Indonesia's Djarum Group launches first locally developed EVs
It unveiled the Polytron G3 and Polytron G3+ electric cars that have a driving range up to 402 kilometers, in partnership with Chinese automaker Skyworth Auto. Polytron's models are adaptations of Skyworth Auto's EV6 car and are powered by lithium ferro phosphate (LFP) batteries that have capacity of up to 51.916 kilowatt-hours.
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Japan Today
3 hours ago
- Japan Today
China expanding into digital currencies, hoping to promote use of its 'people's money'
FILE - In this Aug. 11, 2015 photo, a shadow of a man is reflected on a glass as he reads a newspaper reporting China's central bank or People's Bank of China announced the 2015 edition of the 100 renminbi notes will be issued starting from November 12, at a stand in Beijing. (AP Photo/Andy Wong, File) By ELAINE KURTENBACH China has been expanding use of digital currencies as it promotes wider use of its yuan, or renminbi, to reflect its status as the world's second-largest economy and challenge the overwhelming sway of the U.S. dollar in international trade and finance. However, restrictions on access to Chinese financial markets and limits on convertibility of the yuan, or 'people's money,' are big obstacles blocking its global use. Still, Hong Kong already has stablecoin regulations and some Chinese experts are pushing for regulations to prepare for a possible stablecoin pegged to the yuan. Officials at the People's Bank of China and State Council Information Office in Beijing did not immediately respond to requests for comment on a Reuters report that the State Council, or Cabinet, is preparing to issue a plan for internationalizing the yuan that might include a yuan stablecoin. In the U.S., President Donald Trump has made cryptofriendly policies a priority for his administration. He signed a law, the GENIUS Act, last month regulating stablecoins. Stablecoins are digital currencies whose value is linked to a specific currency such as the U.S. dollar. They can be used as a substitute in situations where currency transactions might be difficult or costly. They are different from cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin in that their only purpose is to be a means of payment, not an investment meant to be traded to gain value. Dollar stablecoins are typically bought and sold for $1 each. They are based on a reserve equal to their value, but are issued by private institutions, not central banks like the U.S. Federal Reserve. Stablecoins are not Digital Central Bank Currencies, which are digital versions of currencies issued by central banks. They are based on blockchain-based distributed ledgers. They are 'stable' in the sense that their value is anchored to the currency they are based on. Critics of stablecoins say that since they are essentially a proxy for ordinary currencies that can bypass banking systems and safeguards set up to manage traditional financial transactions they may be most useful for illegal purposes. China launched its own digital yuan, the e-CNY issued by its central bank, on a trial basis in 2019, and McDonalds was an early participant in that project. Chinese regulators have banned mining, trading and other dealings in private, decentralized digital currencies like Bitcoin, while encouraging use of the digital yuan. The nearly universal use of electronic payments has facilitated use of the e-CNY in the Chinese mainland, with some cities using it to pay wages of civil servants. State media reported that as of July 2024, there were 7.3 trillion yuan worth of transactions using the currency in areas where it is being used on a trial basis. China has also been promoting use of e-CNY in Africa, as it expands business dealings on the continent. But e-CNY are not stablecoins. Experts say regulations are needed to safely manage use of stablecoins and to ensure they could be used smoothly with bank accounts and payment systems. Hong Kong, a former British colony that has its own financial markets, currency and partly autonomous legal system, enacted a stablecoin law that took effect on Aug. 1. Aimed at attracting wealthy investors who want to use digital currencies and other financial products, it requires that a stablecoin linked to the Hong Kong dollar must be equal to the Hong Kong dollar reserves for that digital currency. As a global duty-free port and financial hub, Hong Kong has often served as a base for trying out paths toward liberalizing Chinese financial markets. But new regulations specifically governing yuan stablecoin would be needed if such a digital currency were issued for use in Hong Kong, Liu Xiaochun, deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of New Finance, recently wrote in a report on the Chinese financial website China's currency is not freely convertible in world financial markets and its stringent controls on foreign exchange are the biggest hindrance toward making the yuan a global currency, experts say. According to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, or SWIFT, as of June, the yuan was the sixth most active currency for global payments by value, with a share of 2.88%. Its use peaked in July 2024 at about 4.7%. It's used more often in trade financing, where it accounts for nearly 6% of such dealings, according to that report. The lion's share of yuan transactions take place in Hong Kong. The U.S. dollar's share as a global payment currency was over 47% as of June, followed by the euro, the British pound, the Canadian dollar and the Japanese yen, the report said. AP Researcher Shihuan Chen contributed from Beijing. © Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.
The Diplomat
11 hours ago
- The Diplomat
The Quad's Role Amid China-US Tech Competition
The global implications of the China-U.S. tech rivalry have raised the imperatives for Quad cooperation on AI and semiconductors. From left, Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi , Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio meet at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., July 1, 2025. In July 2025, the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting concluded with announcements on strengthening maritime and transnational security, economic security, cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, and humanitarian assistance across the Indo-Pacific region. A significant takeaway of the convening was the launch of the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative to strengthen cooperation on securing and diversifying critical mineral supply chains. The joint statement by the foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States underscored concerns over 'abrupt constriction and future reliability of key supply chains, specifically for critical minerals.' They raised concerns about dependence on 'any one country for processing and refining critical minerals and derivative goods production,' which may lead to 'economic coercion, price manipulation, and supply chain disruptions.' This development came amid global manufacturers raising alarms over China's April 2025 decision to mandate licenses for export of rare earth alloys, mixtures, and magnets. China's action followed its trade tensions with the U.S. – at the time, the Trump administration had mandated export licenses for a wider range of chips used in artificial intelligence (AI) applications and limited China's access to chip-designing software. Amid China's bilateral trade and tech tensions with the United States, its decision to restrict rare earth exports impacted global supply chains and manufacturing (unlike China's December 2024 export ban on gallium, germanium, and antimony for the U.S. alone). In addition, the move highlighted Beijing's willingness to leverage its dominance in production and refining of critical minerals. Such instances of the China-U.S. tech rivalry resulting in implications for the world have raised the imperatives for deeper tech cooperation among Quad members. The first Trump administration (2017-21) used export controls to limit the flow of tech components to China, barred the use of federal funds to purchase Chinese tech equipment, and indicted Chinese tech companies for espionage activities. While the Trump administration used these measures against China's 5G equipment, the U.S. under President Joe Biden expanded the scope to also include other technologies. Under its 'small yard and high fence' policy, the Biden administration (2021-2025) employed the Trump playbook and hailed export controls as 'a new strategic asset in the U.S. and allied toolkit.' As a result, the Biden administration surpassed the Trump administration's tally of Chinese companies added to the U.S. Commerce Department's 'Entity List.' Moreover, the Biden administration expanded the scope of restricted technologies to include semiconductors and also addressed Chinese 'overcapacity' in clean energy tech (including solar cells and batteries). The current Trump administration (2025-present) has followed through on the Biden administration's tariffs on Chinese semiconductors (starting January 2025) and the December 2024 Section 301 probe into Chinese semiconductors used in American consumer products. Moreover, with DeepSeek highlighting China's advances in the AI domain, the Trump administration built on Biden's 2022 and 2023 restrictions on export of AI-relevant chips to China. This included the April 2025 action on mandating export licenses for less-powerful variants of AI-relevant chips (which the Biden administration backed down from acting against) and the May 2025 restrictions on China's access to chip-designing software. The China-U.S. tech rivalry, now well into its ninth year, has had global implications. Recently, Malaysia began mandating permits for export of U.S.-origin AI-relevant chips to clamp down against transshipment of components to China. Similarly, Singapore has cracked down on individuals allegedly involved in routing of Nvidia's chips to China's DeepSeek. The Trump administration has also continued pursuing the Biden-era goal of seeking compliance from Japanese and Dutch companies on curbing China's access to semiconductor equipment. In addition, the Trump administration's decision to rescind the Biden-era 'AI Diffusion Rule' has led to a scramble from nations seeking AI-relevant chips. The Biden-era rule had defined limits on export of semiconductors for nations categorized into three tiers. The Trump administration's decision to not adopt this framework has led to a country-by-country approach, which was on display during Trump's visit to the Gulf in May 2025. While hosting Trump, Saudi Arabia and the UAE finalized one-on-one agreements on access to American AI-relevant chips and partnerships with U.S. tech companies on AI infrastructure. Ahead of the Quad Summit in India later this year, there is immense scope for further refining AI cooperation among Quad nations. This may include a deeper focus on AI through research partnerships, cross-pollination between incubators, exploring joint workforce development programs, etc. Beyond research partnerships and institutional linkages, these steps can overtime develop bridges between Australian, Indian, Japanese, and American tech ecosystems on the mobilization of talent. Given the recent developments on the China-U.S. tech rivalry, Quad nations may explore a 'Joint AI Readiness Assessment' to determine areas of relative strength and areas of cooperation. This can be along the lines of the bilateral assessment on semiconductors announced by the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) and India Electronics Semiconductor Association (IESA) under the India-U.S. initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). Such an assessment may also draw from the Memorandum of Cooperation for the Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network, which was finalized during the Quad Leaders' Summit in September 2024. Similarly, at the Quad Leaders' Summit in May 2023, the Quad nations finalized the Quad International Standards Cooperation Network and the Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards. This effort to synergize standards across the tech ecosystems of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States may now also consider a similar undertaking on operational matters. This may include sharing of best practices on regulatory compliance mapping, upkeep of databases on licensing records, investment screening mechanisms, etc. This can also be a focus area under the Track 1.5 dialogues on AI and Advanced Communications Technologies, which were announced by the Quad in 2024. Finally, the Quad nations have rightly committed to harnessing AI to empower farmers under the Advancing Innovations for Empowering NextGen Agriculture (AI-ENGAGE) initiative. This initiative exploring AI's applications at the ground level now also requires institutional heft, in terms of cooperation agreements between agri-tech companies, universities, research centers, etc. This may require financing from existing efforts like the Quad Fellowship's expanding donor base or the Quad Investors Network (QUIN), which was launched at the 2023 Quad Leaders' Summit. Given the initiative's aim to use AI for developmental needs, AI-ENGAGE can assume a central role in Quad tech cooperation, even as the China-U.S. tech rivalry raises regulatory and compliance-related challenges across the world.
The Diplomat
11 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Trump's Tactical Concessions on Taiwan Are Not Strategic Retreats
The Trump administration's recent decisions to quietly sideline two high-profile visits by Taiwanese leaders have raised concerns in both Washington and Taipei, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan. But these moves – postponing President Lai Ching-te's New York stopover and canceling a meeting between Taiwan's defense minister, Wellington Koo, and U.S. officials – are more likely about short-term trade diplomacy. History has shown that it may be too early to assume that Trump's concessions on Taiwan represent a fundamental, long-term shift in U.S. policy. First of all, the timing matters. In mid-July, as reports surfaced of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te's planned stopover in New York, Beijing immediately voiced its protests – a common practice. Meanwhile, U.S. and Chinese officials were preparing for a round of trade talks in Stockholm. This marked the third round of negotiations, following the June talks in London that attempted to repair the short-lived agreement reached in Geneva in May. As a result of these successive negotiations, tariffs that had soared into triple digits were now trimmed, Washington eased export restrictions on Nvidia's H20 AI chips, and Beijing resumed rare-earth shipments to the United States. In the context of this tentative détente, the White House advised Lai to postpone the stopover in New York and quietly hold off on Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo's visit to Washington D.C. By demonstrating symbolic restraint, the Trump administration appeared to be signaling a willingness to create a more conducive atmosphere for a potential summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and China's President Xi Jinping. This is not the first time Trump has leveraged the Taiwan issue in an attempt to de-escalate tensions during trade talks. In 2019, the Trump administration delayed a long-anticipated fighter jet sale to Taipei – an action widely interpreted at the time as an effort to improve prospects for a trade deal with China. However, that overture collapsed a month later when the administration raised tariffs from 10 percent to 25 percent on $200 billion of Chinese goods after futile talks between Washington and Beijing. By the end of his first term, Trump had approved more arms sales to Taiwan by value than any of his predecessors since 1990. This precedent suggests that the latest moves by the Trump team are more likely short-term tactical adjustments rather than indicators of a long-term recalibration of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. As in his first term, for Trump flexibility on Taiwan remains a bargaining instrument that can be dialed up or down depending on the state of negotiations. Moreover, given both Trump's own unpredictability and the fact that bilateral trade talks are still in flux, these gestures are unlikely to signal a lasting shift – and could easily be reversed. Moreover, Trump has largely adhered to the long-standing U.S. policy of 'strategic ambiguity' regarding Taiwan. Asked in February whether the United States would defend the island, he demurred: 'I never comment on that.' Even before taking office, Trump framed his response similarly, emphasizing flexibility: 'I never say… I have to negotiate things, right?' Those non-answers are in fact in line with U.S. practices in the past four decades: keep options open and refuse to pre-commit to any specific response to a military move by Beijing against Taiwan. While Trump himself keeps the message deliberately vague, his senior Cabinet officials have at times drawn a clearer line of deterrence. In a July interview, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated: 'We remain as committed as ever to our partners… in places like Taiwan.' And at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned bluntly about the Chinese military's threat to Taiwan and the need to accelerate preparations. Actions may speak louder than words. In June, senior Taiwanese officers were invited as observers to learn from a U.S.-led multilateral air exercise in Alaska, showcasing continued U.S. security assistance to Taiwan. In February and April, the Trump administration sent U.S. naval ships to the Taiwan Strait – a routine practice demonstrating U.S. deterrence and reassurance toward Beijing and Taipei, respectively. The Trump administration has also pressed to accelerate deliveries and clear the years-long backlog of approved arms for Taiwan. Nor is the White House the only actor that matters in shaping U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Members of Congress have long set guardrails, which are grounded in the Taiwan Relations Act, to uphold U.S. commitments to the island. Lee Teng-hui's 1994-95 saga is the textbook example of congressional influence. When the Clinton administration allowed Lee only a refueling stop in Honolulu, lawmakers bristled and exercised their legislative authority to compel the State Department to relax transit rules. Similarly, in 1995, when the White House tried to head off Lee's 'private' visit to Cornell, Congress passed 53 by lopsided margins urging approval. Faced with near-consensus, President Bill Clinton reversed course yet again. Congressional support endures and has intensified in recent years. From 2017 to 2023, lawmakers introduced 124 Taiwan-related bills, double the number introduced in the prior eight years. Congressional delegations show the same trend: while trips to Beijing outnumbered visits to Taipei before 2020, the flow has reversed since then. Although Republicans have refrained from criticizing Trump's recent moves sidelining Taiwan, their silence has not precluded the upcoming congressional delegation to Taipei led by Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS), chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and a longtime advocate for Taiwan. In short, the Trump team's decisions to postpone Lai's New York transit and reschedule Koo's visit are likely tactical steps to protect a fragile trade track, instead of a strategic retreat on Taiwan. The administration's past actions suggest these gestures may be reversible, particularly if trade talks stall, and Trump's public statements continue to align with the doctrine of strategic ambiguity. Meanwhile, continuity in Taiwan-U.S. military cooperation and congressional support remain key sources of assurance and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.
