Private economy law 'to bring new growth momentum'
Vice Minister of Justice Wang Zhenjiang says the law clearly sets out the legal status of the private economy in the country. Photo: RTHK
National Development and Reform Commission deputy head Zheng Bei says officials will ensure private firms enjoy equal market access as state-owned enterprises. Photo: RTHK
Chinese legislative and economic authorities pledged on Thursday to firmly implement the newly passed private economy promotion law to safeguard the rights of enterprises, saying it will unleash new growth momentum.
The 78-article bill, which was passed last week and is set to take effect on May 20, includes measures to combat choke points hindering the private sector, such as ensuring equal market access, finance support and legal protection.
Vice Minister of Justice Wang Zhenjiang said in Beijing the law clearly defines the legal status of private economy in the country.
He also vowed to resolutely implement "targeted measures" listed in the bill, such as ramping up enforcement to combat arbitrary fines and fees.
"The Private Economy Promotion Law clearly stipulates that a sound complaint and reporting mechanism for violations should be established," Wang said.
"The ministry of justice will use the introduction and implementation of the law as an opportunity to urge all regions and departments to intensify investigations and punishment of any violations, strengthen investigations and rectification of problems and ensure that rectification takes place.
"At the same time, key regions, areas and issues should be selected for spot checks," he said.
For his part, Zheng Bei, the deputy head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said the country's economic planner would boost efforts to ensure that private companies enjoy equal market access as state-owned enterprises – as stipulated in the law.
Noting that the rate of the winning tender bids that were lodged by private firms had increased by five percentage points between January and April, compared to the same period last year, she said authorities encourage private firms to join more of the large-scale national projects that are set to be launched this year, with the worth of the projects amounting to three trillion yuan.
"If private enterprises encounter barriers to entry, they can log in to our commission's website and report it via the relevant channel, and we'll work with the relevant parties to investigate and verify the issue," she said.
"We [also] support private enterprises that wish to actively participate in national strategic mega projects and the 'two new' programmes involving industrial upgrades and consumer trade-ins," she added.
Echoing Zheng, Wang Ruihe, deputy director of the National People's Congress Standing Committee's Legislative Affairs Commission, China's highest legislative body,
pointed to more than 26 references to "equal treatment and fair access" in the law.
Also attending the event were officials from National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA) and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce.
The NFRA stressed that authorities have been rolling out credit and loan support for small and micro private entities, such as offering discounts and relaxing the tolerances for non-performing loan ratios.
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