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Normalisation is death of Arab sovereignty, Syria is the best example
Normalisation is death of Arab sovereignty, Syria is the best example

Al Mayadeen

time16 hours ago

  • Politics
  • Al Mayadeen

Normalisation is death of Arab sovereignty, Syria is the best example

We have reached the stage where it can no longer be denied that the Syrian leadership is at the complete mercy of the US and its allies. Its normalisation drive, whereby its officials meet with their Israeli counterparts, are not negotiations but discussions aimed at achieving the best implementation of Tel Aviv's orders. When Arab states make the decision to capitulate to the Israeli-US normalisation and neo-liberal economic model, they set themselves up for a loss of sovereignty and to become at best a tool for policy makers in Washington. If we look at the Jordanian and Egyptian models, we see that their agreements have not saved them from growing instability and economic decline, particularly in Egypt's case. Once, it had become a big deal when President Hosni Mubarak began selling gas to the Israelis, now, Cairo purchases gas through its own pipelines that have reversed the flow. Turning our focus to the current predicament of Syria, it is not even correct to assess it is based upon the Egypt model. In fact, despite some similarities, it is in even worse a predicament than Sudan. The Sudanese state, following the fall of its former leader Omar Bashir, went into a transitional phase whereby the Army and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia agreed upon a power-sharing phase. During this time, the Zionist Entity swept in to take advantage of the situation, fostering relations with both sides, but particularly with notorious goldmine owning war-lord Hemedti's RSF. Sudan, working closely with US President Donald Trump's administration at the time, managed to get sanctions lifted, remove itself from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, receive sanctions relief and aid, while almost paving the way to adopt a neo-liberal economic model; seeking IMF and World Bank loans. Khartoum had pledged that in exchange for these 'gifts' from the US, they would join the so-called 'Abraham Accords' and began negotiations behind closed doors with the Israelis. Is this starting to sound familiar? Then, in April of 2023, the Civil War erupted, and the Israelis swept in to back both sides, after having covertly provided the RSF with military capabilities that enabled it to balance the power on the battlefield in the first place. While the Mossad supported the RSF, the Israeli Foreign Ministry leaned towards the Sudanese Army. In Syria, almost the exact same process has occurred. Yet most pretend as if we haven't seen this same story before. The key difference, however, is that the new Syrian government of Ahmad al-Sharaa has less control than when the RSF and Sudanese Army ran an interim unity government. The recent sectarian bloodshed in Sweida proved this without a shadow of a doubt. There are now separatist militias in Sweida who actually coordinated with Israeli-Druze army forces who had set up a joint communications room to help locate targets during the latest round of bloodshed. Meanwhile, the Syrian security forces had coordinated the entry of tanks into Sweida with the Israelis, yet were bombed anyway, leading to as many as 700 dead amongst their ranks. While the majority of the Syrian Druze and wider Syrian public oppose ties with the Israelis, the Zionist Entity finds inroads with both sides and watches on as they slaughter each other, all in the interest of further weakening the country. Ahmad al-Sharaa was basically non-existent, as it appeared for over a week that Syria was heading towards another civil war, only offering brief statements before the US envoy announced a bizarre arrangement, claiming that Damascus and Tel Aviv had agreed to a truce. It was especially strange because the announcement didn't initially come from the Syrians themselves, but also due to the fact that there was no Syrian-Israeli war. What was happening was that Syrian forces were getting blown to pieces and ordered to stand down. The only relevance the Syrian government forces had was in their failed role inside Sweida, where they went out of control and participated in civilian massacres, alongside Bedouin tribal forces. Never in the known history of war has a nation been invaded, occupied, its capital repeatedly bombed and hundreds of its soldiers blown to pieces, and the country being attacked did not respond in any way. Not only have Ahmad al-Sharaa's forces failed to fire a single bullet towards their occupiers, they have not even threatened the use of force. Even worse, rather than respond, they give the Israelis gifts like infamous spy Eli Cohen's belongings, cracking down on the Palestinian Resistance forces, and declaring fellow Muslims and Arabs their enemies, despite them being the only ones willing to stand up for Syria. Meanwhile, every minority group in the country is isolated, and every community feels the need to bear arms and protect themselves, as nobody trusts the ill-trained, unprofessional security forces. This is what capitulation looks like, a leadership which exists more so on Facebook, X [formerly Twitter], and Instagram than it does in real life. A sectarian bloodbath, with no stability, no national unity, no sovereignty, and whose leaders are collaborating with the genocidal entity, in violation of all the regional, national, cultural, and religious moral obligations. This is normalisation. This is capitulation. This is what happens when you worship at the feet of your occupiers. Syria is the worst case of all, because there is no longer even a united nation or cause that it embodies, which has, for the current moment, died. Only through a unified resistance front will Syria liberate itself. It may take time, but this is the only path, and historically, the Syrian people had resisted the Ottomans, the French, and even got themselves back on their feet after the CIA overthrew their government in 1949. It can happen, but it will take the Syrian people to come together in order to overcome their predicament. There is no example of where normalisation with the Zionist regime, or total capitulation to the US, saves a nation in turmoil. Even in the cases where the US poured trillions into attempts to set up new regimes, like what happened with Iraq and Afghanistan. The only examples of where a regime has not yet declined or sacrificed its security predicament due to normalisation, are in the cases of the UAE and Bahrain, but both were already immensely rich, and nothing much changed upon normalisation. However, even in the cases of the UAE and Bahrain, their positioning themselves as part of the Israeli-US regional anti-Iran alliance puts them in the firing line and could risk national stability in the event of a broader war. The positions of the current regime in Syria are indefensible. Not even from a selfish materialist perspective could you argue their case without engaging in mental gymnastics. There is no strategic depth, nor a demonstration of competent governance in the direction we see the nation going, and at a time when unity is needed the most.

Trump's transactional approach shapes U.S.-China rivalry
Trump's transactional approach shapes U.S.-China rivalry

Japan Times

time7 days ago

  • Business
  • Japan Times

Trump's transactional approach shapes U.S.-China rivalry

Since his first sojourn in the White House, a hallmark of the Donald Trump presidency has been a harder, more nakedly competitive policy toward China. There are intense debates about how the U.S. can prevail in that struggle but there are no signs that a single strategy guides the administration. Nor will there be one. While there is agreement that China is a strategic competitor, U.S. President Trump appears to think quite differently about the meaning of that concept, the significance of the rivalry and what a resolution or ideal end state looks like. A 'victory' as he defines it might well appall national security traditionalists, along with U.S. allies and partners. The National Security Strategy (NSS) issued during Trump's first administration was explicit, calling out China because it (and Russia) 'challenge American power, influence and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.' Beijing, it said, aims 'to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests, seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model and reorder the region in its favor.' The core of the relationship as explained in the NSS is a relentless competition that (then) demanded a new approach, one that was adopted by the Trump administration and its successor. The president has accused China of stealing U.S. jobs, taking its intellectual property and "totally violating its agreement with us' that was designed to remedy those injustices. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has charged China with abusing global trade rules, stealing U.S. technology and flooding the U.S. with fentanyl. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has warned that 'China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. It wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo.' His national security adviser ... wait ... never mind. Policy hasn't matched the tough talk, however. Trump has ignored Congress and refused to ban the social media app TikTok even though it reportedly poses a national security threat. Last month, his administration reportedly blocked Taiwan President Lai Ching-te from transiting the U.S., forcing postponement of his planned trip to Latin America. Taiwan's defense minister was denied meetings at the Pentagon, again reportedly after complaints from Beijing. Export controls that banned the export of Nvidia's H20 chip to China were reversed and language that warned against the use of Huawei's chips was softened. This behavior is consistent with that of the first Trump administration. Then, Trump intervened to lift sanctions against ZTE, a Chinese telecommunications company, at Chinese leader Xi Jinping's request. His administration prioritized the conclusion of a trade deal with China over all other considerations. That yielded a 'historic trade agreement' (says a White House fact sheet) that has since been dismissed. Analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics concluded that China bought a little more than half (58%) of the U.S. exports promised under the deal, failed to return to pre-trade war levels and none of the additional $200 billion in exports that were promised. There are other grounds for criticism of Trump's China policies, but the most fundamental is this: If the NSS is correct and the U.S. is locked in a bitter rivalry with China, why then is Washington pushing away allies and partners — Japan, the European Union and India, to name the three most prominent — that it needs to balance and check China's size, scale and determination to reshape the world in its image? Trump's trade policies have been especially irritating, but his behavior has also raised doubts about U.S. credibility and commitment among even its most reliable friends. There are many explanations but they all reduce to the president himself. For example, Trump's seeming readiness to turn his back on Taiwan reflects his belief that the self-ruling island 'stole' the U.S. chip industry, questions about Taiwan's readiness to defend itself and doubts whether the U.S. could prevent China from unifying the island with the mainland. "Free-riding" is a big complaint: 'Taiwan should pay us for defense. We're no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn't give us anything.' Trump's insistence that past presidents were too quick to embroil the U.S. in overseas wars and his seeming aversion to bloodshed contribute to his position. Bradley Nelson of Saint Xavier University concluded that Chinese aggression against Taiwan would only be a problem for Trump because he 'would likely see it as a personal affront' and a sign that Xi 'believed Trump to be weak, nonconfrontational and afraid to stand up to Beijing.' Readiness to pull back tough sanctions on China is either a gesture to show benevolence — Trump claimed that 'China was being hurt very badly. ... They were closing up factories. They were having a lot of unrest' — or recognition that a trade war would inflict unacceptable damage on both sides. Beijing's willingness to cut exports of rare earth minerals critical to high-tech industries was a 'pain point ... the United States could not withstand,' explained Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, to the Washington Post. A desire to conclude a trade deal with China seems to outweigh all other considerations. Bloomberg reports that Trump has been 'the least hawkish voice in the room' during meetings, signaling a desire for engagement and deals over confrontation. That would confirm the most widespread explanation for Trump's behavior: He is a dealmaker and transactionalism guides his every move. James Crabtree, a journalist, policy analyst and former adviser to the British government, writes that the president has 'few fixed ideological convictions but he remains a transactional leader.' Knowing that Taiwan is Beijing's overriding concern, Trump's readiness to weaken relations with Taipei facilitates progress on that front. Those searching for a unifying theory argue that Trump's penchant for dealmaking reflects, in Crabtree's words, the 'embrace of a raw form of great-power politics.' The president believes that U.S. power — both economic and military — should dictate outcomes and constraints on that power — his power — are illegitimate. In this world view, there are global powers such as the U.S., China and Russia, regional powers, such as Israel, Turkey and India, and all countries should know their place in that hierarchy. That is most, but not all, of the answer. I'd add that Trump doesn't use 'strategic' as traditionally conceived. His 'China threat' is considerably narrower than that embraced by the NSS and most of the strategic community. Sure, he likes to flex his military muscles and brag about the awesome power that he can yield, but that's not his frame when discussing China. Lyle Goldstein, a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, explained to NPR that Trump doesn't talk about the South China Sea. 'He didn't mention going to war over rocks or reefs. He said nothing about the Taiwan Strait or the Luzon Strait. He's focused on commerce. ...' He highlights trade figures — regardless of the real significance of those numbers — because economic statistics, such as size of the economy, job growth, market share, are the most important metrics to him. As Sobolik explained, 'The president cares more about American businesses getting access to China's market than he seems to about national security concerns with Beijing.' White House spokespersons agree without apology, noting that 'This president is successful because he will look anyone in the eye to negotiate better deals for our country, and he will continue to advance American interests." This approach may work — if we use Trump's analytical framework to assess the results. China likes a 'great power mindset' that affords it influence and status. It is as unhappy as Trump with restraints imposed on its sovereignty by international law and multilateral organizations. China too wants a grand bargain, and if Taiwan is part of that equation, then Beijing is likely to deal. Lanxin Xiang, professor emeritus of international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, agrees. He laid out his thinking in an interview for the Stimson Center, and his analysis follows mine. Trump hates ideology, which precludes a new Cold War, since it was at heart an ideological conflict; he is a dealmaker who 'likes to make linkages'; and he and Beijing want a 'grand bargain' in which trade is a 'secondary' consideration. Taiwan is the big issue. He adds that most members of the Chinese 'intellectual policy elite' think like him. That is the foundation for a grand bargain. Or at least a bargain. I doubt there would be a lot of applause outside China or from anyone who isn't one of the president's most ardent supporters. Brad Glosserman is a senior adviser at Pacific Forum and the author of "Peak Japan." His upcoming book on the geopolitics of high-tech is expected to be released by Hurst Publishers this fall.

Australia fires first Himars rocket in war game with US
Australia fires first Himars rocket in war game with US

Free Malaysia Today

time14-07-2025

  • Business
  • Free Malaysia Today

Australia fires first Himars rocket in war game with US

Australia says it will spend A$74 billion on missiles over the next decade. (EPA Images pic) ROCKHAMPTON : Australia's army fired a truck-mounted long-range rocket system that has become a priority for US allies in the Indo-Pacific for the first time today, alongside US and Singapore forces firing the same system in joint war games. Armoured trucks with Himars – high mobility artillery rocket systems that can reach 400km – are in high demand in the Ukraine conflict and are also being acquired by US allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Australia, which is reshaping its forces to respond to China's military build-up. On the first day of Australia's largest war games, 'Talisman Sabre', the US, Australia, Japan, France, South Korea and Singapore held a live-fire exercise in northern Queensland involving US F-35B fighter jets and land-based long-range strike rockets and missiles. Up to 40,000 troops from 19 nations are taking part in Talisman Sabre, across thousands of kilometres from Australia's Indian Ocean territory of Christmas Island to the Coral Sea on Australia's east coast. Australian army brigadier Nick Wilson, director-general of the combined live-fire exercise, said it was the first time Australia, Singapore and the US had fired Himars together, and the first firing by Australia on home soil. 'Himars will be utilised in conjunction with a number of other weapon platforms… to ensure we have a strategy of denial for security, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific,' he told reporters today. The joint exercise at Shoalwater Bay in north Queensland was watched by Australian governor general Sam Mostyn and chief of defence admiral David Johnston. Australia has previously said army regiments with Himars can be transported to neighbouring island states with defence agreements to protect its northern approaches in a conflict. Lockheed Martin delivered the first two of 42 Himars launcher vehicles ordered by Australia in April. Australia has said it will spend A$74 billion on missiles over the next decade, including a new domestic manufacturing capability. US army lieutenant-general Joel Vowell, deputy commanding general for the Pacific, said yesterday the US needed to work with partners in the Indo-Pacific, and that Talisman Sabre was 'a deterrent mechanism because our ultimate goal is no war'.

China and Russia Keep Their Distance From Iran During Crisis
China and Russia Keep Their Distance From Iran During Crisis

New York Times

time06-07-2025

  • Politics
  • New York Times

China and Russia Keep Their Distance From Iran During Crisis

When Russia enlisted the aid of China, North Korea and Iran in its war against Ukraine, some American and British officials began talking about a new 'axis.' It appeared that the four countries were united by anger, authoritarianism and animus against the United States and its allies. But Iran's sales of drones and ballistic missiles to Russia for its war and oil shipped to China did not pay off when it mattered, raising doubts about unity among the nations. None of the other three states rushed to aid Iran during its war with Israel or when U.S. forces bombed Iranian nuclear sites. China and Russia, by far the two most powerful countries among the four, issued pro forma denunciations of the American actions but did not lift a finger to materially help Iran. 'The reality of this conflict turned out to be that Russia and China didn't run to Iran's rescue,' said Alexander Gabuev, the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. 'That just exposes the limitations of the whole 'axis' idea.' 'Each of them is pretty selfish and doesn't want to get embroiled in the wars of others,' he added. 'These are very different wars and different sets of conflicts. The countries are not necessarily sharing the same structures and values and institutional links the same way the U.S. and its allies do.' Want all of The Times? Subscribe.

South Korea Weighing US Request to Boost Defense Spending
South Korea Weighing US Request to Boost Defense Spending

Bloomberg

time27-06-2025

  • Business
  • Bloomberg

South Korea Weighing US Request to Boost Defense Spending

South Korea is in talks with the US about raising its defense spending, a key demand of President Donald Trump as he calls on allies to ramp up their outlays on security and lessen the burden on the US. 'Such discussions are ongoing between working-level officials. We need to decide how to respond,' National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told reporters late Thursday, indicating that progress in talks on trade would also support discussions on security. 'It's true the United States is currently making similar requests to several allies, similar to NATO.'

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