Strategic Implications of Taiwan's 2025 Han Kuang Exercise
The Republic of China Armed Forces launched its major military drill for 2025, the annual Han Kuang Exercise, on July 9. The previous iteration took place over five days and four nights; by contrast, this year's exercise lasted 10 days and nine nights.
In addition to the extended duration, local governments integrated the traditional 'Wan An' and 'Min An' civil defense drills into Han Kuang under the new concept of the 'Urban Resilience Exercise.' The exercise scenarios ranged from China's gray zone harassment to war preparation, coastal counter-landing operations, and in-depth protracted defense, all conducted under a framework of scenario-based, unscripted, and realistic combat training. This reflects a significant evolution in both the scope and depth of the exercise.
Importantly, Han Kuang is not only a test of the tactical proficiency of Taiwan's soldiers and the command resolve of officers – it also carries diplomatic significance. Notably, in recent Han Kuang drills and other military exercises, many foreign individuals – nicknamed 'English teachers' by military enthusiasts – have been observed near the exercise sites, indicating the growing external attention the Han Kuang Exercise is receiving.
Strategic Shifts in Scenario Planning
The key driver behind the restructuring of the Han Kuang Exercise remains the PLA's evolving tactics regarding a potential Taiwan invasion. From the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022 to the Israel-Gaza conflict and recent clashes between Israel and Iran, the changing nature of modern warfare is evident. If the PLA's invasion methods change, Taiwan must prepare differently. The ROC military's primary mission is to defend against a PLA attack, so any shift in enemy strategy demands an adaptive response.
This was evident in recent exercise scenarios, such as live-force training at Taoyuan Airport, simulating a possible PLA airborne assault due to the airport's proximity to Taipei – drawing lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Moreover, the PLA's recent deployment of dual aircraft carrier strike groups beyond the First Island Chain demonstrates its intent to project military power from the Pacific, posing new threats to countries along the First Island Chain. Taiwan has responded accordingly. The 2023 Han Kuang Exercise included drills at Taitung's Fengnian Airport, and the 2024 exercise was planned at Zhihang Air Base (but was canceled due to a typhoon).
These scenarios underscore how current conflicts have spurred PLA development, which in turn shapes Taiwan's evolving defense strategies – from a 'layered deterrence' posture toward a 'multidomain denial' model that emphasizes resilience. The goal for Taiwan is not to initiate war, but to endure a PLA first strike and maintain combat power for a counterattack.
In the past, exercises often concluded with coastal defense scenarios. This year, however, the exercise extended into urban areas, simulating PLA commando raids and fifth-column attacks – key components of China's multidomain warfare, including gray zone operations, cognitive warfare, domestic subversion, and attacks on critical infrastructure.
Deployment of New Equipment
The Han Kuang exercise is also a prime occasion to showcase Taiwan's new weapon systems. The inclusion of HIMARS launchers and live-fire drills involving M1 Abrams tanks not only demonstrates Taiwan's integration of new defense technology but also sends a signal to the United States.
Many arms purchases from the U.S. have faced delivery delays due to American industrial constraints and global conflicts. Nonetheless, Taiwan's ability to rapidly operationalize new systems after delivery strengthens its case for expedited shipments. The ROC Army's demonstration of combat readiness after receiving new equipment provides leverage in urging the U.S. to accelerate deliveries. It also illustrates how Taiwan tests its 'equip-train-fight' doctrines through real-world exercises – one of the hallmarks of this year's drill.
No exercise is flawless, but only through drills can hidden weaknesses be uncovered. Beyond concerns over fatigue from the longer schedule, the unscripted nature of this year's Han Kuang drills challenged troops' responsiveness, possibly leading to operational errors or vehicle accidents. However, discovering these problems is precisely the point of live exercises.
Diplomatic Significance of Civil-Military Exercises
From an international perspective, the combined Han Kuang–Urban Resilience Exercise serves as a powerful statement of Taiwan's defense resolve. This is especially significant to the Trump administration in the United States, which often gauges foreign involvement based on self-reliance. For instance, U.S. President Donald Trump has criticized European countries for not heeding warnings about Russia. His administration expects allies to first demonstrate their own commitment to self-defense before receiving U.S. support.
With ongoing U.S. concerns about Taiwan's defense budget and trade imbalances, questions arise: why should the United States defend a country that isn't fully committed to its own security? Similar frustrations have been voiced about NATO allies. In response, NATO members now include critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, and civil resilience in their national defense budgets. Using this broader calculation, Taiwan's defense spending would appear more substantial, potentially deflecting U.S. criticism.
Within this framework, Taiwan must demonstrate whole-of-society defense efforts. One example is the use of the Taipei MRT system for military transport during exercises – while subway construction isn't counted as defense spending, it has strategic utility in wartime logistics. This illustrates how resilience-oriented defense measures have become focal points of both training and international scrutiny.
As for the foreign observers at Han Kuang, this is nothing new. Delegations from the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which serves as the de facto U.S. embassy, have frequently attended past drills, offering technical advice and relaying insights to their respective agencies. These observers may include both tactical instructors and strategic analysts. Those on-site assess troop reactions to new and legacy systems, while others at the strategic level evaluate command deployment, logistics hubs, and staff planning in response to varied scenarios.
This year, former U.S. Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown even inspected the Tamsui River defenses alongside ROC military leadership.
Not all foreign participants are from official military backgrounds. Some may be defense contractors or arms dealers scouting Taiwan's military practices and potential procurement opportunities – especially ahead of the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition.
Differentiating Disaster Relief and Warfare
The integration of Han Kuang with the Urban Resilience Exercise sends a message: there is no longer a clear distinction between the frontlines and rear areas in a Taiwan Strait conflict. These exercises aim to help civilians understand how to respond in wartime. While there is room for improvement in scenarios like bridge closures, school firefights, and evacuation of shopping centers, they nonetheless increase public awareness and preparedness – potentially enhancing civilian survival during conflict.
Before achieving full sea and air dominance, the PLA is unlikely to conduct a large-scale amphibious landing. Instead, it may deploy light, highly mobile commando teams or utilize embedded fifth-column operatives to attack critical infrastructure and transportation nodes. This is why urban combat scenarios were staged in Taipei's Wanhua District and around Wanban Bridge.
In the Taipei Urban Resilience Exercise, it became clear that disaster relief strategies do not always apply to wartime sheltering. In natural disasters like typhoons or floods, open spaces and visible evacuation points are preferable. But in wartime, these open areas could become missile targets, and elevated sites like school auditoriums may not be safe. Furthermore, peacetime crises rarely involve attacks from armed adversaries or internal saboteurs, unlike wartime scenarios where fifth-column agents may be active.
This highlights the need for crisis management and contingency planning tailored to different threat types. From a public administration standpoint, it also exposes gaps between central and local governments. While the central government is updating defense doctrine for modern warfare, can local governments likewise modernize evacuation and safety policies – or are they simply copying outdated templates? This is a key issue to be addressed in the post-exercise After Action Review process.
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There is little evidence for either assumption. The failure of the recalls does not reflect a re-evaluation of cross-strait policy preferences. Instead, it highlights voter fatigue with partisan manipulation, a desire for stability and competent governance, and growing skepticism toward political actors who treat national security as a tool for short-term electoral gain. A Taiwan-Centered Identity, But Not a Blank Check Taiwan's identity and civic nationalism have evolved over decades of de facto separation from the mainland. Across party lines, most Taiwanese now see their future as distinct from mainland China, and cross-strait debates increasingly revolve around how best to manage that reality, although many inputs from the mainland still outright reject its validity. This Taiwan-first identity is not confined to one political camp. The KMT, knowingly or not, has adopted Taiwan-centric messaging as well. 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The failure of the recall elections does not signal an embrace of Beijing. Taiwanese voters are neither pro-Beijing nor reflexively anti-KMT. They are pro-stability, pro-democracy, and increasingly tired of being treated as pawns in partisan battles. The message to both major parties is clear. To the DPP: stop crying wolf. The CCP threat is real, but cheapening it as a constant partisan bludgeon risks dulling public vigilance when it matters most. To the KMT: do not mistake voter fatigue for a blank check. You now have the public's cautious trust. Use it to lead responsibly, including showing that you are willing to invest in Taiwan's security and fulfill your own pledge to raise defense spending to 3 percent of GDP. Otherwise, that trust will quickly erode. Taiwan's greatest strength against Beijing's coercion is a united and confident public that trusts its democratic institutions. That unity will not be won through fearmongering or careless gestures. It will be achieved through transparency, discipline, and serious governance. Both parties owe Taiwan nothing less.
The Diplomat
25-07-2025
- The Diplomat
Strategic Implications of Taiwan's 2025 Han Kuang Exercise
The ROC military's annual exercise is changing to reflect the PLA's evolving tactics. There is no longer a clear distinction between the frontlines and rear areas in a Taiwan Strait conflict. The Republic of China Armed Forces launched its major military drill for 2025, the annual Han Kuang Exercise, on July 9. The previous iteration took place over five days and four nights; by contrast, this year's exercise lasted 10 days and nine nights. In addition to the extended duration, local governments integrated the traditional 'Wan An' and 'Min An' civil defense drills into Han Kuang under the new concept of the 'Urban Resilience Exercise.' The exercise scenarios ranged from China's gray zone harassment to war preparation, coastal counter-landing operations, and in-depth protracted defense, all conducted under a framework of scenario-based, unscripted, and realistic combat training. This reflects a significant evolution in both the scope and depth of the exercise. Importantly, Han Kuang is not only a test of the tactical proficiency of Taiwan's soldiers and the command resolve of officers – it also carries diplomatic significance. Notably, in recent Han Kuang drills and other military exercises, many foreign individuals – nicknamed 'English teachers' by military enthusiasts – have been observed near the exercise sites, indicating the growing external attention the Han Kuang Exercise is receiving. Strategic Shifts in Scenario Planning The key driver behind the restructuring of the Han Kuang Exercise remains the PLA's evolving tactics regarding a potential Taiwan invasion. From the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022 to the Israel-Gaza conflict and recent clashes between Israel and Iran, the changing nature of modern warfare is evident. If the PLA's invasion methods change, Taiwan must prepare differently. The ROC military's primary mission is to defend against a PLA attack, so any shift in enemy strategy demands an adaptive response. This was evident in recent exercise scenarios, such as live-force training at Taoyuan Airport, simulating a possible PLA airborne assault due to the airport's proximity to Taipei – drawing lessons from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Moreover, the PLA's recent deployment of dual aircraft carrier strike groups beyond the First Island Chain demonstrates its intent to project military power from the Pacific, posing new threats to countries along the First Island Chain. Taiwan has responded accordingly. The 2023 Han Kuang Exercise included drills at Taitung's Fengnian Airport, and the 2024 exercise was planned at Zhihang Air Base (but was canceled due to a typhoon). These scenarios underscore how current conflicts have spurred PLA development, which in turn shapes Taiwan's evolving defense strategies – from a 'layered deterrence' posture toward a 'multidomain denial' model that emphasizes resilience. The goal for Taiwan is not to initiate war, but to endure a PLA first strike and maintain combat power for a counterattack. In the past, exercises often concluded with coastal defense scenarios. This year, however, the exercise extended into urban areas, simulating PLA commando raids and fifth-column attacks – key components of China's multidomain warfare, including gray zone operations, cognitive warfare, domestic subversion, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Deployment of New Equipment The Han Kuang exercise is also a prime occasion to showcase Taiwan's new weapon systems. The inclusion of HIMARS launchers and live-fire drills involving M1 Abrams tanks not only demonstrates Taiwan's integration of new defense technology but also sends a signal to the United States. Many arms purchases from the U.S. have faced delivery delays due to American industrial constraints and global conflicts. Nonetheless, Taiwan's ability to rapidly operationalize new systems after delivery strengthens its case for expedited shipments. The ROC Army's demonstration of combat readiness after receiving new equipment provides leverage in urging the U.S. to accelerate deliveries. It also illustrates how Taiwan tests its 'equip-train-fight' doctrines through real-world exercises – one of the hallmarks of this year's drill. No exercise is flawless, but only through drills can hidden weaknesses be uncovered. Beyond concerns over fatigue from the longer schedule, the unscripted nature of this year's Han Kuang drills challenged troops' responsiveness, possibly leading to operational errors or vehicle accidents. However, discovering these problems is precisely the point of live exercises. Diplomatic Significance of Civil-Military Exercises From an international perspective, the combined Han Kuang–Urban Resilience Exercise serves as a powerful statement of Taiwan's defense resolve. This is especially significant to the Trump administration in the United States, which often gauges foreign involvement based on self-reliance. For instance, U.S. President Donald Trump has criticized European countries for not heeding warnings about Russia. His administration expects allies to first demonstrate their own commitment to self-defense before receiving U.S. support. With ongoing U.S. concerns about Taiwan's defense budget and trade imbalances, questions arise: why should the United States defend a country that isn't fully committed to its own security? Similar frustrations have been voiced about NATO allies. In response, NATO members now include critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, and civil resilience in their national defense budgets. Using this broader calculation, Taiwan's defense spending would appear more substantial, potentially deflecting U.S. criticism. Within this framework, Taiwan must demonstrate whole-of-society defense efforts. One example is the use of the Taipei MRT system for military transport during exercises – while subway construction isn't counted as defense spending, it has strategic utility in wartime logistics. This illustrates how resilience-oriented defense measures have become focal points of both training and international scrutiny. As for the foreign observers at Han Kuang, this is nothing new. Delegations from the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which serves as the de facto U.S. embassy, have frequently attended past drills, offering technical advice and relaying insights to their respective agencies. These observers may include both tactical instructors and strategic analysts. Those on-site assess troop reactions to new and legacy systems, while others at the strategic level evaluate command deployment, logistics hubs, and staff planning in response to varied scenarios. This year, former U.S. Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown even inspected the Tamsui River defenses alongside ROC military leadership. Not all foreign participants are from official military backgrounds. Some may be defense contractors or arms dealers scouting Taiwan's military practices and potential procurement opportunities – especially ahead of the Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition. Differentiating Disaster Relief and Warfare The integration of Han Kuang with the Urban Resilience Exercise sends a message: there is no longer a clear distinction between the frontlines and rear areas in a Taiwan Strait conflict. These exercises aim to help civilians understand how to respond in wartime. While there is room for improvement in scenarios like bridge closures, school firefights, and evacuation of shopping centers, they nonetheless increase public awareness and preparedness – potentially enhancing civilian survival during conflict. Before achieving full sea and air dominance, the PLA is unlikely to conduct a large-scale amphibious landing. Instead, it may deploy light, highly mobile commando teams or utilize embedded fifth-column operatives to attack critical infrastructure and transportation nodes. This is why urban combat scenarios were staged in Taipei's Wanhua District and around Wanban Bridge. In the Taipei Urban Resilience Exercise, it became clear that disaster relief strategies do not always apply to wartime sheltering. In natural disasters like typhoons or floods, open spaces and visible evacuation points are preferable. But in wartime, these open areas could become missile targets, and elevated sites like school auditoriums may not be safe. Furthermore, peacetime crises rarely involve attacks from armed adversaries or internal saboteurs, unlike wartime scenarios where fifth-column agents may be active. This highlights the need for crisis management and contingency planning tailored to different threat types. From a public administration standpoint, it also exposes gaps between central and local governments. While the central government is updating defense doctrine for modern warfare, can local governments likewise modernize evacuation and safety policies – or are they simply copying outdated templates? This is a key issue to be addressed in the post-exercise After Action Review process.
