New EU tariffs on Russian fertiliser confirmed to begin on July 1
New tariffs imposed by the EU on fertilisers coming from Russia and its geopolitical ally Belarus will come into effect on or before July 1, it has been confirmed.
The confirmation comes after the Council of the EU (council of ministers) adopted the proposal from the European Commission for increased tariffs, following the European Parliament's decision to adopt the proposal last month.
The adoption by the council means the proposal has cleared all its legislative hurdles, and therefore the tariffs will come into force no later than the first day of next month.
According to the council, the aim is to reduce EU dependence on those imports as well as to reduce Russian export revenues, thereby limiting its ability to finance its war effort in Ukraine.
The council said that the implementation of these tariffs will be closely monitored to ensure that the EU fertiliser industry and farmers are protected.
The tariff increases on fertilisers will take place gradually, over a transition period of three years.
Once the legislation enters into force, EU tariffs will apply to all agricultural products from Russia, as other agricultural goods are already subject to customs duties.
The new tariffs will apply to goods that made up around 15% of all agricultural imports from Russia in 2023. In the case of fertilisers, the new tariffs will apply to certain nitrogen-based products.
According to the council, the new tariffs will help reduce the EU's dependence on Russia and Belarus, and will boost diversification and domestic production, while also allowing for the diversification of supply, ensuring a stable fertiliser supply and maintaining affordability for EU farmers.
However, the new regulation has been adopted despite the concerns of EU farmers over the impact it will have on the availability and price of fertiliser.
Copa Cogeca, the body representing EU farm organisations and agricultural co-operatives, previously said: 'Farming communities understand and support the overall objective pursued by the EU institutions.
'However, the complete lack of consideration for alternative sourcing, the absence of an impact assessment, and the lack of clarity on market implications, remain deeply problematic,' Copa added.
'While recognising broader foreign policy goals, we must emphasise the serious economic and operational consequences this proposal represents for the EU agricultural sector,' the group said.
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RTÉ News
5 hours ago
- RTÉ News
EU and US sanctions on Russia: Timing is everything ahead of G7 summit
As G7 leaders converge on Kananaskis in the Canadian Rockies this weekend, the prospect of decisively tougher sanctions on Russia will loom large. The Ukraine War is reaching another inflection point: Vladimir Putin has intensified missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian cities and there are fears a Russian ground offensive is imminent. While President Trump has been publicly frustrated with Mr Putin's relentless attacks on civilian targets, he keeps deferring a tougher response. Over the next 10 days, a key NATO summit in The Hague, and a meeting of EU leaders in Brussels, will further clarify Mr Trump's intentions when it comes to Ukraine and the broader issue of European security. Supporters of Ukraine, therefore, are banking on harsher sanctions to convince Russia to move towards the 30-day ceasefire to which Ukraine has in principle already agreed. There is also a growing consensus that Russia's economy, despite weathering the sanctions better than expected, could be more vulnerable than the regime is claiming. This week the European Commission tabled its 18th sanctions package, aimed at stopping the flow of refined Russian crude oil into Europe, while simultaneously pushing to lower the oil price cap agreed by the G7. In July, the Commission will also propose a complete phase out of Russian fossil fuels, especially LNG. In tandem, two US senators Lindsay Graham (Rep) and Richard Blumenthal (Dem) have been promoting a bill which would, in the words of its authors, put "bone-crushing" pressure on Russia by hitting countries which continue to buy its oil with 500% tariffs. Both gambits face formidable challenges. The cap on the price Russia can sell its seaborne crude oil was set at $60 per barrel by a joint decision of the G7 and EU member states in December 2022. The idea was to ensure that the global south did not suffer from a complete ban (which would also have pushed up prices and therefore the Kremlin's revenues), whereas a cap would keep the oil flowing but with less benefit to Russia. 'Shadow fleet' The price cap was policed through the west's virtual monopoly on maritime insurance. To circumvent the cap, Russia began buying end-of-life vessels, effectively creating a parallel shipping network with dubious insurance - what became known as the "shadow fleet". The EU and G7 then sanctioned individual ships: the US hit 200 vessels, the EU 154 and the UK 177. As a result, ports became increasingly unwilling to let these oil tankers dock while flag states like Panama and Honduras were de-registering them (on Wednesday the EU added an additional 77 shadow fleet vessels to the sanctions list). Experts suggest Russia, which still gets one third of its export revenues from crude oil, is still finding ways to circumvent the price cap. However, the EU believes it has significantly reduced oil revenues. India, Turkey and China - the biggest buyers of Russian oil - have been pressuring Moscow to sell its crude below the price cap, officials say. Now, the EU wants to push the price cap lower. Notwithstanding the spike in prices following Israel's attack against Iran, the traded price of crude this year has fallen to around $65 a barrel, rendering the $60 cap ineffective. This week European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen proposed lowering it to $45. This was deliberately timed ahead of the G7 summit: Europe cannot do this alone. The Commission believes that most G7 partners are on board, but not yet the Trump administration. Scott Bessent, the Treasury Secretary, is sceptical and reportedly insisted that a reference to a lower price cap be dropped from the final communiqué of last month's G7 finance ministers meeting in Banff, Alberta. While EU officials say the work to convince President Trump will continue, it may be that the six other G7 countries go it alone, given that the UK and EU between them cover most of the elements (ie, identifying the shadow fleet and maritime insurance). Sources admit, however, that the decision-making process within the Trump administration is "difficult to predict". Brussels is also proposing a ban on any EU operator engaging in transactions, either directly or indirectly, via the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, and also wants to curb the amount of Russian crude making its way into member states through the back door because it has been refined and relabelled elsewhere. Officials admit there are conflicting figures as to how much relabelled Russian crude - mostly refined in India and Turkey - is entering Europe. India and Turkey imported 1.7 million barrels per day of Russian crude in the first quarter of 2025, according to LSEG data; EU member states imported more than 350,000 barrels from both countries in the same period. EU officials say the burden of proof would be switched to the exporting countries to show that the refined oil is not originally Russian, but that could be tricky. "The [European] Commission implementing such a ban would be difficult, given that refiners blend different types of crude oil," writes Warren Patterson, head of commodities strategy with ING. "Determining the origin of the crude oil becomes challenging." The Kremlin is publicly unperturbed. "Naturally, Russia has not been living under restrictions for just a day," spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said this week. "We have long operated under such conditions, which we continue to regard as unlawful. Russia has gained valuable and substantial experience that allows us to minimize the adverse effects of such measures." The Commission has also proposed cutting off a further 22 Russian banks from the Swift international payments system and converting the partial ban on financial institutions to a full ban. The 18th sanctions package could be agreed by the end of the month, with the usual caveat of potential objections by Hungary and Slovakia. Robert Fico, Slovakia's pro-Russian prime minister, has warned he would not support the package - which requires unanimity - unless the Commission provides a solution to the problems caused by a full phase out of Russia fuel. In reality, it has been the contradictory response by the Trump administration to the Ukraine War that has pushed the EU into launching what could be its toughest sanctions package yet. In Kyiv, on 10 May, the leaders of Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany and Poland had called on Russia - on the assumption they had the backing of the Trump administration - to agree to an immediate 30-day ceasefire or face massive sanctions. Instead, the US President enthusiastically backed a call by Vladimir Putin to start talks in Istanbul the following week (with no commitment to a ceasefire). Mr Putin refused to attend the talks, which were conducted by a low-level Russian delegation, and has since intensified air attacks while continuing to insist on his maximalist war aims. Moscow appears convinced that military gains and the demoralisation of the Ukrainian population are a better bet than ceasefires. "The aim of the [18th sanctions] package is to increase pressure on Russia and to make it agree to negotiate with sincere intentions," says Svitlana Taran, an analyst with the European Policy Centre (EPC). "At the moment Russia is engaging in negotiations, but without any real intention to actually negotiate. Russia still thinks that it can win. Moscow is confident they still have more potential to sustain a war of attrition against Ukraine than Ukraine does." In the absence of tougher action from the White House, US senators Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal are currently pushing a bill through the Senate which would - if approved by President Trump - allow for tariffs of 500% on countries which are continuing to buy Russian crude oil, gas, uranium and other exports. The bill currently has 82 sponsors on both sides of the aisle with Graham - regarded as a weathervane on Republican sentiment towards Ukraine - and Blumenthal hopeful it can be adopted before the 4 July recess. Supporters of the bill complain that Mr Putin has been stringing the US president along and has no incentive to get to the negotiating table in the absence of tougher measures. 'Making astronomically high tariffs the center of US policy toward Russia's war is misguided' But the Sanctioning Russia Act (SRA2025) is not without its critics. President Trump would have to determine every 90 days that Mr Putin is refusing to negotiate a peace agreement at which point sanctions would be mandatory. These would be on President Putin himself, on Russian oligarchs and on banks and other financial institutions. But the most eye-catching element is the 500% tariffs on countries buying Russian crude oil. Since China is among the biggest purchasers, this would upend the current negotiations between Washington and Beijing on averting a damaging trade war. "Making astronomically high tariffs the center of US policy toward Russia's war is misguided: a threat that will never be carried out lacks real coercive power," argues Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations. "And a bill that stops all trade with the United States' most important commercial partners is precisely that kind of threat." The authors of the bill insist it is designed precisely to focus minds and to convince Mr Putin that he cannot maintain his war effort for another two or three years. "Russia is in a very perilous state already economically, because 40 percent of its economy is devoted to war production or compensation for soldiers," Senator Blumenthal said during a recent visit to Kyiv. "It's only real source of revenue is oil and gas and other similar energy products, of which 70 percent is sold to India and China together." While Lindsey Graham stresses he has worked closely with the White House in formulating the bill, President Trump has been urging him to water down key aspects and has made his distaste for some of the elements clear. EU officials, while supportive of the need for tougher US pressure on Moscow, are aware of this. "I'm not convinced that the bill will be what gets adopted, even if Trump decides to put sanctions on Putin," says a senior EU source. "These bills in the Senate are notoriously aspirational until the White House gets at them and says: this is what's actually realistic. [Senator] Graham won't do anything without Trump's approval." Russian economy 'clearly heading toward zero growth' Yet, there is a growing body of opinion that this is precisely the time to hit the Russian economy. On paper, Moscow has weathered the sanctions well since 2022. While the economy contracted by 2.1% in 2022, there was economic growth in the following two years as Russia switched to a military economy, deepened trade links with China and India, availed of windfall fossil fuel profits and used its accumulated reserves as a buffer against the sharp decline in exports. This allowed Mr Putin to pour huge resources into military spending. Between 2011 and 2021 the defense budget averaged $53 billion per year. In 2022 it rose to $79 billion and $94 billion in 2023. 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'Good-cop-bad-cop' tactics The growing frustration in Washington at the Kremlin's unrelenting assault on civilians appears to have prompted a change in heart. While the Biden administration steered clear of tough sanctions against Russia's energy sector until the very end of his tenure, and those countries filling Mr Putin's war coffers by buying its crude oil paid no penalty, there is today a change in mood. It is true that European countries which continue to rely on Russian oil could be caught up in the US tariffs. Lindsey Graham insists there will be exemptions for countries that have supported Ukraine's defence. A much tougher bipartisan response from Congress could provide President Trump with a 'good-cop-bad-cop' tactic to be used on Mr Putin, notwithstanding his tendency to cut the Russian president a very generous amount of slack. Brussels would prefer to act in tandem with Washington. However, observers point to Europe's complete oil embargo on Iran in 2009, and how it pushed the country to negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal, as an argument for going it alone. "Just as the EU oil embargo on Iran helped spur action in Washington a decade and a half ago, major new EU sanctions on Russia could do the same today," writes Edward Fishman, a former Obama administration official in Foreign Affairs. "Instead of waiting around for Mr Trump, Brussels should advance new penalties on Russia's energy sector. Even unilateral EU measures would tighten the screws on Moscow - and could prompt Washington to follow suit."
Irish Times
6 hours ago
- Irish Times
Ireland will have to commit substantial funds to arms procurement whether it approves or not
All they talk about in Brussels these days is defence. And with a sense of urgency and common political will that is a product of real fear that the EU itself is existentially threatened . A fear that the threats from Russia to Ukraine – regarded, as one senior European Commission official put it, as a 'de facto member state' – and Vladimir Putin 's wider ambitions against former Soviet states now part of the union are serious. And that the US can no longer be relied on for military support or even nuclear deterrence. The talk is all of meeting new Nato targets of raising defence spending to between three and five per cent of GDP. Russia, member states are warned, has been massively expanding its military-industrial production capacity with an estimated spending in 2024 of 40 per cent of the federal budget and up to 9 per cent of its GDP (up from 6 per cent in 2023) on defence, a commitment only possible in an autocratic state impervious to public sentiment. Ireland, despite its new commitment to bolster its army, remains the poorest performer in the EU class at 0.5 per cent this year. Member states' defence spending has grown by more than 31 per cent since 2021, reaching 1.9 per cent of the EU's combined GDP or €326bn in 2024, almost double the amount spent in 2021. Not enough, however; now a target of €800 billion in the next few years is being discussed. A measure of how seriously the debate is being taken has been the union's willingness with unprecedented speed to raise its sacrosanct fiscal rules, allowing member states to break debt limits to expand their military spending . READ MORE The thrust is now being driven by the EU White Paper on Defence Preparedness 2025, published recently. It was the subject of a well-attended debate this week in the Institute for International and European Affairs, which turned inevitably to the issue of Ireland's own national preparedness and its role next year in steering the EU presidency discussions. Centre stage will be the roll-out of the white paper proposals to revitalise states' military capacity and transform national defence industries to break reliance on foreign, notably US, imported weapons. A new defence financing initiative, Safe, will see the European Investment Bank raise €150 billion to lend to the private sector on condition 65 per cent of loans are for European-produced weapons. Ireland is not planning to dip into the fund, but Minister of State for Defence Thomas Byrne told the meeting that, in the spirit of 'principles-based pragmatism', we might yet do so. Ireland will also have charge of brokering a deal on the next seven-year budget (the Multiannual Financial Framework, or MFF). The process always severely stretches member-state solidarity and will particularly test them this time, with a huge increase in collective defence spending being proposed. That, at a time when all are cash-strapped, will require a massive breach of the one per cent of EU GDP budget spending ceiling, or as Prof Brigid Laffan warned, 'tough trade-offs' on long-standing policy areas. Like agriculture. Ireland cannot stand on the sidelines. It will necessarily have to commit substantial funds to arms procurement as a net contributor to the MFF, like all others, whether or not it approves. [ Parlous state of Defence Forces once again laid bare Opens in new window ] The EU white paper bears a remarkable resemblance in its scope and thrust to the paper produced in Ireland in 2022 by the Commission on the Defence Forces and which prompted our own commitment to major upgrading of the Defence Forces. 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[ Poll shows Ireland's attachment to neutrality is strong but nuanced Opens in new window ] Critical to getting both imperatives through will be important changes in the nature of defence discussions throughout the EU – not least in Ireland, where the debate has largely been confined to political and policy circles. Both the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste have engaged strongly, echoing common EU-wide concerns, but public opinion remains largely indifferent, albeit clinging to vague, often contradictory notions of 'neutrality'. There is often an unwillingness to acknowledge the need to upgrade our defensive capacity or even a need for it. A fundamental challenge remains a public unwillingness to perceive real new vulnerabilities or threats to ourselves – like to our vital undersea cable networks or to cyber attacks, or threats to the territorial integrity of our European partners – as urgent and requiring radical action. Although sympathetic to their plight, and generously receptive of refugees, Irish voters have yet to recognise that their problem is our problem, a real threat to our union, and to develop a real sense of obligation to fellow members of the union arising from our membership of this huge 'peace project'. From a narrow national perspective, as Minister Byrne acknowledged, 'working together is the only way forward'. This debate urgently needs to expand beyond Dáil Éireann's narrow confines.
Irish Daily Mirror
6 hours ago
- Irish Daily Mirror
Figures show the amount of Child Benefit being paid to children living overseas
Over 3,000 people not living in Ireland are claiming child benefit for over 6,000 children, new figures show. It means that at least €866,040 in Child Benefit is being paid to children living overseas each month. This adds up to €10.4m over the course of a year. However, the actual amount could be higher as different rates are paid in respect of twins and triplets. Social Protection Minister Dara Calleary confirmed the figures in response to a parliamentary question from Fine Gael TD John Paul O'Shea. The Cork North-West TD asked the Minister for a breakdown of child benefit paid to persons living in countries other than Ireland. Child Benefit is an automatic monthly €140 payment to the parents or guardians of children under the age of 16. Since 2024, parents can apply for the payment if their children are 16, 17 or 18 and still in full time education or if they have a disability and cannot support themselves. Minister Calleary confirmed that under European Union (EU) regulations, Child Benefit is considered a 'Family Payment'. If a UK, EU or European Economic Area (EEA) citizen is working in Ireland, they can apply for Irish Child Benefit. If the child is living in a different EU or EEA country from the worker, they can also apply for any family benefit payments they are entitled to in the country where their children live. Minister Calleary confirmed that as of April 30, Child Benefit was being paid to 3,381 customers in respect of 6,186 non-resident children.' In total, people in 22 countries were in receipt of these payments. The highest number of claims was in the United Kingdom, where 1,310 people were getting the payment for 2,695 children. Some 1,129 people are in receipt of Child Benefit for 1,129 children living in Poland, while 685 parents are claiming for 1,320 children in Romania. All other countries have receipt numbers in the hundreds, and payments are being made to countries including Lithuania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Spain, Slovakia, Latvia, and Hungary. Deputy O'Shea told the Irish Mirror that he inquired about the figures to assist him in his work as Chairman of the Oireachtas Social Protection Committee. He said: 'As the newly elected chairperson of the Oireachtas Committee on Social Protection, I have put in a series of questions about expenditure across a range of different schemes, such as disability, illness benefit and child benefit. 'This information is useful in providing me with a greater understanding of the social welfare system. 'I intend to tease through all of this detail out further with the Department when they appear before the committee.'
