Is China's space collaboration with Latin America under threat as the US asserts power?
Analysts expect the trend to continue, but it is unlikely that Latin-American countries will abandon the China partnership if the US cannot provide competing alternatives.
The latest controversy involves the potential cancellation of an
US$80 million astronomical observatory project between China's National Astronomical Observatory and a Chilean university.
It was reported last month that Chilean President Gabriel Boric had decided to cancel the project following concerns conveyed to Santiago by the Biden administration. The Chilean foreign ministry was reviewing the matter, the reports said.
Observers warn that the Trump White House is likely to intensify scrutiny of Sino-Latin American
space cooperation and adopt a more assertive approach.
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They expect the United States to continue seeking to block such cooperation, forcing Latin American governments into an increasingly difficult balancing act between the
two superpowers
Francisco Urdinez, associate professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile's Political Science Institute, said that Latin American countries were increasingly facing US pressure over scientific partnerships with China amid the intensifying big power rivalry.
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AllAfrica
6 hours ago
- AllAfrica
US tariffs won't stop China's long game in SE Asia
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At the same time, China is preparing to fill the inevitable gaps left by US-ASEAN trade adjustments. Many ASEAN negotiators have already signaled a willingness to buy more American agricultural products, aircraft and energy, often at higher cost than other suppliers, to placate Washington. But there are sectors where US goods are simply too expensive or fail to meet local requirements. In steel, electronics, textiles, and increasingly in renewable energy equipment, China remains the more competitive supplier. If ASEAN reduces imports of these goods from China to comply with US demands, Beijing can redirect supply to domestic markets or other fast-growing partners, while simultaneously offering ASEAN cooperation in emerging sectors such as electric vehicle (EV) manufacturing and agricultural technology. Such versatility is coming up trumps. During the first half of 2025, China's shipments to Southeast Asia increased 16.6%, while those to the US fell 21.7%. 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RTHK
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- RTHK
All countries should oppose unilateralism: Xi
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South China Morning Post
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