Sharia Court Has No Recognition In Law: Supreme Court

News18

25-04-2025

Last Updated:
The top court emphasised that any declaration or decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure
The Supreme Court has declared that Court of Kazi, Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat, Sharia Court, etc, by whatever name or style they may be, have no recognition in law, while allowing a maintenance plea by a Muslim woman under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
A bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah emphasised that any declaration or decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure.
'The only way such declaration/decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/decision by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other law. Even then, such declaration/decision, at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same, and not a third-party," the bench said.
The court clarified the position of law while relying upon Vishwa Lochan Madan Vs Union of India (2014) as it found a Muslim man initially filed a plea in a Court of Kazi and Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat seeking divorce from the wife.
The bench here was dealing with a plea filed by Shahjahan questioning the Allahabad High Court's order of August 03, 2018, which dismissed her revision petition against the family court at Jhansi's order of April 23, 2010, denying her maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The family court allowed only Rs 2,500 for her two children.
The marriage was solemnised on September 24, 2002, according to Islamic customs. This was the second marriage for both.
After hearing the counsel for the woman and the state government, the bench noted the appellant-woman contended that her husband had caused cruelty to her as she was not able to fulfil his demand for a motorcycle and Rs 50,000. On this aspect, the family court noted that since it was their second marriage, there is no possibility of demand of dowry by the man, as he would be trying to rehabilitate his house.
'Such reasoning/observation by the family court is unknown to the canons of law and is based on mere conjecture and surmise. The family court will do well, henceforth, to bear in mind the observation in Nagarathinam Vs State, through the Inspector of Police (2023) that the '…Court is not an institution to sermonise society on morality and ethics …'," the bench said.
The SC also emphasised that the family court could not have presumed that a second marriage for both parties would necessarily entail no dowry demand.
The bench also objected to the family court, taking note of the 2005 compromise between the couple, opined that it was the appellant's character and conduct which led to the rift in the conjugal life of the parties.
'This reasoning is based on the purported fact that the appellant in the compromise deed had admitted to her mistake. However, from a bare perusal of the compromise deed, it would become clear that it records no such admission. The first 'divorce suit' instituted by the husband in 2005 was dismissed on the basis of this compromise, wherein both parties decided to live together and agreed that they would not give the other party any occasion to complain. Hence, the very basis/reasoning for rejecting the appellant's claim for maintenance appears to be ex-facie unsustainable," the bench said.
The court also dealt with the question of from which date the maintenance will be payable—the date of the application or the date of the order.
In the case, the SC noted, the appellant contested the direction of the family court wherein it had made the maintenance payable from the date of the order instead of the date of application.
'Of course, Section 125(2) of the Code empowers the court to award maintenance from the date of the order but the same has to be justified in the background of the attendant facts and circumstances and should not cause unnecessary hardship to the applicant. In our view, Section 125 of the Code is a beneficial piece of legislation which has been enacted to protect the wife and children from destitution and vagrancy and, in the usual course, it would not be appropriate to disadvantage the applicant for the delay in the disposal of the application by the judicial system," the bench said, relying upon Rajnesh Vs Neha (2021).
Having noted the husband worked as Aarakshak (Constable) in BSF and earned Rs 15,000 when the application was filed in family court, the bench said it is to be borne in mind that this was the situation in 2008-2009 (nearly 16 years ago) and much water would have flown under the bridge since then.
'We are of the view that maintenance could not have been denied to the appellant-wife under the prevailing circumstances," the bench said, directing for payment of Rs 4,000 per month as maintenance to the appellant, from the date of filing of the maintenance petition before the family court.
The court also clarified that the maintenance awarded to the children will also be payable from the date of filing of the maintenance petition. Since the daughter has attained majority, the SC said, the maintenance awarded in her favour will only be payable up to the date of her attaining majority. The court directed the husband to deposit the amount in the family court within four months after adjustment of amounts, if any, already paid.
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tags :
divorce marriage sharia supreme court
Location :
New Delhi, India, India
First Published:
April 26, 2025, 04:19 IST