Victory Day and foreign hosts: Putin deepens African ties
Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted a series of high-level meetings with African leaders from May 7 to 10, reaffirming Moscow's commitment to deepening political, economic, and military ties with the continent. The talks were held alongside commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.
Here are the key takeaways from Putin's bilateral engagements and the participation of African states in the Victory Day events, including the May 9 military parade in Red Square and defense talks between Russian officials and African military delegations.
On Friday, Russian President Vladimir Putin presided over a grand military parade on Red Square that featured thousands of troops and a display of military hardware, including tanks and missile systems. The May 9 Victory Day celebrations were attended by more than two dozen world leaders, among them the heads of state of Burkina Faso, the Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, and Egypt.
Egypt's military police took part in the parade, marching alongside cadets from the other allied nations.
On May 7, Putin met with President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo, who said he had traveled to Moscow despite external attempts to dissuade him from honoring the Kremlin's invitation. The leaders discussed enhancing cooperation in areas such as energy, trade, and infrastructure and reaffirmed the strong historical ties between their countries. Putin noted that around 250 scholarships are allocated annually for Congolese students to study at Russian universities and pledged to expand the quota.
Putin highlighted the wartime ties and record trade with Egypt during a meeting with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi at the Kremlin on Friday. He described Cairo as one of Moscow's key partners in Africa, noting that bilateral trade grew by over 30% last year to reach a record $9 billion, and surged by more than 80% in the first two months of 2025.
At a meeting held on May 10 with Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa, the Russian leader pledged to expand cooperation with the southern African nation in key sectors such as geological exploration, energy, and agriculture, noting the significant potential for trade growth. Putin also announced that 125 government scholarships had been allocated for Zimbabwean students for the 2025–2026 academic year, adding to the 460 Zimbabwean students currently studying in Russia.
Later the same day, Burkina Faso's interim president, Ibrahim Traore, was received by Putin for talks focused on security and counter-terrorism in the Sahel region. Putin pledged continued support in restoring constitutional order and combating armed insurgents in Burkina Faso. He also announced ongoing humanitarian assistance, including last year's delivery of 25,000 tons of wheat and a new shipment of food that will arrive in Ouagadougou this month. Traore also expressed a desire to deepen defense and technological cooperation with Russia, describing the growing partnership as a response to shared challenges and shifting global dynamics.
The Kremlin also announced a meeting between Putin and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the supreme commander of the Libyan National Army, but no additional information was provided.
Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held bilateral talks with African defense delegations on the sidelines of the parade. The discussions with Congolese, Nigerien, Malian, Burkinabe, Nigerian, and Libyan officials focused on strengthening military-technical cooperation, conducting joint training exercises, and increasing arms and logistics support. All sides expressed interest in long-term cooperation in the security and defense sectors.
In parallel, Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with representatives from South Africa, Algeria, and Equatorial Guinea to discuss current military and military-technical cooperation issues.
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