Why no one is talking about counting caste in Kerala

Indian Express

17 hours ago

Written by R C Sudheesh and Dayal Paleri
After much vacillation, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government at the Centre has announced a schedule for conducting the next Census, which will enumerate caste. This comes in the wake of caste surveys in Bihar and Telangana, and amid a tussle over the Karnataka government tabling the results of its own 2015 survey. However, Kerala, otherwise known for its social development experiments, has remained ambivalent about such exercises. The ruling Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the Opposition United Democratic Front (UDF) have decided to wait and watch. Though the 105th Amendment of 2021 restored states' power to recognise socially and educationally backward communities, so far, the Kerala government has dodged the question of conducting a caste census by insisting on waiting for the Supreme Court's verdict in a contempt case against it for not revising the OBC list. It has also cited financial constraints. With the Centre's announcement, there is now renewed pressure on the leading political alliances to clarify their stance.
Diverse political positions on the caste census
Various social and political groups, some of them members of the two leading fronts, have declared their positions. The Nair Service Society, a lobby group of upper-caste Nairs, was among the first groups to oppose the caste census. Some upper-caste Syrian Christian denominations, traditionally UDF supporters, have taken the same stance.
The Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana (SNDP) Yogam, representing the OBC Ezhavas, and its political wing, the Bharath Dharma Jana Sena (BDJS) — an NDA member — favour the exercise. They are joined by the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), a UDF member, and the Latin Catholic Church, both representing OBCs in the state. A few Dalit groups like the Kerala Pulayar Mahasabha have also declared their support. Recent discussions on the sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of reservation have made the exercise more pertinent.
Meanwhile, the leading parties, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and Congress, are struggling to take a firm position, though they have backed a national caste census in line with the INDIA bloc's position. This indecision is glaring considering how caste has been crucial in Kerala politics, from alliances to cabinet seats. Despite the limited benefits of the 1970s land reform, caste and community identity have determined not only land ownership, education and employment opportunities, but also social networks that facilitate migration to the Persian Gulf.
A glimpse of the role of caste can be seen in wealth inequality. Based on the All India Debt and Investment Survey 2013 (the latest data available), scholars Nitin Tagade and Sukhadeo Thorat estimate inequality in wealth, the bulk of which is held as land. They show that while 'Hindu Higher Castes' and the 'Rest' (non-SC Christians in the Kerala context) have disproportionately high wealth in relation to their population in the state, Muslims, SCs, and STs have disproportionately less wealth. While SCs form 8.5 per cent of the state's population, they have only 3.7 per cent of its wealth. The 'Hindu Higher Castes' form 12.7 per cent of the population but have 15.6 per cent of the wealth. The 'Rest' form only 18.9 per cent of the population but has 25.2 per cent of the wealth. Precise, up-to-date data on land ownership and education levels by caste are lacking, making a caste census urgent.
Meanwhile, in state government employment, a database maintained by the Kerala State Commission for Backward Classes shows that the general category accounts for 36 per cent of the staff strength, OBCs 52 per cent and SC/STs 11 per cent. While understanding what grades of service are occupied by these castes will require a dedicated exercise, a caste census could give valuable information on representation in service in proportion to population.
Class versus caste in Kerala politics
In the era of labour union movements, welfare boards, land reform and cooperatives, Kerala saw a political settlement between labour and capital mediated by the state that ushered in higher wages and better labour conditions in comparison to the rest of the country. However, this class-based settlement overlooked society's caste-based underpinnings. This was despite the fact that before the communists brought class divisions to the centre of politics, a vibrant period of anti-caste agitations in the late 19th and early 20th century had boldly challenged the region's caste hierarchies.
The resurgence of anti-caste politics in recent decades has been met with apathy from the two major fronts. This includes protests by Dalit and Adivasi groups against landlessness, Dalit tea plantation workers against low wages, and OBCs against underrepresentation in public services. The major fronts' current ambivalence is reminiscent of the silence around the 2000 Narendran Commission report, which found OBCs to be underrepresented in public services.
Kerala's discomfort with caste must also be seen in the fragile coalitions stitched together along caste lines. For the UDF, taking a firm position on the caste census means pacifying supporters like the IUML and the Syrian Christians, who have opposite stances. For the LDF, it means risking the support of upper-caste groups. At a deeper level, it would mean accepting the primacy of caste in Kerala society, casting a shadow on its commitment to a primarily class-based politics. With the LDF staring at a financial crisis and an assembly election, spoiling the current compromises could prove costly.
It might seem perplexing that the LDF, whose primary social base comprises Ezhavas, other OBCs, SCs, and STs, has been reluctant to hold a state-led caste census. Such an exercise could have helped consolidate its core support while reaching out to other groups demanding caste enumeration. However, the unpredictable political consequences may be too risky for the LDF, particularly as it seeks to regain declining support among Nairs and Syrian Christians, who are increasingly moving towards the NDA. This consideration is evident in the LDF's proactive endorsement of the Economically Weaker Sections quota.
A more fundamental explanation for the lack of enthusiasm around a state-led caste census may lie in apprehensions about the potential disruption it could create. By unsettling the social coalitions that have underpinned Kerala's bipolar political order, the exercise risks triggering demands for a fundamental restructuring of alliances. This could destabilise the delicate caste and communal balances that have shaped the electoral strategies of both fronts over the past four decades. Meanwhile, for the savarna Malayali public, the caste census stands as a direct challenge to the disproportionate privileges they have accumulated over the years.
Communal fault lines
The imminent caste census also risks exposing the fragility of Kerala's communal accommodations, long embedded within its otherwise stable bipolar politics. Muslim organisations, notably the IUML, have unequivocally endorsed the census. For them, it serves a dual purpose: Not only could it objectively assess the community's socio-economic status, it might also counter the BJP's central campaign plank — the allegation that Muslims wield disproportionate socio-political advantages.
For the BJP in Kerala, which has largely opposed the caste census as an 'election stunt' pending the Centre's stance, the political calculus remains complex. While the immediate gains may be limited, the party may wish to benefit from any erosion of the communal balance that underpins the UDF's social base. The socio-economic picture the census will provide could amplify the increasing tensions between Muslims on the one hand and Syrian Christians and Nairs on the other. However, whether the BJP will be able to gain electorally from this is an open question, as the census may simultaneously undermine its own project of Hindu consolidation.
In Kerala's political and communal landscape, the caste census may ultimately prove a double-edged sword. While potentially disrupting the state's carefully maintained political stability and social alliances, it threatens to expose foundational socio-economic fault lines, with uncertain consequences. The exercise could fundamentally alter the state's political discourse, compelling it to confront uncomfortable questions of caste that have long been obscured by narratives of Kerala exceptionalism.
The writers are assistant professors, Social Science at NLSIU, Bengaluru