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Indian Express
5 days ago
- General
- Indian Express
As Beijing prepares to build world's biggest hydropower dam, a look at the Yarlung Tsangpo River
Calling it the 'project of the century,' Beijing has announced the construction of the world's biggest hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibetan territory. The project was introduced in 2020 as part of China's 14th Five-Year Plan. According to reports, it is to consist of five cascade hydropower stations, producing an estimated 300 million megawatt hours of electricity annually at a cost of approximately 1.2 trillion yuan (US$ 167 billion). The dam has drawn criticism from the lower riparian states of India and Bangladesh as well as Tibetan groups and environmentalists. Let's take a look at the river, its hydropower potential, and its future amid climate change. The Yarlung Tsangpo is the largest river on the Tibetan plateau, originating from a glacier near Mount Kailash. 'Tsangpo' means river in Tibetan. According to academic Costanza Rampini in the Political Economy of Hydropower in Southwest China and Beyond (2021), the basin spreads over more than 500,000 sq km of land in China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh, 'though 80% of it lies in China and India.' It runs 2,057 km in Tibet before flowing into India. One fascinating feature of the river is the sharp 'U' turn that it takes, known as the Great Bend, at the proximity of Mount Namcha Barwa near the Indian border. In India, the Yarlung Tsangpo enters Arunachal Pradesh as Siang. The Siang then gathers more streams and flows down towards Assam where it is joined by the Lohit and Dibang rivers. Further downstream, it is known as the Brahmaputra, which in turn flows through Assam before entering Bangladesh. 'Upon entering that country it undergoes one more change in nomenclature, this time accompanied by a sex change – the 'male' Brahmaputra, for some reason, becomes the 'female' Jamuna,' remarks author Samrat Choudhury in The Braided River: A Journey Along The Brahmaputra (2021). The Brahmaputra, as Jamuna, makes its way towards an eventual confluence with the Ganga, known in Bangladesh as Padma. 'This great river of many great rivers finally flows into the Bay of Bengal, after undergoing yet another change of name as the Meghna,' notes Choudhury. 'Like the Nile in Egypt,' says Tibetologist Claude Arpi in Water: Culture, Politics and Management (2009), 'the Yarlung Tsangpo has fed the Tibetan civilisation that flourished along its valleys, particularly in Central Tibet.' Approximately 130 million people live within the Yarlung Tsangpo river basin, many of whom are the rural poor. Rampini adds, 'Indeed, in North-east India, the YTB [Yarlung-Tsangpo-Brahmaputra] is often referred to as the 'lifeline' of the region.' As the YTB descends from the Himalayan mountains to the plains of Assam, it crosses steep slopes and gathers strong energy, which gets scattered in the form of intense summer floods, especially in India and Bangladesh. 'The energy that the YTB gains throughout its course also puts the river at the centre of China's and India's recent renewable energy development strategies,' says Rampini. For long, both countries have been mobilising their engineering capacities to dam their respective stretches of the river and harness optimal hydropower. China has constructed several dams along tributaries of the Yarlung Tsangpo, such as the Pangduo and Zhikong dams on the Lhasa River. In 2014, it completed the Zangmu Dam along the main stem of the Yarlung Tsangpo. The Indian government, too, has expedited the clearance of big dams along the YTB and its tributaries. Although Beijing has assured India that dams along the Chinese stretch of YTB would have no downstream transboundary impacts, India remains vigilant and anxious. 'Perhaps even more concerning to Indian officials than Chinese dams along the YTB,' argues Rampini, 'is China's controversial multi-billion-USD plan to divert water from its southern regions to its more arid regions, a project known as the South-North Water Transfer.' According to Rampini, the case is further complicated by the fact that the river crosses one of the disputed boundaries between India and China — the McMahon Line, which separates the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh from Tibet. The McMahon Line was negotiated in 1914 by representatives of the new Republic of China, the Tibetan government, and the British government. India and the international community continue to recognise it as the legal border between North-east India and the current-day Tibet Autonomous Region of China. However, since gaining control over Tibet in the mid-20th century, China has contested the border, arguing that Tibet was not an independent state at the time of the treaty, making it invalid. This has led both China and India to establish a permanent military presence on their respective sides of the contested line and, in 1962, the border became the site of the last India-China war. 'The Brahmaputra, or Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, is counted among the world's ten major rivers,' asserts Arpi. Rampini adds that there is also no major international water treaty governing the YTB. Bangladesh, as the lowest riparian country in the basin, feels the most threatened, experts say. Scholars argue that cooperation over the management of the Yarlung Tsangpo, or Brahmaputra, is vital now, given the impact of climate change. 'The flows of the YTB and the ferocity of its floods are highly dependent on the melting of Himalayan snow and ice,' says Rampini. As human activities drive up surface temperatures, the Himalayas could experience between 15% and 78% glacier mass losses by 2100. Rampini explains, 'As glaciers retreat, glacier-fed rivers such as the YTB will first experience an increase in runoff, as more glacial melt swells their flows.' While this may cause monsoon floods now, the long-term repercussions are worrisome. 'In the long term, as glaciers continue to shrink, the YTB could experience a near 20% decrease in mean upstream water supply between 2046 and 2065, threatening the livelihoods of communities that rely on the YTB flows,' writes Rampini. Additionally, lesser river water will weaken the Chinese and Indian dam-building efforts along the YTB, since hydroelectricity generation depends on river flow. The YTB river system ties together the fates of China, India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Scholars warn that unchecked dam-building efforts along the Yarlung Tsangpo and the current mega project may eventually lead to a possible 'water war' between the two nations.
The Diplomat
5 days ago
- Business
- The Diplomat
China's New Mega-Dam Raises the Stakes for Sino-Indian Hydrodiplomacy
On July 19, Chinese Premier Li Qiang officially announced the start of construction on a long-planned hydropower project on the lower reaches of the Yarlung Tsangpo River. Billed as a centerpiece of China's clean energy drive, the dam marks a new chapter in the country's infrastructure history – one with profound implications not only for domestic development, but also for regional stability in South Asia. This is no ordinary project. First proposed in the 1990s and later elevated to national priority in China's 14th Five-Year Plan, the Yarlung Tsangpo hydropower station is widely seen as the country's most ambitious hydro initiative since the Three Gorges Dam, with Li framing it as a 'project of the century.' The dam's installed capacity will reportedly exceed 60 gigawatts – roughly triple that of the Three Gorges – generating electricity for tens of millions of homes. State media underscored its strategic importance in helping China reach its 2060 carbon neutrality target, ensure energy security in western regions, and promote high-quality development in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It is also part of China's 2035 long-term development strategy, which calls for the creation of multiple clean energy hubs along major river basins. But the project's magnitude also heightens its geopolitical sensitivity. The Yarlung Tsangpo, known as the Brahmaputra once it enters India, originates in Tibet and flows east before making a dramatic U-turn at the Great Bend and descending into Arunachal Pradesh – a territory claimed by both India and China. It eventually reaches Bangladesh and empties into the Bay of Bengal. The river sustains agriculture, fisheries, and livelihoods for over 130 million people downstream. That China's newest dam is located just upstream of this bend – before the river crosses into Indian-administered territory – has renewed long-standing concerns in New Delhi about Beijing's leverage as an upper riparian state. Those concerns are not new. Indian officials have for years raised objections to large-scale Chinese dam-building along the Yarlung Tsangpo, especially when pursued unilaterally. Following earlier project announcements in January, India's Ministry of External Affairs publicly called for prior consultation on all activities affecting shared rivers. While no new official statement had been released following last week's announcement, Indian media reported that the government is 'closely monitoring' the latest developments. Some Indian commentators have gone further, warning that Chinese dams near the border could pose strategic risks during times of heightened tensions. Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Pema Khandu openly described the proposed dam as a potential 'water bomb.' Chinese authorities, for their part, have sought to allay downstream concerns. Chinese diplomats have emphasized that the project is designed as a run-of-the-river facility that will not significantly alter water volumes flowing into India. In addition, China insists that it 'has always acted responsibly' when developing transboundary water resources. But such reassurances – though consistent in tone – have not always sufficed to calm regional unease. For downstream countries, what matters is not only hydrological facts, but also a sense of inclusion and institutional trust. That trust remains limited. At present, the only formal cooperation mechanism between China and India on water issues is a hydrological data-sharing agreement first signed in 2002. Under this memorandum, China provides India with real-time flood season data on the Yarlung Tsangpo to aid disaster preparedness in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam. However, the mechanism has proven vulnerable to geopolitical strain. In 2017, during the Doklam standoff between Chinese and Indian forces, Beijing temporarily suspended data transfers – a move widely interpreted as political signaling. Although data-sharing later resumed, the episode revealed just how fragile functional cooperation can be in the absence of deeper institutional guarantees. At the heart of the issue lies a legal and diplomatic vacuum. Unlike India's water treaties with Pakistan (the Indus Waters Treaty, which India suspended following a terror attack in April) and Bangladesh (the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty), there is no binding bilateral framework governing river management between China and India. China has generally opted for flexible, bilateral memoranda rather than formal legal agreements, citing the principle of upstream states' sovereign rights to develop internal water resources. This divergence in legal philosophy – combined with mutual mistrust – has left the Yarlung Tsangpo without the kind of institutional architecture that could help prevent escalation. That absence is all the more concerning given the broader regional context. South Asia is already among the world's most water-stressed and conflict-prone river basins. Climate change is accelerating glacial melt, intensifying floods, and shifting monsoon patterns, all of which amplify the stakes of upstream interventions. Bangladesh has long expressed frustration over upstream diversions affecting its dry-season flows. Nepal has sparred with India over hydropower projects along the Ganges tributaries. In recent years, India itself considered reviving a major dam project in Arunachal Pradesh – widely viewed by analysts as a geopolitical counter to Chinese activities upstream. It would be shortsighted for China and India – Asia's two most populous nations – to allow water to become another theater of strategic rivalry. The potential for cooperation is far greater. Establishing joint monitoring mechanisms, expanding early warning systems, and launching basin-level dialogues could foster transparency and confidence. Strengthening the existing data-sharing agreement and insulating it from political disruptions would be a good first step. But building true water cooperation will require more than technical fixes. It demands institutional imagination – and political will. That kind of institutional breakthrough will not be easy. Neither China nor India has signed the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, the only global treaty governing transboundary rivers. And while India has signed binding water-sharing treaties with some neighbors, its approach remains similarly bilateral and interest-driven. In other words, both governments have historically rejected the idea that upstream development should be subject to international constraints. In this sense, their stances mirror each other: each sees itself as a regional hegemon, wary of legal obligations that might curtail sovereign decision-making. As a result, both countries have become status quo powers in a region that desperately needs rule-making. This mutual caution reflects deeper realities. In both Beijing and New Delhi, water is not just a resource – it is a symbol of authority, sovereignty, and developmental legitimacy. That makes compromise politically difficult, especially amid rising nationalist sentiment and hardening border disputes. But the absence of cooperation carries its own dangers. As climate change and geopolitical risk compound each other, what is now an institutional vacuum could easily become a vacuum of control. A shift will not come easily. But the risks of inaction are real. The Yarlung Tsangpo will continue to flow across borders, indifferent to geopolitical lines. Whether it becomes a source of contention or a channel for collaboration depends on the choices that China and India make today.
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Business Standard
6 days ago
- Business
- Business Standard
No threat to India from upper Brahmaputra mega dam project, says China
China on Wednesday defended the launch of its massive hydropower dam on the Brahmaputra river in the environmentally sensitive Tibetan region, asserting that the project poses no threat to India or Bangladesh, both downstream countries the river flows through. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said at a briefing that the dam 'will not have any negative impact on the downstream regions'. He added that China has maintained communication with India and Bangladesh on the matter, and that it continues to share hydrological data and cooperate on flood prevention and disaster relief. The project, which is being developed near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) at Nyingchi City — close to Arunachal Pradesh — was formally announced by Chinese Premier Li Qiang on Saturday. The river, called Yarlung Zangbo in Tibet, flows into India as the Brahmaputra and subsequently into Bangladesh. India is reportedly keeping a close watch on what could become the world's largest hydropower station. The dam is projected to generate over 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually — more than the total yearly consumption of the United Kingdom. Why is China building a dam near Arunachal Pradesh? Beijing has positioned the dam as a key component of its green energy ambitions. Incorporated in China's 14th Five-Year Plan and long-term development blueprint through 2035, the project is intended to bolster clean energy production, reduce carbon emissions, and address climate change. According to a Reuters report, the dam could produce as much electricity in a year as the UK consumes. Chinese officials also claim that the project will provide flood control benefits, stimulate infrastructure growth, generate employment, and act as an economic booster for sectors such as construction and equipment manufacturing. With an estimated cost of $167 billion to $170 billion (around 1.2 trillion yuan), it is expected to support China's bond markets and reinforce its energy security goals. Why is India worried about the Chinese dam? India has expressed serious concern over the strategic and environmental implications of the project. Officials in New Delhi worry that China's upstream control of a critical transnational river could give it the ability to manipulate water flow — using it as a geopolitical tool in times of conflict. Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu has described the project as a 'ticking water bomb' and an existential threat. 'The issue is that China cannot be trusted. No one knows what they might do,' Khandu said in an interview earlier this month. He also noted that China is not party to any international water-sharing treaty that might have imposed regulatory checks. Experts in India fear that, aside from power generation, the dam could enable China to hold or release large volumes of water — potentially causing artificial floods in Indian territory. Guo, however, emphasised that the project aims to improve the lives of local communities while contributing to climate goals. 'In the planning, design and construction of the hydro projects, China strictly adheres to top-level industrial standards to ensure full ecological protection,' he said.
Malaysia Sun
22-07-2025
- Business
- Malaysia Sun
China strengthens disability support systems in 14th Five-Year Plan period
BEIJING, July 22 (Xinhua) -- Millions of people living with disabilities have seen their lives improve as China made major strides in accessibility, inclusion and support during the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025). At a press conference held in Beijing on Tuesday, senior officials from the China Disabled Persons' Federation (CDPF) outlined the major achievements in disability support during the period and shared new goals for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). "The enrollment rate of children and adolescents with disabilities in compulsory education in China has reached 97 percent, with over 30,000 disabled students entering universities each year," said Cheng Kai, chairman of the CDPF, at the press conference. The next five-year plan is set to prioritize high-quality development in the disability sector, according to the press conference. LEARNING AND EARNING According to Cheng, China's education system for individuals with disabilities has undergone further improvement. Currently, 75,800 students with disabilities study in secondary vocational schools nationwide, while 59,800 attend regular high schools. Li Dongmei, vice chair of the federation, noted that a special campaign was launched to equip school campuses with assistive devices, benefiting nearly 100,000 students with disabilities. Standardized textbooks have been developed for special schools, as well as sign-language textbooks for nine subjects. Financially, in 2025, the per capita subsidy for students with disabilities receiving compulsory education was increased to more than 7,000 yuan (about 980 U.S. dollars) per year. Those whose families have financial difficulties are eligible to receive 12 years of free education from primary school to senior high school. With stronger educational and financial support, individuals with disabilities are better equipped to enter the workforce. The annual net income of families with disabled members in China grew at an average rate of 6.9 percent per year from 2020 to 2023, roughly matching the pace of the country's GDP growth, according to Cheng. During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, more than 400,000 persons with disabilities were newly employed every year, Li said. The employment rate of the disabled population grew by nearly 5 percentage points. BETTER ACCESS, BETTER CARE The participation rate of persons with disabilities in China's basic medical insurance has remained above 95 percent. Meanwhile, over 90 percent of persons with disabilities in China are covered by basic pension insurance for both urban and rural residents, said Cheng. By June 2025, living allowances for the disabled in financial difficulty and nursing subsidies for the severely disabled had benefited 11.88 million and 16.4 million, respectively. A total of 10.5 million persons with disabilities are covered by the country's subsistence allowance system, Cheng added. Public services have also been enhanced to improve the lives of persons with disabilities. A nationwide campaign for barrier-free home renovations benefited 1.28 million households with severely disabled members during the period, surpassing the original target of 1.1 million, Cheng said. China is also exploring the use of advanced technologies such as smart bionic hands and guide robots to improve the well-being of persons with disabilities, ensuring that scientific and technological progress benefits this community. Zhou Changkui, chairperson of the Board of Executive Directors of the CDPF, said that the federation and some other governmental departments have jointly issued a guiding document to promote the use of technology in supporting persons with disabilities. It is also collaborating with universities, research institutes and high-tech companies to boost the development of relevant technologies and industries. TOWARD A FAIRER, SMARTER FUTURE As China charts a path for the 15th Five-Year Plan, the emphasis on high-quality development in the disability sector remains central, with a focus on stronger support systems and innovation-driven solutions. A key focus will be improving livelihood security for persons with disabilities. Efforts will include refining basic, inclusive, and guaranteed social protection systems, as well as better support for persons with disabilities in rural areas, said Zhou. Public services will also see significant upgrades. Zhou noted that long-term care for the severely disabled and rehabilitation programs for children with autism will be expanded in the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Zhou said that to safeguard equal rights, China will revise and step up enforcement of key disability-related laws. Enhanced legal services and stronger judicial protections will help ensure that persons with disabilities can fully enjoy fairness and justice. Moreover, during the upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan period, China will continue to promote the application of artificial intelligence and other cutting-edge technologies to serve persons with disabilities, and ensure that advanced technologies better meet their needs, according to Zhou. The plan will also highlight cultural and spiritual wellbeing. Community-based sports and cultural programs will be expanded, while greater support will be extended to persons with disabilities in artistic creation and cultural industries. As Zhou emphasized, achieving a better life for people living with disabilities means enriching both body and spirit.
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Business Standard
22-07-2025
- Business
- Business Standard
Explained: China's mega dam on Brahmaputra and India's downstream risks
China has reportedly begun constructing what it is calling the world's largest hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo River in Tibet, just across the Line of Actual Control from Arunachal Pradesh. Situated in Medog (Metok) County and near Mainling/Nyingchi, the dam will be a series of five cascade hydroelectric stations, collectively known as the Medog or Yarlung Tsangpo mega-dam. When completed, which is projected for the 2030s, it will connect to China's power grid as the river flows south to Arunachal Pradesh and through India and Bangladesh as the Brahmaputra. Why is China building a dam near Arunachal Pradesh? The Chinese government describes the project as an integral part of its clean energy and climate objectives. The project is incorporated in China's 14th Five-Year Plan and long-term development plans up to 2035. The dam project aims to produce electricity, which would be equivalent to the entire United Kingdom's needs in one year, according to the Reuters report. Beyond renewable energy targets, the project may also serve flood-control functions and act as a stimulus for domestic investment, infrastructure growth, and jobs. What will be the benefits for China? The expected scale of power generation is massive. The combined annual output is projected at 300 billion kWh, far surpassing the Three Gorges Dam, and covering roughly the yearly electricity consumption of the UK. With an estimated cost between $167 billion and $170 billion (1.2 trillion yuan), the project is expected to boost Chinese construction, equipment, and bond markets. Furthermore, the project is expected to contribute to China's carbon-cutting goals and may provide downstream flood mitigation. Meanwhile, control over a major tributary will provide China the geopolitical leverage and potential influence over transboundary water flows. Why is India worried? India is worried that China's upstream control of the Brahmaputra's waters could allow China to control water levels as a tactical weapon of sorts. Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of Arunachal, called the dam a "ticking water bomb" and a threat to life. His concerns stem from Beijing not having signed up to any international river-sharing agreements and not knowing what its future plans might be. The risks downstream include reduced flow (the sediment captured is critically important to irrigation), problems with the ecosystem, and more extreme dry seasons. There are also significant risks, including floods, from sudden discharge of water in the case of planned storage (for electricity generation, for example) or accidents (including maintenance issues and emergencies). All of which is concerning for India's north-east. Additionally, the project stretches across a seismically active Himalayan gorge — which heightens landslide, flood, and ecological hazard, potentially devastating downstream regions. Does it challenge India's geopolitical position? This project is near a contested territory in Arunachal Pradesh. India is concerned that China's unilateral actions could redefine control over shared water resources and geopolitical influence. Flow reduction could impair drinking water, crop yields, and riverine ecosystems in Assam and beyond. With increased dependence on a dam controlled by China, India may find itself politically constrained. Additionally, the project risks militarising water policy in an already fragile Himalayan border context. How is India responding to China's dam construction? To counter China's influence, India is fast-tracking hydropower in Arunachal. Plans include the 11,000 MW Upper-Siang Multipurpose Project (SUMP) at a cost of around Rs 1.5 trillion, with a reservoir capacity of 9.2 billion cubic metres, likely to strengthen India's water rights under international norms. Additional projects like Subansiri Lower (2,000 MW) and Dibang (2,880 MW, tallest concrete gravity dam) are under various stages of planning and construction. India relies on the 2006 Expert-Level Mechanism, through which China shares real-time flood-season hydrological data for Brahmaputra and Sutlej. Meanwhile, Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma has publicly stated that despite concerns, there's no immediate threat—citing the river's multiple sources, including Bhutan and local rainfall. Conversely, organisations in Arunachal like SIFF and ex-CM Nabam Tuki, along with student bodies in Assam, have pressed for thorough impact reviews, transparency, and the declaration of Assam's flood issues as a national emergency. How has the world responded to China's action? Bangladesh has raised questions about a reduction in water supply and flow variability. However, China states the project is expected to have no negative effects on countries downstream. Meanwhile, environmental organisations have raised concerns regarding the dam's potential to influence a sensitive ecological zone, highlighting the potential for earthquakes and other natural disasters, given its location in the Himalayas. While India and Bangladesh have formally raised the issue with China, there has been little overt international censure or coordinated global diplomatic response so far. The project is seen as an extension of China's broader infrastructure and strategic ambitions rather than a direct provocation warranting sanctions or collective action. Moreover, the lack of enforceable worldwide agreements on rivers permits China to move ahead without any serious accountability from the rest of the world. For India, this is a multi-faceted challenge. The downstream risks for India include everything from water shortages to environmental damage, along with border tensions. As a response, India is increasing hydropower and flood control investment plans, while also utilising diplomatic engagement, data-sharing, and political mobilisation as diverse strategies to stake its own claims.
