National Resistance Thwarts Largest Smuggling Operation of Iranian Weapons to Houthi Militia
In a statement, the military media of the National Resistance reported that the operation took place on **June 27**, resulting in the seizure of a smuggling vessel named **"Al-Sharwa."** The ship was carrying a massive shipment of advanced weapons, estimated at **750 tons**, sent by Iran's Revolutionary Guards to their proxy, the Houthi militia in Yemen.
The statement added that the confiscated weapons included:
- **Air defense and missile systems** (naval and aerial)
- **Attack and reconnaissance drones**
- **Advanced radar systems**
- **Launching systems**
- **Eavesdropping devices**
- **Konkurs anti-tank missiles**
- **B10 cannons**
- **Advanced sniper rifles**
- **Tracking lenses**
- **Large quantities of ammunition** (including Kalashnikov and "Shiki" rounds) and other military equipment.
The Resistance emphasized that this smuggling operation exposes **Iran's ongoing scheme to arm the terrorist Houthi militia**, debunking the group's claims of having "domestic military manufacturing capabilities." It also reveals the extent of the threat posed by the Iranian regime to **international navigation in the Red Sea** through its armed proxies.
The statement noted that the weapons were **tightly concealed**: strategic systems were disassembled and hidden inside **electric generators and industrial machinery**, while ammunition was stashed within **large battery compartments** to mislead maritime surveillance units.
The military media detailed that the operation began with **precise intelligence tracking** of a suspicious vessel departing from the **coast of the Horn of Africa**, operated by smugglers linked to the Houthi militia. Naval forces of the Resistance then intercepted the ship **west of the international maritime route in the Red Sea**, towing it to a secure area where the cargo was unloaded and documented.
The National Resistance stated that it would soon release **confessions from the ship's crew** and broadcast footage showing samples of the seized weapons and equipment.
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The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
