Emergent Indus water sharing challenges

Express Tribune

2 days ago

The writer is an academic and researcher. He is also the author of Development, Poverty, and Power in Pakistan, available from Routledge
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While the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) of 1960 is more of a water distribution treaty rather than a water sharing one, it has provided a longstanding framework for two neighbouring rival nations to share the transborder rivers emerging out of the Himalayan glaciers. At the time when this treaty was inked, water flowing through the six Indus tributaries was plentiful, and pollution or climate change were not considered major problems.
Over time, however, this treaty has come under major stress not only due to its inability to contend with ecological or climate related stresses, but due to the insatiable demand for water and hydroelectricity by the burgeoning populations on both sides of the tense border.
As an upper riparian state, India has threatened to weaponise water following recurrent conflicts with Pakistan. Disputes over Indian plans to damn the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan have also been growing.
Last year, India informed Pakistan that it wanted to renegotiate the terms of the IWT. The latest cross-border skirmishes following the Pahalgam attacks in occupied Kashmir gave India an excuse to put the treaty in abeyance. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague has recently announced that this treaty cannot be annulled unilaterally, and that the PCA has authority to adjudicate water disputes between the two countries. While Pakistan is pleased with this announcement, India has refused to recognise the PCA's authority in the case.
Given this situation, whether the IWT will be reinstated, renegotiated, or remain indefinitely suspended remains to be seen.
Pakistan is much more dependent on the Indus tributaries than India, so India's threats to divert or withhold water allocated to Pakistan is not an issue which is taken lightly. However, experts point out that India cannot immediately alter the flow of the western rivers. In the high flow season (May and September), the western rivers carry billions of cubic meters of water, and the existing upstream run-of-the-river dams on these rivers have very limited storage. But if India develops new infrastructure on the western rivers, it could gain greater control over the timing and volume of flows into Pakistan, especially during the dry season when the flows across the basin are lower.
However, any large-scale dam or diversion project to channel water from the western rivers to other parts of India would take years to build. The sites available in occupied Kashmir for major water storage present geological hurdles, and the needed infrastructure development would also be very costly. Holding back high flows on rivers like the Chenab or Jhelum also risks flooding upstream regions in India itself.
Pakistan currently does not have sufficient reservoirs to store enough water to deal with the crisis it would face if India were to succeed in disrupting the flow of the western rivers. Pakistan is thus speeding up construction of the Mohmand and Diamer-Bhasha dams. Yet, Pakistan won't be able to survive more than short-term disruptions to water flow despite this new infrastructure development. Moreover, the Indus delta is already shrinking due to reduced freshwater outflows, so increased uncertainty in upstream flows could accelerate that degradation, with devastating consequences for coastal livelihoods and fisheries.
Pakistan has stated that any attempt by India to construct major new storage on the western rivers would be considered an act of war. Indian attempts to assert hegemony over shared water would also make it vulnerable to similar moves by China, as India itself is a lower riparian state on the Brahmaputra and the Indus rivers.
Some suggest that Pakistan could use India's decision to walk away from the IWT to seek a renegotiated agreement by staking a claim to some of the water from the eastern rivers. However, rather than making a bid to get more water, Pakistan may gain more international sympathy if it focuses on human security and environmental security concerns instead, which the existing IWT is unable to resolve. Pakistan should thus aim for IWT modifications which enable conservation and climate mitigation measures that are mutually beneficial for both India and Pakistan.