Woman who spent over $262,000 using stolen credit card credentials arrested while trying to buy jewellery
A 48-year-old woman was arrested for her suspected involvement in making unauthorised transactions of more than $262,000 using another person's credit card credentials.
The police said they received several reports on June 11, from victims of Government Official Impersonation Scams (GOIS) who were deceived by scammers posing as staff members from the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).
Money belonging to the victims was purportedly transferred to a credit card, which was then used to make unauthorised transactions.
Through follow-up investigations, officers from the Commercial Affairs Department established the identity of the credit card owner and discovered that he was also a victim of a GOIS.
He had been instructed to apply for a credit card and handed the credit card credentials to the scammer.
The credit card was eventually traced to a 48-year-old woman, who was arrested on June 14 while attempting to make a purchase at a jewellery store.
Preliminary investigations revealed that the woman had allegedly provisioned the credit card credentials on her mobile phone app and made several fraudulent purchases of gold bars and jewellery, with the intention of handing them over to the scammers.
The woman will be charged in court on June 16 with abetment by conspiracy to commit cheating, which carries an imprisonment term of up to 10 years and a fine.
The police advise merchants and sales staff to be vigilant and adopt correct card acceptance procedures when processing credit or debit card transactions. They should look out for the name and security features on the card face and contact their processing bank immediately for advice if they detect anything suspicious.
Credit or debit cardholders are advised to call their card-issuing banks immediately if they notice any discrepancies or if their cards are lost or stolen.
You should also not give out card details to strangers, and adopt measures such as activating SMS notifications for charges and checking your bank statements.
For more information on scams, visit www.scamshield.gov.sg or call the ScamShield helpline at 1799.
Anyone with information on such scams may call the police hotline at 1800-255-0000 or submit information online at www.police.gov.sg/i-witness.
All information will be kept strictly confidential.
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