&w=3840&q=100)
How religion, and not patriotism, motivates the Pakistan Army
Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif, Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (DG-ISPR), Pakistan, recently stated during a press briefing in Rawalpindi that Islam was not just integral to the faith of individual soldiers but part of the army's overall training. It was a lacklustre event on May 11, which, despite being delayed by four hours, failed to produce any visual evidence to back up its tall claims and was therefore dismissed as a poor attempt to emulate India's DGMO Press Conference.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
However, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif's claim about Islam being part of Pakistan's Army's training is undoubtedly true. Late General Zia-ul-Haq, soon after he became the Chief of the Army Staff in 1976 — informs Shuja Nawaz (2008) — changed the motto of the army from Jinnah's 'Unity, Faith, and Discipline' to 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah' (Faith, Obedience of God, and Struggle in the Path of Allah).
Apart from encouraging commanders to join their troops in congregational prayers and elevating the regimental status of maulavis (though not with demur from old-type officers), he even allowed Tablighi Jamaat missionaries to preach at the Pakistani Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul, near Abbottabad in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Tablighi Jamaat preachers would deliver khutba (sermon) after Friday prayers at the PMA until 1984. In 1985, Major General Asif Nawaz prohibited their entry into the premises, stating that the place was a military academy, not a seminary (Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, P.384-385).
General Zia-ul-Haq also contributed the foreword to Brigadier SK Malik's book The Quranic Concept of War (1979). It was pithy but instructive, which might explain the current scenario.
'JEHAD FI-SABILILLAH is not an exclusive domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of military force alone… The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a military state, CANNOT become 'professional' if in all his activities he does not take on the 'colour of Allah'. The non-military citizen of a Muslim state must, likewise, be aware of the kind of soldier that his country must produce and the ONLY pattern of war that his country's armed forces may wage.'
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
Recent evidence about the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the constituted authority and terror network in Pakistan might appear to be a legacy of Zia-ul-Haq's policies. The visuals that have emerged from Pakistan, in the aftermath of India undertaking Operation Sindoor, are revealing. Corpses of slain terrorists were draped in the national flag of Pakistan during their last journey, with personnel of the Pakistani army and police giving them a ceremonial gun salute.
A designated terrorist, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, led the Salat-ul-Janazah (funeral prayer) flanked by senior officers of the Pakistani Army. It is an ocular proof that the boundaries between the government and terror apparatus have been somewhat blurred in Pakistan. Even the fig leaf, which previously concealed this relation, has been dropped. How to deal with such a country, at a theoretical level, should constitute a challenge for the global community. Whereas India might be the immediate victim of Pakistan's terrorism, the threat has a wider canvas.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
Pakistan's Army has two-fold origination — a) historical and b) ideological. Historically, the Pakistan Army, like its Indian counterpart, has its origin in the colonial Indian Army (or the British Indian Army). The ranks, formations, drills/manoeuvres, uniforms, badges, lifestyle/mode of recreation, etc, are a legacy of the colonial army. While this colonial army no doubt ensured the external security of India for almost two centuries, whereby notorious foreign aggressions were relegated to history, it was in no sense a national army. Not patriotism but colonial interests at home and abroad formed the motivating factor of this army. No wonder Indian battalions participated in the battles of World Wars I & II in foreign war theatres.
'As now constituted', — reads a pamphlet published by the All India Congress Committee, 'the armed forces under the Government of India are Indian in one sense only— in that their cost is borne by the people of India. In everything else they are either British or, at any rate, non-national, though an overwhelming proportion of their personnel is furnished by India' (Defence of India or Nationalisation of Indian Army, P.3). The author of the pamphlet was Nirad C Chaudhuri, who was literally an 'unknown Indian' at that time, before he became an internationally known scholar.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
The transfer of power to the domains of India and Pakistan led to the formation of two sovereign armed forces. In a sovereign nation, patriotism must replace colonial interests as the driving force of the army. Interestingly, the Azad Hind Fauz (Indian National Army) led by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had provided a model of a patriotic national army to Indians during World War II. The INA, which shunned racial/religious divides and formed its brigades named after national leaders, had drawn participation from Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians alike in Southeast Asia. The INA was path-breaking not just in Indian but also global contexts, which taught uniformed men and women to fight and die for the nation's independence. Love of the country was its motive force. It had directly or indirectly influenced the Indian Army as we know it today.
Major Somnath Sharma, India's first Param Vir Chakra awardee, who laid down his life combating invasion on Kashmir less than three months after independence of India, was decisively fighting for his country's security and honour. Similarly, Brigadier Mohammed Usman, who died fighting Pakistani invaders at Nausera (July, 1948) and earned the nickname 'Nausera Ka Sher' (the Tiger of Nausera), upheld the validity of patriotism over religious trapping. It is this religion-neutral patriotism that forms the motive force of the Indian Army.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
The partition of India, which accompanied the independence, led to the reorganisation of the armed forces in two dominions, viz, India and Pakistan. The Indian Army and Pakistan Army, despite their shared past, grew along different lines. India chose to have an apolitical and secular armed force where the religious or linguistic identity of a soldier was his/her private affair. The military is actuated by the principle of patriotism. The Indian Army follows an honour code –'Naam, Namak, Nishan', ie, a) name/honour of the unit/Army/Nation, b) loyalty to the nation and c) insignia flag of one's unit/regiment/army/nation. The esprit de corps, or the spirit of comradeship and brotherhood of the brave, transcends caste, creed, religion or language.
The Indian Army has had Hindu, Zoroastrian, Christian and Sikh Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS) since independence. At least once a Muslim has been at the top post of the Indian Air Force. But never have they been categorised as such.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
This would be unthinkable in Pakistan, which had not seen any Hindu commissioned officer after the 1950s. Late Major CR Dutt, who later joined Bangladesh Mukti Bahini, was one such officer.
Simultaneously, there is an ideological source of origin of the Pakistan Army, viz, Islam. Whereas it might be true General Zia-ul-Haq heralded the Islamisation of the Pakistan Army in particular and of the nation in general during his presidency, throughout which he continued to be the COAS, there were other compulsions to underscore Islam in the pre-1971 period. The idea of patriotism never seems to have appealed to the Pakistani army.
The only observation Major General Shaukat Riza could make about Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in an official publication of the Pakistan Army was, 'The INA was headed by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former Congress President who was a rabid Hindu Brahmin' (The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, P.103). This observation was made in a chapter titled Indian National Army, though it was dealing with the Red Fort trial in particular.
STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose — not a Brahmin, anyway — was possibly the most secular nationalist. The chapter fails to explain why many Muslims, including General Shahnawaz Khan, General M Z Kiani, etc, fought in the Indian National Army alongside Hindus and Sikhs if Subhas Bose was 'rabid Brahmin'. This is because patriotism is a virtue alien to the Pakistan army. It fights on the zeal of Islam. Its army is merely a reflection of the Pakistani state, which was founded on religious rather than racial or territorial identity.
Islam was the only glue that kept its western and eastern flanks of Pakistan together between 1947 and 1971. The eastern flank (today Bangladesh) was actually more populous than the western flank with its four provinces.
Pakistan's army would like to imagine itself as the legatee of the Arab and Turkish armies of the mediaeval ages that carried the victorious banner of Islam through non-Islamic lands. Historically, this might be preposterous because Pakistanis, whether they were Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Pathans, Hazaras or Bengalis (before 1971), were not remotely connected to the Arabs, Turks or Kurds. Their forefathers, if they had converted to Islam, converted mostly under coercion to avoid the humiliation of Jiziya, if not to escape the sword of Islam on their necks. The Muslims of Pakistan were actually themselves frontline victims of historical Islamist military aggression on India. Thus, truly speaking, the garrison state of Pakistan exists not so much on the map as much as in the minds of Pakistanis.
During the 1965 War, when the Pakistan Army launched Operation 'GIBRALTAR' on August 7, 1965, to wrest Kashmir from India's control, the historical inspiration was obvious. It sought to recreate the valour of Tariq ibn Ziyad (670-718 AD), the commander of the Arab-Berber Muslim army, who invaded Spain from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar. The Rock of Gibraltar is a Spanish derivative of the Arabic name Jabal-Tariq, or the mountain of Tariq. It was this conquest that brought Spain under Islam's control for the ensuing seven centuries. 'The Gibraltar force'—informs the then COAS of Pakistan, viz General Mohammad Musa (1983)—'consisted of approximately 7000 Mujahidin from 'Azad Kashmir'. Most of it was given some guerrilla training within a short time before it was launched' (My Version: India-Pakistan War, 1965, P.36). General Musa admits that the operation ended in a failure. This, however, proves that there was a definite connection between the Pakistan Army and Mujahidin (terrorists) even prior to Zia-ul-Haq's era.
The names of the units in Operation Gibraltar were also revealing. Shuja Nawaz informs us that the units were named after historical Muslim military heroes, viz, Tariq (bin Ziad), (Mahmud) Ghaznavi, Salahuddin, (Mohammed bin) Qasim, and Khalid (bin Waleed). Only one unit was named Nusrat (meaning Victory) in honour of the wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Crossed Swords, P.206).
The Pakistan Army uses a prayer, which is called Tariq's prayer in honour of the aforesaid Tariq ibn Ziyad. Its English translation, as available on the website of Pakistan's Army (though not accessible from India at present), reads, 'These Ghazis, these devoted souls of your lordship/whom you have blessed with the zeal of your worship/their legions overcame deserts and rivers/and trample mountain to dust with fervour/they care not for the world's pleasure/the love of the lord are their treasures/the mission and the aim of Momim is martyrdom/not the booty of war, nor crave for a kingdom'.
This prayer proves that Pakistan's Army is not a normal national army, which, actuated by a sense of patriotism, defends the territory of a nation. It rather likes to imagine itself as the modern-day avatar of Islam's mediaeval army of conquest. In its quest it could co-opt mujahidin, an honourable term in Islam for the automatic weapon-wielding terrorists. Pakistan might like to celebrate the legacy of Islamic conquests. The question is whether such things have a place in the 21st-century world.
The writer is author of the book 'The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India' (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Print
11 minutes ago
- The Print
Nehru and Jinnah made Indian politics their personal quarrel. Partition was a consequence
He remained engaged with politics and helped foster interaction between the Muslim League and Congress. But by 1928–29, he became disillusioned with the Congress. In 1930, he left for England for good. However, in 1933, Muslim League leader Liaquat Ali and others proposed to make him the League's permanent, sole leader, and persuaded him to return. He remained a lifelong leader of the League. Jinnah's way of life was European and upper-class. When he entered politics in 1906, at the age of 30, he chose the Congress. His objective was to secure self-government for India within the British Empire. It was a big enough aim at the time. He liked British-style constitutional politics and moving gradually through concrete gains. He opposed bringing religious elements into politics. In 1920, Jinnah was among the Congress leaders who strongly asked Gandhi not to support the Khilafat movement and not bring mullah s and maulvi s into politics. He considered the political use of ignorant crowds dangerous and harmful. But with Gandhi's arrival, the culture of the Congress began to change. Displeased with Gandhi's crowd-oriented, monopolistic, and wonder-seeking style of politics, Jinnah eventually left the Congress. Pakistan was the one-man achievement of Mohammad Ali Jinnah,' wrote Leonard Mosley in his memorable book The Last Days of the British Raj . It is ironic, though, that Jinnah, who secured the creation of a country in the name of Islam, had a completely secular taste. Nehru was not off the mark when he said: 'He wasn't really a Muslim at all. I know Muslims… Jinnah couldn't even recite a Muslim prayer and had certainly never read the Koran.' Indeed, Jinnah's thinking, conduct and convictions were all far from Islam. True, Jinnah had arrogance. But he showed no signs of any sentimentality, pretensions, ideological dogmatism, or liking for flattery. Gradually, though, on behalf of the Muslim League, his stance became hardline. One of the reasons behind this transformation—from being 'the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity' to the divider of the country—might have been the humiliation Jinnah suffered when Gandhi entered Indian politics and monopolised the Congress. Before Gandhi's entry into Indian politics, Jinnah was among the top Congress leaders. In 1915, when Gandhi arrived from South Africa, Jinnah was among the leading members of Gujarati society welcoming him. The meeting in Bombay on 14 January 1915, where Jinnah first met Gandhi, was presided over by Jinnah. But at Gandhi's very first words, Jinnah was taken aback. Gandhi said that he was 'glad to find a Mahomedan not only belonging to his own region's Sabha, but chairing it.' It was a patronising barb, even though an unconscious one, that assumed Gandhi's own superiority to judge one and all in ways he liked. Stanley Wolpert, in his comprehensive book Jinnah of Pakistan, wrote, 'That first statement of Gandhi's set the tone of their relationship, always at odds with deep tensions and mistrust underlying its superficially polite manners, never friendly, never cordial.' Gandhi's ways and manners were also distasteful to Jinnah. He was irked by Gandhi's authoritative attitude toward his colleagues and the people. Gandhi's dress and many of his statements seemed artificial to Jinnah. Once, when press photographers surrounded Jinnah and Gandhi to take pictures, Gandhi said to Jinnah, 'You like this, don't you?' Jinnah promptly replied, 'Not as much as you do.' In a special MG Ranade Memorial Lecture in 1943, Ambedkar said that both Gandhi and Jinnah were afflicted with an authoritarian attitude, avoiding those who behaved on equal terms, preferring to open up and deal only with those who considered themselves beneath them. Ambedkar regarded both Gandhi and Jinnah as suffering from 'colossal egotism', who made Indian politics a matter of their 'personal quarrel' and brought it to a standstill. Of course, Jinnah had faults, but he also had strength and determination. In realpolitik, Jinnah was a skilled negotiator, picking up exactly his own side's strong points as well as the opponent's weak ones. He stuck to his demands and refused to compromise. But none of this could have won him Pakistan if, along with a separatist mindset, a Muslim society had not firmly stood behind him. In fact, Jinnah could become the leader of the Muslims only when he adopted their communal approach. To gain popularity among Muslims, he had to abandon his secular convictions. Aziz Ahmad put it beautifully: 'It was not Jinnah who led the Muslims, but Muslim consensus that led Jinnah. His role was that of an honest, clear-headed lawyer who could present his client's wishes in perfectly precise words.' Yet, in the end, the creation of Pakistan was not solely the result of Jinnah or Muslim obstinacy. If the Congress leaders had possessed the right political qualities and a correct understanding of political Islam, the result could have been different. Whether India would have been better off united can be debated endlessly. But it is undeniable that during 1946-47, there were many factors, any one of which, had it been absent, could have made the Partition impossible. Also read: Nehru and Jinnah squabbled like schoolboys when Travancore declared its independence How the Empire was divided India was very close to being independent unitedly. In February 1947, the British government announced in the British Parliament that it would transfer power to India by June 1948. Partition was never a British plan, nor did the British officials working in India ever want it. All evidence shows that the British government made various attempts to ensure that the 'beautiful empire' they had built, the 'jewel of the British Crown', would remain intact. The problem was with the Indian leaders, both from the Congress and the Muslim League. There was great prejudice between Jinnah and the Congress leaders. As late as March 1947, Nehru dismissed Jinnah as insignificant, 'A mediocre lawyer with an obsession for Pakistan'. He made this remark to Mountbatten when he arrived to take charge as the new Viceroy. Nehru also considered Jinnah to have 'no real education'. Conversely, Jinnah regarded Nehru as 'an arrogant Brahmin who covers his Hindu trickiness with a veneer of Western education'. Jinnah had the faults of stubbornness, rigidity, brusqueness, intolerance of personal humiliation, and a quick temper. But he also had qualities like self-confidence and firmness. There was no frivolity or empty bluster in him. Thus, Nehru made a grave error of judgement in thinking that Jinnah was not serious about Pakistan and was merely playing high stakes to raise his own importance. In this misunderstanding, Nehru ignored Jinnah and the Muslim League. Only by this error did he, after first accepting the Cabinet Mission plan, go back on it at a press conference on 10 July 1946 in a casual manner. Nehru's biographer Michael Brecher has rightly called it 'one of his most fiery and provocative statements in his forty years of public life'. The consequences were disastrous. Jinnah reacted to Nehru's statement 'like an army leader who has come in for armistice discussions under a flag of truce and finds himself looking down the barrel of a cocked revolver'. Immediately, Jinnah held a meeting in Bombay on 27 July 1946 and announced withdrawal of his support for the Cabinet Mission plan. He called for observing 'Direct Action Day' on 16 August 1946 to press the demand for Pakistan and openly indicated the use of violence, 'Today we have forged a pistol and are in a position to use it.' At the time, the provincial government of Bengal was under the Muslim League. Huseyn Suhrawardy was the Prime Minister of Bengal, who methodically incited Muslims to violence, and on Direct Action Day, a massacre took place in erstwhile Calcutta. Within two days, over 4,000 corpses lay in Calcutta, and thousands were injured. After such a horrific event, only then Viceroy Lord Wavell went to comfort suffering people and encourage those who were trying to maintain harmony. Neither Gandhi, nor Nehru, nor Jinnah—whose decisions led to such a carnage—visited the region. Even after the widening distrust between the Muslim League and Congress, Lord Wavell kept trying to preserve a united India. For this, he had to suffer humiliation and be removed from his post. The British government did not want to wait endlessly for Congress and the Muslim League to reach an agreement. In February 1947, it announced the appointment of Lord Mountbatten as the new Viceroy and the date of transfer of power to India by June 1948. Mountbatten arrived in India on 22 March 1947. He charmed everyone with his personality. If there was anyone completely unaffected by Mountbatten's charms, it was Jinnah. He was in the habit of observing every person, event, and statement with full attention. He was extremely careful about something to which Nehru was completely careless—never to let a rival know one's feelings, which they may exploit. That is why no praise or excessive courtesy had any effect on Jinnah. Not even Mountbattens'. In their very first meeting, Gandhi proposed to Mountbatten that Jinnah be appointed head of the interim government and be left free to decide whom to take or not take into his cabinet. So that the wrangling would end and the way for the transfer of power would be cleared. At first, Mountbatten welcomed it and assured consideration, but after seeing the attitude of other Congress leaders, especially Nehru, he considered it impractical. He found that Nehru and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel had already made up their minds to accept Partition, even without Gandhi's consent. So, on 3 June 1947, Mountbatten presented the Partition proposal, which both sides accepted. After Nehru and Patel accepted it, Gandhi also gave up his opposition. According to Ram Manohar Lohia, in the impatience for power, Nehru and Patel had already decided to accept Partition without taking Gandhi into confidence. Gandhi himself charged them with this in the Congress Working Committee meeting (14–15 June 1947), which accepted Partition. Lohia was present at that meeting and wrote in detail about it in his book Guilty Men of India's Partition (1960). So, the top Congress leaders had already made up their mind to go ahead with the Partition rather than share power with the difficult Muslim League leaders. This was all decided when Lord Wavell, a firm opponent of Partition, was still in office. They even broke the promise they had given Wavell by accepting a proposal to satisfy Jinnah for a united India. Viceroy Wavell wrote sadly in his diary in February 1947: 'There is no statesmanship or magnanimity in Congress.' Thus, the task for which the British government had allotted sixteen months was completed by Mountbatten in less than five months. His energy and self-confidence were one factor. But the uncertainty, exhaustion, and impatience for power of the Indian leaders played a role too. The blame for the violent nature of Partition, however, lies with Mountbatten for arbitrarily advancing the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947. He secured agreement from all parties for this accelerated timeline. As a result necessary arrangements that should have preceded the Partition were never completed. It became horrifically violent, disorderly and chaotic. Thousands of miles of boundary demarcation had to be completed in just five weeks, with no prior preparations. In Punjab, even two days after 15 August 1947, millions of people did not know whether their village or town was in India or Pakistan. For this, and for many other reasons, the Partition proved to be a lasting tragedy, for which the Indian leaders were fundamentally responsible. Our leaders' personal traits and limitations played a huge role in bringing about the civilisational disaster upon the country. Lord Wavell repeatedly made it clear, from 1940 up to March 1947, that Partition would not resolve the Hindu-Muslim problem. It would only lead to mass violence, administrative collapse, and long-term hostility. His words proved prophetic. He had consistently advised that the British government should not consent to Partition unless absolutely forced. Tragically, that is exactly what happened. Shankar Sharan is a columnist and professor of political science. He tweets @hesivh. Views are personal. (Edited by Theres Sudeep)
News18
20 minutes ago
- News18
US Promises Counter-Terrorism Support To Pakistan, Agrees To Share Intelligence & Funds
The United States expressed its intent to create a peaceful economic corridor through Pakistan to Kabul, which could facilitate trade and enhance stability in the war-torn country In a significant development for US-Pakistan relations, both nations have agreed to strengthen their counter-terrorism cooperation in a recent high-level meeting, with the United States offering full support to Pakistan in its fight against terror groups. The discussions, held between US and Pakistani officials, outlined a series of commitments that signal a deepening of ties, especially in intelligence-sharing, military assistance, and cross-border security operations. Diplomatic sources in Islamabad told CNN-News18 that the United States pledged to provide vital support to Pakistan's ongoing efforts to combat terrorism, particularly from groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). The commitment came at a time when Pakistan is facing increased threats from militant groups along its borders, particularly the volatile regions along the Pak-Afghan and Pak-Iran frontiers. The United States will also share critical intelligence with Pakistan to help tackle cross-border terrorism. This includes satellite surveillance to monitor human infiltration along Pakistan's borders. The collaboration aims to enhance border security and track terrorist movements in real-time, especially across areas prone to militant activity. One of the most notable developments from the meeting was the expressed interest of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in resuming its intelligence operations within Pakistan. This comes after years of tension between the two countries over intelligence-sharing and the presence of US operatives in the country. Pakistan is expected to respond to this request in the near future. Another significant aspect of the discussions was the renewal of the Coalition Support Fund (CSF), which had been suspended by the Trump administration in 2018. The CSF is a US financial aid programme designed to reimburse Pakistan for its counterterrorism efforts. The resumption of this fund signals a shift toward closer cooperation, especially in military and security matters. The talks also touched upon regional security and economic stability, particularly concerning Afghanistan. The United States expressed its intent to create a peaceful economic corridor through Pakistan to Kabul, which could facilitate trade and enhance stability in the war-torn country. This proposal was part of the Trump administration's vision for the region, but it had faced numerous obstacles in the past. Pakistan has agreed to facilitate this effort, further cementing its role as a key player in Afghan peace and reconstruction. Additionally, the United States has requested Pakistan's assistance in recovering military equipment left behind by American forces during their 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. The request highlights the growing trust between the two countries, with Pakistan playing a crucial role in helping the US retrieve sensitive equipment from the region. The discussions ended with a commitment to continue dialogue, with the next round of counterterrorism talks scheduled to take place in Washington next year. Location : United States of America (USA) First Published: News world US Promises Counter-Terrorism Support To Pakistan, Agrees To Share Intelligence & Funds | Exclusive Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
&w=3840&q=100)
Business Standard
41 minutes ago
- Business Standard
Arab League condemns Benjamin Netanyahu's 'Greater Israel' remarks
The League considered these statements to be a violation of the sovereignty of Arab states and an attempt to undermine security and stability in the region ANI Others The Arab League has condemned in the strongest terms the statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regarding the annexation of parts of the territories of sovereign Arab states, in preparation for the establishment of what he called "Greater Israel." The League considered these statements to be a violation of the sovereignty of Arab states and an attempt to undermine security and stability in the region. In a statement released Tuesday, the League said these remarks represent a serious threat to collective Arab national security and a flagrant challenge to international law and the principles of international legitimacy. The statements also reflect expansionist and aggressive intentions that cannot be accepted or tolerated, and they reveal an extremist mindset steeped in colonial delusions. Within the same contest, Egypt has condemned the statements raised in some Israeli media regarding the so-called "Greater Israel," while affirming its commitment to establishing peace in the Middle East. In a statement issued by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs this evening, Egypt demanded official clarifications regarding these statements due to the indications they carry and that could trigger instability. (Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)
