Rwandan Embassy in Rabat Commemorates 31 Years Since Tutsi Genocide
'First of all we commemorate because we remember what happened 31 years ago and we do remember because we want to take lessons from the past and make sure that what happened in Rwanda in 1994 doesn't happen again,' Ambassador to Morocco, Shakila K. Umutoni, said on the purpose of the event in an interview with Morocco World News (MWN).
Under the emblem 'Remember, Unite, Renew,' the solemn but poignant event brought together 300 participants, including high-level officials representing the strong ties between Rwanda and Morocco. This year's ceremony was attended by Moroccan Human Rights Council (CNDH) President Amina Bouayach, Ministerial Delegate for Human Rights Mohammed Habib Belkouch, and Loubna Ait Basidi, who represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In remarks at the event, Belkouch described the commemoration as a symbolic event of great importance for human reconciliation, applauding Rwanda's efforts to rebuild after the devastating genocide and affirming the Rwandan people's 'right to memory' as a way to honor victims and prevent the repetition of such horrors. He reiterated Morocco's support for Rwanda, citing King Mohammed VI's 2016 visit to the country as a testament to the strength of bilateral ties, and acknowledged the damaging role of Belgian colonialism in sowing ethnic divisions.
For her part, Bouayach reflected on the unimaginable loss of one million lives due to perceived differences, warning that hatred, though it evolves in language and form, never truly disappears, genocide is never announced and 'once it starts it's already too late.' She stressed that the genocide is not merely a historical event but a 'universal trauma' that demands continuous vigilance and a daily commitment to the fight for human dignity, reminding that 'humanity is never acquired.'
Loubna Ait Basidi attended the event on behalf of Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita who was unable to attend the event as a guest of honor. Representing all Moroccans, Basidi expressed solidarity with the Rwandan people and reiterated Morocco's commitment to preserving peace and stability across the African continent. She also commended the cooperation between Morocco and Rwanda, expressing hope that the Rwandan 'flame of hope' would light the path ahead.
For the past three decades, remembrance are annually held from April 7 to July 3 in Rwanda and across the globe to honor the memory of the one million Tutsis brutally murdered during the 100-day genocide in 1994.
These commemorations not only pay tribute to the victims but also aim to draw lessons from the past to prevent such atrocities from ever occurring again, while offering support to survivors and recognizing the Rwandans who helped bring the massacres to an end.
This year's ceremony was a testament to the was the importance of sharing stories of resilience as a means of remembrance and healing.
Valaence Kamrari, a survivor of the Tutsi genocide, was among the attendees – serving as a reminder that this atrocity was not far back in history. Kamrari had traveled from France to share his personal testimony in Rabat. At just six years old, he witnessed the horrors of the genocide unfold before his eyes. Kamarari expressed that he was never able to truly celebrate his own birthday, which falls on April 30 – durnig the genocide's timeline – because it is a too painful. It was a poignant reminder that trauma of such magnitude is not confined to the past but leaves a lasting, life-altering impact.
The commemoration also recognizes the remarkable journey of Rwanda's recovery and the resilience of its people. Despite global doubts, Rwanda has rebuilt itself through unity, reconciliation, and visionary leadership, transforming into a country focused on development and national cohesion.
'Another reason that it's important for Rwanda to hold commemoration events is to also acknowledge the resilience of the Rwandan people and the renewal after the genocide,' Said Umutoni further said to MWN. 'While the international community thought it was impossible to rebuild the Rwandan people, show the world that it's possible when you come together, it's possible when you reconcile your people.'
'This is actually a reminder that solidarity comes from the top,' concluded Umutoni, referring to the 2016 visit of King Mohammed VI to Rwanda, where he left a powerful message of support at the genocide memorial.
This year's commemoration not only honors the past but also reaffirms the enduring friendship between the Rwandan and Moroccan people, offering hope for a continued and strengthened relationship. Tags: Morocco and RwandaRwanda ambassador to Rabatrwandan genocide
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Geopolitics as an Exact Science
Geopolitics has the potential to be an accurate science. Already in 1971, James N. Rosenau, one of the great theorists of international relations, published a reference book entitled 'The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.' He was not taken seriously despite his fame at the time, which continues to this day. Prior to that, in 1969, he published a book titled 'The Linkage Politics,' a masterpiece about the convergence of national and international systems. He had proven, by writing about forty books and thousands of scientific articles, that dedication and resilience always make a difference. I am referring to Rosenau in an attempt to depict the shift that the international system has been taking over the last ten years. A trend that I had foreseen in three of my last books in French, mainly the one titled 'The International System in Transition, from the Proliferation of Actors to Programmed Disorder,' published in 2017. As a matter of fact, important things are taking place on the geopolitical and diplomatic chessboard. I will be sharing my view on the matter through the latest news, starting with the upcoming summit between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin scheduled to take place in Alaska on August 15, 2025. This meeting comes as no surprise, since during his electoral campaign for the 2024 presidential elections, the American president gave significant importance to the United States' relations with Russia. He had promised that once elected, he would reach out to his Russian counterpart to find the appropriate means to improve relations between the United States and Russia and, hopefully, put an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, political analysis on both sides agrees that the outbreak of the war resulted, among other things, from the dichotomous interpretation by both parties of the provisions of the Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015) agreements. The obsolescence of the agreements was officially announced in 2022. In an article published just before the American presidential elections, I had formulated a number of hypotheses, some of which still hold up. (Hami, H.: US Presidential Elections: Common Sense Should Not Override Analysis, Evidence, in MWN, August 19, 2024. I delved into some scenarios pertaining to the American foreign policy toward Europe, the Middle East, Iran, and, inevitably, the United States' behavior regarding the crisis between Ukraine and Russia. I basically said that if Donald Trump were reelected, he would probably tackle the Ukrainian issue, relations with the Europeans, and the tumultuous relations with Russia and China. But he would be less interventionist, contrary to what some experts may think. Ukraine and Russia would come to terms on the basis of the new reality on the ground. The United States had no interest in seeing Russia collapse. I went on assuming that the pressure on NATO would resume, but without allowing Russia to revamp its strength. However, the European allies would experience some sort of setback. They wouldn't have played well the line they were supposed to with respect to Russia. Flirting with Moscow to a certain extent would have been tolerated. However, the Europeans went a little too far. They harbored the hope of holding the stick in the middle to regain their independence along the way. Bet lost. President Trump holds as his sacred duty to resolve conflicts through diplomacy, even if it means using deterrence and persuasion along the way. The use of force would remain an option, but such an option might be the last resort. Nothing suggests that things would be easy at the Alaska Summit. Two forms of nationalism, sometimes bordering on chauvinism, shown by Presidents Putin and Trump, as some observers see it, may slow down the process, but there is still hope that the realism and pragmatism for which both heads of state are known will eventually prevail. The summit is reminiscent, to some extent, of the conditions under which the Yalta conference was held in 1945. The Alaska summit also reminds us that Western Europe remains a prime battleground, yet the Europeans have few cards to play. They had failed in their task in the aftermath of the USSR's disintegration. The mission was to keep Russia at bay and relieve the pressure on the US as conditional protector. Nothing is taken for granted It was long ago that the mythical song 'Wind of Change' by the German band Scorpions made the crowds of Germans in particular and Europeans in general dance. The victory of the West, which made Francis Fukuyama the official analyst of 'The End of History' and the victory of the 'Free World.' The same song that would have given Vladimir Putin sleepless nights, as it reminded him of his last days in East Berlin where he was the head of the KGB office (currently FSB and SVR). Putin would get his revenge in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference. There he criticized the unipolar fait accompli of the international system and called for the establishment of a multipolar system to end what he saw as an unacceptable American hegemony. President Putin is sketching out a geopolitics in which Russia refuses to be the patsy for changes taking place on the global security chessboard—particularly in its European and Asian neighborhoods. It is also far away, that scene of Boris Yeltsin on a tank in 1991 in which he was seen addressing the crowd and intimidating members of the KGB who were trying to organize the counter-revolution by overthrowing Mikhail Gorbachev. Just as distant is the memory of the latter lamenting being betrayed by the United States and its European allies, precisely by playing Ukraine for the umpteenth time and making the ship, albeit autonomous, which would navigate in the already troubled waters of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the various strategic straits for global security. The present paper aims to go even further and cast a wide net to refine a reading already done in two other articles dedicated to the changes the international system is undergoing, which highlight a zigzag transition but whose ultimate goal would be to reposition the major state actors and neutralize minor state actors who are overplaying their hand (No Room for Dual-allegiance in Geopolitics, 09/19/2024; et H. Hami : Géopolitique assimilée pour les uns et saut dans l'inconnu pour les autres, MEDIAS 24 du 09/01/2025)The same reading would apply to non-state actors who play the role of troublemakers and refuse to throw in the towel. The reading proposed in the two articles is based on the assumption that the international system in difficult transition can no longer accommodate the proliferation of so-called endemic or frozen conflicts. On the other hand, it highlights the limited, if not obsolete, scope of the 'pivot states' paradigm, the 'creative disorder' paradigm, and the 'non-state actors as intermediaries or proxies' paradigm. It therefore seems that the American president is sticking to a well-crafted roadmap. He adopts a more coherent approach compared to his predecessors. The approach consists of the premise that the security of the United States begins with cleaning up internally and monitoring the game externally. More concretely, this approach involves a reinterpretation of the postulates of isolationism, interventionism, and wait-and-see that have characterized American foreign policy for nearly two centuries. The idea of cleaning house also applies to traditional allies and inveterate adversaries. Within both categories, President Trump would distinguish between reliable allies and intractable adversaries. He would help the former to safeguard their national interest, and he would give the latter a chance to get on board. Security comes through order, far from American national borders. This becomes logical when reading the fallout from the various attempts to reshape strategic chessboards disrupted by conflicts that never seem to end. First of all, the abandonment of the 'regime change' paradigm as a first choice to keep 'entangled' leaders in the grip of acute intranational crises. Next, the neutralization of political opposition actors who have proven their inability to successfully achieve a peaceful transition once in power in pilot democracy countries. These actors were supported directly and indirectly and even invited to take responsibility after the American military intervention or that of the United States' allies. They failed because they traded a cleverly concealed suzerainty for an open suzerainty to the benefit of regional state actors who are now in the sights of major international players. Two striking examples. On the one hand, the failure of political Islam as a driver for the various episodes of the Arab Spring that occurred two decades later. This scenario would have resembled—had it succeeded as expected—the Budapest Spring (1958), the Prague Spring (1968), the mixed Warsaw Spring (1989), the Revolution of Dignity, also known as the Maïdan Revolution in Kyiv (2013-2014), and the upheavals in Tbilisi, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in 2008. It was nothing like that. On the contrary. The countries that were the scene of the Arab Spring are currently at the back of the pack of countries that have relatively come out of it. On the other hand, the promoters of the counter-revolution in the Arab Spring countries haven't gotten off scot-free, either. Their commitments are becoming more and more costly. But they have no choice. However, unlike the actors of the Arab Spring, they know how to adapt and read the direction of the geopolitical compass well. Now, these claims need to be backed up with concrete cases. Logical. I have gotten a few examples. One, in the midst of the war between Iran and Israel, the White House announces the conclusion in June 2025 of an agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda ending four decades of military confrontations involving the M23 non-state army fueled by neighboring countries and mercantile interests due to the wealth this country abounds in. Unnoticed, this agreement, although fragile, confirms the determination of the new American administration to bring order to a rich African continent that continues to fuel the most unbelievable covetousness. Two, the end of Bashar Assad's regime in December 2024. The fact is not insignificant and falls within the framework of a wise reading of the most important parties interested in the conflict: the United States and Russia. There too, as with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia has shown calculated passivity, and Turkey has taken the lead. Three, the conclusion in August 2025 of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the patronage of the United States. An important event, as it is part of a balancing act that the United States and Russia are playing with regard to Western Europe, the South Caucasus Republics, Central Asia, and Iran. Taming the troublemakers for the sake of getting peace Observers undoubtedly remember how Azerbaijan reconquered a large part of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020-2024, a territory it had lost in 1993-1994 due to the coalition between Armenia and Armenian dissidents with Russia's blessing. The latter, occupied with the war with Ukraine, let it happen and allowed Turkey to take the lead in its own way. The conclusion of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a severe blow to the promoters of the various Minsk processes and the trilateral approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The beneficiaries of the persistence of instability in various issue areas have already started to make their voices heard. Suffice it to mention a declaration of a high-ranking official of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who echoes the perception of the Iranian inner decision-makers with respect to the abovementioned peace agreement. He steps into the fray to warn Azerbaijan and Armenia, urging them not to trust President Trump. He stigmatizes the decision the two countries made to create a corridor in Zangezur and to grant the United States a lease for a period of 99 years. Iran, already weakened by the war with Israel and by the intervention of the United States, which partially destroyed its nuclear facilities, feels the vise tightening around it. The senior Iranian official indirectly expresses the hope that a trilateral alliance including India, Iran, and Russia will put an end to the containment-encirclement project of which they are the subject. Iran fears its influence over Armenia will wane after it lost its grip on some countries in the region, notably Syria and Lebanon (Tehran is desperately trying to oppose the demilitarization of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon to thwart the Lebanese government's decision on the matter). Thus, the agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, the regime change in Syria, and the understanding between Azerbaijan and Armenia are part of the dynamic the Trump administration initiated to resolve many endemic problems. Some might object: what about the Palestinian issue and the fate of Gaza? Judicious question that requires a bit of tact on my part. First, a statement: the idea of conquering Gaza and the forced exodus of Palestinians is rejected without delay or biased interpretation. Next, the Knesset's vote on a non-binding motion to annex the West Bank and Jordan Valley in July 2025 and the Israeli security cabinet's approval of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plan in August 2025 to take control of Gaza cannot be acted on in the current state of affairs and will be doomed to long-term failure. This is a nervous reaction on Israel's part to the increasing recognition of the State of Palestine by European countries, which are known for being unconditional supporters of Israel. The United States, which promoted the idea of securing Gaza and establishing a form of international management of the Palestinian enclave, no longer seems to see it from that angle. This is too risky and could trigger a destabilizing movement among some Gulf Arab allies and receive a cold welcome from other countries sympathetic to Israel in the immediate vicinity. Similarly, such a hypothesis wouldn't promote Israel's security, which some decision-making centers in Tel Aviv wish for or use as an alibi to maintain the state of uncertainty in the country. Nor can it encourage countries in troubled areas to look favorably on the American approach to conflict resolution through economical and developmental means. In all the commotion, one truth emerges: Europe, once a strategic intermittent among the second circle of most influential strategic actors, is becoming a prized target for the United States, Russia, and China. Europe is not invited to the Alaska summit. It is being ordered to pay for the American weapons it is supposed to send to Ukraine. Neither Moscow nor Washington is offended by keeping Europe out of the new geopolitical configurations. The Europeans would jump in eventually. An overlooked fact: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky congratulates Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for initiating a promising peace process with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The same goes for Turkish President Tayyeb Recep Erdogan, whose country is very active in seeking a solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This means that the 'endemic conflict resolution' approach is on the right track. It will be the same for the crisis in Libya, the situation in the Sahel-Saharan strip, and the regional conflict over the Moroccan Sahara. The tour of Masaad Boulos, senior advisor to the American president for the Middle East, notably in Tunisia (July 22, 2025), Libya (July 23, 2025), and Algeria (July 27, 2025), gives an idea of the United States' vision regarding the perception of security and stability in the region. Thawing frozen conflicts Regarding Libya, it must be noted that in the aftermath of Masaad Boulos' visit, the Libyan protagonists have decided to resume dialogue to advance the process of normalizing political life. They are returning to the foundations of a plausible and salutary solution: the conclusions of the Skhirat agreements (2015) and the various rounds of dialog in Bouznika and Tangier (2020, 2024). Already, I had anticipated such a development in an article dedicated to Libya, believing that the resolution of the crisis in Libya would come through what I called 'the building-up through extremes' (H. Hami : Libya: Weak Core, Strong Core, for the End of Disorder in the Maghreb, January 10, 2025). Regarding Tunisia, the path Tunisia has been following over the last four years is a matter of serious concern in some Western decision-making circles. Observers interpret Masaad Boulos' visit to Tunis as a barely concealed warning. The Tunisian decision-makers are kindly requested to review their roadmap with respect to their alliances in the region and the Middle East. As for Algeria, Masaad Boulos' message is even clearer: the need to end duplicity and double-talk. The United States reaffirms its recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over its entire territory, including the so-called Western Sahara. The Algerian military institution is being ordered to calm down and get on board. No mention of the Polisario. No resorting to the outdated refrain of the self-determination referendum leading to independence. Only the autonomy plan Morocco proposed in 2007 is fully taken into account for a just, realistic, and sustainable solution. Naturally, the Polisario is playing with ambivalence. For the past days, information has been disseminated about a meeting that allegedly took place at the Foreign Office in London between its chief diplomat and the British Minister of State for the MENA region. In London, no comment, but seasoned observers do not rule out the idea that if confirmed, the meeting would have no effect on the United Kingdom's recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara as affirmed on June 1, 2025, by David Lammy, the British Foreign Secretary. Indeed, he unequivocally stressed his country's support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, which London considers to be the most credible, viable, and pragmatic basis for a lasting resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, the British would not be far off, like other European countries, from trying to convince the Polisario leaders to distance themselves from an Algeria that is struggling with its geopolitical contradictions, which would eventually lead the country into an existential tragicomedy. The United Kingdom, in turn, seeks to anticipate the developments that the various Atlantic initiatives will experience and take advantage of them so as not to be forced to make painful concessions in its overseas territories. The United Kingdom is not the only European country to fear a sudden change in this matter; France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, among others, fear that a groundswell will disrupt the apparent calm in the overseas territories. The trend of seeing countries hostile to Morocco return to better dispositions regarding the Sahara issue will increase in the coming months. South Africa would soon provide the demonstration. Indeed, the gestures of certain movements within the African National Congress (ANC) regarding Morocco's sovereignty over its southern provinces resemble blows in the water. South Africa will soon be on board. South African political forces are warning against separatist tendencies in Orania and the Eastern Cape. Furthermore, relations with the United States have not been smooth since the expulsion of Ibrahim Rasool, South African ambassador to Washington, in March 2025. President Cyril Ramaphosa's visit to Washington in May 2025 does not seem to have cooled down the heat of misunderstandings. Experts of African affairs don't rule out seeing Pretoria temper its hostility toward Morocco regarding the Southern provinces. I wrote an article in January 2024 where I shared my perception on that matter (H. Hami, Dépendance stratégique et État-ascenseur: la fin de la lune de miel; Maroc diplomatique, le 17/01/2024). Another article that followed up was supported and published recently to sustain the same argument (H. Hami: Morocco and South Africa, Twisting Toward a Common Ground, MWN, 07/29/2025). Observers sometimes have amnesic memories. They tend to believe that the West makes regime change an ethical, moral, and inevitable priority to help so-called oppressed peoples. For example, they forget that strategic state interventions have often played the role of cleaners without getting anything in return. In this respect, it is worth reminding François Mitterrand's position during his first year as President of France. He adopted a strong discourse toward African countries, calling for the implementation of democracy and human rights in Africa. He became more famous in the eyes of Africans for his speech in La Baule on the occasion of the 16th conference of African and French heads of state in 1990. In the aftermath, democratic elections were organized in Algeria in December 1991-January 1992. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) scored a comfortable majority in the first round (December 1991), but the second round was canceled. The process was aborted because Mitterrand would have given the order to the military establishment to do so. It is true that at the time, political planners in France and some European countries wanted to make Algeria the 'Germany of North Africa' in the wake of German reunification in 1990 and the first step aimed at creating the European Union. In doing so, Mitterrand would have no idea that on the other side of the Atlantic, in the United States, a plan was being hatched: the creation of pivotal states under three categories. The first category would involve states that were riding high due to possessing strategic resources in the eyes of the Americans. The second category would involve intermediate actors who had hegemonic ambitions dating back to the history of the 15th-20th centuries. The third category involves minor actors who were operating according to the clock of suzerainty at two speeds. These policy planners cried victory, in the same way as Francis Fukuyama, Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Bernard-Henry-Levy, etc., did. They were caught off guard by the counter-reaction from countries supposedly having thrown in the towel in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hypothetical end of the Cold War. And it is within the same logic that the dynamics around stability in the Sahel region, the Libyan crisis, the Sudanese civil war, and naturally the issue of the Moroccan Sahara are inscribed. Geopolitics might be considered an exact science or rocket science. As was mentioned in the first lines of this article, James N. Rosenau outstandingly approached the subject in his piece called 'The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.' I modestly align myself with this perspective. An adherence that I emphasized by referring to an article I modestly wrote on the matter. Yet, an update is always essential and indispensable in order to keep up with changes both on the academic and political chessboard. It is the mission I have assigned myself to enrich a renewed reflection on geopolitics, which, without a doubt, needs to be approached as we approach the exact sciences. Tags: geopoliticsMoroccoopinionRussiaSaharaUS
Morocco World
5 hours ago
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Oued Eddahab Recovery: Why August 14 Is Morocco's Most Candid Day of Sovereignty
Marrakech – On August 14, 1979, notables, ulema and tribal elders from Oued Eddahab filed into the Royal Palace in Rabat and recited the bay'ah to King Hassan II, a ceremony that fused law, history and political will into one moment of national consolidation, and when the King responded that he had received their pledge and would 'preserve it as the most precious trust,' he fixed the date in the public memory as the day Morocco turned an impasse into a commitment, a promise from people to throne and from throne to people. That ceremony is now marked every year as an official public holiday in Morocco. But it matters less for the menu of paid days off than for what it says about the constitutional grammar of the state, because in the Moroccan tradition, sovereignty is not just a cartographic assertion; it is a living contract renewed by communities that declare who they are and where they belong. It was also, in strategic terms, a decisive counter to an Algerian-backed plan to turn the southern tip of the Sahara into the Polisario Front's first permanent territory with deep-water Atlantic access – a move Morocco pre-empted before it could take shape. What happened on August 14 did not occur in a vacuum. It was preceded by the November 1975 Green March, when 350,000 unarmed Moroccan citizens crossed into the Sahara to assert the kingdom's claim and compel Spain to negotiate. Days later came the Madrid Accords, which ended Spanish administration and apportioned interim responsibilities to Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco took the northern two-thirds of the territory, while Nouakchott administered the southern third, including Oued Eddahab. Hassan II had anticipated this division as a tactical necessity – he told UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in early 1975 that sharing the territory with Mauritania was the only way to block Algeria's separatist designs. The arrangement came under immediate Algerian attack. Algiers viewed a Morocco–Mauritania axis as an existential threat to its regional leverage, funnelling arms to the Polisario and escalating guerrilla warfare. The decisive break came in July 1979, when a military coup in Mauritania shifted the country's alignment toward Algiers. Within weeks, Nouakchott signed the 'Algiers Agreement' with the Polisario, pledging to withdraw from Oued Eddahab and hand it over to the separatists. The deal, set to take effect in seven months, could have transformed the war by giving the guerrillas deep-water access and an international staging point. Morocco moved before the ink dried. In early August, the Royal Armed Forces advanced to secure the territory, and on August 14, in an unmistakable rejection of the Algiers plan, the region's tribal leaders traveled to Rabat to renew their bay'a to the Moroccan monarch – a legal and political snub to both Mauritania's new rulers and Algeria's military establishment. Hassan II's position was unapologetically blunt: 'If Mauritania chooses a path, we shall stand beside her – on the condition it does not touch a single inch of Moroccan soil nor place a foreign frontier between Morocco and Mauritania.' Between Madrid and Algiers: law, gunfire, and the long arc of UN diplomacy The legal scaffolding is clear for anyone who cares to read the record rather than the slogans, beginning with the text of the Madrid declaration of principles, continuing through the Morocco–Mauritania border treaty that described a straight southern line from the 24th parallel to the intersection of the 23rd parallel north and the 13th meridian west, and culminating in the Mauritania-Polisario agreement of August 5, 1979, which removed Nouakchott from the dispute and left two principal antagonists facing each other across the desert. That withdrawal could have been a game-changer – handing the separatists a coastline, a port in Dakhla, and a launchpad for international recognition. But Morocco's August 14 move shut that door permanently. From 1991 onward, the UN mission MINURSO has frozen the front while the political file moved from the referendum formulas of the 1990s to the language adopted by the Security Council in recent years that stresses a realistic, pragmatic, enduring political solution based on compromise. Indeed, when the Council again renewed MINURSO's mandate in October 2024, it once again pressed for refugee registration in the Tindouf camps, again affirmed the centrality of the Personal Envoy's process, and again reflected what seasoned diplomats already know: that the referendum project is not coming back and the field has shifted to autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty. When the Polisario tried to force a crisis at Guerguerat in late 2020 by blocking the vital road link to Mauritania, Morocco moved to secure the corridor and restore traffic while partners publicly emphasized the need to keep the passage open, a small incident in kilometers yet a large one in meaning because it showed where the region's commercial arteries actually run and who has the capacity and legitimacy to keep them flowing. The desert wall that pins the ceasefire line across more than two thousand kilometers remains the lived geography of this standoff, a long earthwork that turned raiding warfare into sporadic potshots. And for all the heated rhetoric about a return to war since 2020, the facts on the ground point to a low-intensity pattern that never alters the strategic balance and never dislodges the basic UN framing of a negotiated political settlement. The new diplomatic geometry The cartography of recognition and support has been redrawn in the last five years, and anyone pretending otherwise is reading from yesterday's briefings. Because, for one thing, the United States recognized Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara in December 2020, and subsequent administrations have not reversed that proclamation. For another thing, the official US line has hardened around the Moroccan Autonomy Plan as the sole viable basis under the UN process. More importantly, perhaps, Spain, the former administering power, pivoted in March 2022 by embracing and describing the 2007 Moroccan plan as the most serious, credible, and realistic proposal. In fact, Madrid's phrasing of its newfound support for the Moroccan plan has become the European template for discarding Polisario's statehood dream as untenable and far-fetched. Take, for instance, France's decision in July 2024 to forgo decades of ambivalence by publicly declaring autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the only workable path. As if that was not distressing enough for dreamers of Sahrawi nationalism and their handlers in Algiers, London echoed this shift just last June, when the UK government endorsed autonomy as the credible and pragmatic solution. And so, four decades after Oued Eddahab's recovery, Morocco's Autonomy Plan has become the only realistic framework on the table. Proposed in 2007, the autonomy plan has since won explicit or tacit support from over 120 countries across every region, making it one of the most internationally endorsed conflict-resolution frameworks in Africa. It lays out a system in which the Saharan population would elect its own legislative and executive bodies, manage local resources, and preserve cultural identity, while foreign affairs, defense, and currency remain under Moroccan sovereignty. This structure has been repeatedly described by UN envoys as 'serious and credible,' and its durability lies in the fact that no alternative proposal has drawn comparable backing or survived as long in active diplomacy. Even the UN's diplomatic language has evolved; the 'self-determination referendum' is no longer treated as a practical option. Algeria and the Polisario cling to it rhetorically, but behind closed doors, many of their former sympathizers admit the referendum is dead. As Hassan II predicted in the 1970s, a separatist micro-state dependent on foreign arms is unviable, and in today's security climate, it would also be a direct threat to regional stability. The map on the ground tells an even more visible story, since a cascade of African and Arab partners have opened consulates in Laayoune and Dakhla. There were roughly twenty-nine consular missions in the two cities by mid-2024, and this new momentum expanded still further with new openings like Chad's. And while it is often dismissed by critics as mere symbolism, this consular reality actually channels students, traders, and investors, in short, the quiet, boring traffic that makes sovereignty tangible. At the multilateral level, the Security Council continues to carry forward a vocabulary that privileges realism and compromise. And that vocabulary dovetails with a wider Atlantic-Sahel security architecture in which Morocco functions as a stable southern anchor through the US-Morocco Defense Cooperation Roadmap to 2030 and the annual African Lion exercises, an operational rhythm that is not theater for cameras but genuine interoperability tested year after year. The coastline is also part of NATO-adjacent maritime monitoring, valued by the Pentagon as a secure flank in the Atlantic defense line. Development as statecraft in the South The southern provinces are not a press release; they are engineering works and public accounts and contracts you can read, beginning with the 2015 New Development Model for the Southern Provinces, a multi-year, multi-sector program that tied infrastructure to jobs and social services, then radiating into specific projects that have moved from artist's impression to poured concrete. This stellar vision's flagship is the Dakhla Atlantic Port, a deep-water complex under construction on the Atlantic with a price tag measured in the tens of billions of dirhams. It is conceived as a logistics hinge between Morocco and West Africa and is designed to pull private capital into fisheries, agro-industry, and transshipment. And alongside this crown jewel of Morocco's increasingly vibrant southern provinces are ongoing auxiliary works on roads, power, and hinterland zoning – innovative projects whose raison d'être is to make sure that the port does not sit on a dead shore. Running north-south is the Tiznit-Laayoune-Dakhla expressway, one thousand and fifty-five kilometers of dual carriageway now operational end-to-end. This project took a decade and unlocked the geography, cutting travel times, knitting local markets to national ones, and making the idea of an impoverished periphery increasingly obsolete. Energy is the second pillar, from the 300-megawatt Boujdour wind farm entering service to the Dakhla desalination complex and its dedicated wind supply, to an emerging portfolio of grid reinforcement and green-hydrogen proposals that, if sequenced sensibly, can turn the reliably windy coastline into a power and water platform for agriculture and industry rather than a talking point for conferences. And there is a continental dimension in the works, with France signalling readiness to finance a three-gigawatt HV link between Casablanca and Dakhla that would knit the south more tightly into the national grid. Here is a project that makes no geopolitical statement on its own, yet, taken together with the consular map, the highway, and the port, demonstrates how development policy becomes strategy without ever needing to say so. A hard truth for Tindouf and a clear horizon for autonomy In the political marketplace of 2025, the Polisario is not a government in waiting; it is an armed front headquartered on Algerian soil with a diplomatic network and a media machine, yet without the basic attributes of a viable state. Whatever story Algeria and its dwindling army of separatism cheerleaders may want to believe and sell, the incontrovertible fact remains that the UN's repeated, unfulfilled calls for a proper census and registration in the Tindouf camps tell a different story about governance and accountability that no slogan can drown out. Algeria's posture has moved from proxy diplomacy to strategic fixation, a choice that has cost it flexibility just as European energy priorities and Atlantic security concerns have shifted south and west. And while Algiers can keep financing a stalemate, it cannot reverse the slow, cumulative consolidation of Moroccan sovereignty that shows up in council votes, bilateral statements, port cranes, and road signs rather than on Twitter timelines. Control of the southern port of Dakhla effectively blocked the Polisario from ever establishing a viable state. The separatists were left landlocked in the desert interior, wholly dependent on Algerian safe havens and supply routes. For Algeria, this was a strategic defeat. Its investment – military, financial, and diplomatic – in creating a 'Sahrawi republic' with a coastline collapsed overnight. Internationally, the Moroccan move reframed the conflict: the narrative shifted from 'decolonization' to one of territorial integrity and counter-separatism in a continent where dozens of borders are artificial and fragile. By contrast, Morocco's offer is on the table and has been since 2007. The heart of this initiative is a detailed autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty that Parliament can debate, that the Palace can guarantee, that the UN can situate within its process, and that partners now explicitly name as the credible basis for a solution. And it is precisely because it is specific and administrable that this offer is gaining ground while maximalist banners gather dust. So when August 14 returns each year it is not nostalgia for a single day in 1979, it is a reminder that the Sahara file has always rewarded those who do the quiet work of building facts that endure, that the oath of Oued Eddahab was not theater but a constitutional act, that the development model is not cosmetics but a budget, and that autonomy under sovereignty is not a slogan but a governance architecture ready to be filled with schools, ports, courts and councils. And this, ultimately, is the only language the region and the world still take seriously. It is also a reminder of Morocco's core doctrine: act decisively, deny adversaries the initiative, and turn legal vulnerabilities into lasting geopolitical assets. Read also: Omar Hilale: 50th Green March Anniversary Set for Definitive Western Sahara Closure
