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India.com
a day ago
- Politics
- India.com
Other Nations Also Enrich Uranium – So Why Is Only Iran A Global Villain?
New Delhi: Uranium enrichment is not rare. Argentina does it. Brazil too. So does Japan. Even the Netherlands. All of them refine uranium for peaceful reasons, mainly for energy. No drama. No threats. No sanctions. Then there is Iran. Same process. Same science. But a global firestorm. Warnings from Washington. Airstrikes from Israel. Sanctions. Suspicion. Why? Let's break it down. Same Process, Different Perception Enrichment means increasing the concentration of Uranium-235. Natural uranium holds just 0.7% of it. Power reactors need around 3-5%. Nuclear bombs need more than 90%. Countries like Argentina and Japan keep enrichment under 5%. No surprises. No secrets. Always under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) watch. Iran did not stop at 5%. It went to 60%. That is far above energy needs. Just a step away from weapons-grade material. The United Nations' nuclear energy watchdog, IAEA, has flagged it repeatedly. It says Iran holds more than 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium that is enough for making 10 nuclear bombs. 'Secrecy' Fuels Suspicion Iran's nuclear journey has allegedly not been transparent. In 2009, a hidden facility at Fordow was revealed, not by Tehran but by Western intelligence. Before that, the AMAD project (an Iranian scientific project with the aim of developing nuclear weapons) quietly explored weaponisation until 2003. And now, IAEA inspectors are routinely denied access. In 2025, for the first time in two decades, the IAEA formally declared Iran in breach of its obligations. Compare that with Brazil, the Netherlands or Japan. Their programmes stay open and cooperative. No secret bunkers. No hidden centrifuges. The Regional Firetrap Iran sits in a volatile neighbourhood – Israel, Saudi Arabia and U.S. bases in the Gulf nations. Tensions always near the surface. Iranian leaders have issued fiery statements against Israel. Some called for its destruction. That changes how the world views Tehran's nuclear work. Israel does not take chances. It launched airstrikes in 2025 on Iranian nuclear sites – Natanz, Fordow and more. The United States supported it. The message was loud and clear – Iran's nuclear rise will not be tolerated. None of the other uranium-enriching countries face such hostility from their neighbours. No threats. No attacks. No regional war risk. Technology Through 'Backdoor' Iran allegedly did not always develop its nuclear tech legally. It reportedly tapped into the A.Q. Khan network from Pakistan and bought parts from shady vendors in Europe. That purported history still haunts it. Other nations built their systems through public and internationally accepted channels. No smuggling, no cover-ups. JCPOA Gamble, Its Collapse In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with six global powers. It agreed to limit enrichment, reduce stockpiles and allow inspections. In return, it got sanctions relief. Then in 2018, President Donald Trump pulled the United States out. Sanctions returned. Iran responded by allegedly ramping up enrichment again. By 2025, its uranium stockpile was reportedly 22 times higher than JCPOA limits. The agreement collapsed. The trust shattered. Symbol of Sovereignty or Defiance? For Iran, its nuclear programme is a matter of national pride. A stand against what it sees as Western domination. Its leaders say enrichment is a right and a matter of dignity. But to Washington and Tel Aviv, it looks like defiance, a threat and a potential path to the bomb. Japan does not speak this language, nor does Brazil. Their enrichment is a utility. Iran's is a political statement. Double Standard? There is one. Israel reportedly holds nuclear weapons. It never signed the NPT. It faces no sanctions. Iran signed the treaty. It faces the scrutiny, the airstrikes and the economic chokehold. Still, Iran's own behavior – secrecy, enrichment levels and regional aggression (as alleged) – keeps fueling the fire. The World Watches IAEA continues to raise red flags. Sanctions tighten. Talks stall. And yet, other nations with enrichment programmes continue uninterrupted. Argentina refines. The Netherlands develops. Japan innovates. But the spotlight never turns their way. Only Iran stands at the centre of this nuclear storm. Enriching uranium, but also enriching suspicion.
Time of India
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Israel-Iran conflict: Why Pakistan never helped 'brother' Iran develop nuclear weapons
As the fiery tensions between Israel and Iran escalate into a full-blown conflict, with Israel launching deep strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and former US President Donald Trump hinting that America might soon join the fray, the spotlight turns to the complex web of alliances and rivalries in the region. Amid this turmoil, a puzzling question emerges: why did Pakistan , often calling itself Iran's "brother" in the Muslim world and a nuclear-armed state itself, refrain from openly helping Tehran develop nuclear weapons? Despite clandestine proliferation links in the past, Pakistan has consistently stopped short of enabling Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. This restraint reflects a tangled mix of geopolitical calculations, sectarian divides, and international pressures that have shaped Pakistan's cautious stance toward Iran's nuclear program — even as both nations share strategic interests and a history of cooperation. Pakistan did help Iran — sort of Pakistan became a nuclear weapons state in 1998, while Iran has long sought nuclear technology -- officially for peaceful purposes, but with suspicions of developing a weapons programme. Despite both being Muslim-majority states with some historical cooperation, Pakistan did not openly or officially help Iran build nuclear weapons, and their nuclear trajectories diverged for several reasons. However, it turns out Pakistan did secretly aid Iran, but only to a point. In the 1980s and 1990s, Pakistan's A.Q. Khan network clandestinely transferred sensitive centrifuge technology, blueprints, and components to Iran, which significantly advanced Iran's uranium enrichment capabilities. T he centrifuge designs Iran used in its Natanz enrichment plant closely resembled those developed at Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which were themselves based on stolen European designs. The facility was recently targeted by Israel and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that both above-ground facilities as well as the underground centrifuge halls have been destroyed. Why didn't Pakistan go further? International pressure : Once the A.Q. Khan proliferation network was exposed in the early 2000s, Pakistan came under immense international scrutiny and pressure, especially from the United States and the IAEA, to halt any further proliferation activities. The threat of economic and military sanctions, as seen in the past with legislative actions like the Symington, Glenn, and Pressler Amendments, made continued assistance to Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions too risky for Pakistan's national interests Strategic calculations: Pakistan's nuclear programme was primarily aimed at countering India, not at empowering Iran or other regional rivals. Openly helping Iran develop a bomb would have risked destabilising the regional balance and undermined Pakistan's own strategic position, including its unique status as the only declared Islamic nuclear power. Sectarian dynamics: While both countries are Muslim-majority, Pakistan is predominantly Sunni and Iran is Shia. This sectarian divide, combined with different regional ambitions, has often made their relationship cautious and competitive. Pakistan has also sought to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, who are rivals of Iran and strongly oppose a nuclear-armed Iran. Legal, diplomatic constraints: Pakistan, though not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), has faced ongoing international demands to adhere to non-proliferation norms, especially after the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network. Iran, as an NPT signatory, was subject to IAEA inspections and international oversight, making overt assistance from Pakistan highly risky. Could recent conflict change Pakistan's stance? Regional tensions and the escalating Israel-Iran conflict have intensified speculation about Pakistan's stance on Iran's nuclear ambitions. While Pakistan has openly expressed political solidarity with Iran — calling for Muslim unity against Israel and condemning Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites — it has firmly maintained a defensive nuclear doctrine and denied any commitment to actively support Iran's nuclear weapons program or engage militarily, including with nuclear weapons. Despite fiery rhetoric from some Iranian officials claiming Pakistan would retaliate against Israel if Iran were attacked with nuclear weapons, Pakistani leaders have categorically rejected such claims as fabricated and irresponsible. What was the AQ Khan network? The AQ Khan network was a clandestine nuclear proliferation network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani metallurgical engineer known as the "father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.". Starting in the 1970s, Khan acquired uranium enrichment centrifuge technology and parts primarily from European countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, and France. He used this technology to build Pakistan's nuclear programme but simultaneously established a black market network that sold nuclear technology and equipment to countries including Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The network operated through a complex web of international suppliers and middlemen spanning over 20 countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, Turkey, South Africa, Switzerland, South Korea, and Dubai. Khan's network supplied not only centrifuge components but also technical expertise and even nuclear weapons designs, effectively offering turnkey nuclear weapons programmes to buyers. This illicit trade was financially lucrative, with Khan reportedly receiving over $100 million from sales to Libya alone. The network was exposed in 2003 after international intelligence agencies intercepted shipments, most notably the German-registered cargo ship BBC China bound for Libya carrying centrifuge parts. This led to Libya's decision to dismantle its nuclear programme and name Khan as the supplier. Khan publicly admitted to his role in nuclear proliferation in 2004 and was placed under house arrest by Pakistani authorities, though he was released in 2009. The network's operations involved shell companies based in Dubai used to facilitate shipments and obscure transactions. Khan's activities blurred the line between state and non-state actors, with evidence suggesting possible awareness or complicity by elements within the Pakistani military and government, although official denials persist. The network's impact was profound, spreading nuclear weapons capability to multiple states and raising ongoing concerns about nuclear proliferation risks worldwide.
