Golden State Warriors jersey history - No. 15 - Ralph Polson (1952-53)
The Golden State Warriors have had over 600 players don the more than 60 jersey numbers used by their players over the more than 75 years of existence the team has enjoyed in its rich and storied history.
Founded in 1946 during the Basketball Association of America (BAA -- a precursor league of the NBA) era, the team has called home the cities of Philadelphia, San Francisco, Oakland, and even San Diego.
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To commemorate the players who wore those numbers, Warriors Wire is covering the entire history of jersey numbers and the players who sported them since the founding of the team. For this article, we begin with the sixth of 27 players who wore the No. 15 jersey for the Warriors.
Sep 15, 2017; Culver City, CA, USA; Golden State Warriors jerseys on display during the Nike and Sony press conference at Sony Studios. Mandatory Credit: Kelvin Kuo-USA TODAY Sports
That player would be Golden State forward alum Ralph Polson. After ending his college career at Whitworth, Polson was picked up with the sixth overall selection of the 1952 NBA draft by the New York Knicks.
The Riverside, California native was dealt to the (then) Philadelphia (now, Golden State) Warriors before the year was out, his final 46 games played at the NBA level.
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During his time suiting up for the Warriors, Polson wore only jersey No. 15 and put up 3.9 points and 4.4 rebounds per game.
All stats and data courtesy of Basketball Reference.
This article originally appeared on Warriors Wire: Warriors jersey history - No. 15 - Ralph Polson (1952-53)
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Here's the thing: Last season, 17 NBA players played at least 1,000 minutes and earned at least 8.5 free-throw attempts per 100 possessions. Of those, 16 have played in an NBA All-Star Game. The other one is Kuminga. Even if you lower the bar to his career rate of 7.3 per 100, the list of players to clear the 7.0 mark is almost entirely past, present or future All-Stars (i.e. Franz Wagner). The three worst players on the list are Deni Avdija, RJ Barrett and Bennedict Mathurin. Of the 35 players besides Kuminga to clear 7.0 in at least 1,000 minutes last season, 28 have played in at least one All-Star Game. That's for one season, but we can also look at career marks. It's more challenging because free-throw rates have been declining overall; achieving Kuminga's free-throw rate was a less amazing feat, say, 20 years ago, when 21 different players did it. 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The best outcome for everyone would likely be a sign-and-trade that brings back small contracts and draft compensation, but that's always easier to theorize about in June than to execute in a small time window in July. One final note: Kuminga could also sign his qualifying offer of $10.2 million and become an unrestricted free agent next July, when there should be more cap space in the market. While this would be palatable in the very short term for the Warriors, the risk of his uncompensated departure a year from now likely incentivizes Golden State to keep this option off the table. Even if Kuminga doesn't fit, the Warriors would likely be better off with the Masai Ujiri Memorial Delayed Sign-and-Trade, re-signing him this summer to use in a trade package later. Russell's brand has taken a beating since he didn't fit in L.A. and has been exposed defensively in the postseason. But he's a good scorer and shooter whose shortcomings might be perceived differently if he were cast as a high-usage sixth man rather than a starting point guard. Russell was also outlier bad from 3 last year (a career low 31.4 percent), but that isn't the way to bet going forward. The Nets will have full Bird rights on him in addition to their jillions in cap space; while he doesn't exactly fit Brooklyn's timeline, re-signing him to use as a trade piece either in-season or next summer makes sense from a cap perspective and adds some floor for Brooklyn's offense as the Nets rebuild. Notably, if Brooklyn struggles to find other uses for its cap space, it could sign Russell to a bloated one-year deal with a non-guaranteed second year, one that would effectively operate as a trade exception to use in-season or even next summer. Russell's cap hold is $28 million, but the Nets could pay him the max if they wanted; as long as they set aside $28 million of their cap space for his hold, they can finish their other business and then go as high as they want on Russell. Note that keeping Russell and Cam Thomas (below) on their books would take the Nets down to $40 million in room — still likely plenty for what they have planned this offseason. Much like Russell above, Thomas' value is an extremely divisive topic because he is so dependent on generating tough 2-point jump shots and offers little in the non-scoring categories. However, he was more efficient last season (57.5 true shooting percentage), and his sheer shot-creation volume provides a solid floor for an offense. On a rebuilding team, the key variable in Thomas' favor is that he is still only 23, so theoretically, his best years remain ahead. The other, even more crucial variable is that his cap hold is only $12.1 million. 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Would he rather sign a deal for three or four years to lock in long-term money? Or would he prefer an MLE deal for $29 million over two years with a player option, which would allow him to jump back into the market a year from now with the Pistons having his early Bird rights and more rival teams having cap space? The latter strikes me as more likely. Lopez deserves more than the nontaxpayer MLE, but getting somebody to pay it to him could prove problematic. The Nets don't need him, so he's depending on either Milwaukee's participation in a sign-and-trade or a strong offer from the Bucks to keep him. (Milwaukee has full Bird rights on Lopez, but his deal cannot be extended.) If he finds an unfriendly market relative to the BORD$ value above, one thing Lopez could do is a two-year MLE deal for $29 million with a second-year player option that allows him to re-enter free agency a year from now. One thing that seems certain is that he won't lack for suitors at this price (keep an eye on Houston after the Rockets got to the 1-yard line with him two summers ago), which is why I suspect he'll be bid up above the MLE and end up either in a sign-and-trade or back with the Bucks. Lopez is also eligible for a no-trade clause from the Bucks, which makes no sense from Milwaukee's perspective but would be objectively hilarious. Does my computer secretly think the Bulls were awesome? Is this some kind of AI hallucination? Between this and Giddey's valuation, I have questions. Here's the thing: Jones was really good last season when he got the chance to play, especially after the trade to Chicago. He averaged double figures as a Bull, with 58-50-88 shooting splits. He had nearly six assists for every turnover! He made an amazing 55.8 percent of his shots from floater range! He's only 25! Is he actually good? One reason to go through exercises like BORD$ is to flag value situations you might have otherwise missed. Jones might not be a $21 million player, but there's also a decent chance he's seriously undervalued in the marketplace. Nobody thinks of him as a starter, and his reluctance to shoot from outside is a clear limitation. However, his defense, ball security and floater game low-key add quite a bit of value to offset his lack of dynamic shot creation. At the very least, he'd be a top-notch backup who would fit in several different places. This number feels just right for Alexander-Walker after a breakout season in which he established himself as both an elite perimeter defender and a steady ballhandler who can take some turns at point guard with the second unit. While his offense remains prone to peaks and valleys, Alexander-Walker is an unrestricted, starting-caliber shooting guard and should have a strong market. The Nets being the only team with cap space is a limiting factor, likely putting the Wolves in a relatively favorable position regarding re-signing him. It's not out of the question that he could do a one-plus-one deal for the nontaxpayer MLE (or just above it with Minnesota) and try again next year when there should be more cap space in the system. Sign-and-trades could also be an exit route, given the work Minnesota has to do on its cap this summer. That said, keeping Alexander-Walker and one of the bigs (Randle or Reid) feels like the best end-game version for Wolves, and keeping Alexander-Walker for something around three years and $60 million feels doable. Collins seems unlikely to opt out of his $26.6 million player option in 2025-26. However, this valuation at least offers a framework for what an extension might look like — possibly in concert with a trade. Collins is still only 27 and quietly threatened the 50-40-90 club for much of last season; he finished at 52.7 percent from the field, 39.9 percent from 3 and 84.8 percent from the free-throw line. He's lost some of the basket-area explosion that made him such a potent offensive player in Atlanta but has offset it with improved shooting since coming to Utah. Between that and his top-notch secondary rim protection as a non-center, Collins is a valuable player; he's just not quite as valuable as his contract pays him. Still, imagine a two-year, $40 million extension on his current deal, and you get to a total of $66.6 million over three years. Account for 5 percent raises, and one can envision an opt-out-plus-sign-and-trade that starts him at about $21.1 million in 2025-26. An acquiring team below the second apron would only need to send the Jazz $13.6 million in such a scenario, giving Utah instant cap savings in addition to (presumably) some asset considerations. I'm getting all worked up about this, but Collins probably just opts in and tries to cash out in free agency a year from now. The Jazz could also extend him, but they're committed long-term at power forward with Lauri Markkanen. One of the many ripple effects of the Jayson Tatum injury is that Horford might be more gettable in free agency than previously presumed. With Horford at age 39 and the Celtics likely both facing a 'gap' year and needing to trim salary, it might make sense for him to hunt for a different contender on a one-year deal. Because of his size, shooting and switchability, he can fit virtually everywhere, and suitors should be plentiful; additionally, one suspects this is a situation where the Benjamins will matter less than the team situation and championship equity. There are many issues with Porter that don't involve the basketball court, but BORD$ sees only the basketball court, plus his age (25) and his huge production as a bench catalyst for the Bucks at the end of last season. Porter has a player option for a piddling $2.5 million and will certainly opt out, but once that happens, what's his value? The Bucks have no Bird rights on Porter; if he opts out, they will need to use exception money to bring him back. Milwaukee might have the $14.1 million nontaxpayer midlevel exception depending on whether Lopez (above), Bobby Portis Jr. (below) and Gary Trent Jr. are back, but it's also possible the Bucks are limited to the $5.7 million taxpayer exception. If that's the case, the Bucks will likely be holding their breath, hoping they can bring back Porter at that price, with a one-year deal with a second-year player option seeming the most plausible scenario. Grimes is a restricted free agent this offseason. Grimes was awesome after his trade from Dallas to Philly, putting up big numbers in meaningless games for the Sixers, and that makes him tricky to evaluate going forward. Known mostly as a 3-and-D guy, Grimes averaged 32.0 points per 100 possessions and shot 55.9 percent on 2s in 28 games as a Sixer, posting an 18.8 PER. However, the combination of his restricted free agency and the lack of cap space in the market should limit any sort of bidding war and put the Sixers in a strong position to keep him on a team-friendly deal. His BORD$ number is a pretty convenient one as far as his next contract. This is the pay range that keeps his pay above the nontaxpayer MLE, thus icing out any rival offers, but maintains the Sixers' status below the second apron. Thus, a three-year deal for $55 million to $60 million seems like a reasonable endpoint. I'm a bit surprised Paul's free agency hasn't generated more discussion. The Point God doesn't really fit in San Antonio anymore after the Spurs traded for De'Aaron Fox last year and presumably will draft Dylan Harper soon. Paul is 40, but he can still help a lot of teams, as he showed with his steady handling of the Spurs in the first half of the season. Because of this, he seems like a prime candidate to chase a ring as either a fifth starter or key backup, especially since his game still fits in a lot of places. Putting a dollar value on this is the conundrum, since he's mostly looking at teams who couldn't afford him at this BORD$ number. How much of a discount would he take to, say, team up with the Wolves or Nuggets or reunite with the Warriors? Those destinations might not offer much more than the minimum. However, if Paul values dollars over jewelry, other landing spots come into view for the midlevel exception. San Antonio has no Bird rights on Paul. As a non-Bird free agent, it can offer him a maximum of $13,179,600, of which $627,600 would be likely incentives, plus another $1,255,198 in unlikely incentives, for a total of $14,434,798. Note that this total is very slightly more than the $14.1 million nontaxpayer MLE. LeVert might be one of the most straightforward free-agent situations in the league. The Hawks want him back and can pay him more than anyone else due to Bird rights, LeVert is worth a bit more than the nontaxpayer MLE by BORD$, and his age (he turns 31 in August) doesn't stand in the way of a multiyear deal. Something in the three-year, $50 million range, with a partial or team option on the third year, seems like the wheelhouse here. Paying LeVert that amount would leave the Hawks available to use most or all of their nontaxpayer midlevel exception on a center and still stay below the tax line. Portis has a player option for the 2025-26 season. Portis has a player option for $13,445,754 for the coming season, which he could opt out of to get a deal for the $14.1 million nontaxpayer MLE somewhere else. However, one other intriguing option would be for him to opt in to the final year and then sign a two-year extension off that with a 5 percent raise, taking the total package to $43 million for the three years and nearly matching what's available on an MLE deal. The reason for the Bucks to play ball on this is that Portis' contract would immediately be tradeable if the extension didn't boost his annual salary by more than 5 percent and didn't go beyond three years. Additionally, adding in a 15 percent trade kicker would take the amount of the deal, if he ends up getting dealt this summer, to much more than Portis could get on a three-year MLE deal from another team. Thus, both sides would come out ahead in some respects. This is a rather optimistic reading of the 31-year-old Capela's market after he lost his starting job in Atlanta to Onyeka Okongwu last season. The Hawks have full Bird rights on Capela and could even extend him before free agency begins, but Atlanta has other offseason priorities and lacks infinite salary space. If the Hawks draft a center with one of their two first-round picks (13th and 22nd), it seems unlikely Capela would be back. Capela is stretched as a starter but would be one of the best backup centers in the league; one wonders how he'd look in LA reunited with his old pick-and-roll partner Harden. Note that Atlanta's Bird rights on Capela, in concert with his high salary last season, make sign-and-trades a distinct possibility. (Illustration: Will Tullos / The Athletic; photos: William Purnell, Ronald Martinez, Barry Gossage / Getty Images)
