Trump's transactional approach shapes U.S.-China rivalry

Japan Times

a day ago

Since his first sojourn in the White House, a hallmark of the Donald Trump presidency has been a harder, more nakedly competitive policy toward China.
There are intense debates about how the U.S. can prevail in that struggle but there are no signs that a single strategy guides the administration. Nor will there be one.
While there is agreement that China is a strategic competitor, U.S. President Trump appears to think quite differently about the meaning of that concept, the significance of the rivalry and what a resolution or ideal end state looks like. A 'victory' as he defines it might well appall national security traditionalists, along with U.S. allies and partners.
The National Security Strategy (NSS) issued during Trump's first administration was explicit, calling out China because it (and Russia) 'challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.' Beijing, it said, aims 'to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests, seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model and reorder the region in its favor.'
The core of the relationship as explained in the NSS is a relentless competition that (then) demanded a new approach, one that was adopted by the Trump administration and its successor.
The president has accused China of stealing U.S. jobs, taking its intellectual property and "totally violating its agreement with us' that was designed to remedy those injustices. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has charged China with abusing global trade rules, stealing U.S. technology and flooding the U.S. with fentanyl. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has warned that 'China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. It wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo.' His national security adviser ... wait ... never mind.
Policy hasn't matched the tough talk, however. Trump has ignored Congress and refused to ban the social media app TikTok even though it reportedly poses a national security threat. Last month, his administration reportedly blocked Taiwan President Lai Ching-te from transiting the U.S., forcing postponement of his planned trip to Latin America. Taiwan's defense minister was denied meetings at the Pentagon, again reportedly after complaints from Beijing. Export controls that banned the export of Nvidia's H20 chip to China were reversed and language that warned against the use of Huawei's chips was softened.
This behavior is consistent with that of the first Trump administration. Then, Trump intervened to lift sanctions against ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications company, at Chinese leader Xi Jinping's request. His administration prioritized the conclusion of a trade deal with China over all other considerations.
That yielded a 'historic trade agreement' (says a White House fact sheet) that has since been dismissed. Analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded that China bought a little more than half (58%) of the U.S. exports promised under the deal, failed to return to pre-trade war levels and none of the additional $200 billion in exports that were promised.
There are other grounds for criticism of Trump's China policies, but the most fundamental is this: If the NSS is correct and the U.S. is locked in a bitter rivalry with China, why then is Washington pushing away allies and partners — Japan, the European Union and India, to name the three most prominent — that it needs to balance and check China's size, scale and determination to reshape the world in its image? Trump's trade policies have been especially irritating, but his behavior has also raised doubts about U.S. credibility and commitment among even its most reliable friends.
There are many explanations but they all reduce to the president himself. For example, Trump's seeming readiness to turn his back on Taiwan reflects his belief that the self-ruling island 'stole' the U.S. chip industry, questions about Taiwan's readiness to defend itself and doubts whether the U.S. could prevent China from unifying the island with the mainland. "Free-riding" is a big complaint: 'Taiwan should pay us for defense. We're no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn't give us anything.'
Trump's insistence that past presidents were too quick to embroil the U.S. in overseas wars and his seeming aversion to bloodshed contribute to his position. Bradley Nelson of Saint Xavier University concluded that Chinese aggression against Taiwan would only be a problem for Trump because he 'would likely see it as a personal affront' and a sign that Xi 'believed Trump to be weak, nonconfrontational and afraid to stand up to Beijing.'
Readiness to pull back tough sanctions on China is either a gesture to show benevolence — Trump claimed that 'China was being hurt very badly. ... They were closing up factories. They were having a lot of unrest' — or recognition that a trade war would inflict unacceptable damage on both sides. Beijing's willingness to cut exports of rare earth minerals critical to high-tech industries was a 'pain point ... the United States could not withstand,' explained Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, to the Washington Post.
A desire to conclude a trade deal with China seems to outweigh all other considerations. Bloomberg reports that Trump has been 'the least hawkish voice in the room' during meetings, signaling a desire for engagement and deals over confrontation.
That would confirm the most widespread explanation for Trump's behavior: He is a dealmaker and transactionalism guides his every move. James Crabtree, a journalist, policy analyst and former adviser to the British government, writes that the president has 'few fixed ideological convictions but he remains a transactional leader.' Knowing that Taiwan is Beijing's overriding concern, Trump's readiness to weaken relations with Taipei facilitates progress on that front.
Those searching for a unifying theory argue that Trump's penchant for dealmaking reflects, in Crabtree's words, the 'embrace of a raw form of great-power politics.' The president believes that U.S. power — both economic and military — should dictate outcomes and constraints on that power — his power — are illegitimate. In this world view, there are global powers such as the U.S., China and Russia, regional powers, such as Israel, Turkey and India, and all countries should know their place in that hierarchy.
That is most, but not all, of the answer. I'd add that Trump doesn't use 'strategic' as traditionally conceived. His 'China threat' is considerably narrower than that embraced by the NSS and most of the strategic community. Sure, he likes to flex his military muscles and brag about the awesome power that he can yield, but that's not his frame when discussing China.
Lyle Goldstein, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, explained to NPR that Trump doesn't talk about the South China Sea. 'He didn't mention going to war over rocks or reefs. He said nothing about the Taiwan Strait or the Luzon Strait. He's focused on commerce. ...'
He highlights trade figures — regardless of the real significance of those numbers — because economic statistics, such as size of the economy, job growth, market share, are the most important metrics to him. As Sobolik explained, 'The president cares more about American businesses getting access to China's market than he seems to about national security concerns with Beijing.' White House spokespersons agree without apology, noting that 'This president is successful because he will look anyone in the eye to negotiate better deals for our country, and he will continue to advance American interests."
This approach may work — if we use Trump's analytical framework to assess the results. China likes a 'great power mindset' that affords it influence and status. It is as unhappy as Trump with restraints imposed on its sovereignty by international law and multilateral organizations. China too wants a grand bargain, and if Taiwan is part of that equation, then Beijing is likely to deal.
Lanxin Xiang, professor emeritus of international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, agrees. He laid out his thinking in an interview for the Stimson Center, and his analysis follows mine. Trump hates ideology, which precludes a new Cold War, since it was at heart an ideological conflict; he is a dealmaker who 'likes to make linkages'; and he and Beijing want a 'grand bargain' in which trade is a 'secondary' consideration. Taiwan is the big issue. He adds that most members of the Chinese 'intellectual policy elite' think like him.
That is the foundation for a grand bargain. Or at least a bargain. I doubt there would be a lot of applause outside China or from anyone who isn't one of the president's most ardent supporters.
Brad Glosserman is a senior adviser at Pacific Forum and the author of "Peak Japan." His upcoming book on the geopolitics of high-tech is expected to be released by Hurst Publishers this fall.