Has the Indus Waters Treaty been fair to India, and what is the way forward: An Expert Explains

Indian Express

25-05-2025

Earlier this month, Pakistan signalled to India that it was willing to discuss the Indus Waters Treaty, which New Delhi had put in abeyance after the Pahalgam attack of April 22.
While the treaty came under renewed focus after Pahalgam — with Prime Minister Narendra Modi reiterating that 'blood and water cannot flow together' — India had issued a notice to Pakistan to renegotiate its terms back in January 2023.
The Indus treaty has endured for almost 65 years, sharing the waters of the Indus river system — the 'Eastern Rivers', namely Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, for India, and the 'Western Rivers' of Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab for Pakistan.
Sections in both India and Pakistan have claimed the treaty is unfair to their country and too generous to the other. When it was signed, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had termed it the 'price of peace for Pakistan'. Now, there are calls within India to scrap it entirely, while Pakistan has claimed that any disruption to its water supply will be treated as 'an act of war'.
However, amid all the clamour, much about the treaty remains little-understood, to its supporters and detractors alike. Uttam Kumar Sinha, Senior Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses breaks down the terms of the treaty, and what keeping it 'in abeyance' means.
The Indus Waters Treaty was a product of the context in which it was signed. A lot has changed since then, not just politically, but hydro-geomorphologically and in terms of population growth and irrigation use. In all fairness, the treaty needs to be renegotiated keeping the current realities in mind.
Under the treaty, Pakistan got a higher volume of water. The average annual flow of water in the 'western rivers' (135.6 million acre feet) is more than four times that of the eastern rivers (32.6 maf). But two things are important to note here. India needed the exclusive use of the waters of the eastern rivers, which the treaty secured for us. India has since built dams and other water projects on these rivers, including the Bhakra Nangal dam and the Rajasthan canal project now called the Indira Gandhi Canal, which have helped irrigate Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan.
In return, Pakistan got a much larger portion of the flow of water from the three western rivers but India was entitled to certain use on these rivers such as domestic use, non-consumptive use, agriculture use and generation of hydro-electric power. This we have not fully utilised. Also, India has the right to create water storage capacity of up to 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) on the western rivers. A capacity of only about .7 MAF on Salal and Baglihar dams havebeen achieved. With the Pakaldul dam nearing completition, the storage capacity is set to inch up to .8 maf.
It helps to remember that the treaty was negotiated by civil engineers and not politicians and diplomats. So it took a pragmatic and utilitarian view of the Indus Basin. The system of rivers was apportioned or divided into eastern and western rivers and not volumetric allocations. If it was based on volumes, it would have required negotiating six separate agreements, a task that would have never been accomplished.
Contrary to what sections in Pakistan have accused India of, keeping the treaty in abeyance does not mean blocking water to Pakistan. It means India will focus on the provision of the treaty on the western rivers and optimise it. India does not have the storage capacity to prevent water from flowing into Pakistan. But it can carry out 'sediment flushing operation' from the existing dams.
There is a strategic intent as well. Suspending the treaty sends a strong signal to Pakistan that business as usual is not possible. So far, India has been a very responsible upper riparian state [region located upstream of a river], and all the hydro-power projects it has initiated have gone through the due process mentioned in the treaty. Now, New Delhi is making it clear that new terms are needed if the treaty has to go ahead.
When the treaty is renegotiated, what changes should India ask for?
Two things are very important. One is the grievance redressal mechanism in the treaty.
Article IX of the treaty lays down a graded three-level mechanism, in which disputes are first taken up at the level of the Indus Commissioners of India and Pakistan, then escalated to the World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert, and finally to the International Court of Arbitration (CoA) in The Hague.
For long, Pakistan has used this three-level mechanism to delay dams and hydro-electric projects by India. Pakistan has repeatedly misused Article IX of the treaty to stall Indian projects—objecting to the Salal Dam, dragging Baglihar to a Neutral Expert, halting the Tulbul navigation project since 1987, and forcing the Kishanganga project to arbitration, where India ultimately prevailed but faced imposed restrictions.
Just like India has maintained that all its issues with Pakistan should be resolved bilaterally, the Indus treaty too should have a bilateral dispute resolution mechanism.
Pakistan always seeks international arbitration. I mentioned earlier that the treaty was negotiated by civil engineers. In its earliest hearings, India sent eight engineers. Pakistan sent two engineers and 176 lawyers. The attempt from Islamabad has been to internationalise the issue and paint India as misusing its upper riparian position. The revised treaty should have provisions against this.
The second thing is that the treaty is very prescriptive about what India can or cannot do when building dams. Since then, dam-building technology has progressed a lot. India should renegotiate and incorporate these elements into the treaty.
The Indus originates in Tibet. Should India be concerned about China's interference while it resolves the river issue with Pakistan?
According to satellite imagery and other available information, China is, as of now, not building dams on Indus. Unlike Pakistan, which is among the worst water managers in the world, China is a highly skilled dam-builder. A dam on the Indus only to spite India, when it does not serve domestic purposes, is possibly not on the cards for Beijing. However, India is a lower riparian state with China on the Brahmaputra too, where it is planning to build a 'super dam', and about which New Delhi has raised concerns. But this is a problem that New Delhi is well aware of.
To address water-related tensions with Beijing, India must strengthen its capabilities on the Brahmaputra while forging strategic lower-riparian partnerships with Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh to present a unified front in engaging China on transboundary water concerns. A task made all the more challenging by the fragile and shifting dynamics in the neighbourhood.
Yashee is an Assistant Editor with the indianexpress.com, where she is a member of the Explained team. She is a journalist with over 10 years of experience, starting her career with the Mumbai edition of Hindustan Times. She has also worked with India Today, where she wrote opinion and analysis pieces for DailyO. Her articles break down complex issues for readers with context and insight.
Yashee has a Bachelor's Degree in English Literature from Presidency College, Kolkata, and a postgraduate diploma in journalism from Asian College of Journalism, Chennai, one of the premier media institutes in the countr
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