Will US tariffs sink Australia's Aukus submarine delivery goals?
New US tariffs on steel and aluminium could delay delivery and increase the cost of nuclear submarines promised to
Australia under the
Aukus pact, with analysts warning of rising scepticism about the trilateral defence deal.
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The assessment came after senior US Senator Tim Kaine reportedly told an Aukus gathering in Washington last week that submarine construction was facing budget and schedule setbacks.
Kaine, the top Democrat on the Senate's sea-power subcommittee, said about one-third of the steel and aluminium used in US naval vessels came from allies including Canada and the UK – both now hit with tariffs under President
Donald Trump 's renewed trade war.
The UK faces a 10 per cent levy while Canadian metals are subject to a blanket 25 per cent tariff.
Under the Aukus agreement signed in 2021 between Australia, Britain and the US, Canberra is set to acquire three Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from Washington starting in the early 2030s, with a new fleet of British-designed SSN-Aukus vessels due in the 2040s.
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Malcolm Davis, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, said if Australia were to receive its first Virginia-class submarine in 2033, followed by the remaining two by the end of the next decade, the impact of tariffs could be negligible.
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