Israel says it has attacked Houthi targets in Yemen's Hodeidah port
Minister of Defence Israel Katz on Monday said the military was 'forcefully countering any attempt to restore the terror infrastructure previously attacked'.
The Israeli military claimed that the 'port serves as a channel for weapons used by the Houthis to carry out terrorist operations against Israel and its allies'.
The Houthi movement, which controls large parts of northern Yemen, later claimed responsibility for drone and missile attacks on locations in Israel, including Ben Gurion airport, Ashdod and Jaffa.
In a statement, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the strikes were a direct response to the attacks on Hodeidah and Israel's continued bombardment of Gaza.
'The drone attack successfully achieved its objectives,' he said, adding that operations would continue until Israel ends its offensive on Gaza and lifts the siege.
Since Israel launched its war on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis have carried out several attacks on shipping lanes in the Red Sea, saying they were acting in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has responded with repeated strikes on Houthi targets, particularly in Hodeidah, a key entry point for goods and aid into Yemen.
'The Houthis will pay a heavy price for launching missiles toward the State of Israel,' Katz said.
Earlier this month, the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack on the Greek-owned vessel Eternity C, which maritime officials said had killed four people.
In May, the United States brokered a deal with the Houthis to halt their bombing campaign in exchange for reduced attacks on international shipping. However, the Houthis clarified that the agreement did not extend to operations involving Israel.
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Al Jazeera
23-07-2025
- Al Jazeera
Sudan's competing authorities are beholden to militia leaders, say analysts
In June, the Sudanese Armed Forces appointed Prime Minister Kamil Idris to lead the civilian cabinet in Port Sudan, the wartime capital on the Red Sea coast. Idris wanted an overhaul, to appoint a team of technocrats to run the new government. But Gebreil Ibrahim and Mini Arko Minawi – leaders of two powerful armed groups from Darfur – refused to leave their posts, and army leader Abdelfattah al-Burhan overruled Idris to keep them there. 'Burhan's concession to Ibrahim and Minawi allows them to keep ministries that control [government] revenue,' said Suliman Baldo, the founder of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, a think tank. Al Jazeera sent written questions to army spokesperson Nabil Abdullah, asking him why al-Burhan overruled Idris. No response had been received by the time of publication. On the other side of the war is a coalition of armed groups that have, de facto, divided Sudan in half after more than two years of civil war. The Rapid Support Forces paramilitary, which is battling the army, has formed an alliance with smaller armed factions and declared its intention to form a parallel government that will ostensibly represent all of Sudan. The RSF-backed coalition has already unveiled its leadership council, on which the leaders of armed groups feature in prominent positions. Analysts told Al Jazeera that SAF and the RSF are trying to meet the demands of powerful militias in a bid to keep their respective battlefield alliances intact. In February, the RSF announced that it had formed an alliance with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), an armed group from the Nuba Mountains led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu. From the beginning of the war, it had remained neutral, shocking observers when it allied with the RSF to form a new alliance and parallel government, which they named Tasis (foundation). The SPLM-N governs large swaths of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and has been at war with the army – as well as the RSF, which used to be the army's ally before they turned their guns on each other – for 40 years. SPLM-N was born out of the SPLM, which emerged in the early 1980s to fight for southern independence and to end its marginalisation by the elites of northern and central Sudan. The Nuba – a group of about 50 communities from what was then central Sudan – was part of the SPLM. But when South Sudan seceded in 2011, Nuba fighters rebranded as SPLM-N and continued their rebellion against Khartoum, fighting and defeating the RSF, which was deployed to fight them by former President Omar al-Bashir in 2016. Nearly a decade later, on July 2, Tasis announced a 31-member senior leadership council, with Hemedti as its head and SPLM-N's al-Hilu as deputy. While the full list of the 31-member council is not yet public, it also includes Tahir al-Hajar, the head of the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Gathering Forces (SLGF), according to an interview he gave Al Jazeera Mubasher. Tasis will soon roll out a government to help the RSF and its allies in their fight against the army, Kholood Khair, Sudan expert and founder of Confluence Advisory think tank, believes. The RSF wants to exploit the guise of a formal government to better profit from aid groups, buy sophisticated weapons such as fighter jets that can only be sold to states, and boost its stance in any future negotiations with the army, she explained. 'They do not want to go into any kind of mediation as a rebel group. They want to be seen as a government [to boost their legitimacy],' Khair said. Al Jazeera asked Tasis spokesman, Alaa Nugud, to respond to accusations that the alliance was simply formed to garner international legitimacy for armed groups on the ground. While he did not respond before publication, Tasis portrays itself as the cornerstone of a 'New Sudan' seeking to protect historically neglected and persecuted communities, even as the RSF stands accused of committing ethnic killings and genocide against sedentary communities known as 'non-Arabs' in Darfur. However, 'this is just a group formed out of war dynamics despite their entire narrative of it being a coalition of the marginalised,' said Hamid Khalafallah, an expert on Sudan and PhD candidate at the University of Manchester. On the Port Sudan government's side, Gebreil Ibrahim and Mini Arko Minawi lead the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army – Mini Minawi (SLA-MM), respectively. The two armed groups mainly comprised sedentary farming 'non-Arab' communities from the vast western region of Darfur who came together to fight a rebellion against the central government in 2003. Their stated aim was to end the persecution and neglect of their communities, but like most of Sudan's armed groups, they ended up using their weapons to negotiate access to state coffers and prominent posts in government instead. 'What this whole war has shown is if you pick up a gun, then you can get power,' Khair said. 'The RSF are really the poster children for this model,' she added. The RSF in its current form was born during the Darfur war, which started in 2003, when al-Bashir tapped Mohamed Hamdan 'Hemedti' Dagalo and his feared 'Arab' Popular Defence Forces (Janjaweed) militia to crush the rebellion there. Al-Bashir rewarded Hemedti, who took part in countless atrocities against 'non-Arabs', by repackaging the Janjaweed into the RSF in 2013, with Hemedti at its head and a place with the army. As part of the state, Hemedti was able to consolidate control over lucrative gold mines, expand recruitment and lease out fighters to partake in regional wars for tens of millions of dollars. When al-Bashir was deposed by a popular uprising in April 2019, a wealthy, powerful Hemedti became al-Burhan's deputy in the Transitional Military Council. Tasis, as well as the army-backed government in Port Sudan, are beholden to armed actors, which means more local commanders could expand recruitment and acquire weapons, hoping to get strong enough to gain political power, analysts warn. Mohamed 'al-Jakomi' Seid Ahmed, an army-aligned commander from northern Sudan, made a statement a few weeks ago that hinted at his aspirations, Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker's Baldo said. Al-Jakomi said that he would be training a whopping 50,000 men in Eritrea to protect Sudan's Northern State from possible incursion by the RSF. He confirmed his plan in an interview with Al Jazeera Mubasher. In addition, Baldo referenced Abu Aqla Keikel, whose force was instrumental in helping the army recapture the agricultural heartland of Gezira state three months after defecting from the RSF to the army in October 2024. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Al Jazeera's reporting point to atrocities committed by Keikel's fighters, prompting the European Union to sanction him on July 18. Still, analysts say his power is growing and he may harbour ambitions to secure some form of political power. 'These are individuals who can hold the army hostage through their autonomous militias … as a way to secure seats around the cake when it is divided,' Baldo told Al Jazeera. To appease armed actors that they want to keep onside, the army-backed government will likely create new positions as rewards, Jawhara Kanu, an expert on Sudan's economy, said. 'The government will just have to keep swelling … with as many ministries as possible to reward as many people as possible,' she told Al Jazeera. However, neither Port Sudan nor Tasis will be able to hand out political posts forever, especially if the war continues and more powerful militias emerge. The army doesn't have enough revenue – a result of losing control of nearly half the country, which encompasses profitable gold mines and agricultural lands, according to Khair. She added that Hemedti and his family are unlikely to cede much of their private wealth to pay recruits. Throughout the war, the RSF incentivised its fighters by allowing them to plunder the cities and villages they attacked. But as loot runs dry, militias may resort to building their fiefdoms by setting up checkpoints to heavily tax people and goods passing through, warns Khair. 'The new predatory behaviour, supported by the state in RSF and army areas, will be checkpoints. And these checkpoints will mark one rebel leader's area from another,' she told Al Jazeera. 'In a decade's time, it may eventually be difficult to tell which militia is loyal to the army and which is loyal to the RSF,' Khair added.
Al Jazeera
21-07-2025
- Al Jazeera
Israel says it has attacked Houthi targets in Yemen's Hodeidah port
Israel's military has launched new air raids on Yemen's Hodeidah port, targeting what it described as Houthi-linked sites used to stage drone and missile attacks against Israel and its allies. Minister of Defence Israel Katz on Monday said the military was 'forcefully countering any attempt to restore the terror infrastructure previously attacked'. The Israeli military claimed that the 'port serves as a channel for weapons used by the Houthis to carry out terrorist operations against Israel and its allies'. The Houthi movement, which controls large parts of northern Yemen, later claimed responsibility for drone and missile attacks on locations in Israel, including Ben Gurion airport, Ashdod and Jaffa. In a statement, Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree said the strikes were a direct response to the attacks on Hodeidah and Israel's continued bombardment of Gaza. 'The drone attack successfully achieved its objectives,' he said, adding that operations would continue until Israel ends its offensive on Gaza and lifts the siege. Since Israel launched its war on Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis have carried out several attacks on shipping lanes in the Red Sea, saying they were acting in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. Israel has responded with repeated strikes on Houthi targets, particularly in Hodeidah, a key entry point for goods and aid into Yemen. 'The Houthis will pay a heavy price for launching missiles toward the State of Israel,' Katz said. Earlier this month, the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack on the Greek-owned vessel Eternity C, which maritime officials said had killed four people. In May, the United States brokered a deal with the Houthis to halt their bombing campaign in exchange for reduced attacks on international shipping. However, the Houthis clarified that the agreement did not extend to operations involving Israel.
Al Jazeera
20-07-2025
- Al Jazeera
Will Israel ever get blowback for bombing its neighbours?
In the last two years, as well as its war on Gaza and increasingly violent occupation of the West Bank, Israel has launched attacks on Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The most recent attacks on Syria were launched this week, going so far as to hit the country's Ministry of Defence. Of course, the Israelis point to their justifications for the attacks on Syria – principally, in Israel's telling, to defend the Syrian Druze minority. A US-brokered ceasefire has taken effect, but whether it holds remains to be seen. In Lebanon, Israel claimed it wanted to stop the threat posed by Hezbollah. The attacks on Iran, it said, were to end that country's attempt to build a nuclear bomb. And in Yemen, Israel's bombing was a response to attacks from the country's Houthi rebels. Explanations aside, the question becomes whether the Israelis can continue to act in a manner that has many around the world, and particularly in the Middle East, seeing them as the aggressor. Impunity over relationship-building The Israeli argument is that all these conflicts – and the more than 58,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza – are necessary because Israel faces an existential battle that it has no choice but to win. The Israeli government, in its current far-right makeup, at least, does not seem to care if its neighbours do not like it. Rather, it seems to care that they fear it. And as the most powerful military force in the region, with the backing of the most powerful military force in the world, the Israelis feel that they can largely do what they want. Israel is taking advantage of a weakening international order and a moment of flux in the way the world is run, particularly with the United States under President Donald Trump openly moving towards a more transactional foreign policy. Western countries had previously attempted to maintain the idea of a liberal international order, where institutions such as the United Nations ensure that international law is followed. But Israel's actions, over decades, have made it increasingly hard to maintain the pretence. The world has been unable to stop Israel from continuing its occupation of Palestinian land, even though it is illegal under international law. Settlements continue to be built and expanded in the West Bank, and settlers continue to kill unarmed Palestinians. Human rights organisations and international bodies have found that Israel has repeatedly violated the rules of war in its conduct in Gaza, and have accused the country of committing genocide, but can do little more. Taking advantage No other power wants, or feels strong enough, to take on the mantle the US is arguably vacating. And until the rules get rewritten, it increasingly feels like might equals right. Israel, the only nuclear power in the region, is taking advantage. Supporters of Israel's actions in the past two years would also argue that those predicting negative consequences for its attacks have been proven wrong. The main perceived threat to Israel was the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance, and the argument was that these countries and groups would strike Israel severely if the latter went too far in its attacks. Israel did escalate, and the reaction from Iran and its allies was, in many cases, to choose to stand down rather than risk the total devastation of their countries or organisations. Iran did attack Israel in a way that the country had not experienced before, with Tel Aviv being directly hit on numerous occasions. But some of the worst-case scenario predictions did not take place, and ultimately, the direct conflict between Israel and Iran lasted 12 days, without the outbreak of a wider regional war. In Lebanon, Israel can be even happier with the result. After an intensified bombing campaign and invasion last year, Hezbollah lost its iconic leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and much of its military capacity, as well as some of its power in Lebanon. It is now, at least in the short term, no longer much of a threat to Israel. Israeli hubris? Israel seems to believe weak neighbours are good for it. Much as in the case of Gaza and the occupied West Bank, the perception is that there is no real need to provide an endgame or next-day scenario. Instead, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has demonstrated, Israel can maintain chaos as far away as possible from its borders, as long as it maintains security inside. But the current situation in Syria is an interesting example of what can go wrong, and when Israeli hubris may go too far. Netanyahu has maintained that Syria south of Damascus must remain demilitarised. His first argument was that this would ensure the safety of the Druze minority, thousands of whom also live in Israel and demanded that Israel protect their brethren following violence involving Bedouin fighters and government forces. The second argument was that the new authorities in Syria cannot be trusted because of the new leadership's past ties to groups such as al-Qaeda. After Israel's bombing and some US prodding, Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa agreed to withdraw government security forces from the Druze-majority province of Suwayda on Thursday, warning that while Israel 'may be capable of starting a war', it would 'not be easy to control its consequences'. By Friday, it had become clear that thousands of Bedouin – and other tribal forces – were headed to support the Bedouins in Suwayda after reports of massacres against them. Al-Sharaa, presumably with the acquiescence of Israel, announced that Syrian government forces would deploy in Suwayda to end the ongoing clashes there, and a new ceasefire was declared on Saturday. As it happens, the presence of a strong state with control over its territory may be more effective than allowing anarchy to reign. Blowback If anything, Israel's actions in Syria will increase its regional isolation and raise eyebrows among countries that could have been seen as potential allies. Saudi Arabia has emphasised its support for the new Syrian government, and Israel's behaviour will add to Riyadh's feeling, post-Gaza, that any 'Abraham Accords' normalising ties cannot happen in the short term. For many countries in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf, Israeli hegemony, especially with the rise of messianic far-right forces in its government, leads to war, expansionism, chaos, and security risks. And Israel's short-term military gains run the risk of blowback elsewhere. Iran's military capabilities may have been heavily damaged in its war with Israel, but Tehran will likely seek to shift tactics to undermine Israel in other ways in the years to come, while improving its defences and potentially focusing on achieving a nuclear weapon. As mentioned, the opinions of regional countries may not be the highest priority to the current crop of Israeli leaders, as long as they continue to have US support. But that does not mean that – in the long term – Israel will not increasingly face blowback for its actions, both diplomatically and in terms of its security. Domestically, constant wars, even if beyond Israel's borders, do not provide a sense of long-term security for any populace. The percentage of military reservists answering call-ups has already reportedly been decreasing. In a country where the majority of the military personnel are reservists who have jobs, businesses and families to take care of, it is difficult to maintain a permanent military footing indefinitely. That has contributed to an increasing divide in Israel between a dominant ultranationalist camp that wants to fight first and ask questions later, annex Palestinian land, and force regional acceptance through brute force, and a more centrist camp that – while perhaps not prioritising alleviating Palestinian suffering – is more sensitive to international isolation and sanctions, while attempting to hold on to a 'liberal Zionist' image of Israel. Should current trends continue, and the ultranationalist camp retain its dominance, Israel can continue to use its military power and US backing to yield short-term successes. But by sowing chaos around its borders and flouting international norms, it is breeding resentment among its neighbours and losing support among its traditional allies – even in the US, where public support is slipping. A more isolated Israel can do what it wants today, but without a long-term strategy for peace, stability and mutual respect with its neighbours – including the Palestinians – it may not be able to escape the consequences tomorrow.
