
New South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is playing with dynamite
American political leaders have often likened politics to sports. Former presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have all described politics as a 'contact sport.' Others have echoed the sentiment with lines like: 'Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.'
While phrases may vary, the message is the same: politics – and by extension, national foreign policy – requires taking a clear side.
President Lee Jae Myung, like former President Moon Jae-in, has chosen to steer the country's foreign policy through what they term 'strategic ambiguity.' This approach seeks to balance ties between the US and China, maintain engagement with North Korea and avoid formal alignment.
In line with that approach, Lee has chosen not to attend the NATO Summit being held on June 24–25, 2025.
This stands in stark contrast to former President Park Geun‑hye, who launched the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) – a NATO‑supported diplomatic framework aimed at enhancing regional dialogue.
Similarly, Yoon Suk Yeol, Lee's immediate predecessor, attended three consecutive NATO summits as part of the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) – with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – to reinforce ties amid growing global instability and authoritarian alignment.
Lee's decision to skip this year's summit has drawn strong criticism.
On June 23, Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies called IP4 a 'strong ad hoc coalition' and criticized South Korea's NATO withdrawal. He suggested that leftist forces in the Lee administration had pushed the move, fearing that tough statements on China would come out of the session.
As the US operates various small multilateral frameworks to contain China – pursuing both independent and coordinated efforts among them – Cha pointed out that, apart from the Korea-US-Japan cooperation represented by the 'Camp David Agreement,' South Korea is not a member of any security alliances such as the Quad or AUKUS. Because of this, China has long viewed South Korea as the 'weakest link' in the US-led front to contain China.
David Maxwell of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy called the decision a 'strategic mistake,' while Andrew Yeo of the Brookings Institution urged stronger alliance cooperation amid US uncertainty.
Experts also warn that skipping the summit weakens South Korea's credibility and defense posture, especially since most NATO members are part of the UN Command.
South Korea's ambiguity today echoes Japan's postwar Yoshida doctrine – a strategy of non-involvement in global conflicts, centered on pacifism and total reliance on the US for defense.
Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, the architect of that policy, used Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to justify non-participation in collective security.
This allowed Japan to avoid internal division and the burdens of war, while still enjoying the benefits of belonging to the free world.
In a revealing exchange with future Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, Yoshida once said that the day for Japanese rearmament
will come naturally when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our heaven-bestowed good fortune that the constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the constitution gives us a perfect justification.
In John Welfield's An Empire in Eclipse , Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda summed up (source no. 2) Japan's evasion bluntly:
The Americans were always asking us to do this and to do that, take over part of their Far Eastern policies. But all their efforts were sabotaged by one Japanese cabinet after another. That's why Eisaku Sato got the Nobel Prize. He got it for his accumulated achievements in the field of sabotage. I suppose he is the only prime minister ever to have got the Nobel Prize for sabotage.
Yet, as Japan modernized and became one of the world's leading economies, Yoshida expressed regret about the foreign policy he had crafted. In his 1963 book Sekai to Nihon , he wrote (source no. 3):'During my many overseas trips, especially my recent trip to Europe and America, I have visited many countries in the free world and met face-to-face with their leaders.
I was deeply moved by the sight of these countries having already overcome the pain of war and their leaders striving to contribute to world peace and prosperity under their own responsibility.
I have come to feel that Japan, too, should strive to contribute to the free world with its own capabilities and responsibilities.
As for Japan's own defense capabilities… for an independent Japan, which is among the first-rank countries in economics, technology, and learning, to continue to be dependent on another country is a deformity of the state.
It would be selfish to expect the benefits of being a member of the United Nations, as Japan has done up until now, but refuse to help the United Nations' peacekeeping mechanisms.
This is certainly not what we mean by placing importance on the international community. With regard to the above-mentioned constitutional principles and national policies, I myself cannot escape responsibility for the use of the Constitution as a pretext for this way of conducting national policy.
As the US wavers in its commitments – at times even threatening to leave NATO altogether – South Korea cannot afford to drift into passive ambiguity. Precisely because US reliability is uncertain, Seoul must strengthen its collective security arrangements with other democracies.
South Korea has long benefited from its place in the free world. To help preserve the current international order, it must now demonstrate a willingness to shoulder not just the rewards of prosperity but the burdens of responsibility, as well.
Hanjin Lew, a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs, is a former international spokesman for South Korean conservative parties.
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