly to the public that cooperation between Korea and Japan contributes to addressing issues on the Korean Peninsula, as well as to peace and stability in the broader Northeast Asian region.'
In particular, Seoul and Tokyo should avoid repeating the past mistake of allowing historical disputes to spill over and hamper economic and security cooperation, as happened during the overlapping period of the Moon Jae-in administration and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's second term.
'I'd like to single out the Moon-Abe period as an important turning point because, no matter how much Korea-Japan relations were tied up in historical issues, there had always been certain lines neither side would cross,' Lim said, when asked about the most important turning point in bilateral relations over the 80 years since liberation and its significance.
'During the Moon and Abe administrations, however, those lines collapsed, sending the relationship into a downward spiral.'
Tensions peaked in 2019 when South Korea's Supreme Court ordered Japanese companies to compensate the Korean victims of wartime forced labor. In response, the Abe administration restricted exports of three key semiconductor materials in July and removed South Korea from its list of preferred trading partners the following month. These actions led to a nationwide boycott in South Korea of Japanese goods and travel to Japan.
That November, the Moon administration conditionally delayed its decision to end the GSOMIA military intelligence-sharing pact with Japan, effectively suspending its operation, while a radar lock-on dispute the following month further strained defense cooperation and exchanges between the two countries.
This period also saw growing economic security concerns, driven by the first Trump administration's 'America First' policies and supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic.
'Yet, paradoxically, this period also made us realize anew that Korea and Japan are bound together — economically, socially and culturally — in ways that are profoundly close,' Lim said. 'Never again should historical issues be allowed to damage cooperation not only in the economic sphere, but also in the realm of security.'
Time for a new joint declaration
For many in Seoul, the benchmark for a diplomatic reset remains the 1998 Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Declaration, formally titled the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration: A New Partnership Toward the Twenty-first Century.
In the declaration, Seoul and Tokyo set out a roadmap for future-oriented cooperation, including principles for collaboration across sectors such as security, the economy, policy, people-to-people and cultural exchanges and global issues. It also included Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's expression of 'deep remorse and heartfelt apology' for Korea's colonization.
The time has come to forge a new joint declaration.
'The international situation in 1998, when it was created, is completely different from what it is now, so we need a vision for Korea-Japan cooperation that reflects the current circumstances,' she said.
'Among the action plans for 43 items included (in the declaration), there are some that were relevant then and still are today, but there are also topics that are no longer timely. So, we need an updated version that addresses how to deal with those aspects.'
Choi cites the 'Trump risk' as a clear example.
'It's not just because of the Trump administration, but because the international environment has become very unstable,' Choi said. 'For instance, if US involvement is reduced, how will regional security be maintained? We need to discuss how Korea and Japan can cooperate in that context.'
Choi noted that a forward-looking approach should extend beyond economic and historical matters that were absent or only lightly addressed in the 1998 declaration.
For instance, the 1998 declaration did not mention supply chains, AI or 5G, which are now central to both bilateral and global agendas. The joint declaration also left out specific historical topics, like the memorial service at the Sado gold mine, where Koreans were subjected to forced labor during World War II.
Choi underscored that these issues should be included in a new framework, along with plans for handling future challenges.
Lee concurred on the need to forge a new joint declaration in light of the shift in the balance between Seoul and Tokyo since then.
'At that time, in 1998, we were still — I wouldn't say far behind Japan, but in a somewhat lower position — and that perspective was reflected in much of the content,' Lee said.
'If that declaration was made in the context of Japan helping Korea, today the two countries are truly on an equal footing. In this context, we need a new version of the Korea-Japan Partnership Declaration that considers how the two countries, as equals, should cooperate.'
Seizing the Ishiba opportunity
Nam Ki-jeong, professor at the Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University, views the current Ishiba administration in Tokyo as part of a rare alignment of circumstances that could offer the Lee administration a valuable opening.
'The Ishiba Cabinet has the potential to last a bit longer,' he said. 'While it's possible that it could end in a very short period, if we carefully devise and execute a strategy in coordination with the Ishiba Cabinet and those around it, we can advance Korea-Japan relations during the time that the Cabinet is in place.'
Even if the political situation changes, Nam argues, the groundwork laid now could bring long-term benefits. If the ruling Liberal Democratic Party were to shift further to the right after the Ishiba Cabinet, for example, under figures like former economic security minister Sanae Takaichi, the existing groundwork could help keep a more hardline government in check.
On the other hand, if the LDP were to hold longer to the relatively liberal approach established by Ishiba, Seoul and Tokyo could have a better chance of improving their relationship beyond its current state.
'Right now, Korea-Japan relations enjoy an exceptionally favorable combination of administrations. When such a combination emerges, we must think on our side about how to make the most of the opportunity,' Nam said. 'Producing tangible results while Ishiba is in office is crucial at this moment.'