American-Israeli hostage ‘born again' after Hamas release: Father
(NewsNation) — American-Israeli hostage Sagui Dekel-Chen was released by Hamas on Saturday after nearly 500 days in captivity.
His father, Jonathan Dekel-Chen, said his son has been 'born again' after his release, adding that it's now time for his son to get treatment and heal from the Oct. 7, 2023, attack.
'He's been, in a sense, sort of born again as a human being in the world that we inhabit, and that's joyous,' he said. 'It's joyous for himself. It's joyous for his wife, his three little girls, and our family, our community near us.'
500 days of the Israel-Hamas war, by the numbers
Sagui Dekel-Chen was among the three men released in Khan Younis, Gaza, on Saturday in the latest victory for the fragile ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.
'I have my son back. We have light back in our lives,' said Jonathan Dekel-Chen, recalling the moment he saw his son return home. 'To see him, and mostly, to see his eyes, was a moment I will never forget for the rest of my days. Since he was a little kid, he speaks with his eyes. From the second that I saw him in person, not just via camera, from the handoff in Gaza, my son was back after 500 days in hell. Glad to have him back.'
Jonathan Dekel-Chen added that his son will need to undergo 'a lot of of recovering rehabilitation' from his wounds because he didn't receive proper medical attention.
Hamas also released Israeli Argentinian Iair Horn and Russian Israeli Alexander (Sasha) Troufanov, the Israeli Defense Forces confirmed.
Chen was among the last remaining living Americans held in captivity. The State Department noted that Hamas still holds 73 hostages, including New Jersey native Edan Alexander, who had recently graduated high school, and the remains of four additional Americans who were killed in Gaza.
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