De facto decentralisation in Syria - World - Al-Ahram Weekly

Al-Ahram Weekly

23-07-2025

Clashes between Syria's Druze community and Sunni tribesmen showed the weakness of the country's interim government and the dangers of Israel's attempts at divide and rule
Tensions in Syria continued to simmer this week following a surge of violent and bloody clashes between the Druze community and Sunni tribes in the southern region of Sweida.
Despite efforts to de-escalate the situation, lasting stability remains elusive. Instead, there is growing apprehension that the crisis may deepen, exacerbated by the increasingly irreparable rift between Damascus's interim government and influential Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri.
Well-informed sources suggest that relations between the two have deteriorated beyond reconciliation, as the chasm widens between the transitional authorities' demands and those of Sheikh Al-Hijri, whose sway over his community has only strengthened after the recent brutal fighting and bloodshed
Following the interim authorities' declaration of a ceasefire in Sweida, Sheikh Al-Hijri swiftly dismissed the announcement, stating that there existed no agreement or negotiations with Damascus. Instead, he appealed for international intervention to shield the Druze community from identity-based killing.
Since the fall of the former Syrian regime in December, Al-Hijri has openly contested the legitimacy of the interim government, as well as its constitutional declaration, which he denounced as a 'dictatorial edict devoid of a popular mandate'.
Insisting on a more inclusive process, he has demanded a participatory democratic constitution crafted by representatives from Syria's diverse governorates. He has likewise rejected the deployment of government forces into Sweida, maintaining that internal security remains the sole prerogative of the province's inhabitants.
The rift between Al-Hijri and Damascus has now erupted into open confrontation.
Hamza Al-Mustafa, Syria's minister of information within the interim government, affirmed that the administration 'is diligently engaged in efforts to de-escalate tensions in Sweida, guided by a strategy that upholds national cohesion and thwarts external meddling.'
He emphasised that 'isolated actions such as those undertaken by Al-Hijri must not serve as a pretext to tarnish entire communities. Justice demands a clear distinction between individual conduct and collective identity.'
While other Druze religious figures, such as Sheikh Youssef Jarbou, have shown a reluctance to confront Damascus and have distanced themselves from Al-Hijri's appeals for international protection, the sectarian violence in Sweida has only solidified Al-Hijri's standing among the Druze majority.
This swelling support now presents the interim authorities with one of their most formidable challenges yet.
Since assuming power in January 2025, Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa has struggled to establish centralised authority, with the absence of a unified national army standing as his most critical challenge.
The new military remains a patchwork of former rebel factions absorbed wholesale with their existing command structures rather than a disciplined state force under Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra's control.
This lack of integration has perpetuated wartime divisions, with many groups retaining heavy weapons and operating autonomously. The government's failure to professionalise the armed forces has left local warlords and identity-based armed groups wielding real power, rendering Damascus's authority nominal in vast swaths of the country.
This institutional vacuum has revitalised sectarian and tribal loyalties as the primary drivers of security. When sectarian violence erupts, whether against minority Alawites on the coast or Druze in Sweida, fighters mobilise along communal lines, exacerbating fragmentation.
Al-Sharaa's presidency, built on his legacy as the former leader of the Islamist group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, faces a paradox: the very insurgent forces that toppled the former Syrian regime now resist subordination to the state they nominally serve.
Unlike his rule in the north of the country in Idlib under the previous regime, where control relied on ideological cohesion and localised coercion, governing Syria demands balancing competing ethnic and sectarian interests within a fractured military and society.
As a result, the transition appears increasingly hollow. Al-Sharaa's critics argue that rather than fostering inclusivity, his administration has concentrated power among a narrow elite, replicating the authoritarianism it ostensibly replaced.
Key institutions are staffed by loyalists, not consensus-driven figures, while the extension of the transitional period to five years, far beyond the typical six- to 12-month framework, suggests an entrenchment of power rather than a path to democracy.
The violence in Sweida, which has already claimed thousands of lives and left countless more wounded, has driven tens of thousands of civilians to seek refuge in the Daraa governorate, their exodus a stark testament to the deepening crisis.
Moreover, in stark contrast to the brutal clashes last March along the Alawite-dominated coast, where violence rooted in sectarian identity unfolded without external interference, the turmoil in Sweida has drawn direct Israeli involvement.
The Israeli response came in the form of shelling Syrian government forces and allied tribal militias, following Israel's declaration of a firm red line: no deployment of Syrian Army units in or around Sweida.
This external constraint significantly undermines the Interim government's capacity to enforce its sovereignty in the province through military means. While the long-term consequences of this impasse have yet to fully materialise, one thing is clear: the Kurdish leadership in the north is closely monitoring these violent developments.
As it continues delicate negotiations with the Damascus-based government, particularly over the terms of integrating into national institutions, foremost among them the army, the unfolding crisis in Sweida serves as a potent reminder of the fragile and fragmented nature of Syria.
An Arab diplomat speaking to the Al-Ahram Weekly on condition of anonymity described Syria as standing at a critical juncture, one whose outcome could profoundly threaten the nation's fragile unity.
'The current trajectory is deeply alarming,' the diplomat cautioned, given its potential to unleash further destabilisation.
'Almost 15 years of civil war, compounded by relentless regional and international interference, have transformed Syria into a theatre of staggering complexity, a tangled web of competing alliances, divergent visions, and irreconcilable interests. This labyrinthine reality has rendered the prospect of national cohesion nearly unattainable, leaving the country mired in fragmentation and perpetual strife,'
'The authorities in Damascus pursue objectives starkly at odds with those of Syria's ethnic and sectarian factions. Similarly, the ambitions of Turkey and the Gulf states diverge from the strategic priorities of Israel and the US,' he said.
Yet, the most intractable obstacle remains the absence of trust among the Syrian factions themselves, a legacy of years of bloodshed that has left each party clinging to external patrons rather than seeking common ground.
These developments cast profound doubt upon the interim government's capacity to forge a unified Syrian state from Damascus.
Since his appointment as US Special Envoy for Syria and Lebanon last May, Tom Barrack has consistently championed Washington's vision of a central Syrian state, firmly rejecting proposals to partition the nation along sectarian lines.
Yet, the escalating violence in Sweida has compelled Barrack to recalibrate his rhetoric. In remarks some days ago, he acknowledged Washington's 'profound concern' over the deteriorating situation, urging meaningful political inclusion for minority groups and demanding accountability for atrocities perpetrated by regime-aligned forces.
Perhaps most revealing was the tempered departure signaled by US State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce, who cautiously noted that Washington maintains 'no principled objection' to federalism or minority self-governance in Syria.
Asked whether the US opposes federalism or autonomy for minorities in Syria, she responded that 'we do not oppose federalism or self-governance, but the decision lies with the Syrians.'
A well-informed Western source close to Al-Sharaa and familiar with the complexities of the Syrian scene after the overthrow of the former regime told the Weekly that the growing likelihood of a decentralised system emerging in Syria 'stems less from a deliberate political decision by the Transitional Government and more from the increasing fragility of the central authority in Damascus'.
The state's inability to project effective control beyond limited territories is becoming increasingly apparent, he argued.
Syria today is a fragmented landscape, with competing military and political zones controlled by various actors. This fragmentation is not merely temporary but is solidifying into localised forms of governance that are more responsive to their populations than Damascus can currently afford to be.
One of the critical drivers of this shift is the empowerment of ethnic and sectarian communities such as the Kurds and Druze, who not only participated in the uprising against the former regime and the Islamic State (IS) group but have since taken steps since to institutionalise their autonomy.
These groups, having borne the brunt of the conflict, now demand not just recognition but also a stake in shaping the country's future. Their demands are amplified by scepticism over whether the interim government in Damascus genuinely intends to include them in the national dialogue or whether it will revert to the centralising tendencies of the past.
Compounding the political discontent are Syria's devastating socioeconomic conditions, which continue to erode the state's legitimacy and capacity. The country suffers from hyperinflation, widespread unemployment, crippled infrastructure, and crumbling public services.
The Syrian pound has lost most of its value, and millions are unable to meet basic needs. Investment is minimal, and the state's inability to provide jobs or even basic services has further alienated the population, pushing many local communities to rely on their own resources and governance mechanisms.
Moreover, whispers of normalisation with Israel without any substantive restitution of occupied land and without democratic oversight or public accountability serve to undermine the government's credibility while potentially bartering away Syria's sovereignty for the transient stability of those in power.
This pattern, argue Al-Sharaa's critics, reveals not a true political transformation, but rather the repackaging of authoritarian rule – a paradoxical dynamic where the state's institutional authority weakens even as its leaders tighten their grip on power.
All these indicators, including military fragmentation, political exclusion, economic collapse, and geopolitical vulnerability, point towards an inevitable shift toward decentralisation not as a choice, but as a consequence of systemic weakness.
Though Syria's interim government still retains a fleeting opportunity to reconstruct the nation on the foundations of pluralism and inclusive governance, that window is rapidly narrowing, the Arab diplomat warned.
Intensifying sectarian and ethnic fissures, exacerbated by the opportunistic ambitions of regional actors, chief among them Israel, threaten to extinguish what little hope remains.
In the turbulent wake of the former regime's collapse, Israel appears to be exploiting Syria's instability, seeking to fragment its territorial integrity. Cloaked in the language of humanitarian concern, its proposal for 'safe zones' in the south serves, in effect, as a bid to establish a demilitarised enclave under de facto Israeli control.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 24 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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