Corn Bears Hold onto Losses at Monday's Close
USDA reported a private export sale of 225,000 MT of corn to Mexico this morning all for 2025/26. Another 229,000 was sold to unknown destinations, with 35,000 MT for 2024/25 and 194,000 MT for 2025/26.
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Crop Progress data indicated 76% of the US corn crop was silking as of 7/27, 1 point back of the 5-year average. The crop was 26% in the dough stage, vs. the 24% average. Condition ratings were down 1 point at 73% gd/ex and 384 on the Brugler500 index.
USDA tallied corn export shipments at 1.522 MMT (59.93 mbu) during the week ending on July 24. That was up 54.55% from last week and 42.16% above the same week last year. Of that total, 610,316 MT was headed to Japan, with 460,381 MT on its way to Mexico. Marketing year exports have totaled 60.34 MMT (2.376 bbu), which is 29.25% above the same period last year.
Over the weekend, President Milei of Argentina announced a reduction in the export tax for corn back to 9.5%, from 12%. AgRural estimates the Brazilian second corn crop at 68% harvested as of Thursday, shy of the 91% complete from the same week last year.
Sep 25 Corn closed at $3.93 3/4, down 5 3/4 cents,
Nearby Cash was $3.78 1/2, down 6 1/4 cents,
Dec 25 Corn closed at $4.14, down 5 cents,
Mar 26 Corn closed at $4.31 1/4, down 5 1/4 cents,
New Crop Cash was $3.71 5/8, down 5 1/4 cents,
On the date of publication, Austin Schroeder did not have (either directly or indirectly) positions in any of the securities mentioned in this article. All information and data in this article is solely for informational purposes. This article was originally published on Barchart.com
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