Philippines sees no issue if Japan amends Constitution to define SDF
Speaking to Kyodo News on Tuesday, Foreign Secretary Theresa Lazaro said that revising Article 9 of Japan's supreme law, which renounces war and bans Japan from possessing a military, to define the SDF "will augur well" for its relations with the Philippines and suit the current security issues.
"We see no emotional hang-up on such a situation. It's a different world now. We are interconnected," Lazaro said when asked how the issue is viewed by the Philippines with its harrowing experience under the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 during World War II.
Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party has long sought to mention the SDF in the Constitution to counter claims the forces are unconstitutional. The supreme law was drafted under the U.S.-led Allied occupation of Japan after the war and took effect in 1947.
During the war, which ended with Japan's surrender to the Allied powers on Aug. 15, 1945, approximately 1.1 million Filipinos and 500,000 Japanese soldiers and citizens died. While a strong anti-Japanese sentiment swept the Philippines for years after the occupation, the two countries normalized relations 11 years later and have since continued improving them.
The Philippines in 2023 became a recipient of Japan's official security assistance aimed at supporting like-minded partners by providing defense equipment. The two countries signed the Reciprocal Access Agreement last year to facilitate the transfer of SDF and Philippine military personnel for joint exercises and disaster relief.
The defense deals were made as both the Philippines and Japan, along with United States and other countries, face China's growing assertiveness in regional waters along with North Korea's missile and nuclear threats.
Meanwhile, Lazaro, who assumed her post early this month, said the Department of Foreign Affairs is considering sending officials to a memorial service for the Japanese and Philippine war dead "to commemorate this very important occasion."
Although the Philippine government has sent a message to the embassy-organized event that is held annually on Aug. 15 at the Japanese Memorial Garden in Laguna, south of Manila, Philippine officials have not usually attended.
In 2016, Japan's then Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko visited the site, which was built in 1973 by Japan, while Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba became the first Japanese leader to do so when he went there in April this year.
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