Japan says China boosting military capabilities in broader areas
Also taking into account security threats from North Korea and Russia, the ministry's 2025 white paper said that Japan is on track to meet its goal of raising defense-related outlays to 2 percent of gross domestic product, "fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities" amid U.S. pressure for higher spending.
China has been "increasing operational capabilities in more distant areas," the document said, adding that it conducted over 1,200 landings and takeoffs from aircraft carriers in the Pacific in total last year.
Among the latest moves not covered in the paper are simultaneous operations by two Chinese aircraft carriers, the Shandong and Liaoning, in the western Pacific in early June this year, which Japan confirmed for the first time ever in the waters.
The paper, summarizing the nation's security challenges and defense activities in the year ended this March, said China's "intensified military activities" have led to a situation that could "seriously impact Japan's security, which is a cause of grave concern."
China is also trying to enhance its capabilities to carry out "gray zone" operations, aggressive actions that fall short of armed attacks, by strengthening coordination between the military and the People's Armed Police Force, such as the coast guard, the paper said.
"Overall, we kept our serious view unchanged on the current security environment," which is "the most severe and complex" in the post-World War II era, a government official told reporters.
The paper also said that China may have "rehearsed some parts of military operations toward the reunification with Taiwan, including invasion operations," in surrounding areas of the self-ruled democratic island that Beijing regards as a breakaway province to be brought into its fold.
Regarding North Korea, the document described it as "posing an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's security than before," with Russia's military activities in the Indo-Pacific region "posing a strong security concern," both the same expressions as in the 2024 report.
Russia and North Korea have been stepping up their military partnership amid Moscow's prolonged full-scale invasion of Ukraine since 2022, which North Korean troops have joined, while Pyongyang is continuing its missile and nuclear weapons development.
The paper pointed to the possibility that Pyongyang would receive military assistance from Moscow, such as "the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies."
Japan decided in 2022 to gradually increase its defense expenditure including related costs for the following five years with a target of 2 percent of GDP in fiscal 2027.
The nation's annual defense budget had long been capped at around 1 percent of GDP, or around 5 trillion yen ($34 billion) under its war-renouncing Constitution.
Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has been adding pressure on allies since taking office in January with his "America First" pledge, prodding NATO members to vow to invest 5 percent of GDP for defense and related expenses by 2035.
In the white paper, the Defense Ministry emphasized that it has secured "the necessary and sufficient budget," with outlays in fiscal 2025 totaling 9.9 trillion yen, equivalent to 1.8 percent of GDP in fiscal 2022.
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In recent years, India itself considered reviving a major dam project in Arunachal Pradesh – widely viewed by analysts as a geopolitical counter to Chinese activities upstream. It would be shortsighted for China and India – Asia's two most populous nations – to allow water to become another theater of strategic rivalry. The potential for cooperation is far greater. Establishing joint monitoring mechanisms, expanding early warning systems, and launching basin-level dialogues could foster transparency and confidence. Strengthening the existing data-sharing agreement and insulating it from political disruptions would be a good first step. But building true water cooperation will require more than technical fixes. It demands institutional imagination – and political will. That kind of institutional breakthrough will not be easy. Neither China nor India has signed the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, the only global treaty governing transboundary rivers. And while India has signed binding water-sharing treaties with some neighbors, its approach remains similarly bilateral and interest-driven. In other words, both governments have historically rejected the idea that upstream development should be subject to international constraints. In this sense, their stances mirror each other: each sees itself as a regional hegemon, wary of legal obligations that might curtail sovereign decision-making. As a result, both countries have become status quo powers in a region that desperately needs rule-making. This mutual caution reflects deeper realities. In both Beijing and New Delhi, water is not just a resource – it is a symbol of authority, sovereignty, and developmental legitimacy. That makes compromise politically difficult, especially amid rising nationalist sentiment and hardening border disputes. But the absence of cooperation carries its own dangers. As climate change and geopolitical risk compound each other, what is now an institutional vacuum could easily become a vacuum of control. A shift will not come easily. But the risks of inaction are real. The Yarlung Tsangpo will continue to flow across borders, indifferent to geopolitical lines. Whether it becomes a source of contention or a channel for collaboration depends on the choices that China and India make today.
