PNG Faces Deadline For Fixing Issues With Money Laundering And Terrorist Financing
Article – RNZ
Papua New Guinea has five months remaining to fix its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing systems or face repercussions. Scott Waide, RNZ Pacific PNG correspondent
-Analysis
Papua New Guinea has five months remaining to fix its anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) systems or face the severe repercussions of being placed on the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) 'grey list'.
The FATF has imposed an October 2025 deadline, and the government is scrambling to prove its commitment to global partners.
Speaking in Parliament, Prime Minister James Marape said Treasury Minister, Ian Ling-Stuckey has been given the responsibility to lead a taskforce to fix PNG's issues associated with money laundering and terrorist financing.
'I summoned all agency heads to a critical meeting last week giving them clear direction, in no uncertain terms, that they work day and night to avert the possibility of us getting grey listed,' Marape said.
'This review comes around every five years.
'We have only three or four areas that are outstanding that we must dispatch forthwith.'
PNG is no stranger to the FATF grey list, having been placed under increased monitoring in 2014 before successfully being removed in 2016.
However, a recent assessment by the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) highlighted ongoing deficiencies, particularly in the effectiveness of PNG's AML/CTF regime.
While the country has made strides in establishing the necessary laws and regulations (technical compliance), the real challenge lies in PNG's implementation and enforcement.
The core of the problem, according to analysts, is a lack of effective prosecution and punishment for money laundering and terrorism financing.
High-risk sectors such as corruption, fraud against government programmes, illegal logging, illicit fishing, and tax evasion, remain largely unchecked by successful legal actions. Capacity gaps within key agencies like the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary and the Office of the Public Prosecutor have been cited as significant hurdles.
Recent drug hauls have also highlighted existing flaws in detection in the country's financial systems.
The implications of greylisting are far-reaching and potentially devastating for a developing nation like PNG, which is heavily reliant on foreign investment and international financial flows.
Deputy Opposition leader James Nomane warned in Parliament that greylisting 'will severely affect the economy, investor confidence, and make things worse for Papua New Guinea with respect to inflationary pressures, the cost of imports, and a whole host of issues'.
If PNG is greylisted, the immediate economic fallout could be substantial. It would signal to global financial institutions that PNG carries a heightened risk for financial crimes, potentially leading to a sharp decline in foreign direct investment.
Critical resource projects, including Papua LNG, P'nyang LNG, Wafi-Golpu, and Frieda River Mines, could face delays or even be halted as investors become wary of the increased financial and reputational risks.
Beyond investment, the cost of doing business in PNG could also rise. International correspondent banks, vital conduits for cross-border transactions, may de-risk by cutting ties or scaling back operations with PNG financial institutions.
This 'de-risking' could make it more expensive and complex for businesses and individuals alike to conduct international transactions, leading to higher fees and increased scrutiny.
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What Are New Zealand's Risk To Facilitating Unregulated Alternative Remittance?
Press Release – Asia Pacific AML The research focuses on NZs AML/CFT Act and legislative framework for effectiveness to manage risks arising from traditional money remittance, also known as alternative remittance. Such methods of trading are unconventional (traditional) and emerging Preface This is an evolving research report that examines New Zealand's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act (NZ AML/CFT Act). The research focuses on NZ's AML/CFT Act and legislative framework for effectiveness to manage risks arising from traditional money remittance, also known as 'alternative remittance'. Such methods of trading are unconventional (traditional) and emerging (modern) ways of transferring money or value and operate outside of the formal banking system. This research examines whether NZ's AML/CFT Act has ability to regulate and supervise businesses or private individuals that perform methods known as alternative remittance and that operate outside of the conventional banking sector. Observations and Findings Though the NZ AML/CFT Act provides regulatory oversight of contemporary methods of financial activity, there is no regulatory framework that captures unconventional trading methodologies. Unconventional trading methodologies do no require a Wire Transfer. That is, businesses that do not rely on an electronic or wire transfer for international money or value transfer, remain outside of the NZ AML/CFT Act. This is because the NZ AML/CFT Act only captured international transaction money or value activity that is carried out through a Wire Transfer. This is confirmed with the definition of 'Prescribed Transaction' for international activity is explicitly limited to 'Wire Transfer' (Section 5 AML/CFT Act). Consequently, NZ is operating as a country that has no regulatory licensing or registration system capturing international 'Alternative Remittance'. Also known as 'Informal Money or Value Transfer' – many ethnic communities residing in western countries rely on their traditional methods of trade. Not providing a regulatory structure to enable 'legalised' Informal Money or Value Transfer services – will always result in a strong demand for services known as 'underground trading'. Channels of underground banking have a proper purpose and are not illegal. It is only when a country has no regulatory structure to formalise these channels, that underground banking channels become problematic. This is due to the attraction that underground banking channels have to organised and trans-national criminal groups. Like a bee to the honey pot, organised criminals seek methods of money or value transfer (including asset transfer), that has very little or no record keeping. Circumventing International Sanctions The lack of oversight of the alternative-remittance trading sector in New Zealand (NZ) increases the likelihood that NZ is being used as a conduit country to avoid or circumvent United Nations Sanctions. This risk impacts NZ economically and increases national and international security risks to NZ and to other countries. Further detail of these risks will be captured in following publications.. Financing of Terrorism Though Money Laundering is a serious offence and destructive to society, the offence of 'Financing of Terrorism' is in essence facilitating an attack to intimidate and/or threaten people for the purpose of supporting beliefs linked to political, ideology or religion. Often death results to innocent people and often the deaths can include in tens, hundreds or thousands of people losing their lives or suffering grievous bodily harm. Terrorism Financing, due to its consequences, is therefore the higher priority for AML/CFT Supervisors. Any weaknesses in national AML/CFT laws will weaken security of not just the country with the weaker legislative framework, but heightened risk occurs across all other countries. This is because the country operating with weak AML/CFT laws, may be facilitating an attack on any other country. The MOJ as the Administrator of the NZ AML/CFT Act must therefore take its responsibilities seriously. What Is Meant By Remittance Services? Remittance services were generally introduced for the purpose of enabling immigrants to transfer their income back to their home country to support family or community events. Traditional or alternative remittance does not rely on conventional banking systems or formal electronic or wire transfers. Overtime, remittance services have evolved for some methods to incorporate use of banking facilities. However, most often there is no international wire transfer or cross border of funds. Ledger style or off-setting transactions are a common method for alternative remittance. Informal methods of remittance and traditional methods of remittance are for a legitimate person, however these methods also commonly attract trans-national criminal syndicates. Unless a country bans methods of alternative remittance (ie exchange of value outside of conventional banking), or has clear legislative frameworks to regulate this activity, then the methods are known as 'legalised underground banking'. What Is Money or Value Transfer Services? Money or Value Transfer Services (MVTS) is a phrase used to describe the ability to move money or value on behalf of another. The conventional form of money or value transfer services is through a banking institution which involves an electronic or 'wire' message. What is Informal Money or Value Transfer Service? Informal MVTS refers to Informal Money or Value Transfer Services. Another common acronym is IVTS which stands for Informal Value Transfer Systems. Informal value transfer systems are another terminology used for alternative remittance or traditional remittance that rely on non-conventional systems and do not require a wire or formal electronic transfer. The ability to seek non-conventional means of value transfer are lifelines for many underserved populations around the world. For migrants that move from the East to the West, the need to continue accessing alternative or traditional remittance services is crucial. Options of conventional banking are dismissed due to high fees which results in less of their hard-earned funds reaching the intended recipient. If the traditional or alternative remittance market for legitimate trade is not regulated, then underground banking will result. The risk is that those who are seeking to commit ML/FT will also access this unregulated market. The attractiveness of this style of underground banking is well known to the underground criminal groups. It is therefore crucial for the MoJ to strike a balance between regulation and financial inclusion. To date, the NZ AML/CFT Act and regulatory framework has weighed heavily to regulate contemporary style forms of trading with a focus on western style banking methods which require an electronic or wire transfer. NZ's AML/CFT Act and regulatory framework has not catered to eastern style traditional methods of trading which do not rely on any cross-movement of funds or value, or the use of an official electronic wire-transfer or electronic communication. Consequently the methods of trading that do not capture a wire transfer or cross movement of funds or value remain outside of the AML/CFT Act and continues underground and unregulated. For New Zealand's Ministry of Justice to address these issues it needs to keep the following principles in mind: NZ has opened its borders to refugees and residents from the eastern region of the globe. A great proportion of NZ immigrants originate from the eastern region of the globe. They now reside in New Zealand and have either successfully obtained NZ citizenships and/or, are intending to apply for NZ citizenship. These groups of NZ citizens that have migrated from the East to the West, have brought with them their nations style of trading. Most of these NZ citizens have ongoing financial commitments to their home country. These citizens will need to, at times, send goods, services, or money, to their family that remain in their home country. Such expenses may include medical expenses for their parents, or real estate transactions for their parents, and/or other family members. In today's contemporary world, it should not be the power of any government to dictate how a private individual may spend their money. It also would be against humanitarian laws to prevent a private individual sending money, funds or value to loved ones who live outside of NZ. Examples of such expenses and/or requirement for providing money, funds or value is commonly for health expenses for elderly parents, or funeral expenses. Anniversaries and birthdays may be another reason for NZ citizens to send funds back to their home country. Unless there is a blanket ban on a country that forbids any type of trade with that country, the NZ immigrants who originate from the eastern region of the globe can be expected to have the need for services for sending money, funds or value to their country of birth or from the country where they migrated from. Global Regions that Commonly Utilise Alternative Remittance Private individuals that originate from the eastern region of the globe are prone to utilising methods of alternative remittance or traditional remittance. It is important to understand this type of trade operates for legitimate purposes, however, if unregulated, attract trans-national criminal groups. Global regions that typically use or rely on traditional or alternative remittance include: Africa India Middle East China With the exception of China, the other three regions have inherent risks to terrorism and financing of terrorism. This increases the need for other countries to enable the regulated facilitation of trade that uses traditional or alternative remittance services. NB: Though China has a lower risk to financing of terrorism, the country presents a significant risk to NZ's economic and social status as a consequence of strong ties to the distribution of precursors and other laboratory type illegal narcotics that swamp New Zealand. Challenges in Regulating Alternative Remittance Regulating traditional remittance methods presents several challenges for regulatory authorities. One of the primary difficulties lies in distinguishing between remittance transfers conducted through alternative remittance and those conducted by entities that qualify as informal or conventional money services businesses. The lines between these entities can be blurred, making it challenging to develop clear regulatory frameworks to address the risks associated with traditional or alternative remittance and the regulation of the same. FATF Recommendations The Financial Action Task Force is the global watchdog for country compliance to international recommendations. The FATF first issued its Forty Recommendations in 1990 aimed at governments and financial institutions. Together, these Recommendations form a comprehensive regime against money laundering and have been accepted world-wide as one of the most comprehensive bases for tackling money laundering. The Recommendations were revised in 1996 to reflect all serious crimes. Though 'Anti-Money Laundering' laws were generally operating across the western world at the time of the 9/11 bombings in the USA, 'Financing of Terrorism' was not featured across Western countries. Following 9/11 the FATF updated its international recommendations and included 9 Special Recommendations that were focused on preventing the risk of financing of terrorism. The Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing were adopted by the FATF in October 2001. Special Recommendation VI relates to Alternative Remittance. This recommendation requires – Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions. FATF Special Recommendation VI For each Special Recommendation (SR) the FATF provided an Interpretive Note to explain the purpose and outcome of each SR. An Extract from the Interpretive Notes of SRVI is copied below. The objective of Special Recommendation VI is to increase the transparency of payment flows by ensuring that jurisdictions impose consistent anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures on all forms of money/value transfer systems, particularly those traditionally operating outside the conventional financial sector and not currently subject to the FATF Recommendations and are not regulated. Observation: It is clear SRVI and its title 'Alternative Remittance' is intended to capture 'all forms' of money or value trading and in particular it emphasises 'traditional' activity that operates outside the conventional financial sector and 'not currently' subject to the FATF Recommendations. NZ Needs to Regulate Alternative Remittance Trade NZ's Ministry of Justice, as Administrator of the AML/CFT Act, needs to react swiftly to update NZ's AML/CFT compliance laws to bridge these existing gaps and/or omission of addressing 'traditional remittance' and/or 'alternative remittance'. These methods or trading are not yet defined in the NZ AML/CFT Act. Consequently, such trading continues in NZ legally which is unregulated and without any government or AML/CFT oversight of such trading. Not defining alternative or traditional remittance services will result in businesses partaking in 'non-transfer' type activity, including a simple offsetting on a balance sheet. Leaving an obvious and ambiguous definition that fails to transparently address the risk of 'underground banking' leaves New Zealand vulnerable to facilitating 'underground banking'. Consequently, NZ increases the risks faced by other countries. The Ministry of Justice must address these issues during the current update of the AML/CFT Amendment Bill. Failing to do so will result in NZ continuing as a conduit country and increasing ML/FT risks at a national and international level. Financial Exclusion When a country pushes out informal MVTS and/or alternative or traditional remittance, those businesses and private individuals resort to 'underground' services. Underground services avoid regulatory oversight and create a trading service that criminals can access and abuse. The author has knowledge that when NZ bank's closed the accounts of money remitters that were using the banking channel, they have simply reinvented their businesses and are purporting to be a retailer of goods. The disguise as a retailer is averting NZ's AML/CFT compliance obligations. This means suspicious activity may be getting facilitated without any commitment from these businesses to report. Financial Exclusion causes underground banking which in turn provides the means for criminals to transact in money or value in an unregulated and unsupervised trade industry. This is why Financial Inclusion is far safer than Financial Exclusion and why Financial Inclusion was always a priority for the FATF. Catering to Financial Inclusion Financial Inclusion requires the development of an AML/CFT regulatory framework that integrates with the processes and procedures that businesses or private individuals rely on when carrying out or performing traditional style trading. To achieve that purpose, the NZ AML/CFT Act requires definitions that capture such trading and the FSPR Act requires a definition that obligates the registration of businesses or private individuals who are performing international or local trade through methods outside of a wire transfer. Reporting Structure for Informal Sector Currently the NZ AML/CFT Act requirement for the reporting of international activity is limited to activity conducted through an electronic or wire-transfer. There is no reporting mechanism to capture businesses that do not rely on electronic or wire transfers. This is a significant flaw in the NZ AML/CFT Act. NZ's AML/CFT Act requires a reporting framework for traditional or alternative remitters that do not rely on wire transfers. This article is a series of articles including: Kerry Grass* * About The Author Since January 2010, Kerry has been operating Anti-Money Laundering Consultants Limited (AMLC). AMLC specialises in establishing AML/CFT risk assessments, compliance programmes and independent AML/CFT auditing services. The company also provides
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What Are New Zealand's Risk To Facilitating Unregulated Alternative Remittance?
This is an evolving research report that examines New Zealand's Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism Act (NZ AML/CFT Act). The research focuses on NZ's AML/CFT Act and legislative framework for effectiveness to manage risks arising from traditional money remittance, also known as 'alternative remittance'. Such methods of trading are unconventional (traditional) and emerging (modern) ways of transferring money or value and operate outside of the formal banking system. This research examines whether NZ's AML/CFT Act has ability to regulate and supervise businesses or private individuals that perform methods known as alternative remittance and that operate outside of the conventional banking sector. Observations and Findings Though the NZ AML/CFT Act provides regulatory oversight of contemporary methods of financial activity, there is no regulatory framework that captures unconventional trading methodologies. Unconventional trading methodologies do no require a Wire Transfer. That is, businesses that do not rely on an electronic or wire transfer for international money or value transfer, remain outside of the NZ AML/CFT Act. This is because the NZ AML/CFT Act only captured international transaction money or value activity that is carried out through a Wire Transfer. This is confirmed with the definition of 'Prescribed Transaction' for international activity is explicitly limited to 'Wire Transfer' (Section 5 AML/CFT Act). Consequently, NZ is operating as a country that has no regulatory licensing or registration system capturing international 'Alternative Remittance'. Also known as 'Informal Money or Value Transfer' – many ethnic communities residing in western countries rely on their traditional methods of trade. Not providing a regulatory structure to enable 'legalised' Informal Money or Value Transfer services – will always result in a strong demand for services known as 'underground trading'. Channels of underground banking have a proper purpose and are not illegal. It is only when a country has no regulatory structure to formalise these channels, that underground banking channels become problematic. This is due to the attraction that underground banking channels have to organised and trans-national criminal groups. Like a bee to the honey pot, organised criminals seek methods of money or value transfer (including asset transfer), that has very little or no record keeping. Circumventing International Sanctions The lack of oversight of the alternative-remittance trading sector in New Zealand (NZ) increases the likelihood that NZ is being used as a conduit country to avoid or circumvent United Nations Sanctions. This risk impacts NZ economically and increases national and international security risks to NZ and to other countries. Further detail of these risks will be captured in following publications.. Financing of Terrorism Though Money Laundering is a serious offence and destructive to society, the offence of 'Financing of Terrorism' is in essence facilitating an attack to intimidate and/or threaten people for the purpose of supporting beliefs linked to political, ideology or religion. Often death results to innocent people and often the deaths can include in tens, hundreds or thousands of people losing their lives or suffering grievous bodily harm. Terrorism Financing, due to its consequences, is therefore the higher priority for AML/CFT Supervisors. Any weaknesses in national AML/CFT laws will weaken security of not just the country with the weaker legislative framework, but heightened risk occurs across all other countries. This is because the country operating with weak AML/CFT laws, may be facilitating an attack on any other country. The MOJ as the Administrator of the NZ AML/CFT Act must therefore take its responsibilities seriously. What Is Meant By Remittance Services? Remittance services were generally introduced for the purpose of enabling immigrants to transfer their income back to their home country to support family or community events. Traditional or alternative remittance does not rely on conventional banking systems or formal electronic or wire transfers. Overtime, remittance services have evolved for some methods to incorporate use of banking facilities. However, most often there is no international wire transfer or cross border of funds. Ledger style or off-setting transactions are a common method for alternative remittance. Informal methods of remittance and traditional methods of remittance are for a legitimate person, however these methods also commonly attract trans-national criminal syndicates. Unless a country bans methods of alternative remittance (ie exchange of value outside of conventional banking), or has clear legislative frameworks to regulate this activity, then the methods are known as 'legalised underground banking'. What Is Money or Value Transfer Services? Money or Value Transfer Services (MVTS) is a phrase used to describe the ability to move money or value on behalf of another. The conventional form of money or value transfer services is through a banking institution which involves an electronic or 'wire' message. What is Informal Money or Value Transfer Service? Informal MVTS refers to Informal Money or Value Transfer Services. Another common acronym is IVTS which stands for Informal Value Transfer Systems. Informal value transfer systems are another terminology used for alternative remittance or traditional remittance that rely on non-conventional systems and do not require a wire or formal electronic transfer. The ability to seek non-conventional means of value transfer are lifelines for many underserved populations around the world. For migrants that move from the East to the West, the need to continue accessing alternative or traditional remittance services is crucial. Options of conventional banking are dismissed due to high fees which results in less of their hard-earned funds reaching the intended recipient. If the traditional or alternative remittance market for legitimate trade is not regulated, then underground banking will result. The risk is that those who are seeking to commit ML/FT will also access this unregulated market. The attractiveness of this style of underground banking is well known to the underground criminal groups. It is therefore crucial for the MoJ to strike a balance between regulation and financial inclusion. To date, the NZ AML/CFT Act and regulatory framework has weighed heavily to regulate contemporary style forms of trading with a focus on western style banking methods which require an electronic or wire transfer. NZ's AML/CFT Act and regulatory framework has not catered to eastern style traditional methods of trading which do not rely on any cross-movement of funds or value, or the use of an official electronic wire-transfer or electronic communication. Consequently the methods of trading that do not capture a wire transfer or cross movement of funds or value remain outside of the AML/CFT Act and continues underground and unregulated. For New Zealand's Ministry of Justice to address these issues it needs to keep the following principles in mind: NZ has opened its borders to refugees and residents from the eastern region of the globe. A great proportion of NZ immigrants originate from the eastern region of the globe. They now reside in New Zealand and have either successfully obtained NZ citizenships and/or, are intending to apply for NZ citizenship. These groups of NZ citizens that have migrated from the East to the West, have brought with them their nations style of trading. Most of these NZ citizens have ongoing financial commitments to their home country. These citizens will need to, at times, send goods, services, or money, to their family that remain in their home country. Such expenses may include medical expenses for their parents, or real estate transactions for their parents, and/or other family members. In today's contemporary world, it should not be the power of any government to dictate how a private individual may spend their money. It also would be against humanitarian laws to prevent a private individual sending money, funds or value to loved ones who live outside of NZ. Examples of such expenses and/or requirement for providing money, funds or value is commonly for health expenses for elderly parents, or funeral expenses. Anniversaries and birthdays may be another reason for NZ citizens to send funds back to their home country. Unless there is a blanket ban on a country that forbids any type of trade with that country, the NZ immigrants who originate from the eastern region of the globe can be expected to have the need for services for sending money, funds or value to their country of birth or from the country where they migrated from. Global Regions that Commonly Utilise Alternative Remittance Private individuals that originate from the eastern region of the globe are prone to utilising methods of alternative remittance or traditional remittance. It is important to understand this type of trade operates for legitimate purposes, however, if unregulated, attract trans-national criminal groups. Global regions that typically use or rely on traditional or alternative remittance include: Africa India Middle East China With the exception of China, the other three regions have inherent risks to terrorism and financing of terrorism. This increases the need for other countries to enable the regulated facilitation of trade that uses traditional or alternative remittance services. NB: Though China has a lower risk to financing of terrorism, the country presents a significant risk to NZ's economic and social status as a consequence of strong ties to the distribution of precursors and other laboratory type illegal narcotics that swamp New Zealand. Challenges in Regulating Alternative Remittance Regulating traditional remittance methods presents several challenges for regulatory authorities. One of the primary difficulties lies in distinguishing between remittance transfers conducted through alternative remittance and those conducted by entities that qualify as informal or conventional money services businesses. The lines between these entities can be blurred, making it challenging to develop clear regulatory frameworks to address the risks associated with traditional or alternative remittance and the regulation of the same. FATF Recommendations The Financial Action Task Force is the global watchdog for country compliance to international recommendations. The FATF first issued its Forty Recommendations in 1990 aimed at governments and financial institutions. Together, these Recommendations form a comprehensive regime against money laundering and have been accepted world-wide as one of the most comprehensive bases for tackling money laundering. The Recommendations were revised in 1996 to reflect all serious crimes. Though 'Anti-Money Laundering' laws were generally operating across the western world at the time of the 9/11 bombings in the USA, 'Financing of Terrorism' was not featured across Western countries. Following 9/11 the FATF updated its international recommendations and included 9 Special Recommendations that were focused on preventing the risk of financing of terrorism. The Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing were adopted by the FATF in October 2001. Special Recommendation VI relates to Alternative Remittance. This recommendation requires – Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions. FATF Special Recommendation VI For each Special Recommendation (SR) the FATF provided an Interpretive Note to explain the purpose and outcome of each SR. An Extract from the Interpretive Notes of SRVI is copied below. The objective of Special Recommendation VI is to increase the transparency of payment flows by ensuring that jurisdictions impose consistent anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures on all forms of money/value transfer systems, particularly those traditionally operating outside the conventional financial sector and not currently subject to the FATF Recommendations and are not regulated. Observation: It is clear SRVI and its title 'Alternative Remittance' is intended to capture 'all forms' of money or value trading and in particular it emphasises 'traditional' activity that operates outside the conventional financial sector and 'not currently' subject to the FATF Recommendations. NZ Needs to Regulate Alternative Remittance Trade NZ's Ministry of Justice, as Administrator of the AML/CFT Act, needs to react swiftly to update NZ's AML/CFT compliance laws to bridge these existing gaps and/or omission of addressing 'traditional remittance' and/or 'alternative remittance'. These methods or trading are not yet defined in the NZ AML/CFT Act. Consequently, such trading continues in NZ legally which is unregulated and without any government or AML/CFT oversight of such trading. Not defining alternative or traditional remittance services will result in businesses partaking in 'non-transfer' type activity, including a simple offsetting on a balance sheet. Leaving an obvious and ambiguous definition that fails to transparently address the risk of 'underground banking' leaves New Zealand vulnerable to facilitating 'underground banking'. Consequently, NZ increases the risks faced by other countries. The Ministry of Justice must address these issues during the current update of the AML/CFT Amendment Bill. Failing to do so will result in NZ continuing as a conduit country and increasing ML/FT risks at a national and international level. Financial Exclusion When a country pushes out informal MVTS and/or alternative or traditional remittance, those businesses and private individuals resort to 'underground' services. Underground services avoid regulatory oversight and create a trading service that criminals can access and abuse. The author has knowledge that when NZ bank's closed the accounts of money remitters that were using the banking channel, they have simply reinvented their businesses and are purporting to be a retailer of goods. The disguise as a retailer is averting NZ's AML/CFT compliance obligations. This means suspicious activity may be getting facilitated without any commitment from these businesses to report. Financial Exclusion causes underground banking which in turn provides the means for criminals to transact in money or value in an unregulated and unsupervised trade industry. This is why Financial Inclusion is far safer than Financial Exclusion and why Financial Inclusion was always a priority for the FATF. Catering to Financial Inclusion Financial Inclusion requires the development of an AML/CFT regulatory framework that integrates with the processes and procedures that businesses or private individuals rely on when carrying out or performing traditional style trading. To achieve that purpose, the NZ AML/CFT Act requires definitions that capture such trading and the FSPR Act requires a definition that obligates the registration of businesses or private individuals who are performing international or local trade through methods outside of a wire transfer. Reporting Structure for Informal Sector Currently the NZ AML/CFT Act requirement for the reporting of international activity is limited to activity conducted through an electronic or wire-transfer. There is no reporting mechanism to capture businesses that do not rely on electronic or wire transfers. This is a significant flaw in the NZ AML/CFT Act. NZ's AML/CFT Act requires a reporting framework for traditional or alternative remitters that do not rely on wire transfers. This article is a series of articles including: Kerry Grass* * About The Author Since January 2010, Kerry has been operating Anti-Money Laundering Consultants Limited (AMLC). AMLC specialises in establishing AML/CFT risk assessments, compliance programmes and independent AML/CFT auditing services. The company also provides AML/CFT outsourcing services across the globe to businesses that have regulatory obligations to anti-money laundering compliance laws.
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Chris Bishop's Comments During Stan Walker's Performance Have ‘No Place' At Aotearoa Music Awards
Article – RNZ 'The Awards respect and honour te ao Mori and we were proud to support Stan with his vision for his powerful rendition of Mori Ki Te Ao.' The producers of the Aotearoa Music Awards have condemned Cabinet Minister Chris Bishop's comments during Stan Walker's performance, saying his remarks have 'no place' at the awards ceremony. At Auckland's Viaduct Events Centre on Thursday night Bishop was captured on video declaring 'what a load of crap' during Walker's performance, which prominently featured Toitū Te Tiriti banners. Some people in front of him were on their feet dancing and waving tino rangatiratanga flags. In a statement issued on Saturday, the producers said they were committed to creating a 'safe, respectful and inclusive environment' and that these 'expectations were clearly communicated to all who attended the event'. 'The inappropriate comments made by Hon. Chris Bishop during Stan Walker's performance have no place at the Aotearoa Music Awards,' the statement read. 'The Awards respect and honour te ao Māori and we were proud to support Stan with his vision for his powerful rendition of Māori Ki Te Ao.' In a statement to RNZ, Bishop admitted he said 'what a lot of crap' and something about performative acclaim. He said it referred to what he called the overtly political branding on display. Renowned musician Don McGlashan was seen on the video confronting Bishop, but McGlashan said he did not realise at first that it was the minister. 'I could hear an enormous amount of ranting, kind of against the whole thing. I didn't get the full gist of it, but it was basically – 'the hīkoi is ages ago, sit down everybody' – so this geezer was just ranting away and telling everybody to sit down,' McGlashan said. 'After a while, I turned to him and said 'Ah, shut up you dickhead' and I looked at him and I thought, 'Oh, I know that face'. Then he said, 'What did you say to me?''. McGlashan said that he again told Bishop to ''shut up you dickhead', and he said, 'I could say the same to you,' and I said, 'Well, I wasn't talking and you were.' And then I realised I was talking to the leader of the House'. Another witness said the minister appeared to them to be drunk. 'For him to take an instant dis-gratification towards Toitū Te Tiriti and that movement and to say that it's a load of crap is actually highly offensive. I'm very worried for somebody of high power in this country to be making those sorts of remarks in public,' they said. Bishop has since acknowledged his comments were poorly judged, telling RNZ: 'On reflection, I should have kept my thoughts to myself.' However, he has denied making specific remarks about the hīkoi – the protest marches that have taken place across Aotearoa in support of upholding the Treaty of Waitangi – and has suggested the backlash amounts to a 'political smear job'. 'Chris is a long-time supporter of New Zealand music and went to the Awards to celebrate successful Kiwi artists,' a spokesperson said. Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has declined to comment further, with his office saying the PM had nothing to add to Bishop's statement. David Seymour defended Bishop shortly after he was sworn in as deputy prime minister on Saturday. 'Just because you become a senior minister, it doesn't mean you should stop having opinions,' Seymour said. 'It might well be that, based on what Chris saw in that moment, he was correct. It may be that people will agree with him.' Seymour said he believed New Zealanders would draw their own conclusions.
