How the Russia-Ukraine conflict also became a cultural war
(The Indian Express has launched a new series of articles for UPSC aspirants written by seasoned writers and scholars on issues and concepts spanning History, Polity, International Relations, Art, Culture and Heritage, Environment, Geography, Science and Technology, and so on. Read and reflect with subject experts and boost your chance of cracking the much-coveted UPSC CSE. In the following article, Mohammad Asim Siddiqui engages with literary depiction of Victory Day in Russia and Ukraine.)
'Born in Ukraine, made famous in Russia, [Nikolai] Gogol embodies both the ties that bind the two countries and the differences that set them apart.' These lines about literary figure Nikolai Gogol—born in Ukraine (then part of the Russian Empire) and widely regarded as one of the most important writers in the Russian literary canon—highlight how literature offers a lens to look at the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and understand its deeper political, historical, and emotional undercurrents.
For instance, works on Victory Day and World War II by many Russian and Ukrainian writers and poets provide insights into the construction of collective memory, contestation around national identities, and, most importantly, the processing of historical events across generations. But before delving into the literary portrayals of these key events, let us first briefly understand the significance of Victory Day and how it is remembered differently in Russia and Ukraine.
On May 9 every year, Russia celebrates Victory Day to mark the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in WWII. Notably, while the Allies observe 'V-E Day', or Victory in Europe Day, on May 8 — the day Nazis surrendered in France — Soviet leader Joseph Stalin chose to celebrate the fall of the Nazis in Soviet-controlled Berlin the next day.
Russia has taken pride in the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in what it celebrates as the 'Great Patriotic War'. In recent years Russian President Vladimir Putin has equated the ongoing war against Ukraine with the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany.
Ukraine has traditionally observed Victory Day on May 9. But in 2023, it started celebrating the Day of Remembrance and Victory over Germany on May 8, aligning itself with most European nations. Hence, Ukraine's shift from May 9 to May 8 is part of its broader de-Russification process that has been going on for many years but picked up pace after the Post-Maidan events.
The Maidan Uprising, or Euromaidan, refers to protests and demonstrations that began in November 2013 at Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv against then President Viktor Yanukovych's many pro-Russian policies.
In 2015, the Ukrainian parliament also took a decision to mark May 8 as the Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation, while May 9 retained its status as Victory Day. The poppy flower became the symbol of Remembrance and Reconciliation Day, replacing the Ribbon of Saint George, an important Russian symbol.
A survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology showed that the popularity of Victory Day gradually declined following Russia's annexation of Crimea and its support for Russian paramilitaries in the eastern Donbas region in 2014. Public support for Victory Day came down from 37% in 2017 to 31% in 2018.
The situation was accelerated in 2022 after the Russia-Ukraine war began, leading to Ukraine's official shift to commemorating May 8 in line with European countries.
Many Russian and Ukrainian writers and poets have depicted Victory Day and WWII in their writings. Aleksey Tolstoi (1883-1945), better known for his science fiction, wrote the story 'The Russian Character' (1945) which centres around a soldier whose face is disfigured in the War and who hides his identity from his family after his return. The story highlights the soldier's resilience and bravery in the face of a crisis.
Interestingly, Tolstoi – well-known for his active endorsement of the official Bolshevik line – was called by George Orwell, along with another Soviet writer Ilya Ehrenburg, 'literary prostitutes' in his 1945 essay 'The Prevention of Literature'.
Russian writer Mikhail Sholokhov's story 'Fate of a Man' (1956), portrays the bravery of Andrey Sokolov, who participates in the War as a truck driver, and is captured by the Nazis and sent to a concentration camp. He escapes from the Nazis, and later learns on Victory Day that his son, an officer in the army, was killed on the last day of the War.
Anna Akhmatova (1889-1966), an important Russian poet during the War, wrote the poem 'Victory' which asks how the Great Victory is to be remembered:
By our doors Great Victory stays…
But how will we glory her advent?
Let women lift higher the children! They blessed
With life midst thousands and thousands deaths—
Thus will be the dearest answered.
A very popular song titled 'Victory Day', written in 1975 by Russian poet Vladimir Kharitonov and composer David Tukhmanov has been a part of Victory Day celebrations in the Soviet Union. The song celebrates the patriotism and sacrifice of the Russian people:
Days and nights at hearth furnaces,
Our Motherland didn't sleep a wink.
Days and nights a hard battle we fought—
We hastened this day as best we could.
Svetlana Alexandrovna Alexievich, Nobel Prize winning Belarussian writer, has two remarkable books on the memory of World Wars and the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Going against the official Soviet version of the heroic and patriotic war, her first book, The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War II (2017), presents monologues of women, chronicles the stories of rapes, torture and atrocities faced by hundreds of women during the War.
Considering herself a pacifist, her selection of stories in the book also makes a case against the notion of war and the heroism attached to it. Last Witnesses: An Oral History of the Children of World War II (2019), a companion volume to The Unwomanly Face, provides a painful recollection of hundreds of children who witnessed bombing, destruction and deaths in WWII. Praising her unique blend of journalism and literature – often called documentary literature – her Nobel Prize citation described her 'polyphonic writings' as 'a monument to suffering and courage in our time'.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has also prompted many Ukrainian writers to discover their linguistic identity. Ukrainian author Volodymyr Rafeyenko switched from Russian to Ukrainian – a language he hardly knew but learnt gradually – after Russia's invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014. His novel in Ukrainian titled Mondegreen: Songs about Death and Love (2022) is about the struggle of a Ukrainian refugee from the Donbas region to learn Ukrainian and adjust to his new life in Kyiv.
The main subject of the novel, as Rafeyenko admits, is the Ukrainian language. Talking about the implications of the war, Ukrainian poet and writer Serhiy Zhadan has said, 'If Ukraine wins, there is some future for us, if Russia wins, there will be no literature, no culture, nothing.' For him, writing in Ukrainian is a political act: 'That's why even if you write love poems but do it in Ukrainian, you take a certain position in one way or another, it has a political connotation.'
As part of the process of decolonisation and de-Russification, Ukrainians have also revisited classic Russian literature to call out examples of bias and prejudice towards other nations and peoples. In Kyiv, the statue of iconic Russian poet Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837) has often been smeared with ink as a mark of Ukrainians' protest. Celebrated Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov (1814-1841) has also been called out for his prejudice against Chechens.
Ukrainian-born Russian writer Nikolai Gogol (1809-52) who has many streets and monuments in Ukraine named after him is a bone of contention between the two countries. During the conflict, both Russia and Ukraine have staked their claim on Gogol and his legacy. Hamid Dabashi cites Giorgi Lomsadze and Nikoloz's apt insight about Gogol's significance for the two countries: 'Born in Ukraine, made famous in Russia, Gogol embodies both the ties that bind the two countries and the differences that set them apart.'
How do the differing dates of Victory Day celebrations in Russia (May 9) and Europe (May 8) reflect broader geopolitical and historical narratives?
What role does public memory, including commemorative practices and symbols, play in shaping national identity in post-Soviet states like Ukraine and Russia?
How has Ukraine's shift from May 9 to May 8 for Victory Day observance contributed to its broader process of de-Russification?
How have political events such as the Maidan Uprising and the Russia-Ukraine war influenced the reinterpretation of World War II memory in Ukraine?
In what ways does the contestation over historical figures like Nikolai Gogol reflect the cultural and political tensions between Russia and Ukraine?
(Mohammad Asim Siddiqui is a Professor in the Department of English at Aligarh Muslim University.)
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