Dutch spies say Russian hackers targeted police
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THE HAGUE: A previously unknown Russian hacking group known as "Laundry Bear" was behind attacks last year on Dutch police, intelligence services in the Netherlands said Tuesday, with sensitive work-related data stolen.
The attack last September was part of a wider campaign by the Russian hackers against Western and Nato targets, according to an investigation by Dutch security and intelligence services AIVD and MIVD.
"We have seen that this hacker group successfully gains access to sensitive information from a large number of (government) organisations and companies worldwide," said MIVD director Peter Reesink.
"They have a specific interest in countries of the European Union and Nato," he added.
Laundry Bear hackers have targeted armed forces, governments and defence contractors as well as IT and service providers in several countries, the Dutch authorities said.
They have also tried to hit Dutch high-tech firms producing systems unavailable in Russia due to Western sanctions.
The investigation showed that Laundry Bear was "highly probably a Russian state-supported threat actor", the agencies said in their statement.
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The Dutch authorities also decided to expose the technical methods the hackers used to infiltrate systems, hoping this would allow for better defence.
"This limits Laundry Bear's chances of success and digital networks can be better protected," said AIVD chief Erik Akerboom.
"This increases our national resilience," he added.
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