Indonesia's military once called all the shots. It may again under Prabowo
Indonesian rights groups have decried proposed revisions to a military law that could pave the way for active-duty military personnel to hold more civilian posts and engage in business activities, a haunting hallmark of dictator Suharto's New Order era.
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Rights and pro-democracy activists fear the practice, referred to as military dual-function or dwifungsi, could potentially return as lawmakers are pushing to revise a 2004 law on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI).
Under Suharto's 32-year rule, the military permeated national politics, as well as domestic affairs, as it helped Suharto cling to power and maintain order during various crises.
Military chief General Agus Subiyanto has said the current law is 'outdated' as it has not been amended for more than 20 years.
The 2004 military law 'is considered no longer relevant' to address various problems 'in implementing the fundamental norms of state policies and political decisions', Agus said at a meeting with the House of Representatives on Thursday.
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The revision bill was included by lawmakers in this year's legislative priority bills. Defence Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin had earlier last week revealed the government's focus on the legal amendment, including an article that restricts military personnel from holding civilian posts.
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