Why MBS Is Keeping the Pressure on Iran

Newsweek

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Though Tehran and Riyadh appear to be getting closer, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is quietly boxing in Iran—replacing confrontation with containment through diplomacy, economic leverage, and nuclear pressure.
When Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations in 2023, the move was widely seen as a turning point. But behind the optics of smiles and handshakes, their core rivalry continued. MBS simply changed the game: masking the iron fist with a velvet glove. It may look like a thaw, but in reality, it's a recalibrated contest for influence. MBS is boxing Iran in Syria, Lebanon, and nuclear diplomacy.
President Donald Trump speaks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) before posing for a family picture with Gulf leaders during a gathering of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Riyadh on May...
President Donald Trump speaks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) before posing for a family picture with Gulf leaders during a gathering of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Riyadh on May 14, 2025. More
BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP via Getty Images
Once on opposite sides of Syria's civil war, Riyadh and Damascus are now forging a strategic bond. Saudi Arabia is using investment to edge out Iran. In May 2025, MBS arranged a private meeting between President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa—positioning Riyadh, not Tehran, as Syria's international diplomatic guarantor.
In Lebanon, the 2023–24 Israel–Hezbollah war devastated Iran's top proxy. Israeli strikes killed much of Hezbollah's leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, and crippled its infrastructure. With Tehran financially constrained, Saudi Arabia stepped in.
Riyadh now plays a gatekeeping role in Lebanon's reconstruction, with foreign aid increasingly tied to Gulf approval. The rise of pro-Gulf leaders such as Army Chief Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, a former ICJ judge, signals a political pivot.
Iran's "Shiite Crescent," once central to Tehran's power projection across Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, is giving way to a "Saudi Full Moon"—a widening sphere of influence built on investment, diplomacy, and institutional leadership.
The regional battlefield has shifted. Riyadh's former reliance on confrontation and harsh rhetoric has given way to diplomatic pressure.
Saudi Arabia recently offered to mediate U.S.–Iran nuclear talks. Though seemingly de-escalatory, it was a strategic bid for influence. MBS cast himself as a global statesman, positioning Riyadh as a neutral convener with deeper intent.
Excluded from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Riyadh has now inserted itself into the architecture of diplomacy to ensure its red lines on nukes, missiles, militias, and regional destabilization shape any future agreement.
In May 2025, the U.S. and Iran concluded their fifth round of indirect nuclear talks. Washington called them beneficial, but Tehran's foreign minister admitted complex issues remain. Saudi Arabia welcomed the talks—on terms aligned with its interests. Whether in the room or not, MBS is setting the diplomatic tone.
A striking example came during the May 2025 summit in Riyadh, where MBS hosted Trump and Syria's al-Sharaa. The meeting marked Syria's diplomatic return—on Saudi terms. Trump announced a "cessation of sanctions" against Syria and secured nearly $4 trillion in Gulf investment pledges, including up to $1 trillion from Saudi Arabia. The summit cemented Riyadh's role as the region's financial and strategic anchor, sidelining Tehran, Qatar, and the UAE.
It also spotlighted Trump's personal bond with MBS: "I like him too much. That is why we give so much." This is a gesture he has never extended to the UAE's Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan or Qatar's Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani.
The optics crystallized a regional reversal. Where Iran once posed as the vanguard of resistance, Riyadh now hosts Iran's former allies, reopens the Syria file on its terms, and presents itself as a future-oriented Arab power. Across much of the region, it is Saudi Arabia that now looks like the victor.
Alongside its regional diplomacy, Saudi Arabia has embraced nuclear hedging—keeping the domestic capability option on the table to pressure both Tehran and Washington. MBS has made his position clear: "If Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible."
This is strategic signaling, not bluster. During Trump's first term, U.S. officials explored nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Those talks have resumed, and Trump has removed the prior requirement that Riyadh normalize relations with Israel in exchange for nuclear cooperation. This break from Biden-era conditionality exposes Riyadh's unprecedented leverage.
The message is twofold: if Iran expands its nuclear program, Riyadh will not remain idle. And if Washington wants regional influence, it must reckon with a Saudi Arabia no longer content to play the passive security client.
It forces the U.S. to make a choice: either accommodate Riyadh or risk proliferation. It also underscores Saudi Arabia's refusal to be left behind diplomatically, militarily, or strategically.
Is Saudi restraint truly de-escalation or a subtler form of coercion? MBS has not abandoned the rivalry with Iran—he has recalibrated it. The Kingdom has shifted from proxy wars and religious conflict to a more finessed strategy: strategic displacement, narrative control, and institutional gatekeeping.
Whether by sidelining Iran in Syria, reshaping Lebanon, injecting himself into the United States via Iran nuclear diplomacy, or leveraging nuclear ambiguity, MBS is dictating the pace. The goal is redefinition. This is not rollback. It is replacement. MBS is working within a U.S.-led order while preparing for a post-American Middle East.
Dr. Talal Mohammad is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and an independent consultant in government affairs, geopolitics, and strategic intelligence. He is the author of Iranian-Saudi Rivalry Since 1979: In the Words of Kings and Clerics, and his work has appeared in leading international outlets. You can find him on X @DrOxbridge.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.