Trump says Ukraine shouldn't target Moscow, amid talk of US-supplied missiles
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Trump on Monday gave Russia 50 days to strike a peace deal with Ukraine, voicing exasperation with Moscow, and announcing that Nato members would supply Kyiv with new military aid.
In what would be an even more extraordinary shift, the Financial Times reported that Trump spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about providing US missiles to hit Moscow.
But asked by reporters at the White House if Zelensky should look at striking the Russian capital, Trump replied: 'No, he shouldn't target Moscow.'
Trump had taken office vowing to end the conflict swiftly and to stop the flow of billions of dollars of US weapons to Ukraine.
02:08
Trump threatens Russia with 100% 'secondary' tariffs if no deal on Ukraine ceasefire
Trump threatens Russia with 100% 'secondary' tariffs if no deal on Ukraine ceasefire
The Republican put heavy pressure on Zelensky and initially touted his relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
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