Lebanon, Syria hold talks on refugees, border security
Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam concluded an official visit to Damascus on Monday, leading a ministerial delegation that included Foreign Minister Youssef Raji, Defense Minister Michel Mansi, and Interior Minister Ahmad Hajar.
The Lebanese officials met with Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shibani to address key bilateral issues, including border control, refugee returns, and economic cooperation.
A new chapter in Lebanese-Syrian ties
Prime Minister Salam described the visit as the beginning of a 'new chapter' in relations between the two countries, rooted in mutual respect, trust, and non-interference.
'Syria's decisions belong to Syrians, and Lebanon's decisions belong to the Lebanese,' he stated.
Border security, smuggling, and coordination
Discussions centered on controlling border crossings and combating smuggling. Both sides agreed to continue the land and maritime border demarcation process, launched earlier during a Saudi-sponsored meeting in Jeddah between the countries' defense ministers.
They also emphasized the importance of strengthening security coordination to preserve regional stability.
Refugee return and detainee files
The leaders agreed to cooperate in facilitating the safe and dignified return of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, with support from the United Nations and friendly states.
The Lebanese delegation raised the issue of Lebanese detainees and missing persons in Syria and requested Syria's help in legal cases, including the extradition of suspects involved in the 2013 Tripoli mosque bombings.
Boosting economic and energy ties
Talks also covered economic collaboration, including reopening trade and transit routes, importing oil and gas, and improving civil aviation between the two countries.
The two sides agreed to revisit several bilateral agreements, including the framework of the Lebanese-Syrian Higher Council.
Joint committee and future coordination
A joint ministerial committee will be formed to follow up on shared files, comprising the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, interior, and justice. Additional discussions will include the ministries of economy, transport, energy, and social affairs.
Sanctions, unity, and rebuilding Syria
Both governments reaffirmed their commitment to Syria's territorial unity and called for lifting international sanctions on Syria to stimulate economic recovery and attract investment. They stressed that Syrian recovery would also benefit Lebanon—particularly in terms of refugee return, energy access, and trade.
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