Military Digest: How China factor plays crucial role in Indo-Pak military confrontations, look no further than 1965

Indian Express

27-04-2025

With India and Pakistan in a diplomatic stand-off due to the terror attack in Pahalgam in which 26 people were killed, it is a fit occasion to look back 60 years on the 1965 war between the two countries in which China tried its best to help Pakistan.
All strategic experts agree that the Pak-China military ties and the threatening postures that China adopts against India from time to time are major factors in deciding any military offensive against Pakistan. While China remained relatively silent in 1971, making limited aggressive postures in the Northeast, it was far more belligerent during the 1965 war.
Documents accessed from the United States State Department archives and declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) files show that in the middle of the Indo-Pak war, on September 16, 1965, China formally warned India to dismantle all military installations on or over the China-Sikkim boundary within three days or face 'serious consequences'.
There was a background to this ultimatum, which was given when India was prosecuting war against Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab on a full scale. From September 1964, China intermittently charged India with building military structures on and across the Sikkim border.
The documents show that on October 4, 1964, China claimed that up to August 1964, Indian troops built up to 18 aggressive military structures (dugouts, shelters, bulwarks, etc.) on the Chinese side of the Nathu La pass or the boundary line (11 on the Chinese side and seven on the boundary line).
On January 3, 1965, China amplified and updated its charges to 31 structures, all within 5 km of the Natu La. This, in turn, was increased to 50 'aggressive structures and posted guards' by January 18, 1965. China's subsequent note of July 29, 1965, noted that New Delhi failed to dismantle the alleged structures as 'urged' by it.
Indian officials steadfastly denied all of the Chinese charges concerning the Sikkim border. India noted that the accusations were intentional fabrications designed to justify renewed Chinese military advances in the area.
The Chinese note, however, raised grave concern in New Delhi. 'The Chumbi valley is the best invasion route into India and a successful Chinese attack through it could carry into East Pakistan, thus isolating the Indian forces in Assam to the East. Although the Chinese are not specifically threatening such an attack, the Indians are prone to over-reaction, and the mere implication of an attack in this sensitive area confronts them with the dilemma of reinforcing their already sizeable forces in the area by drawing forces away from the Pakistan frontier, or taking the chance that any Chinese action will be limited in scope and pose no serious threat,' a CIA document noted.
It further said the immediate Indian reaction to the Chinese ultimatum was likely to be an urgent appeal for assurances from the US, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Should military action actually materialise, the Indian pleas for direct assistance, especially from the US, would become desperate, it added.
The declassified documents also contained remarks attributed to General Sam Manekshaw, then General Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Command, dated September 19, 1965.
'(1) North Sikkim:
No evidence of a significant Chinese buildup or activity north of the northern Sikkin border is known to him.
(2) Chumbi Valley:
Beginning September 17, small groups of Chinese soldiers began approaching Indian border control posts at Natu La and Jelep La. Numbers increased through the morning to high at noon of about one battalion (800 Chinese troops). Most come no closer than 100 yards although a small group came within two feet of Indian sentries at the border. They withdrew last night and are engaging in a similar build up this morning. The Chinese have three regiments in the Chumbi Valley.
(3) Bhutan:
There were no unusual Chinese movements north of the Bhutan border.
(4) NEFA:
There was no notable Chinese troop action as yet on the NEFA borders. Possible exception is in area of Rima where he said the Chinese have division strength immediately available.
(5) Ladakh:
He said that as a former corps commander in Ladakh he would consider Chinese military action in the Demchok area unlikely because of the strength of the Indian forces in the Indus Valley.'
While the Chinese threats failed to impact immediate military operations conducted on the western front, they did succeed in tying up a considerable number of troops in the east, which otherwise could have been moved to the west and given India a significant numerical and material advantage.
In fact, China continued to create trouble in the weeks after the ceasefire with Pakistan. The US archives contain the text of an aide memoire of then Indian Foreign Secretary C S Jha to the US Ambassador dated November 29, 1965.
The Foreign Secretary (FS) notes that on November 13, 1965, there was a serious incursion across the Dongchui la in Sikkim, resulting in the death of one Indian soldier.
'During the last few days the intrusions on the Sikkim border have become almost a daily occurrence. In the Western Sector the Chinese troops have practically re-militarised the 20 km demilitarised zone thereby violating the Colombo Proposals as well as China's own unilateral declaration,' the FS said.
These Chinese actions were clearly done to help Pakistan by keeping the Sino-Indian border aflame so as to put pressure on India not to proceed further against Pakistan, the note said.
In Ladakh, at certain points, the Chinese crossed the LAC and intruded into undisputed Indian territory like Tsaskur and Track Junction at Daulet Beg Oldi.
It is worth noting that the Chinese face-off in Ladakh began in 2020, barely a year after the Indian air strikes in Pakistan after the 2019 Pulwama terror attack. Thus, it is likely that in the present instance, too, the Chinese are unlikely to maintain a silent posture and will attempt to intimidate Indian positions all along the LAC to relieve pressure on Pakistan.