Lebanese Syriac Union Party Leader Ibrahim Mrad: Hizbullah Are Traitors Who Should Be Tried and Hanged from Electric Poles – They Destroyed Lebanon and Assassinated Its Leaders
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Memri
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- Memri
Lebanon At A Crossroads, Between Sovereignty And Continued Control By Hizbullah And Its Weapons
Introduction On August 5, 2025, the Lebanese government is expected to convene for a session on the issue of disarming Hizbullah. This will be the second discussion on the matter since the government's establishment on February 8, after the first discussion, in April, yielded no results.[1] The upcoming session takes place as Lebanon once again faces a crucial juncture in its history, fifty years after the outbreak of civil war: will it extricate itself from the grip of Hizbullah and Iran and embark on a new path – that of a sovereign state, free from the control of sectarian militias loyal to another state? Or will it once more miss the opportunity and allow Hizbullah to maintain its status as a state-within-a-state, while retaining its weapons and using them to impose its will and the will of its patron Iran on the Lebanese state? Disarming the terror organization Hizbullah is the primary challenge now facing Lebanon, alongside the rebuilding of the country and its economy. On the face of it, this task should be easier today, after the organization has lost much of its power, both inside Lebanon and outside it, as a result of the war with Israel. Within Lebanon, most of its top command has been eliminated, starting with its previous secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, who brought Hizbullah to its present standing in Lebanon and abroad. The organization has also lost numerous fighters and weapons, its prestige has waned, and it has lost support even among its own base. Hizbulah's political clout has waned as well, following the election of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, figures who are not part of the resistance camp. In addition, it seems that the barrier of fear surrounding the organization in Lebanon has been breached, and today more and more voices are challenging the legitimacy of its weapons and its presence as a military force, and there are increasing calls to prosecute its operatives who were involved in crimes against Lebanese citizens. On the regional level, too, Hizbullah has lost many of its sources of power, starting with the resistance axis itself, headed by its patron Iran, which sustained severe blows in the war. Moreover, the conception advanced by this axis, of "the unity of the fronts" in fighting Israel, has collapsed. Iran itself sustained severe blows during its 12-day war with Israel and later also with the U.S. Although the Iranian regime did not fall, it lost many of its commanders and its military capabilities; furthermore, the war worsened the economic crisis in the country, which will no doubt detract from Iran's ability to fund the terrorist organizations it sponsors. That said, even today Hizbullah must not be underestimated – neither in terms of its weapons and fighters nor in terms of the popular support it enjoys. Despite the blows it has suffered, it remains a significant and dangerous force, particularly inside Lebanon. It is now working to rebuild its military might, in direct contravention of the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and Israel, which was signed with the mediation and approval of the organization's ally, Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and with the consent of the organization itself.[2] In fact, Hizbullah began to undermine the ceasefire agreement immediately after it was signed, by claiming that it does not demand its complete disarmament but applies only to South Lebanon. In actuality, the agreement calls for the armed forces to dismantle unauthorized military infrastructures and positions and seize unauthorized weapons "starting with the southern Litani area."[3] In other words, the agreement implies that this activity should begin with South Lebanon but also continue beyond this region. In an attempt to justify its position, Hizbullah claims that its weapons are vital to the country's security and defense, and calls for dialogue about Lebanon's "national defense strategy." Moreover, it has defined the general outlines of this dialogue in advance by declaring that its weapons must remain a central part of it. Furthermore, despite its claims that its weapons are directed only at external enemies, Hizbullah directs accusation of treason at any Lebanese who calls to disarm it and threatens to "sever the hand" of anyone who dares to do so – thus validating its opponents' claims that it weapons are also directed at its rivals at home. The organization is also exploiting the events in Syria – namely the attacks by elements affiliated with the new regime, headed by Ahmed Al-Sharaa, on concentrations of minorities, as well as the Israeli attacks in Syria – to justify retaining its weapons. The organization's opponents, for their part, are trying to leverage Hizbullah's relative weakness and the American, European and Gulf support for disarming it, and are therefore sharpening their tone against it. They are urging the state and the president to meet their obligation to dismantle the organization's military framework, as required by international resolutions and the ceasefire agreement, and recently there have even been calls to outlaw Hizbullah. Caught in the middle are Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun, who assumed their roles after the ceasefire agreement with Israel and face tremendous pressure – from both inside and outside the country – to accomplish a series of goals: extricate Lebanon from the financial crisis that threatens to bring it to the brink of bankruptcy; rehabilitate it following the war; and extend the state's sovereignty over all its territory. The president and prime minister have both declared their commitment to fully implement the ceasefire agreement and the UN Security Council resolutions that explicitly call to disarm Hizbullah. President Aoun is apparently the one leading this effort, for he has declared on numerous occasions that he intends to achieve this objective, albeit by means of dialogue and not by force. However, this dialogue has yet to begin, and if it does begin, it may enable Hizbullah to buy time to rebuild itself and threaten its opponents, as it is already doing. It should be stressed that the longer the government and the president delay in dealing with the issue of Hizbullah's disarmament, the more difficult this task will become, due to the organization's efforts to recover and regain its political and military power, and the likelihood that global attention, which at present is still focused to some extent on Lebanon and this issue, will gradually wane. The challenge now rests with Lebanon and Israel, as well as the U.S. and France, which are guarantors of the agreement: will they manage to leverage the shift in the regional power balance to force Hizbullah to disarm – a task they did not manage to accomplish after the war between Hizbullah and Israel in 2006? As of this writing, and despite its relatively strong position, the first to back down was actually the U.S. In late June 2025, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack proposed a softer approach to Hizbullah and its weapons, an approach that essentially adopts the French position, which distinguishes between Hizbullah's political and military wings. Barrack also stressed that disarming Hizbullah was an internal matter to be decided by the Lebanese state, and that the U.S. had no intention of interfering in it. Furthermore, the roadmap he proposed to Lebanese officials focused on Hizbullah surrendering only its heavy weapons.[4] Hizbullah fighters (Image: This report reviews the positions of the various elements in Lebanon on the issue of Hizbullah's disarmament. Hizbullah's Position: Retaining Its Arms And Minimizing The Ceasefire Agreement While Threatening UNIFIL And Opponents At Home Although Hizbullah sustained painful blows during its year of fighting against Israel, it was not vanquished. It retains its weapons and threatens to use them against Israel again, if necessary. The ceasefire provides it with an opportunity to refurbish its image and standing within Lebanon and to rebuild its military wing, which is "the essence of Hizbullah," according to Mahmoud Qamati, member of the organization's Political Council.[5] It should be stressed that the ceasefire agreement is essentially a road map for disarming Hizbullah,[6] and that the organization apparently never intended to fully comply with it. At present it is trying to prevent the implementation of its main part, namely the disarmament, without being seen as violating the agreement. To this end, since signing the agreement it has been implementing it only partially, while reinterpreting it unilaterally to suit its interests. In fact, the organization continues to follow the strategy it has adopted since its establishment: of placing responsibility for its actions on the state and hiding behind the state when convenient, while threatening its opponents at home. Currently, Hizbullah is demanding that the state repair the damage caused by the war it started without the state's consent, and also expects the state to protect it from Israeli attacks, which are intended to prevent Hizbullah from violating the ceasefire agreement it agreed to. Hizbullah: We Will Hold On To Our Weapons; The Ceasefire Agreement Applies Only To The Area South Of The Litani Immediately after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, Hizbullah clarified that it would retain its weapons and began to undermine the agreement by seeking to redefine its geographical scope. It claims that the agreement applies only to the area south of the Litani and that the fate of its weapons beyond that area is an internal Lebanese matter to be determined through dialogue. In other words, according to Hizbullah, this issue is not part of the agreement and therefore is not within the purview of the international body charged with monitoring the agreement's implementation, namely the International Monitoring and Implementation Mechanism (IMIM), led by the U.S. and including Israel, Lebanon, France and UNIFIL. Furthermore, Hizbullah has declared its intention to rebuild its military wing, without government oversight. In a December 14, 2024 speech, Hizbullah Secretary-General Na'im Qassem asserted that the ceasefire agreement "applies only south of the Litani River. [It stipulates that] Israel must withdraw to its border with Lebanon and the Lebanese army must deploy as the sole [force] authorized to bear arms… The agreement has nothing to do with internal Lebanese affairs, [such as] the relationship between the resistance [i.e., Hizbullah] and the state and armed forces, and the existence of [Hizbullah's] weapons.' Qassem admitted that, due to the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria, Hizbullah "has currently stopped [receiving] military supplies via Syria," but stressed that this would not prevent it from rearming, saying: "The new [Syrian] regime may renew this [supply] route, otherwise we will look for alternative routes."[7] About six months later, in an interview with the Al-Mayadeen television channel that was shot on June 11 and broadcast about a month later, Qassem claimed that his organization was rebuilding itself, saying: "We are prepared. We are recovering and rehabilitating ourselves…"[8] In addition, the organization insists on describing itself as "resistance," which, according to its officials, is a principle accepted by the international community and anchored in UN Security Council resolutions. Accordingly, it argues that UN Security Council Resolutions 1680 and 1559, which are cited in Resolution 1701 and in the ceasefire agreement, do not apply to it because they refer to disarming the "armed militias" in Lebanon, and Hizbullah is not "a militia" but rather legitimate and accepted resistance force. As for the discussions about its weapons, Hizbullah contends that they should be part of formulating Lebanon's "national defense strategy," and has recently even set terms regarding the timing and content of these discussions. It asserts that they must begin only after Israel withdraws from South Lebanon and ceases its military operations there, and after the state pledges to start repairing the damages caused by the war. In this manner the organization seeks to defuse the leverage of its rivals at home and abroad, who contend that Israel's withdrawal and the rebuilding of Lebanon cannot happen before the organization surrenders its weapons. Recently, Hizbullah toughened its position even further and set additional conditions for the start of the talks on this matter, in an attempt to postpone it for as long as possible. For instance, in a July 18 speech, Secretary-General Qassem said: "Today, Lebanon faces three real dangers. The first danger is Israel on its southern border, which threatens all of Lebanon and its future. The second danger is ISIS on its eastern border [i.e., in Syria]… The third danger is the tyranny of America, which seeks to control Lebanon and force its patronage upon it…" Qassem went on to say that only when these dangers are eliminated will it be possible to commence discussions on Lebanon's national defense strategy.[9] In a speech he delivered on July 30, 2025, Qassem reiterated his outright rejection of the demand that Hizbullah disarm and confine itself to political activity. He asserted: "Our weapons [exist] to oppose Israel. They have nothing to do with Lebanon's internal [affairs]. Our weapons are [a source of] strength for Lebanon. We say that we are willing to discuss how these weapons will be part of Lebanon's strength, but we will not allow them to be handed over to Israel. Today, anyone who demands that the weapons be surrendered is in essence demanding that they be handed over to Israel… Don't anybody play this game with us. We will never be among those who deliver weapons to Israel… Anyone who now demands that the weapons be surrendered – be he in Lebanon or abroad, an Arab or an international [figure] – is serving the Israeli plan…"[10] As for the content of the discussions, Hizbullah views itself as a significant component of Lebanon's defense strategy, alongside the armed forces. This is evident from remarks by Mahmoud Qamati, a member of Hizbullah's Political Council, who stressed that the organization was prepared to discuss weapons only as part of talks about the country's defense strategy, "which includes the resistance, alongside the Lebanese army, people and state."[11] Hizbullah Secretary-General Qassem even took it upon himself to outline the boundaries between the state's powers and Hizbullah's, saying: "We [agree] that the weapons should be only in the hands of the state. But which weapons? Those that protect the citizens, [Lebanon's] internal security. The weapons of the resistance, on the other hand, are dedicated solely to confronting the Israeli enemy, and have nothing to do with internal [security]…"[12] It Is The Responsibility Of The State To Force Israel To Meet Its Obligations; If It Fails, We Will Act The heads of the organization repeatedly stress that the Lebanese state, which signed the ceasefire agreement with Israel, is also the one that must force Israel to implement it, and that the ability to do so is a test of the government's competence. If it fails, they say, it will demonstrate the need for Hizbullah's weapons, proving what has already been proved in the past: that Hizbullah is the only one that can force Israel to withdraw. The organization officials also emphasize that, if needed, Hizbullah will not hesitate to act against Israel just as it did in the past – namely without the state's consent. In a June 28 speech, Qassem said: "…[The agreement] has created a new situation, headed 'the responsibility of the state'… We have complied with the agreement in full… [and] now they tell us to 'hand over the weapons'… Are we to dismantle our means of power, which frightened [Israel] and affected it, and compelled it to reach an agreement, while Israel is still in [our territory] and is not meeting all its obligations?... We are committed to the agreement while the Israelis are not. [Dealing with Israel's] ongoing aggression and violations is the responsibility of the Lebanese state. The state must exert pressure and fulfill all its obligations… Do you think we will remain silent forever? No, there's a limit to everything… We have only one choice… We will fulfill our obligation. We will remain in the field, and we will pray to Allah and trust Him to send us His angels and help us succeed. If not on the first day, then on the second or third. If not in the first month, then in the second or third. And if not at our hands, then at the hands of someone else. We always win, by attaining either victory or martyrdom."[13] Threats To Use Weapons Against Hizbullah's Opponents: Any Hand That Reaches For Our Weapons Will Be Severed Despite Qassem's abovementioned claim, that Hizbullah's weapons "are dedicated solely to confronting the Israeli enemy, and have nothing to do with internal [security]," the organization continues to use its weapons to threaten its rivals at home. For example, Qassem warned that "we will not let anyone take the weapons of Hizbullah or the resistance… The phrase 'taking the weapons' should be erased from the lexicon. We will not let anyone take the weapons of the resistance, which are its supporting pillar… [In fact,] we will confront anyone who harms the resistance and attempts to take its weapons… whether it is Israel, America or their proxies, just as we confronted Israel…"[14] Hizbullah Political Council member Mahmoud Qamati went so far as to threaten President Aoun after the latter expressed hope that, in 2025, weapons would remain only in the hands of the state.[15] Qamati said that "the hand reaching for Hizbullah's weapons will be severed."[16] After his statements sparked a furor, Qamati refused to apologize and clarified that he had said them in response to the "provocative discourse in Lebanon."[17] Shi'ite mufti Ahmad Qabalan, who is close to Hizbullah, also warned: "Beware of playing with fire, because we… have nothing to lose… The fuse of civil war is in the hands of those who insist on besieging, punishing and strangling us and would even bury us alive if they could…"[18] Action Against UNIFIL In South Lebanon Disguised As "Popular Resistance" By "Locals" In the recent months, there were reports of several incidents in which South Lebanon "locals" intercepted UNIFIL patrols and prevented them from entering certain areas on the pretext that they were not escorted by the Lebanese army.[19] Hizbullah also used this method in the period before the recent war, when its operatives, disguised as locals, initiated confrontations with UNIFIL forces tasked with preventing the presence of armed Hizbullah fighters in South Lebanon. Among these incidents was the December 14, 2022 confrontation between "locals" and UNIFIL forces in which UNIFIL soldier Sean Rooney was killed and three others were wounded – all of them members of the organizations Irish peacekeeping force. Contrary to Hizbullah's claims, these were not spontaneous local incidents but rather planned operations by its operatives. Moreover, about a month after the signing of the ceasefire agreement, there were indications that Hizbullah was laying the groundwork for renewed military activity in South Lebanon in the guise of "popular resistance," when two previously unknown groups appeared and declared they would undertake armed resistance against the IDF forces deployed there. Figures close to Hizbullah signaled their approval of these activities by stating that they understood "the anger of the locals" who "refuse to ignore" the activities of the IDF.[20] In light of this, Hizbullah may also conduct armed operations against UNIFIL, disguised as "popular resistance by locals," and perhaps even target the Lebanese security forces, if they overstep the boundaries Hizbullah has drawn for them. Lebanon's President And Government Caught Between Their Good Intentions And Fear Of Confronting Hizbullah For the first time in many years, Hizbullah faces a government and a president who do not accept its authority. One of the main issues on the agenda of the president and the government is Hizbullah's future as a military force, i.e., the future of its weapons and its fighters. Regarding the former, the president, the prime minister and many of the government ministers have repeatedly stressed that the question isn't whether Hizbullah will be disarmed, but only when and how this will happen. In his inaugural speech, President Aoun asserted "the right of the state to be the only body holding weapons, and to invest in its army so as to control its borders," and stressed his determination to preserve Lebanon's territorial integrity and implement the international resolutions.[21] The government, headed by Prime Minister Salam, pledged in its guidelines to implement the president's statements regarding "the state's obligation to be exclusively authorized to possess weapons." Also, for the first time in years, these guidelines did not include the principle imposed by Hizbullah that proclaims "the army, the people and the resistance" to be the key components of Lebanon's defense strategy and thereby legitimizes Hizbullah's weapons.[22] Lebanese President Joseph Aoun (Image: Al-Nahar, Lebanon, July 31, 2025) However, despite the decisive statements from the Lebanese heads of state, for more than six months after assuming office these leaders were seemingly apprehensive about confronting Hizbullah. They appeared to be handling the issue in a way that would allow them to claim, to audiences inside and outside the country, that they were acting to disarm Hizbullah, as required by the ceasefire agreement, but without reaching the point of a direct clash with the organization. President Aoun, who is leading the process vis-à-vis Hizbullah, stressed that he intended to do so through dialogue with it, so as to reach "solutions accepted by all Lebanese."[23] In fact, he clarified his concerns about confronting Hizbullah, saying, ""We will deal with the issue in a responsible manner, for that is crucial to ensure the security of the public… Any intra-Lebanese dispute can only be resolved based on the rationale of reconciliation. We will implement the issue of confining the weapons [to the state], but we are waiting for the right circumstances to determine how this should be done."[24] The president did not explain what these circumstances were, and his remarks imply that there is no deadline for implementing the process. This impression is confirmed by the fact that, despite repeated calls from MPs and politicians, Aoun did not convene the Supreme Defense Council until May 2, some five months after assuming the presidency. When it finally convened its discussions focused not on Hizbullah but rather on the Palestinian weapons inside Lebanon, or, more precisely, on Hamas's weapons. In late July 2025, there seemed to be a shift in the stance of the president and the government, possibly as a result of internal and external pressure, and also due to Hizbullah's increasingly harsh rhetoric regarding its weapons. For the first time in many months, Prime Minister Salam announced that the government session on August 5 would address the issue of Hizbullah's arms. In a July 31 speech, just a few days before the session, President Aoun reiterated the call for Hizbullah to disarm, saying: "Out of loyalty to the fallen and their sacrifice... we must stop the deaths in this land and put an end to the destruction and suicide, especially when the wars have become futile and are prolonged for the benefit of others... We must seize this historic opportunity and emphasize without hesitation that the weapons must be only in the hands of the army and the security forces, throughout Lebanon's territory. [This must happen] sooner rather than later, in order to restore the world's confidence in us and in the state's ability to maintain its security... Referring to the roadmap presented to Lebanese officials by U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack, Aoun stated that it had undergone "significant changes" and would be presented to the government "to determine a timeline for its implementation." According to him, Lebanon's main demands from the envoy were for Israel to immediately cease its offensive activity in Lebanon, including the targeted attacks, withdraw beyond the internationally-recognized border and release the prisoners it is holding. On the domestic front, Aoun called for "extending state control over all of Lebanon's territory and for all armed groups, including Hizbullah, to surrender their weapons to the Lebanese army." On the international level, he called for the Lebanese armed forces to receive ten billion dollars in financial aid over ten years, for the convening of an international conference on Lebanon's reconstruction, and for the demarcation of the Lebanon-Syria border, among other demands. Aoun asserted that all these steps must be taken "simultaneously." That is, he effectively rejected Hizbullah's demand that the discussion about its weapons take place only Israel complies with the aforementioned demands. At the same time, he also implicitly dismissed the opposite demand made by the U.S. and Israel – that Hizbullah disarm before Israel takes these steps. It should be emphasized that, despite these firm statements, particularly regarding Hizbullah's weapons, President Aoun did not set a definite timetable for the disarmament of Hizbullah and the other militias. Nor did he address the mechanism by which this would be accomplished. It remains to be seen whether Hizbullah will respond to this call, and what steps the government and President Aoun will take to ensure that the process actually takes place. The Future Of Hizbullah's Fighters Alongside the debate about the future of Hizbullah's weapons, there is also the question of its fighters. According to various estimates, the organization has several tens of thousands of skilled and trained men, many of whom have families to support, which means that dismantling Hizbullah's military wing may create an economic and employment crisis among the organization's members and support base. Perhaps in an attempt to sweeten the pill and in a nod to Hizbullah, President Aoun suggested integrating its fighters into the Lebanese Armed Forces in accordance with their skills and the army's needs. Reports in the Lebanese and Arab media suggest that other proposals have been floated as well, all of them allowing the organization's fighters to continue operating in or alongside the Lebanese army and security forces. Some of these proposals even came from senior Hizbullah officials whose identity was not disclosed. Among the proposals are: replicating the model of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units (PMU); establishing a separate unit that will operate alongside the army, and forming a sort of civilian border guard unit that will operate under the army's auspices. Significantly, all these ideas leave Hizbullah's military organizational framework intact, or, at the very least, maintain the operational fitness of its fighters. It is also possible that these ideas were floated as trial balloons to gauge the reactions of the organization and its opponents at home and abroad. Integrating Hizbullah's Fighters Into Various Units Of The Lebanese Armed Forces This idea was put forward by President Aoun when he described his favored option to the Qatari daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, ahead of his visit to Qatar in April 2025. He said that Hizbullah's operatives "are ultimately Lebanese. [So] if they want to join the army, they can join recruitment courses, like the operatives of the Progressive Socialist Party [headed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt] and the members of the [Christian] Lebanese Forces party [did after the civil war ended in 1990]. If they meet the conditions and requirements in terms of education, medical condition and age, they will be accepted. What applies to all Lebanese will also apply to the young men of Hizbullah. We have not discussed this with them, but this is my view. We will apply the [National] Defense Law to them and to others."[25] It should be noted that, although integrating Hizbullah's fighters in the army as individuals and not as an organizational unit will indeed dismantle or at least weaken Hizbullah, it is also likely to affect the character and functioning of the Lebanese army. Absorbing thousands or even tens of thousands of Hizbullah fighters into the Lebanese army, which currently has about 80,000 servicemen, will completely alter its identity and operation, especially if they attain positions of command. Furthermore, Hizbullah opponents claim that its members are ideologically motivated and loyal first and foremost to the Ruling Jurisprudent, i.e., the Supreme Leader of Iran, and not to the Lebanese state. In other words, there is a possibility that they will function as a fifth column within the Lebanese army. Replicating The PMU Model According to Lebanese and Arab media, the idea of replicating the Iraqi PMU model was also floated, but was unequivocally rejected by both President Aoun and opponents of Hizbullah. The PMU was established in Iraq in 2014 – with the support and guidance of Iran and based on a fatwa by Iraqi Shi'ite leader Ali Al-Sistani – as an umbrella organization of numerous militias, most of them Shi'ite, officially tasked with fighting the Sunni jihad organization ISIS. In 2016, the Iraqi parliament passed a law making the PMU subordinate to the Irai prime minister and part of Iraq's armed forces. But, despite this, its member militias are also permitted to operate independently. For the militias, this is an optimal situation: they and their weapons are sanctioned by the state and receive state funding as forces combatting ISIS, but they also maintain their independence. And as a matter of fact, most of these militias remain loyal to the Iranian regime, which maintains close and direct contact with them. According to this model, Hizbullah could maintain its military organizational framework, even if officially subordinate to the president or the government and funded by the state. President Aoun is apparently leery of this idea because, when asked about it by the Qatari daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, he replied, "No, no way. No PMU and no independent unit within the army."[26] Establishing Independent Military Frameworks Attached To The Army The third option, proposed even before the signing of the ceasefire agreement, involves establishing military frameworks for Hizbullah's operatives that would be administratively attached to the army and operate under its command. One proposal was to reestablish the "Supporters of the Army" (Ansar Al-Jaysh), a force that existed in Lebanon in the 1970s and consisted of armed "civilians" who operated in the border villages of South Lebanon. They were paid by the army, and tasked with gathering intelligence, building fortifications and performing guard duty. This model is apparently being promoted by Hizbullah itself. The Al-Nahar daily quoted an unnamed Hizbullah official who praised the model, saying that these operatives enjoyed "great leeway" in operating against Israel.[27] Mahdi Akil, an expert on regional issues who publishes in the Al-Akhbar daily and on the Al-Mayadeen website, both of which are affiliated with Hizbullah, wrote about the need to establish "an auxiliary army" due to the quantitative and qualitative "weakness" of the Lebanese army, and in light of the great threat to posed by Israel to Lebanon. Akil claimed that the "Supporters of the Army" model could provide an appropriate solution to this problem.[28] It should be mentioned that, prior to the ceasefire, elements close to Hizbullah raised similar proposals, aimed mainly at granting Hizbullah's military wing official standing as a legitimate fighting force alongside the state security apparatuses. For instance, Arab media reported that associates of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is an ally of Hizbullah, suggested establishing a "South Brigade," comprising 10,000 to 15,000 Hizbullah operatives, which would be responsible for security in South Lebanon. Another proposal was to cancel the position of Chief of Staff and replace it with a 'joint headquarters' of several military bodies, including a missile unit commanded by Hizbullah.'[29] Position Of Hizbullah's Opponents: Hizbullah Not Legitimate; No Room For Dialogue About Its Weapons; It Should Be Disarmed, By Force If Necessary Conversely, there are growing voices in Lebanon – including within the government – calling to disarm Hizbullah completely and immediately, with no debate or dialogue. These voices also warn of Hizbullah attempts to evade implementing the ceasefire agreement and to rebuild itself. They reject the proposals to integrate Hizbullah into the Lebanese security forces, viewing this as a way for Hizbullah to retain its military power. Among these voices are Hizbullah's "traditional" opponents, including the Lebanese Forces party, headed by Samir Geagea; the Phalanges, or Kataeb Party, headed by Samy Gemayel, and the Maronite Patriarch Bechara Boutros Al-Rahi. Joining them are former senior politicians such as former Lebanese president Michel Suleiman, former prime minister Fouad Siniora and several Shi'ites who oppose Hizbullah, such as journalist Ali Al-Amin. Also in this camp are elements that were previously allied with Hizbullah but in the past year have joined its opponents, most prominently the Free Patriotic Movement party, led by Gebran Bassil. Dialogue Or Debate About Hizbullah Weapons Is A Waste Of Time Hizbullah's opponents reject its legitimacy as a military force and its demand to discuss its weapons as part of formulating a national defense strategy, viewing this as an attempt to buy time. For example, Ma'rouf Al-Da'ouq, a columnist for the Lebanese Al-Liwa daily, wrote: "Hizbullah is trying once again to drag the country into the trap of dialogue. This is a clear attempt to buy time, in hopes that there will be regional or international developments that will serve [Hizbullah's] interests and ultimately enable it to retain its weapons with no restrictions…" Al-Da'ouq added that, based on past experience, Hizbullah will not hesitate to dodge its commitments before the ink is even dry.[30] Hizbullah's Weapons Do Not Protect Lebanon But Rather Cause It To Be Attacked Hizbullah's opponents stress that disarming it is an important condition for extending the state's sovereignty over all its territory, and reject the organization\s claim that its weapons are vital to Lebanon's national security, noting that these weapons are actually the reason for attacks by Israel, as demonstrated in the latest war. In his 2025 Easter sermon, Maronite Patriarch Al-Rahi said: "We are in complete agreement that weapons outside the framework of the state or its decisions endanger Lebanon's interests for many reasons. The time has come for all of us to say that the state, the army and the official security forces are the ones [responsible for] defending Lebanon…"[31] Lebanese MP Ghassan Hasbani, of the Lebanese Forces party, said that Hizbullah's weapons do not defend Lebanon, but actually caused the war. He said to Al-Jadeed TV: "[In Lebanon] there are weapons that are not in the hands of the state… These weapons led to a very large attack by an enormous military power in the region… that no regional country can stop… The existence of Hizbullah's weapons justifies these Israeli attacks…"[32] Independent MP Ibrahim Mneimneh said: "These weapons bring no benefit, and are used only for internal needs and threats. They have no legitimacy and should be immediately handed over to the state."[33] The Ceasefire Agreement Applies Throughout Lebanon; Hizbullah Must Be Disarmed Completely, Even By Force Hizbullah's opponents repeatedly stress that the ceasefire agreement applies to all parts of Lebanon and insist that the state must completely disarm the organization as part of this agreement, i.e., under international oversight. They contend that these weapons expose Lebanon to the danger of Israeli attacks or civil war and prevent it from receiving international aid and support. Former Lebanese president Michel Suleiman said after the funeral of slain Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah: "It's time to leave behind us the [era] of [Hizbullah's] statelet-within-a-state, [which took] decisions about war in every direction and arena. It's time for the [Lebanese] state to be exclusively in charge of sovereignty and foreign policy, and for weapons to be in the hands of Lebanon's army. The armed organizations that are outside the legitimate framework must be dismantled… We must start to build the state, its institutions and its military forces and to put all our resources in its service, instead of devoting time to rehabilitating the resistance and its various institutions."[34] On another occasion Suleiman said that Hizbullah's claim that it is permitted to retain its weapons in the area north of the Litani River "is totally contrary to Resolution 1701 and to the recent ceasefire agreement. This is another death blow to peace, [which means] the continuation of the war, the collapse of the economy and Lebanon's isolation in the international arena."[35] Lebanese MP Camille Cham'oun, of the Strong Republic bloc, head of the Free National Party, remarked: "Hizbullah agreed to the ceasefire agreement and to Resolution 1701, which stipulates that weapons must be surrendered in all of Lebanon's territory. The U.S. and the international community are linking the rehabilitation [of the country] to the surrender of the weapons… The claim that weapons can be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations is an old one… Hizbullah must… hand over its weapons peacefully."[36] Wehbe Katicha, a former Lebanese MP from the Lebanese Forces party, remarked that Lebanon should disarm Hizbullah, even by force, if it refuses.[37] Criticism Directed At Lebanon's State Institutions: They Are Not Fulfilling Their Roles And Are Endangering The Country Hizbullah's opponents are directing their criticism not only at the organization itself but also at Lebanon's government and president, although many of them are among the president's and government's supporters. They accuse them for being tardy in fulfilling their duties and thereby exposing Lebanon to sanctions or to Israeli attacks, and some even claim that they are adopting Hizbullah's stance. They also argue that it was the state's evasion of its obligation to disarm the militias that led to the deadly civil war in the mid-70s, and that Hizbullah is likely to once again use its weapons to fight its rivals at home and to thwart government decisions, as it did on May 7, 2008.[38] Samir Geagea, head of the Lebanese Forces, a Christian party, harshly criticized the president's and the government's conduct and their response to the roadmap presented by U.S. special envoy Thomas Barrack in June 2025, and accused them of adopting Hizbulah's stance. "Despite all that has happened and everything we are suffering to this day," he said, "the response of Lebanon's leaders to some of the American proposals conforms almost exactly to what Hizbullah wants, with the exception of some cosmetic points." He added: "The illegitimate weapons in Lebanon are not an American problem, and after the 2024 war they are not an Israeli problem, either. They are primarily a Lebanese problem. The presence of illegitimate military and security organizations in Lebanon, chief of them Hizbullah, has crushed and continues to crush the Lebanese state." The demand to disarm these organizations, he stressed, comes from most of the Lebanese people and from Lebanon's friends in the East and the West.[39] Criticism of Aoun's stance in favor of holding talks with Hizbullah about its disarmament was also voiced by MP Camille Chamoun, who said: "Weapons and dialogue are two things that don't mix. Talks with Hizbullah on this matter are a waste of time. This is evident from the remarks of Hizbullah Secretary-General Na'im Qassem and the Hizbullah MPs who threatened to sever any hand that reached for the weapons…"[40] Lebanese journalist Ali Hamada wrote: "Some government members are addicted to making deals with Hizbullah in every domain, especially those who are hoping for a promotion or to make profits in some specific area. They make light of the issue of the treasonous weapons and take part in distracting [us] from the danger these weapons pose to the Lebanese – to the extent of believing that Hizbullah's weapons and its military and security apparatus are not top priorities, and that [eliminating them] is not a precondition for statehood and reform. These senior officials' deliberate neglect of the issue of the weapons must be seen as collaboration or capitulation. We direct the attention of several government members to their duty to the Lebanese and to the country… The weapons [that still exit] to the south and the north of the Litani, and everywhere else, are the foremost challenge [we face], which supersedes all others. This challenge is the key to the [hoped-for] correction and to defending the reform that the president and the government are talking about." Hamada urged the president and the government "to increase the pressure on the relevant party to conclude the matter of the weapons and of the military and security mechanisms that are operating outside the legitimate framework. Without this," he said, "there won't be a state or anything else."[41] In an article in the daily Nida Al-Watan, Elie Mahfoud, head of the Forces of Change bloc in the Lebanese parliament, which is affiliated with the Christian Lebanese Forces party, urged the government to present Hizbullah with two options: either announce, of its own free will, the dismantling of its military, security and intelligence arm and become a political party, and then implement all this within 60 days, or else be faced with a government decision that would essentially outlaw Hizbullah. Mahfoud warned: "If the government does not do this and make some progress in the process of saving [the country], it will supply oxygen to a group that is [just] waiting for an opportunity to pounce on what has already been achieved, and then we will be faced with a disaster that will take us back to the time of 'the Black Shirts'[42] and May 7, 2008."[43] * N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI.
Shafaq News
3 days ago
- Shafaq News
War is possible again: Lebanon's ongoing negotiations on Hezbollah's arsenal
Shafaq News After months of political back-and-forth, the issue of Hezbollah's weapons has become increasingly central in both domestic Lebanese discourse and international positioning. With time running short and diplomatic options narrowing, the debate is intensifying, signaling the potential for renewed escalation. Limited Diplomatic Window Many observers note that the possibility of removing the Lebanon file from US Syria envoy Tom Barrack is unlikely to alter Washington's or Tel Aviv's longstanding demands regarding Hezbollah's disarmament. Speculation surrounding the possible reappointment of former envoy Morgan Ortagus—known for her vocal support of Israel—has further fueled concerns about a diminishing diplomatic posture by the US in handling Lebanon's complex political and security landscape. Meanwhile, Hezbollah remains adamant about retaining its arsenal for the foreseeable future. In contrast, key international actors, led by the United States, continue to demand concrete steps toward consolidating state control over all weapons. This outlook is reinforced by a series of high-profile public statements that suggest the window for political resolution is rapidly closing. Diverging Rhetoric: Aoun's Appeal Versus Hezbollah's Defiance The Lebanese President Joseph Aoun issued a direct appeal to Hezbollah, calling for the group to hand over its weapons 'today rather than tomorrow,' framing the issue in existential terms, 'to liberate occupied territories, rebuild the state, restore international trust in Lebanon, and prevent further national collapse.' Aoun emphasized that the sacrifices of Lebanon's martyrs must not be in vain. Hezbollah's leadership, however, is far from the President's appeal. The Secretary-General Naim Qassem reiterated that disarmament is not on the table. He warned against reducing Lebanon to 'an Israeli annex,' regardless of the cost, and instead emphasized other priorities—including reconstruction efforts following the Israeli war and halting Israeli attacks. 'End the aggression and free the prisoners; only then can we have a serious discussion,' Qassem declared, dismissing any calls—domestic or foreign—for disarmament as serving 'the Israeli project,' and argued that Israel's ambitions extended beyond disputed border points, warning that disarming the resistance would pave the way for Israeli expansionism inside Lebanon. Despite the apparent contradiction between Aoun and Hezbollah, political sources suggest that a quiet but constructive dialogue is ongoing between the two sides. This conversation is expected to culminate in a government session that will formally address the state's monopoly over arms. Negotiations, Not Disarmament—For Now Lebanese political analyst Qassem Qassir told Shafaq News that disarmament is not currently on the agenda. He confirmed that negotiations between Hezbollah and the presidency continue, but stressed that any meaningful discussion about Hezbollah's weapons hinges on several non-negotiable conditions: ending Israeli aggression, withdrawing from Lebanese territory, releasing prisoners, and initiating reconstruction. 'These are firm and clear positions,' Qassir said. 'Any consideration of limiting arms to the state can only follow the fulfillment of these demands.' Qassir also emphasized that Hezbollah's heavy missiles and drones constitute 'a point of strength for Lebanon,' forming a strategic deterrent against Israel. 'These capabilities cannot be relinquished without assurances for their protection.' He further warned that the US and Israel do not merely seek Hezbollah's disarmament, but rather its destruction—whether those weapons are held by the party or the Lebanese Army. 'Israel may use the pretext of disarmament to justify a new war on Lebanon,' he cautioned. While internal discussions have floated the idea of placing Hezbollah's arms under unofficial state authority, Qassir concluded that no concrete steps have been taken by the Lebanese state toward actual disarmament. What is unfolding, he said, remains confined to preliminary consultations and general understandings. Israel Rejects Lebanese Initiative, Heightening Risks of Escalation With diplomacy faltering, many in Lebanon fear that an escalation is inevitable—possibly resembling the recent conflict that ended with a ceasefire agreement on November 27. Two developments in particular are fueling these fears. First is the continued pattern of Israeli airstrikes and targeted assassinations, concentrated in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. Second is a report by Reuters, citing five diplomatic sources, stating that Israel rejected a proposal from Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. The proposal had sought a halt to Israeli airstrikes as a first step toward fully implementing the ceasefire agreement. Israel has issued neither confirmation nor denial of the report. Potential Political Fallout? Beyond the battlefield risks, internal political repercussions also loom. Despite Hezbollah's entrenched role in the Lebanese government, ongoing external pressure and internal divisions over its weapons could reshape the very structure of governance. This unresolved contradiction—between Hezbollah's strategic doctrine and growing international insistence on state sovereignty—has yet to reach a breaking point. But the signals from all sides suggest that the margin for ambiguity is rapidly narrowing.
Memri
3 days ago
- Memri
Lebanese Syriac Union Party Leader Ibrahim Mrad: Hizbullah Are Traitors Who Should Be Tried and Hanged from Electric Poles – They Destroyed Lebanon and Assassinated Its Leaders
Ibrahim Mrad, president of the Lebanese Syriac Union Party, said in a July 29, 2025 interview on El Siyasa Channel on YouTube that he considers Hizbullah to be traitors and that its leaders should be put on trial and hanged from electric poles. He said Hizbullah has betrayed Lebanon and should not be allowed to participate in politics. Mrad added that this militia and political party has destroyed Lebanon, assassinated Lebanese leaders and elected officials, and should have been tried in a military court and hanged from the gallows.
