Hassan Abbas on the Resurgent Support for Pakistan Army's Rise, Post-Operation Sindoor

The Diplomat

07-07-2025

'The sense of external threat and national unity has led many Pakistanis to rally around the armed forces, although this resurgence in support may prove to be transient.'
The Pakistan military's image has improved in the eyes of the Pakistani people following the four-day India-Pakistan military strikes in May. A recent survey conducted by Gallup Pakistan found that 93 percent of those polled felt their view of the military had improved following the clashes with India. There has been an outpouring of nationalist pride in the military, and the stature of Army Chief Gen Asim Munir, who was promoted to the post of field marshal and hailed as a 'savior' following the clashes, has grown further in the wake of his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Only a few months ago, the Pakistani military was deeply unpopular in the country, despised for its role in the ouster and incarceration of Prime Minister Imran Khan, Pakistan's most popular politician, and its brutal crackdown on his supporters. That has changed since May. The military's newfound popularity has raised concerns over its possible assumption of a role in governance.
Sharing his insights into the changed public mood in Pakistan vis-à-vis the military, Pakistani-American scholar, Hassan Abbas, a distinguished professor of International Relations at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C., said that while the current popularity of the military 'may seem to favor an enhanced military role [in politics],' 'support for the military tends to erode once political mismanagement or authoritarian overreach becomes apparent.' Pakistan's history suggests that the people will eventually push back against 'prolonged military interference in politics,' he told The Diplomat's South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran.
In a recent interview, you suggested that the terror attack at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir may have been perpetrated by groups like the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP). What could have motivated such an attack, and do you believe India responded in a way that may have served the attackers' interests?
In the absence of verifiable evidence, the mutual recriminations between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam attack are not only unproductive but also risk obscuring the possibility of third-party involvement. It is imperative to consider the strategic calculus of transnational extremist groups, particularly the ISKP, which has demonstrated both intent and capability to launch high-profile attacks in the region. ISKP thrives on instability and confrontation between regional powers, especially India and Pakistan. An escalation in bilateral tensions serves its objectives in several ways: it diverts security resources away from counterterrorism, deepens sectarian and nationalist divides, and creates fertile ground for recruitment by heightening a sense of crisis.
If indeed ISKP or similar entities orchestrated the attack, one could argue that India's immediate attribution of blame to Pakistan, without conclusive evidence, may have inadvertently validated the group's strategy—playing regional rivals against each other to carve out operational space. The group's motive would thus be to provoke military responses, undermine dialogue, and benefit from the distraction of two nuclear-armed states consumed by mutual hostility.
There has been much speculation about the meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir. What are your insights into this high-level interaction?
The Trump-Munir meeting was indeed unexpected and, according to informed observers, was arranged through discreet channels — most likely between the White House and Pakistan's military or intelligence leadership. While exact details remain unknown, publicly available information and informed speculation suggest that Iran was a major point of discussion. Gen Munir's recent visit to Tehran alongside Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif gave him firsthand insight into the evolving regional dynamics, especially in the context of the Israel-Iran confrontation.
Trump's reported remarks about Gen Munir's deep understanding of Iran underscore that the meeting likely focused on strategic stability in the Gulf, avoiding a full-scale conflict, and exploring Pakistan's role in regional de-escalation. It is also plausible that Pakistan reiterated its interest in renewing U.S.-Pakistan defense ties and conveyed its position regarding the recent military exchange with India. Furthermore, Trump likely advised restraint vis-à-vis India, while urging Pakistan to intensify counterterrorism operations against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISK, and Kashmir-focused extremist factions. The meeting signaled that Washington seeks to retain functional ties with Islamabad—not only to avoid pushing Pakistan entirely into China's orbit but also due to Pakistan's nuclear status and its pivotal location in an increasingly volatile region.
How has this meeting between Trump and Munir been perceived across different segments of Pakistani society, including political parties, the public, and the military establishment?
The reaction within Pakistan has been largely positive, particularly among the general public and segments of the military establishment. There was a sense of national pride that Pakistan's military leadership was received with such importance by the U.S. president, signaling international recognition of Pakistan's strategic relevance. This favorable perception is also shaped by a broader decline in anti-American sentiment in recent years—a notable shift from earlier periods marked by deep skepticism of U.S. intentions.
However, critical voices have emerged, especially among civil society actors, independent analysts, and some political commentators. Their concerns center on the timing of the meeting — immediately preceding U.S. military action against Iran's nuclear infrastructure — which some view as problematic. A few critiques, often conveyed through social media or in measured opinion pieces, have warned against Pakistan being perceived as a complicit actor in potential regional escalation. There is also strong speculation that Trump may have raised the Abraham Accords in an effort to coax Pakistan into normalizing relations with Israel—contingent, perhaps, on tangible progress in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire and renewed hope for a two-state solution. Pakistan can potentially move in this direction if Saudi Arabia takes the lead.
Some critics argue that strong military-to-military ties between the U.S. and Pakistan have historically undermined democratic institutions in the country. Why then is the renewed momentum in U.S.-Pakistan relations being celebrated so broadly?
This criticism, while not unfounded, often overlooks the broader historical context. U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has indeed shaped the country's strategic orientation since the 1950s, starting with alliances like SEATO and CENTO and later deepening during the Afghan Jihad in the 1980s. These alliances yielded significant economic and military benefits for Pakistan, albeit often at the cost of civilian oversight and democratic consolidation. It is true that much of this cooperation unfolded under military regimes, sidelining elected governments.
However, there have also been notable exceptions. The U.S. played a quiet but constructive role in facilitating democratic transitions — such as the rise of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister in 1988 — and major aid packages like the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act were delivered during civilian governments. Today, many Pakistanis view renewed engagement with the U.S. not through an ideological lens but as a pragmatic necessity — especially given the country's economic distress and security challenges. The celebration of renewed ties thus reflects both strategic calculations and public desire for international legitimacy and stability, rather than a rejection of democratic values. This revival or warming of U.S.–Pakistan relations also suggests that Pakistan is seeking to strike a balance in its ties between China and the U.S.
Recent developments — including India-Pakistan clashes, the Munir-Trump meeting, and the Iran-Israel conflict — have improved the Pakistani military's public image. How do you interpret this shift?
The Pakistani military's image had taken a significant hit in recent years, particularly due to its controversial role in the ousting of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and its heavy-handed treatment of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) senior and mid-level leadership. Widespread public disillusionment followed, with unprecedented levels of criticism directed at the military, both online and in street protests, leading to severe backlash from law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
However, the recent military skirmishes with India, especially what is perceived domestically as a tactical victory — including the downing of several Indian aircraft — have sparked a surge in nationalist sentiment. Pakistan's Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos (translated as 'unbreakable wall' in response to India's Operation Sindoor), which showcased Pakistan's defensive capabilities and strategic preparedness, has helped rehabilitate the military's image. The sense of external threat and national unity has led many Pakistanis to rally around the armed forces, although this resurgence in support may prove to be transient.
Public sentiment shifted dramatically after Operation Sindoor, with growing support for the military's role. Are Pakistanis now more accepting of a larger military footprint in political affairs?
At present, public tolerance for an expanded military role in governance has indeed increased, largely due to national security concerns and the perception that the military is a stabilizing force amid regional turmoil. However, such support tends to be cyclical and situational. Pakistan's historical experience demonstrates that prolonged military interference in politics eventually triggers public pushback. Every military ruler — from Ayub Khan to Musharraf — ultimately exited under pressure and public discontent.
While the current climate may seem to favor an enhanced military role, it would be premature to interpret this as a permanent shift in public attitudes. Pakistanis generally aspire to democratic governance, and support for the military tends to erode once political mismanagement or authoritarian overreach becomes apparent.
Given his current popularity and institutional control, do you see Gen Munir being tempted to stage a formal coup? Or does he already wield sufficient power without one?
Gen Munir is arguably in a more commanding position than many past military rulers, yet he has not needed to formally seize power. Through strategic alliances with the leadership of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the military has maintained de facto control without overtly undermining the constitutional order.
This civilian-military alignment — where two of the country's three major political parties appear aligned with the armed forces — is highly unusual by Pakistani standards. While this arrangement has provided short-term stability, it raises questions about sustainability. Political volatility in Pakistan has historically defied expectations, and such alignments, if perceived as undemocratic, could fuel public backlash or fragmentation within the ruling coalition over time.
While nationalism is surging in Pakistan, how have ethnic minorities — particularly in Balochistan — responded to this wave of military pride and assertiveness?
Balochistan remains a complex and restive region, with its own political dynamics and historical grievances. While urban centers in the province have witnessed participation in nationalist fervor, this trend has not fully penetrated rural or insurgency-affected areas, where skepticism towards the central government and military remains high.
The current regional instability — particularly the Iran-Israel confrontation — has created both risks and opportunities for Islamabad. On the one hand, it enables renewed focus on border control and counter-smuggling operations, which may curtail militant mobility. On the other, it offers the federal government a strategic opportunity to reset its approach toward Balochistan by pursuing reconciliation with disaffected groups and investing in meaningful political inclusion and development. Without such outreach, the underlying causes of unrest will persist.
Does the recent shift in power dynamics mark the end of the road for Imran Khan and the PTI?
Despite the sustained crackdown on the PTI leadership and Imran Khan's ongoing legal challenges, the party retains popular support and remains a formidable political force. In any free and fair electoral contest, the PTI is likely to perform strongly. However, the political environment is currently shaped by security concerns stemming from India-Pakistan tensions and regional instability involving Iran and Israel. The IMF has also helped bring in some financial stability lately.
The apparent consensus among key power brokers to allow the current government — effectively a PML(N)-PPP coalition — to serve its full term until 2029 reflects a calibrated political arrangement. At the same time, both parties maintain significant national constituencies, and Bilawal Bhutto, in particular, appears to have a promising political future ahead. That said, Pakistan's political history is replete with sudden shifts, realignments, and popular upheavals. Imran Khan's political future cannot be written off, and the PTI's resilience — coupled with public discontent over economic and security conditions — may well redefine the political landscape in the future.