Zelenskyy wins EU and NATO backing as he seeks place at Trump-Putin talks
Trump, who for weeks had been threatening new sanctions against Russia for failing to halt the war, announced, instead, on Friday that he would meet Putin on Aug. 15 in Alaska.
A White House official has said Trump is open to Zelenskyy attending, but preparations are under way for only a bilateral meeting.
Russian strikes injured at least 12 in Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia region, the country's foreign affairs ministry said on Sunday.
Zelenskyy, responding to the strike, said, "That is why sanctions are needed, pressure is needed."
The Kremlin leader last week ruled out meeting Zelenskyy, saying conditions for such an encounter were "unfortunately still far" from being met.
Trump said a potential deal would involve "some swapping of territories to the betterment of both (sides)," compounding Ukrainian fears that it may face pressure to surrender land.
Zelenskyy says any decisions taken without Ukraine will be "stillborn" and unworkable. On Saturday, the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Finland and the European Commission said any diplomatic solution must protect the security interests of Ukraine and Europe.
"The U.S. has the power to force Russia to negotiate seriously," EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Sunday. "Any deal between the U.S. and Russia must have Ukraine and the EU included, for it is a matter of Ukraine's and the whole of Europe's security."
French President Emmanuel Macron and Zelenskyy in The Hague, Netherlands, on June 24 |
POOL / VIA REUTERS
EU foreign ministers will meet on Monday to discuss next steps, she said.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told U.S. network ABC News that Friday's summit "will be about testing Putin, how serious he is on bringing this terrible war to an end."
He added: "It will be, of course, about security guarantees, but also about the absolute need to acknowledge that Ukraine decides on its own future, that Ukraine has to be a sovereign nation, deciding on its own geopolitical future."
Russia holds nearly a fifth of the country.
Rutte said a deal could not include legal recognition of Russian control over Ukrainian land, although it might include de facto recognition. He compared it to the situation after World War II when Washington accepted that the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were de facto controlled by the Soviet Union but did not legally recognize their annexation.
Zelenskyy said on Sunday: "The end of the war must be fair, and I am grateful to everyone who stands with Ukraine and our people today."
A European official said Europe had come up with a counter-proposal to Trump's but declined to provide details. Russian officials accused Europe of trying to thwart Trump's efforts to end the war.
"The Euro-imbeciles are trying to prevent American efforts to help resolve the Ukrainian conflict," former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev posted on social media on Sunday.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said in a vituperative statement that the relationship between Ukraine and the European Union resembled "necrophilia."
Roman Alekhin, a Russian war blogger, said Europe had been reduced to the role of a spectator.
"If Putin and Trump reach an agreement directly, Europe will be faced with a fait accompli. Kyiv — even more so," he said.
U.S. President Donald Trump and Zelenskyy attend a meeting on the sidelines of a NATO summit in The Hague, Netherlands, on June 25. |
UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE / VIA REUTERS
In addition to Crimea, which it seized in 2014, Russia has formally claimed the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia as its own, although it controls only about 70% of the last three. It holds smaller pieces of territory in three other regions, while Ukraine says it holds a sliver of Russia's Kursk region.
Sergei Markov, a pro-Kremlin analyst, said a swap could entail Russia handing over 1,500 sq km to Ukraine and obtaining 7,000 sq km, which he said Russia would capture anyway within about six months.
He provided no evidence to back any of those figures. Russia took about 500 square kilometers of territory in July, according to Western military analysts who say its grinding advances have come at the cost of very high casualties.
Ukraine and its European allies have been haunted for months by the fear that Trump, keen to claim credit for making peace and hoping to seal lucrative joint business deals between the U.S. and Russia, could align with Putin to cut a deal that would be deeply disadvantageous to Kyiv.
They had drawn some encouragement lately as Trump, having piled heavy pressure on Zelenskyy and berated him publicly in the Oval Office in February, began criticising Putin as Russia pounded Kyiv and other cities with its heaviest air attacks of the war.
But the impending Putin-Trump summit has revived fears that Kyiv and Europe could be sidelined.
"What we will see emerge from Alaska will almost certainly be a catastrophe for Ukraine and Europe," wrote Phillips P. O'Brien, professor of strategic studies at the University of St Andrews in Scotland.
"And Ukraine will face the most terrible dilemma. Do they accept this humiliating and destructive deal? Or do they go it alone, unsure of the backing of European states?"
Ukrainian political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko said on Sunday that Kyiv's partnership with its European allies was critical to countering any attempts to keep it away from the table.
"For us right now, a joint position with the Europeans is our main resource," he said on Ukrainian radio.
U.S. Vice President JD Vance said a negotiated settlement was unlikely to satisfy either side. "Both the Russians and the Ukrainians, probably, at the end of the day, are going to be unhappy with it," he said on Fox News' Sunday Morning Futures with Maria Bartiromo.
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The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- The Diplomat
ASEAN and Trump's Tariffs: Regional Calamity, Rent Seeking, or Return to the Status Quo?
On April 2, President Donald Trump threw financial markets into turmoil when he announced his 'liberation day' tariffs, which looked set to upend world trade and reverse decades of globalization. He quickly backpedaled, pausing the tariffs for 90 days in order to allow trade negotiations with the affected nations. Among the most heavily tariffed nations were many members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Cambodia, which was hit with a tariff of 49 percent, Laos (48 percent), Vietnam (46 percent), Myanmar (44 percent), and Thailand (36 percent). On July 8, with negotiations stalling, Trump sent out 14 tariff letters to many leaders informing them of 'new tariff lines' if they did not hurry up and settle trade deals by August 1. This quickly focused the minds and attention of the region's leaders, who rushed to negotiate with Washington in the hope of avoiding economy-crippling tariffs. After Trump's initial tariff announcement in April, ASEAN leaders were understandably concerned about the unilateral American tariffs and the possible wide-ranging negative impacts they would have on their export-based economies. On July 3, Vietnam became the first ASEAN country to secure a deal with the U.S., gaining a reduction in its tariff to 20 percent. Indonesia and the Philippines secured their deals in late July, each getting tariffed at 'only' 19 percent. This left Thailand and others in the region understandably angry at their own governments for not yet finalizing deals. When the August 1 deadline arrived, news of 'final' tariff lines was quick to calm the fears of governments and publics across the region. Laos, Myanmar, and Brunei were the only ASEAN countries that did not see threatened tariffs reduced significantly, receiving tariffs of 40 percent in the case of Laos and Myanmar, and 25 percent in the case of Brunei. Nor have there been any expressions of concern from these countries, for whom the U.S. is a relatively minor export market. Brunei's top 3 export partners are Australia, which accounts for 22 percent of its total exports, Singapore (17 percent), and China (17 percent), with the U.S. taking less than 1 percent. Likewise, Laos's top 3 export partners are China (42 percent), Vietnam (22 percent), and Thailand (14 percent), with the U.S. making up just 1.8 percent. Myanmar's top 3 export partners are China (23 percent), Thailand (20 percent), and India (8.6 percent), with the U.S. taking just 3.2 percent. Simply put, Trump and America do not matter much in economic terms to these three ASEAN countries. The final tariffs, as posted on August 1, essentially return most ASEAN member states back to the status quo ante of April 1. Aside from the above states and Singapore, which has been hit with just the 10 percent 'baseline' tariff, all other members are within percentage margins of one another. From a macro view, this will have a very limited impact on the relative competitiveness of these nations' export industries. This is not to say there will not be supply chain disruption and possible rises in prices for goods going both ways, as some products are re-exported to Southeast Asia from the U.S. via corporate supply chains. However, this should be the exception rather than the rule. When one digs further into Trump's tariff exemptions, a richer picture emerges. Annex II of his executive order includes a massive list of product exemptions. Those goods exempted include electronics, pharmaceuticals, smartphones, lumber, computers, integrated circuitry (including semiconductors, mineral and derivative refined ores (including copper and nickel), rubber, chemicals, including aromatics, fuel oils, various forms of oil derivatives and byproducts including fatty vegetable oils. Many of these are among ASEAN nations' top five exports to the United States. A straightforward way to understand these exemptions is that these are products America cannot produce or cannot be sourced elsewhere. This, of course, is to keep the American market and consumer from feeling the pinch of aggravated inflation, noticeable shortages of goods, or shortages needed for American industry. For the time being, Southeast Asian nations have been spared their worst fears. This does not mean that ASEAN economies are safe or that the region's biggest economies with significant export exposure to the American market will not be affected. Machine tools, automobiles, steel, aluminum, processed foods, and other important exports are all subject to the tariff rise. Additionally, Japan and South Korea, which can and do produce similar products, are now subject to substantially lower tariffs of 15 percent, and their industries can rapidly retool for production shifts away from Southeast Asia. The degree of impact is not yet known as the tariffs have only just gone into effect. A major point of contention and focus for the Trump administration was, and is, trade diversion: namely, goods exported from China to Southeast Asia, which are relabeled, rebranded, have slight value added, or are simply provided with fraudulent paperwork to deceive U.S. customs agents as to their origins. It is known that part of the tariff deals with Southeast Asian governments has been an insistence on cracking down on the transshipment of goods to the American market, i.e., goods from China. It is rumored that the U.S. could set regional or content origin requirements as high as 50 percent, meaning that half of the final product's value must be added in the country subject to import tariffs. This is designed to disrupt Chinese industrial and corporate supply chains and deal with product transshipment. The Trump administration's method for dealing with transshipment is to impose a 40% import tariff if customs officials deem a product to be transshipped or not in compliance with content origin rules. This is forcing some ASEAN states to reorganize their regulatory methods, with Malaysia no longer allowing chambers of commerce to issue certificates of origin. Similar moves and restructuring will be seen across ASEAN in the very near future. The problem with current content origin rules is that there is a lack of certainty as to the exact formulation and percentage or local content required. There is no defined and published formula for how much content from China or how much value-added processing will be allowed before transshipment tariffs apply. This, of course, creates massive uncertainty for business and points to a lack of clear and uniform strategy from the Trump administration. However, with transshipment, one can assume that there will be a single unified formula applied globally. If not, businesses will simply reorient to the lowest-cost and most feasible jurisdiction, as they did after the first Trump administration's imposition of tariffs on China in 2018. The Trump administration can go broad and try to punish China-based businesses, which will lead to significant supply chain disruption, reorganization, and the likely movement of some production out of China. The second option is a narrow application designed to do away with small value add, relabeling, and the like, which will lead to minor disruptions to the status quo. Which way the administration breaks depends on its intent to harm Chinese business while mitigating noticeable effects to American consumers. In addition to the uncertainty surrounding transshipment rules is Trump's continuously shifting policy. On August 7, the day before the tariffs were set to come into force, the U.S. president announced that he would now levy a 100 percent tariff on semiconductor imports. Major producers such as South Korea had already secured exemption of semiconductors as part of their 'deal.' It can be assumed that Southeast Asian governments secured product line-specific carve-outs similar to South Korea rather than depending on the vagaries of Trump's executive order, which subjected exemptions in accordance with Section 232 national security investigations. Trump managed to leverage American economic and trade power against ASEAN states by setting sky-high initial tariff threats, engaging in bilateral negotiations, and using compressed time frame tactics to gain beneficial outcomes. Nearly all ASEAN countries that cut deals within the August 1 deadline, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam, agreed to large purchases of U.S. goods, including Boeing planes and liquefied natural gas (LNG), designed to reduce the size of their trade surpluses with the U.S. On the surface, this appears to be a major win for certain American industries. However, Boeing currently has an order backlog of over a decade, while its 737 Max, which Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia have promised to purchase, is still grounded by the FAA due to its deadly flight safety record. LNG was also a major sell for ASEAN states in the trade negotiations. However, LNG production is nearing maximum capacity in the U.S., with new export production of 11 billion cubic meters coming online in 2028. Given that the European Union is reportedly going to buy €750 billion in LNG over the coming decade, a big question is whether these LNG deals are real or a form of performative statecraft designed to placate Trump. The laws of physics and markets at present and in the near future simply do not equate to America being able to increase LNG production to meet all these trade deals. Put simply, on paper, Trump's transactionalism sounds great, but the delivery timelines of the promised Boeing planes and LNG will stretch far beyond Trump's presidency, by which point they might well be canceled or renegotiated. Initial economic analysis predicts that the current tariff regime could reduce Thailand's GDP by 0.44 percent, Vietnam's by 0.33 percent, and Indonesia's by 0.11 percent, reflecting their different industry-specific tariff lines and exemptions. However, preliminary economic forecasts can only be speculative, given the lack of certainty around rules and enforcement. These forecasts also do not take into account Southeast Asian government measures aimed at stabilizing industries, such as export subsidies, and other policy responses that are certain to materialize. Thailand has already set aside 20 billion baht ($618 million) for the support of affected industries, and other governments are likely to follow suit in order to secure their economic interests. President Trump has managed to rearrange relations with ASEAN states and has successfully made most Southeast Asian leaders 'kiss my ass.' However, his heavy-handed tactics have touched raw nerves with leaders and publics in the region. Singaporean Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen articulated the regional sentiment when he stated during this year's Munich Security Conference that the U.S. was now behaving like a 'landlord seeking rent,' bringing into question American steadfastness and Washington's commitment to the region. That remark was made prior to Trump's initial tariff announcement; the past few months have likely only reinforced these views. The president has also delinked trade from security partnerships, altering a hallmark of previous foreign policy. It appears that only Singapore received significant benefits from being a close U.S. security partner, although this was possibly the result of its trade deficit with Washington. 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6 hours ago
Nikkei Ends at All-Time High as Tariff Uncertainty Wanes
Tokyo, Aug. 12 (Jiji Press)--Japan's benchmark Nikkei 225 stock average recorded a fresh all-time high Tuesday, thanks partly to receding uncertainty over U.S. tariff policy. The key index ended 897.69 points, or 2.14 pct, higher from Friday at 42,718.17, beating the previous record closing high of 42,224.02, marked on July 11, 2024. The Nikkei posted a higher finish for the fifth straight trading day. The broader TOPIX index on the Tokyo Stock Exchange finished up 42.16 points, or 1.39 pct, at 3,066.37, also an all-time high. The TOPIX rose for five straight sessions as well. The Tokyo market was closed Monday for a national holiday. "A sense of relief spread amid strong U.S. corporate earnings as well as decreasing risks of further downward revisions to earnings estimates at Japanese firms thanks to reduced concerns" over the tariff policy of U.S. President Donald Trump, an official at a midsize securities firm said. Japan's economic revitalization minister Ryosei Akazawa, the country's top tariff negotiator, confirmed with U.S. officials last week that the U.S. government will set its tariff rates on Japan in accordance with an agreement reached between the two nations. [Copyright The Jiji Press, Ltd.]
Japan Times
7 hours ago
- Japan Times
Trump's transactional approach shapes U.S.-China rivalry
Since his first sojourn in the White House, a hallmark of the Donald Trump presidency has been a harder, more nakedly competitive policy toward China. There are intense debates about how the U.S. can prevail in that struggle but there are no signs that a single strategy guides the administration. Nor will there be one. While there is agreement that China is a strategic competitor, U.S. President Trump appears to think quite differently about the meaning of that concept, the significance of the rivalry and what a resolution or ideal end state looks like. A 'victory' as he defines it might well appall national security traditionalists, along with U.S. allies and partners. The National Security Strategy (NSS) issued during Trump's first administration was explicit, calling out China because it (and Russia) 'challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.' Beijing, it said, aims 'to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests, seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model and reorder the region in its favor.' The core of the relationship as explained in the NSS is a relentless competition that (then) demanded a new approach, one that was adopted by the Trump administration and its successor. The president has accused China of stealing U.S. jobs, taking its intellectual property and "totally violating its agreement with us' that was designed to remedy those injustices. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has charged China with abusing global trade rules, stealing U.S. technology and flooding the U.S. with fentanyl. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has warned that 'China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. It wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo.' His national security adviser ... wait ... never mind. Policy hasn't matched the tough talk, however. Trump has ignored Congress and refused to ban the social media app TikTok even though it reportedly poses a national security threat. Last month, his administration reportedly blocked Taiwan President Lai Ching-te from transiting the U.S., forcing postponement of his planned trip to Latin America. Taiwan's defense minister was denied meetings at the Pentagon, again reportedly after complaints from Beijing. Export controls that banned the export of Nvidia's H20 chip to China were reversed and language that warned against the use of Huawei's chips was softened. This behavior is consistent with that of the first Trump administration. Then, Trump intervened to lift sanctions against ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications company, at Chinese leader Xi Jinping's request. His administration prioritized the conclusion of a trade deal with China over all other considerations. That yielded a 'historic trade agreement' (says a White House fact sheet) that has since been dismissed. Analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded that China bought a little more than half (58%) of the U.S. exports promised under the deal, failed to return to pre-trade war levels and none of the additional $200 billion in exports that were promised. There are other grounds for criticism of Trump's China policies, but the most fundamental is this: If the NSS is correct and the U.S. is locked in a bitter rivalry with China, why then is Washington pushing away allies and partners — Japan, the European Union and India, to name the three most prominent — that it needs to balance and check China's size, scale and determination to reshape the world in its image? Trump's trade policies have been especially irritating, but his behavior has also raised doubts about U.S. credibility and commitment among even its most reliable friends. There are many explanations but they all reduce to the president himself. For example, Trump's seeming readiness to turn his back on Taiwan reflects his belief that the self-ruling island 'stole' the U.S. chip industry, questions about Taiwan's readiness to defend itself and doubts whether the U.S. could prevent China from unifying the island with the mainland. "Free-riding" is a big complaint: 'Taiwan should pay us for defense. We're no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn't give us anything.' Trump's insistence that past presidents were too quick to embroil the U.S. in overseas wars and his seeming aversion to bloodshed contribute to his position. Bradley Nelson of Saint Xavier University concluded that Chinese aggression against Taiwan would only be a problem for Trump because he 'would likely see it as a personal affront' and a sign that Xi 'believed Trump to be weak, nonconfrontational and afraid to stand up to Beijing.' Readiness to pull back tough sanctions on China is either a gesture to show benevolence — Trump claimed that 'China was being hurt very badly. ... They were closing up factories. They were having a lot of unrest' — or recognition that a trade war would inflict unacceptable damage on both sides. Beijing's willingness to cut exports of rare earth minerals critical to high-tech industries was a 'pain point ... the United States could not withstand,' explained Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, to the Washington Post. A desire to conclude a trade deal with China seems to outweigh all other considerations. Bloomberg reports that Trump has been 'the least hawkish voice in the room' during meetings, signaling a desire for engagement and deals over confrontation. That would confirm the most widespread explanation for Trump's behavior: He is a dealmaker and transactionalism guides his every move. James Crabtree, a journalist, policy analyst and former adviser to the British government, writes that the president has 'few fixed ideological convictions but he remains a transactional leader.' Knowing that Taiwan is Beijing's overriding concern, Trump's readiness to weaken relations with Taipei facilitates progress on that front. Those searching for a unifying theory argue that Trump's penchant for dealmaking reflects, in Crabtree's words, the 'embrace of a raw form of great-power politics.' The president believes that U.S. power — both economic and military — should dictate outcomes and constraints on that power — his power — are illegitimate. In this world view, there are global powers such as the U.S., China and Russia, regional powers, such as Israel, Turkey and India, and all countries should know their place in that hierarchy. That is most, but not all, of the answer. I'd add that Trump doesn't use 'strategic' as traditionally conceived. His 'China threat' is considerably narrower than that embraced by the NSS and most of the strategic community. Sure, he likes to flex his military muscles and brag about the awesome power that he can yield, but that's not his frame when discussing China. Lyle Goldstein, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, explained to NPR that Trump doesn't talk about the South China Sea. 'He didn't mention going to war over rocks or reefs. He said nothing about the Taiwan Strait or the Luzon Strait. He's focused on commerce. ...' He highlights trade figures — regardless of the real significance of those numbers — because economic statistics, such as size of the economy, job growth, market share, are the most important metrics to him. As Sobolik explained, 'The president cares more about American businesses getting access to China's market than he seems to about national security concerns with Beijing.' White House spokespersons agree without apology, noting that 'This president is successful because he will look anyone in the eye to negotiate better deals for our country, and he will continue to advance American interests." This approach may work — if we use Trump's analytical framework to assess the results. China likes a 'great power mindset' that affords it influence and status. It is as unhappy as Trump with restraints imposed on its sovereignty by international law and multilateral organizations. China too wants a grand bargain, and if Taiwan is part of that equation, then Beijing is likely to deal. Lanxin Xiang, professor emeritus of international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, agrees. He laid out his thinking in an interview for the Stimson Center, and his analysis follows mine. Trump hates ideology, which precludes a new Cold War, since it was at heart an ideological conflict; he is a dealmaker who 'likes to make linkages'; and he and Beijing want a 'grand bargain' in which trade is a 'secondary' consideration. Taiwan is the big issue. He adds that most members of the Chinese 'intellectual policy elite' think like him. That is the foundation for a grand bargain. Or at least a bargain. I doubt there would be a lot of applause outside China or from anyone who isn't one of the president's most ardent supporters. Brad Glosserman is a senior adviser at Pacific Forum and the author of "Peak Japan." His upcoming book on the geopolitics of high-tech is expected to be released by Hurst Publishers this fall.
