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Business Wire
4 days ago
- Business
- Business Wire
Almonty Industries Reports Second Quarter 2025 Financial Results
TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Almonty Industries Inc. (' Almonty ' or the ' Company ') (NASDAQ: ALM) (TSX: AII) (ASX: AII) (Frankfurt: ALI1), a leading global producer of tungsten concentrate, today announced its second quarter 2025 financial results. Financial Summary: Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are expressed in millions of Canadian dollars. Key Second Quarter 2025 & Subsequent Operational Highlights: Secured hard floor offtake agreement with Tungsten Parts Wyoming, Inc. and Metal-Tech Ltd. to supply a minimum of 40 metric tonnes of tungsten oxide per month exclusively for U.S. defense applications. Invited to participate in the U.S. Critical Minerals Forum, a trade association funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) dedicated to building resilient and diversified critical minerals supply chains. In July 2025, concurrently with the closing of an upsized public offering of common shares in the United States for gross proceeds of US$90 million, Almonty successfully listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market under the symbol 'ALM'. Appointed respected national security thought leader Alan Estevez to the Company's Board of Directors, who most recently served as the U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, with prior roles in the U.S. Department of Defense. Received bipartisan recognition from the U.S. House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, which acknowledged Almonty's role in supporting U.S. efforts to strengthen domestic supply chains for critical minerals, highlighting the strategic relevance of its Sangdong mine and the Company's planned U.S. redomiciliation. Second Quarter 2025 Financial Results Highlights: Revenue recorded in the second quarter of 2025 decreased by 9.4% to $7.2 million, as compared to $8.0 million in the same year-ago quarter. The slight decrease was largely attributable to slightly lower tungsten concentrate sales and a diversion of personnel to start Level 4 preparation. These personnel have resumed normal activities in the third quarter, hence normalizing production. Operating expenses in the second quarter of 2025 totaled $11.2 million, as compared to $2.5 million in the same year-ago quarter. The change in operating expenses was chiefly due to an increase in non-cash share-based compensation expense and an increase in costs associated with the Company's proposed redomiciling. Net loss in the second quarter of 2025 totaled $58.2 million, as compared to $1.8 million in the prior year. The change was primarily attributable to a non-cash loss of $38.1 million from the revaluation of warrant liabilities and a non-cash expense of $6.9 million from the revaluation of embedded derivative liabilities, based on a Black-Scholes valuation method reflecting the increase in the Company's stock price from $3.375 per common share at March 31, 2024 to $6.72 at June 30, 2025 (both on a post-consolidation basis). The Company expects to rectify this with a reversal once a shareholder meeting is held to amend Australian warrants to be priced from AUD to CAD. Adjusted EBITDA, a non-IFRS measure, was ($4.8) million in the second quarter of 2025, as compared to $0.0 million in the same year-ago quarter. (1) Cash and cash equivalents as of June 30, 2025 totaled $24.7 million, as compared to $16.9 million as of March 31, 2025. The change in cash was primarily a result of the receipt of proceeds of $8.4 million in conjunction with the exercise of warrants, partially offset by strategic investments in mining assets at the Company's Sangdong Project in South Korea. Subsequent to the close of the second quarter, the Company raised gross proceeds of US$90 million from the completion of a public offering in the United States. Management Commentary Almonty President & CEO Lewis Black commented: 'During the second quarter, we achieved solid momentum spanning several strategic initiatives, laying the groundwork for Almonty's next phase of growth. Our Panasqueira mine remained a reliable cornerstone, delivering steady tungsten output and valuable operational insights as we prepare for first production at our flagship Sangdong project in South Korea. 'Sangdong's development reached a major milestone during the second quarter. With all processing equipment now installed and the final drawdown of the KfW IPEX-Bank loan facility completed, the mine's construction is effectively complete. We have transitioned into the final pre-production phase at one of the world's largest and highest-grade tungsten projects outside of China, and we remain on track to commence initial production in the second half of 2025. Importantly, Sangdong's significantly higher ore grades relative to Panasqueira should translate into robust production economics once operations begin. 'We also fortified our financial position, ending the second quarter with approximately $25 million in cash thanks to warrant exercises and other equity inflows. Subsequent to quarter end, we listed on the Nasdaq Capital Market and raised US$90 million in a public offering, significantly bolstering our balance sheet to fuel Sangdong's ramp-up and future growth initiatives. 'It's worth noting that our net loss for the quarter was largely driven by a non-cash revaluation of warrant and derivative liabilities, reflecting our share price increasing notably during the period. This IFRS-required accounting adjustment does not impact our cash flow and we do not believe is reflective of underlying operational performance. Excluding this one-time accounting effect, our operating results were in line with expectations. We expect to reverse this accumulated non-cash loss once the remaining Australian warrants are priced into CAD. 'On the strategic front, we were invited to join a U.S. Defense Department-backed critical minerals forum and signed an offtake agreement to supply tungsten oxide for U.S. defense applications – underscoring our key role in building a secure, diversified tungsten supply outside of China. We also welcomed Alan Estevez, a former U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, to our Board of Directors, adding deep national security and industry expertise to our leadership team. With Sangdong on the cusp of production and global demand for tungsten rising, we believe Almonty is entering a transformative new chapter, poised to deliver long-term value to my fellow shareholders,' concluded Black. About Almonty Almonty (NASDAQ: ALM) (TSX: AII) (ASX: AII) (Frankfurt: ALI1) is a leading supplier of conflict-free tungsten – a strategic metal critical to the defense and advanced technology sectors. As geopolitical tensions heighten, tungsten has become essential for armor, munitions, and electronics manufacturing. Almonty's flagship Sangdong mine in South Korea, historically one of the world's largest and highest-grade tungsten deposits, is expected to supply over 80% of global non-China tungsten production upon reaching full capacity, directly addressing critical supply vulnerabilities highlighted by recent U.S. defense procurement bans and export restrictions by China. With established operations in Portugal and additional projects in Spain, Almonty is strategically aligned to meet rapidly rising demand from Western allies committed to supply-chain security and defense readiness. To learn more, please visit Legal Notice The release, publication or distribution of this announcement in certain jurisdictions may be restricted by law and therefore persons in such jurisdictions into which this announcement is released, published or distributed should inform themselves about and observe such restrictions. (1) Use of Non-IFRS Financial Measures Non-IFRS financial measures are not recognized measures under IFRS, do not have a standardized meaning prescribed by IFRS and may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies. Rather, these measures are provided as additional information to complement IFRS financial measures by providing further understanding of Almonty's results of operations from management's perspective and additional insight into Almonty's operating performance and trends. Almonty's definitions of non-IFRS measures used in this news release may not be the same as the definitions for such measures used by other companies in their reporting. Non-IFRS measures have limitations as analytical tools and should not be considered in isolation nor as a substitute for analysis of Almonty's financial information reported under IFRS. In this news release, Almonty uses the non-IFRS financial measure 'Adjusted EBITDA'. Almonty's management uses Adjusted EBITDA in order to evaluate its operating performance, by eliminating the impact of non-operational or non-cash items. Below is a reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA to its most direct measure under IFRS. Disclaimer for Forward-Looking Information This news release contains 'forward-looking statements' and 'forward-looking information' within the meaning of applicable securities laws. All statements, other than statements of present or historical facts, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and assumptions and accordingly, actual results could differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. You are hence cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by words such as 'plan', 'development', 'growth', 'continued', 'intentions', 'expectations', 'emerging', 'evolving', 'strategy', 'opportunities', 'anticipated', 'trends', 'potential', 'outlook', 'ability', 'additional', 'on track', 'prospects', 'viability', 'estimated', 'reaches', 'enhancing', 'strengthen', 'target', 'believes', 'next steps' or variations of such words and phrases or statements that certain actions, events or results 'may', 'could', 'would', 'might' or 'will' be taken, occur or be achieved. Forward-looking statements in this news release include, but are not limited to, statements concerning the beginning of operations at the Sangdong Mine, the relevance and anticipated economic performance of the Sangdong Mine, the re-evaluation of the warrants, and future growth prospects of the Company. Forward-looking statements are based upon certain assumptions and other important factors that, if untrue, could cause actual results to be materially different from future results expressed or implied by such statements. There can be no assurance that forward-looking statements will prove to be accurate. Key assumptions upon which the Company's forward-looking information is based include, without limitation, that there will be no material adverse change in the market price of ammonium para tungstate (APT), the continuing ability to fund or obtain funding for outstanding commitments, expectations regarding the resolution of legal and tax matters, that there will be no negative change to applicable laws, the ability to secure local contractors, employees and assistance as and when required and on reasonable terms, and such other assumptions and factors as are set out herein. Forward-looking statements are also subject to risks and uncertainties facing the Company's business. Any of these risks could have a material adverse effect on the Company's business, financial condition, results of operations and growth prospects. Readers should consider reviewing the detailed risk discussion in the Company's Registration Statement, the most recent Management Discussion and Analysis for the three and six months ended June 30, 2025 filed on SEDAR+, for a fuller understanding of the risks and uncertainties that affect the Company's business and operations. Although Almonty has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to differ materially from those contained in forward-looking statements, there may be other factors that cause results, level of activity, performance or achievements not to be as anticipated, estimated or intended. There can be no assurance that forward-looking statements will prove to be accurate and even if events or results described in the forward-looking statements are realized or substantially realized, there can be no assurance that they will have the expected consequences to, or effects on, Almonty. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements and are cautioned that actual outcomes may vary. Investors are cautioned against attributing undue certainty to forward-looking statements. Almonty cautions that the foregoing list of material factors is not exhaustive. When relying on Almonty's forward-looking statements and information to make decisions, investors and others should carefully consider the foregoing factors and other uncertainties and potential events. Almonty has also assumed that material factors will not cause any forward-looking statements and information to differ materially from actual results or events. However, the list of these factors is not exhaustive and is subject to change and there can be no assurance that such assumptions will reflect the actual outcome of such items or factors.
WIRED
4 days ago
- Business
- WIRED
Inside the Biden Administration's Gamble to Freeze China's AI Future
Aug 14, 2025 3:13 PM What really motivated the US government to ban Nvidia from selling powerful computer chips to China? Photo-Illustration:Alan Estevez was sitting at his dining room table wearing a t-shirt when Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo called on Zoom to ask if he wanted to be the Biden administration's top export control official. 'You're going to have to sell me on this,' Estevez recalls telling her. It was 2021, and the outspoken New Jersey native thought he had finally left public service behind. After more than three decades at the Pentagon, he had left and taken a job in consulting. He wasn't sure if he was ready to go back. Could he be tempted by the opportunity to help oversee the tens of billions of dollars in semiconductor funding the administration was seeking from Congress? 'I came from DOD,' he recalls saying. '$50 billion is OK money, but it's not a lot of money.' Then Raimondo appealed to his sense of service. Estevez gave in and took the job. By the time Estevez was sworn in as under secretary of commerce for industry and security in the spring of 2022, he had his work cut out for him. The role he had accepted would turn out to be at the center of America's first serious effort to confront the geopolitical risks of artificial intelligence. Within a few years, the project would reshape relations between the world's two largest powers and alter the course of what may be one of the most consequential technologies in generations. Shortly after he joined the Commerce Department, Estevez says he began hearing from officials in the White House. Over breakfast one morning, Tarun Chhabra and Jason Matheny, two key figures working on technology and national security, told Estevez they were planning something big, and they would be needing his help. Over the next six months, the US government revolutionized its strategy for competing with China, now widely considered the nation's most important technological rival. For years, US officials had sought to keep China one or two generations behind in semiconductors, the building blocks of modern technology that power everything from smartphones to AI. But now, as National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan declared that September, 'we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.' On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a sweeping set of export controls designed to cut off China from the most advanced chips used for training powerful AI models, as well as specialized tools that China would need to upgrade its own lagging chipmaking industry. Officially, the controls were intended to throttle China's military modernization and stem human rights abuses fueled by surveillance technology. But as observers digested the dozens of pages of technical specifications and legalese, it became clear that the implications of the new policy were far more vast. In practice, the United States was delivering a targeted blow that would ripple out across the Chinese economy, impacting research and development in every industry or scientific field that relied on computationally intensive machine learning. Anywhere cutting-edge AI or high-performance computing held promise—futuristic weapons, yes, but also curing disease and modeling climate change—the policy could undermine China. A New York Times writer called it a 'declaration of economic war.' War or not, the Biden administration was placing a high-stakes bet that the United States could use its leverage to hold China back, and that the losses in terms of foregone US exports to China and collateral damage to bilateral ties would be worth it. On one hand, it was a gamble that relied on ideas established in Washington decades ago. US policymakers had been using tech restrictions to stymie China's military modernization and punish the country for human rights abuses since the Cold War. More recent advancements in missiles and surveillance technology reinforced that logic. But several people who served in the Biden administration say that a more novel concern was also behind the big bet. Key officials believed AI was approaching an inflection point—or several—that could give a nation major military and economic advantages. Some believed a self-improving system or so-called artificial general intelligence could be just over the technical horizon. The risk that China could reach these thresholds first was too great to ignore. This account of how the Biden administration chose to respond is based on interviews with more than 10 former US officials and policy experts, some of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal government deliberations. Hobbling Huawei When the Biden administration introduced its transformative policy, it did not start from scratch. During his first term, President Donald Trump had also targeted Chinese tech, including semiconductor firms, as part of a broader effort to curb the country's technological rise and global influence. In 2019, the Commerce Department added the Chinese IT giant Huawei to its Entity List, which effectively cut it off from US supply chains, including chips, unless it got a special license. Officials justified the measure with allegations that Huawei had violated US sanctions on Iran. But experts believed they were also trying to undermine the company more generally, fearing that Huawei's exports of 5G wireless infrastructure around the world could give Chinese spies and saboteurs a leg up. Then the Trump administration doubled down, this time by turning to an obscure legal provision called the 'foreign-produced direct product rule.' The FDPR was originally designed to make sure that goods made through US innovation and technology—like missiles or airplane parts—didn't go into weapons systems sold to adversaries, even if those systems were built abroad. In 2020, the Trump administration turned this long-arm tool on Huawei, explicitly targeting the company's 'efforts to obtain advanced semiconductors developed or produced from US software and technology,' as Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said at the time. While the FDPR had previously been used to enforce multilateral arms controls, the move against Huawei targeted 'items made with US technology that were not sensitive, that were not on the control list, that had nothing to do with any AI,' says Kevin Wolf, a former Obama administration export control official. 'Everybody thought that would be the end of this very novel extraterritorial control,' Wolf added. Instead, the US government found the FDPR irresistible. It would later turn it on Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and eventually wield it to constrain high-powered computing in China. 'Obviously we started using it like candy,' says Estevez. 'Certainly threatening to use it, if not actually using it.' In the first Trump administration, the US added Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), a leading Chinese chipmaker, to the Entity List and brought criminal charges against another Chinese semiconductor company, Fujian Jinhua (a judge later found it not guilty). It also worked with the Netherlands, home to the chip-making tool giant ASML, to restrict exports of especially cutting-edge semiconductor equipment. All these moves were, in a way, part of normal business amidst worsening ties between the US and China. They didn't require visions of advanced AI to make sense in Washington, where traditional concerns about military modernization, rights abuses, and fair markets were more than enough to justify targeted efforts against Chinese tech. Revolutionary Technology When Biden took office in 2021, some members of his policy team brought with them a novel anxiety: AI systems might become so capable that they would supercharge national power, leaving rival militaries and economies at a great disadvantage. In early 2019, when you had to be a bit of a geek to have heard of OpenAI's early GPT models, Matheny—one of Estevez's early breakfast partners from the White House—was founding director of the Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET). Essentially a think tank housed inside Georgetown University, CSET was launched with a $55 million grant from Open Philanthropy, a group aligned with the effective altruism movement that funds work addressing issues ranging from 'potential risks from advanced artificial intelligence' to global health. 'AI and other emerging technologies will deliver profound benefits to society, but they will also introduce new risks,' Matheny said at the center's launch. It wasn't long before CSET scholars identified China's growing strength in AI development as a US national security risk. Those scholars included Chhabra—the other White House breakfast partner—as well as future Biden administration officials Saif Khan and Ben Buchanan, all of whom studied technology and national security at CSET. Chhabra coauthored a report published in February 2020 that recommended the United States and key allies 'coordinate on the terms under which they will export leading-edge AI chips to China' and 'forge a democratic way of AI.' That April, Khan coauthored a separate paper arguing for putting controls on chipmaking equipment to ensure that China remained 'reliant on democracies for state-of-the-art chips.' In August, just months before Biden was elected president, Buchanan identified computing power as a key input that allows countries to develop AI and warned that the US was likely running out of time before it could no longer restrain China's access to it. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, a research panel created by Congress that included Matheny, also called for 'implementing coordinated export controls on advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment with allies.' Chhabra, Matheny, Khan, and Buchanan—four experts with varying backgrounds who crossed paths at CSET—would all go on to work on AI policy in the Biden White House. Once there, they and others, including Chris McGuire, a State Department official who had worked on the final AI Commission report, set to work operationalizing their ideas. One former official recalled that their work to keep advanced chipmaking equipment out of Chinese hands began as early as the transition. The theory was that gatekeeping the tools would ensure there would be no Chinese version of Nvidia and prevent Chinese companies like SMIC from building cutting edge factories. This would, as Khan had advocated, keep Chinese AI developers dependent on US suppliers. As the Biden team assembled in 2021, however, its ambitions were broader. Limiting China's chipmaking abilities would block it from independently building computing power, but Chinese developers could still simply buy the best chips from US companies. As close observers of AI were debating the potential of large language models, no one knew for sure what might be possible in the future with vast quantities of what were then the most powerful chips. Some officials believed that keeping China dependent on US supplies would no longer be enough. It was time, they judged, to build support across the administration for cutting off the chips themselves. Former officials recall being motivated by a combination of different risks. Some say the idea of artificial general intelligence was explicitly on their mind. (While there is no universally accepted definition of AGI, the term generally refers to an AI system superior to humans across all intellectual fields.) Others say they were concerned more about specific AI capabilities, whether things that had already been envisioned—supercharged propaganda, automated cyber hacking, synthetic bioweapons—or ones yet to be foreseen. Others say their worries were not even directly related to AI, pointing to reporting that a Chinese company may have used US software to develop chips that in turn powered a supercomputer used to develop hypersonic missiles for the People's Liberation Army. The stakes were especially high, some believed, because a powerful AI system might be used to develop even more capable AI systems, compounding a country's lead and leaving competitors not just incrementally behind, but wallowing in a bygone paradigm. If some of these fears sound vague or far out, that's because they are. Policymakers, however, are forced to take action in the face of uncertainty, and here, the uncertainty itself was cause for alarm. The prescription that officials came up with to meet this challenge—a broad effort to limit China's independent access to computing power—would require buy-in from across the federal government, including several cabinet secretaries and the president himself. Execution Not everyone was on board at first. The White House team had identified risks that demanded action, but there would also be costs. Nvidia, one of the crown jewels of US tech, would be banned from selling some of its most lucrative products to an enormous growing market. Producers of chipmaking equipment, such as Applied Materials and Lam Research, would lose the ability to sell their advanced products to Chinese factories. Experts believed that China might still eventually succeed in developing its own independent semiconductor ecosystem, and cutting the country off could motivate actors around the world to build an America-free supply chain to avoid future disruptions. Former White House officials say they worked intensively to understand the potential blowback. The Chinese government's reaction to the move would clearly be negative, but no one could know what form it would take. Would Beijing target iconic US firms like Apple? Cut off supplies of critical minerals? If China retaliated hard, what options would Washington have? Then there were the specifics. How would the policy distinguish between equipment that really posed a risk, and products companies should still be able to sell? Estevez says he remembers the White House pushed for restrictions on a larger number of items, while the Commerce Department, which is responsible for promoting economic growth, sought a more tailored approach. 'Trying to hold China back is a fool's errand,' Raimondo, the Commerce secretary, told The Wall Street Journal toward the end of Biden's term, describing export controls as mere 'speed bumps' for China. Yet the administration kept plowing forward. Several former officials specifically cited Chhabra's bureaucratic skill and determination as central to making the chip strategy happen. 'American technology should not enable adversaries to build AI capabilities that will be turned against American troops, strategic assets, and critical infrastructure,' says Chhabra, now out of government and leading national security policy at Anthropic. 'Strong export controls are essential for America's national security and AI dominance.' It's not unusual for a group of scholars with a bold new vision for policy to join the government, but it's far less common for their ideas to be put swiftly into action. 'Look, Tarun and I argued all the time,' says Estevez, but 'moving in the same direction was not the issue.' At least among this group of staffers, the core dispute wasn't over whether they should try to constrain China, but over how—broad restrictions versus targeted measures that preserved more flexibility for industry. Finding that balance has been a moving target. After the first round of controls in October 2022, the Biden administration decided it needed to further tighten restrictions. Officials had already banned Nvidia from selling its best AI training chip to China, but the company then developed a new, China-specific chip with capabilities that pushed right up to the limits of the existing rules. In October 2023 and December 2024, the Biden administration tightened the controls on both chips and chipmaking equipment to plug what were perceived as unintentional loopholes. To make any of this stick, however, the Biden administration first needed help from Japan and the Netherlands. Keeping advanced chips out of the Chinese market was a relatively discrete task, targeting just a few products. Undermining Chinese efforts to build cutting edge chips of their own, on the other hand, was a multinational endeavor. That's because semiconductor fabrication relies on precision machinery and software from around the world, with particularly crucial inputs coming from the Dutch company ASML and Japanese companies such as Tokyo Electron. If the United States banned its equipment suppliers from selling to China, but Japan and the Netherlands kept selling, US businesses would lose revenue and China would still be able to upgrade its domestic manufacturing. The Biden administration had sought Japanese and Dutch cooperation at the outset, but there was no quick agreement. So the White House decided to go it alone and announced the 2022 controls before the allies signed on, knowing full well that the move would hurt US companies. The Biden administration then had to convince Tokyo and Amsterdam that joining the effort was worth losing some exports and risking Chinese retaliation. After decades at the Defense Department, Estevez says he was well aware that AI represented the future of warfare. Whether or not an AI inflection point was coming, he knew military planners would still prefer to face a Chinese adversary that was lagging behind technologically. This idea seemed to also carry weight with allied officials. 'The sales pitch to the Dutch and the Japanese was: Artificial intelligence is the future,' says Estevez. 'And they bought that.' One way or another, the persuasion worked. In January 2023, Japanese and Dutch national security officials joined Sullivan at Blair House, the traditional guest quarters for visiting dignitaries across from the White House, to sign an agreement to institute parallel export controls on chip-making equipment sold to China. Aftermath Today, Chhabra works at Anthropic, one of the most well-funded AI startups in the US. Buchanan is a professor at Johns Hopkins University. Khan is a fellow at the Institute for Progress, a think tank focused on innovation. Matheny left the administration in 2022 to become president and CEO of RAND, a storied research organization that often serves government clients. They are each, in various ways, still working on AI, computing, and national security. And they're watching as the Trump administration pulls the country in seemingly conflicting directions. On one hand, most of the semiconductor controls the Biden team enacted have remained in place. Earlier this year, Trump even put restrictions on another Nvidia chip called the H20, which has proven useful for certain kinds of AI development tasks. Several Biden officials said they would have also moved to cut China off from H20s if they had more time in office. But after Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang reportedly began lobbying Trump, the White House abruptly reversed course. In a legally questionable move, Trump said he would authorize licenses for Nvidia to sell H20s to China in exchange for a share of the revenue. Buchanan says the move undermined what Republicans and Democrats had both agreed was a key national security priority. 'Reversing the effective bipartisan course on China AI chip controls, when those chips matter more than ever, is a unilateral surrender,' he explains. Trump, however, has described the situation very differently. 'The H20 is obsolete. You know, it's one of those things, but it still has a market,' he said at a press conference on Monday. 'So we negotiated a little deal.'
The Market Online
26-06-2025
- Business
- The Market Online
NATO's 5% target: Why Almonty Industries' mega mine and NASDAQ listing are a perfect fit for investors
Geopolitical conflicts and trade restrictions are making it increasingly difficult to source critical raw materials. Western companies in the high-tech and defense sectors are particularly struggling with scarce supplies and increasingly stringent export controls. With NATO's new 5% defense spending target, the battle for raw materials such as tungsten, which are essential for defense equipment, is set to gain further momentum. As a result, the demand for independent suppliers and the need for reliable partners with sufficient capacity is growing. Almonty Industries has already established a unique profile as a tungsten producer, with assets ranging from mines in Europe to the upcoming commissioning of a mega deposit in South Korea. The commissioning of the Sangdong mine in South Korea and Almonty's European Operations Almonty Industries (TSX:AII) is on the verge of starting production at its Sangdong Mine, which is set to go into operation soon. With a tungsten content significantly higher than that of many competitors and a mine life span of over 90 years, the project offers considerable cost advantages and planning security. At the same time, it is the largest tungsten mine outside China. By 2027, the Company aims to supply 43% of global supply outside China, which equates to approximately 7% of global supply. In addition to the property in South Korea, the Panasqueira mine in Portugal, which is already in operation, continuously supplies tungsten concentrate. The Company also owns two additional tungsten properties in Spain. Development of tungsten production in Sangdong through 2027. (Source: Almonty Industries) The importance of long-term supply contracts for security of supply In order to meet the demand of reliable end users, Almonty has entered into long-term purchase agreements with the Plansee Group. Another key factor is an exclusive agreement with a US defense company that will purchase at least 40 tons of tungsten oxide per month, which will be used in American defense systems, guaranteeing stable and predictable revenues. In addition, a separate agreement with a South Korean SpaceX supplier secures the purchase of molybdenum, which is also located on the Sangdong property, and complements the portfolio of strategic metals. The minimum price guarantees in these agreements and the open-ended purchase prices allow the Company to plan with certainty. Expansion into the US, personnel changes, and NASDAQ listing Almonty decided at its Annual General Meeting to relocate its headquarters to the US in order to become the only major tungsten concentrate producer in North America. The US Congressional Committee acknowledged the importance of the Sangdong mine for national security in a letter, which can be seen as a clear sign of confidence. In May, the Company was invited to join the Critical Metals Forum, highlighting Almonty's relevance in this area. Alan Estevez and General Gustave Perna recently joined the Board of Directors. Estevez formerly served as US Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, while Perna most recently commanded the US Army. Both bring extensive expertise in defense logistics and strategic procurement to the Company. At the same time, Almonty is planning an IPO on the NASDAQ. This step aims to improve liquidity and attract institutional investors, giving them a direct stake in the expected growth. According to Bloomberg, now is an ideal time to go public, as newly listed companies are currently experiencing the fastest share price increases in years. This year, the shares of three companies more than doubled on their first day of trading. Several factors could significantly increase the Company's value. The NATO target of 5% of gross domestic product for defense spending by 2035 at the latest will drive demand for tungsten significantly. The commissioning of a state-of-the-art tungsten oxide processing plant in South Korea will increase local value creation and improve margins. The molybdenum deposit offers additional revenue opportunities. A successful NASDAQ listing would raise Almonty's profile and attract institutional investors who are looking to invest in security-related raw materials. Given China's tighter export controls and the US's billion-dollar subsidy programs for critical metals, there is a political tailwind for companies like Almonty. Subsidies and tax incentives for domestic production could further strengthen the competitive position. The automotive industry is working on the further development of its batteries for electric vehicles. Tungsten-containing materials such as niobium tungstate are being tested as anode materials. A breakthrough here could further fuel demand for tungsten. Analyst opinions and price targets Market observers are optimistic. The latest revaluation by GBC Research is based on higher long-term tungsten price assumptions and an improved cash flow forecast. In addition, the increased price target reflects both the strategic value of the mine and Almonty's growing role in the global supply chain. The price target has been set at CAD 5.50. Sphene Capital sees the price target at CAD 5.40. The current share price is CAD 3.56. Chart of Almonty Industries. (Source: Almonty Industries is on the verge of maturing from a niche producer to a key raw material supplier for Western high-tech and defense industries. With an established mine in Europe, the high-grade Sangdong project, and a strong network of long-term customers, the Company is securing valuable market share. The planned NASDAQ listing promises additional capital inflows and increased visibility. NATO's new 5% defense spending target will further drive up global demand. For investors focused on commodity security and geopolitical stability, Almonty Industries' unique market position could pave the way for an attractive growth phase. Conflict of interest Pursuant to §85 of the German Securities Trading Act (WpHG), we point out that Apaton Finance GmbH as well as partners, authors or employees of Apaton Finance GmbH (hereinafter referred to as 'Relevant Persons') currently hold or hold shares or other financial instruments of the aforementioned companies and speculate on their price developments. In this respect, they intend to sell or acquire shares or other financial instruments of the companies (hereinafter each referred to as a 'Transaction'). Transactions may thereby influence the respective price of the shares or other financial instruments of the Company. In this respect, there is a concrete conflict of interest in the reporting on the companies. In addition, Apaton Finance GmbH is active in the context of the preparation and publication of the reporting in paid contractual relationships. For this reason, there is also a concrete conflict of interest. The above information on existing conflicts of interest applies to all types and forms of publication used by Apaton Finance GmbH for publications on companies. Risk notice Apaton Finance GmbH offers editors, agencies and companies the opportunity to publish commentaries, interviews, summaries, news and the like on These contents are exclusively for the information of the readers and do not represent any call to action or recommendations, neither explicitly nor implicitly they are to be understood as an assurance of possible price developments. The contents do not replace individual expert investment advice and do not constitute an offer to sell the discussed share(s) or other financial instruments, nor an invitation to buy or sell such. 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National Post
02-06-2025
- Business
- National Post
Almonty Industries Appoints U.S. National Security and Defense Logistics Leader Alan Estevez to the Board of Directors
Article content TORONTO — Almonty Industries Inc. (TSX: AII) (ASX: AII) (OTCQX: ALMTF) (Frankfurt: ALI) ('Almonty' or the 'Company'), a leading global producer of tungsten concentrate, is pleased to announce the appointment of Alan Estevez to its Board of Directors, effective May 30, 2025. Article content Article content Mr. Estevez is a nationally recognized authority in national security, defense logistics, and strategic trade. From 2022 to 2025, he served as Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, where he led U.S. efforts to curb adversarial military advancements by restricting access to sensitive technologies, particularly in China and Russia. Article content Previously, he held senior roles within the U.S. Department of Defense, including Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics, where he oversaw defense acquisition and supply chain operations. Mr. Estevez also advised Fortune 500 companies on logistics transformation during his tenure at Deloitte Consulting. Article content He has received numerous honours for his public service, including three Department of Defense Distinguished Public Service Medals, the Presidential Rank Distinguished Executive Award, and the Service to America Medal. Article content 'We are pleased to welcome Alan to the Board at a pivotal moment for Almonty. His deep expertise in national security strategy, defense logistics, and export controls—gained through decades of public service and leadership within the U.S. government—brings significant strategic value. Alan's firsthand experience in acquisition, contracting, and supply chain operations will be especially relevant as we advance our position as a key allied supplier of tungsten. His appointment aligns with our recently signed offtake agreement with a U.S. defense contractor to supply tungsten oxide exclusively for American defense applications. We look forward to benefiting from his insights as we continue building long-term, sustainable value for our shareholders.' Article content Almonty Industries Inc. is a diversified and experienced global producer of tungsten concentrate in conflict-free regions. The company is currently mining, processing and shipping tungsten concentrate from its Panasqueira mine in Portugal. It's Sangdong tungsten mine in Gangwon Province, South Korea, is currently under construction. The Sangdong mine was historically one of the largest tungsten mines in the world and one of the few long-life, high-grade tungsten deposits outside of China, and has significant upside potential from an underlying molybdenum deposit. Additional development projects underway include the Valtreixal tin/tungsten project in northwestern Spain and Los Santos Mine in western Spain. Further information about Almonty's activities may be found at and under Almonty's profile at Article content The release, publication, or distribution of this announcement in certain jurisdictions may be restricted by law, and therefore, persons in such jurisdictions into which this announcement is released, published, or distributed should inform themselves about and observe such restrictions. Neither the TSX nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in the policies of the TSX) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release. Article content Certain information in this press release constitutes forward-looking information. In some cases, but not necessarily in all cases, forward-looking information can be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as 'estimate', 'project', 'belief', 'anticipate', 'intend', 'expect', 'plan', 'predict', 'may' or 'should' and the negative of these words or such variations thereon or comparable terminology. Forward-looking information or statements in this press release include matters relating to the quantity of tungsten oxide to be purchased under the Offtake Agreement and the price at which such purchases will be made, the applications in which the purchased tungsten oxide will be used, the processing of the tungsten oxide, the time at which deliveries are expected to commence, the term of the Offtake Agreement and the anticipated benefits of the Offtake Agreement for Almonty. These statements and information are based on management's beliefs, estimates and opinions on the date that statements are made and reflect Almonty's current expectations. Article content Forward-looking statements are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements of Almonty to be materially different from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements, including but not limited to: any specific risks relating to fluctuations in the price of ammonium para tungstate ('APT') from which the sale price of Almonty's tungsten concentrate is derived, the risk that the Offtake Agreement may be terminated in accordance with its terms before the end of its initial term, actual results of mining and exploration activities, environmental, economic and political risks of the jurisdictions in which Almonty's operations are located and changes in project parameters as plans continue to be refined, forecasts and assessments relating to Almonty's business, credit and liquidity risks, hedging risk, competition in the mining industry, risks related to the market price of Almonty's shares, the ability of Almonty to retain key management employees or procure the services of skilled and experienced personnel, risks related to claims and legal proceedings against Almonty and any of its operating mines, risks relating to unknown defects and impairments, risks related to governmental regulations, including environmental regulations, risks related to international operations of Almonty, risks relating to exploration, development, production and operations at Almonty's tungsten mines, the ability of Almonty to obtain and maintain necessary permits, the ability of Almonty to comply with applicable laws, regulations and permitting requirements, lack of suitable infrastructure and employees to support Almonty's mining operations, uncertainty in the accuracy of mineral reserves and mineral resources estimates, production estimates from Almonty's mining operations, inability to replace and expand mineral reserves, uncertainties related to title and indigenous rights with respect to mineral properties owned directly or indirectly by Almonty, the ability of Almonty to obtain adequate financing, the ability of Almonty to complete permitting, construction, development and expansion, and challenges related to global financial conditions. Article content Forward-looking statements are based on assumptions management believes to be reasonable, including but not limited to, no material adverse change in the market price of APT, the continuing ability to fund or obtain funding for outstanding commitments, no negative change to applicable laws, the ability to secure local contractors, employees and assistance as and when required and on reasonable terms, and such other assumptions and factors as are set out herein. Although Almonty has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results, level of activity, performance or achievements to differ materially from those contained in forward-looking statements, there may be other factors that cause results, level of activity, performance or achievements not to be as anticipated, estimated or intended. There can be no assurance that forward-looking statements will prove to be accurate and even if events or results described in the forward-looking statements are realized or substantially realized, there can be no assurance that they will have the expected consequences to, or effects on, Almonty. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking statements and are cautioned that actual outcomes may vary. Article content Investors are cautioned against attributing undue certainty to forward-looking statements. Almonty cautions that the foregoing list of material factors is not exhaustive and is subject to change and there can be no assurance that such assumptions will reflect the actual outcome of such items or factors. When relying on Almonty's forward-looking statements and information to make decisions, investors and others should carefully consider the foregoing factors and other uncertainties and potential events. Forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release. Except as required by applicable securities laws, Almonty does not undertake any obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements. Article content Article content Article content Article content Contacts Article content Company Contact Lewis Black Chairman, President & CEO +1 647 438-9766 info@ Article content Article content
