Latest news with #CessationofHostilitiesAgreement
Daily Maverick
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Ethiopia's national dialogue and transitional justice: competition, or complementarity?
The dual peacebuilding processes are equally important — and can run simultaneously through coordination and sequencing. As Ethiopia navigates its complex and fragile political transition, indications are that the transitional justice process is experiencing delays. A public consultation on draft transitional justice laws, initially scheduled for earlier this year, has not occurred. Unofficial but widely circulated claims in the public domain suggest that transitional justice is informally on hold until the National Dialogue Commission concludes its mandate. advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads From the outset, tension has surrounded the coexistence of these two processes, with stakeholders expressing concern that one may steal the spotlight or undermine the urgency and relevance of the other. Transitional justice actors feared the national dialogue would monopolise institutional and political attention. Proponents of national dialogue viewed transitional justice, with its rapid process and victim-centred agenda, as potentially polarising and ill timed. They contended that transitional justice should be delayed — approached instead as a downstream outcome of the dialogue process. However, the relationship between the two processes hasn't been adequately clarified or publicly debated. Furthermore, anonymous sources say the government's failure to establish the Transitional Justice Institutional Coordination Mechanism may have contributed to tensions and the lack of a system to manage institutional and process politics. Forging inclusive agreements While transitional justice focuses on acknowledging harm, providing redress for victims and reforming institutions, national dialogue aims to forge inclusive agreements on fundamental national issues like governance, identity and peaceful coexistence. advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads Globally, various peacebuilding models involving both processes exist in post-conflict settings. Transitional justice can result from dialogue, occur before it, or alongside it. In Ethiopia, transitional justice is an independent process supported by legal and political mandates. It is not just an aspirational ideal — but an established policy commitment. The impetus for pursuing transitional justice didn't arise from the national dialogue; it was motivated by public demands, empirical evidence, international legal obligations and the government's political promises. These were detailed in the Green Paper prepared by the Transitional Justice Working Group of Experts, constituted by the Justice Ministry following the 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front. Momentum for addressing past abuses through transitional justice emerged even before the Tigray conflict. However, these pre-war efforts were fragmented and poorly coordinated. In response to the violations committed during the war, a joint investigation of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended transitional justice as essential in 2021. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement requires the government to establish a comprehensive, national and victim-centred mechanism that aligns with international human rights standards and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy. advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads In line with the policy adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, draft laws have been prepared establishing the Special Bench, Special Prosecution Office, Truth and Social Cohesion Commission, and Vetting Commission. advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads Components of truth-seeking and social cohesion in transitional justice may intersect with the national dialogue's efforts to identify the root causes of violence and instability. Both may examine the structural aspects of violence, reconstruct narratives and clarify history. Tensions Sources suggest that this overlap contributes to tensions between national dialogue and transitional justice. Without a framework to coordinate these overlapping mandates, there is a risk of duplication, confusion and public participation fatigue. The issue calls for a participatory and transparent discussion to clarify how truth-telling, historical inquiry and reconciliation under both processes can be synchronised. What is needed is strategic alignment — not establishing a superficial institutional hierarchy. One way to resolve the confusion is to temporarily pause both processes. This could allow for potential intersections to be examined and addressed through coordination or mandate revisions. That would help ensure complementarity and enable transitional justice and national dialogue to progress concurrently, reinforcing rather than undermining one another. A temporary pause could also be justified by the current conflict situation. For instance, if a peace process is initiated to end hostilities in Amhara or Oromia, a temporary deferral of justice initiatives may be pragmatic. advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads The same holds for national dialogue. Insecurity, displacement and distrust have obstructed public engagement in certain areas, resulting in major opposition political parties withdrawing. Given that the National Dialogue Commission is struggling to finalise the first of its five major activities, it is unlikely to conclude its work within the remainder of the recently extended deadline of February 2026. Delaying transitional justice in favour of national dialogue incorrectly suggests that transitional justice is secondary to national dialogue and that the pursuit of justice must wait for political consensus. This is wrong for at least four reasons. First, postponing transitional justice risks reinforcing perceptions — both domestically and internationally — that the government was never fully committed to the initiative, and is retreating as the process gains momentum. That could undermine public trust and international credibility, making it difficult to rebuild momentum or mobilise the political, institutional and financial resources necessary to pursue the process credibly. Delays Second, the need for transitional justice is expressed in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, public consultations and national surveys, which predate and stand independently from future recommendations of the national dialogue process. Delays would amount to holding justice hostage to processes that are neither substitutes for nor prerequisites to redress — potentially deepening victims' perception of prolonged neglect and impunity. advertisement Don't want to see this? Remove ads Third, postponing transitional justice is premature. The anticipated overlap with the national dialogue and the proposed truth-seeking and social cohesion commission has not materialised as the transitional justice process is still in its preparatory phase. Fourth, Ethiopia doesn't face an either/or dilemma. The transitional justice process does not overburden institutional capacity or divert public attention. It could continue while the two processes are aligned. Even if, following an assessment of overlaps and tensions, a decision is taken to delay implementation of certain transitional justice components, such a decision must be selective rather than blanket. A careful sequencing strategy should pinpoint which pillars might be temporarily paused or adjusted to enhance complementarity between the two processes. Equally essential is that any such decision be communicated through an official and transparent process to safeguard both initiatives from damaging speculation and erosion of public trust. Ultimately, any approach to resolving tensions must preserve the integrity and objectives of both processes. Transitional justice does not obstruct national dialogue, and national dialogue should not obstruct justice. DM Tadesse Simie Metekia is a Senior Researcher, Special Projects, at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). First published by ISS Today.
Zawya
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Zawya
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) condemns air strikes in Fangak, calls for an immediate ceasefire
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) condemns continuing air strikes in Fangak, Jonglei state, which have led to civilian deaths, injuries and displacement as well as the destruction of humanitarian property. On 3 May, aerial bombardments in Old Fangak led to seven civilians being killed while some 27 others were injured and a Médecins Sans Frontières pharmacy was destroyed. This morning, an air strike near a World Food Programme warehouse in New Fangak has damaged a dyke protecting people in this remote location from floods. 'Such violence against civilians and clearly marked humanitarian facilities is unacceptable,' said Guang Cong, Deputy Special Representative, UNMISS. 'These attacks constitute a grave violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. Vitally, they contravene the Revitalized Peace Agreement and severely undermine ongoing efforts to establish durable peace in South Sudan,' he stated. 'We call on involved parties to prioritize civilian protection by recommitting to the Peace Agreement and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and actioning an immediate ceasefire. We also urge South Sudanese authorities to investigate these incidents and hold those responsible to account,' added DSRSG Cong. UNMISS continues to engage with all stakeholders, including national and state authorities, security actors, uniformed personnel, community leaders, civil society organisations as well as international and regional partners to reduce tensions. Distributed by APO Group on behalf of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).
National News
27-04-2025
- Politics
- National News
Mitri visits Emir of Qatar
NNA - Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri visited the Emir of the State of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who affirmed his country's support for Lebanon and readiness to assist in all areas, emphasizing the importance of maintaining stability in Lebanon and continuing the government's reform process. Mitri also met with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, where they discussed the general situation and diplomatic efforts to achieve Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and its commitment to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Mitri's meetings with Qatari officials took place on the sidelines of his participation in the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies forum held in Doha and his participation as a speaker at the Orientalism Conference organized by Her Excellency Lolwah Al-Khater, Qatari Minister of Education.
Al Jazeera
21-02-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
African Union is in desperate need of a new beginning
On February 15, during the 38th summit of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African leaders elected Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the foreign minister of Djibouti, as the new chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), the executive branch of the continental body. He prevailed over Raila Odinga, the former prime minister of Kenya, and Richard Randriamandrato, Madagascar's former minister of foreign affairs. Youssouf has been Djibouti's foreign minister since 2005 and takes over from Moussa Faki Mahamat, the former prime minister of Chad, who has served two consecutive four-year terms as the leader of the AUC. In his official manifesto, he has committed to advancing governance and democracy, strengthening institutional capacity, and fostering peace and security, among other goals. Youssouf assumes office at a precarious time in Africa and is expected to leverage his diplomatic expertise especially to address the conflicts raging in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Youssouf appears poised to champion peace and work for substantial positive changes in countries across the continent in the coming years. But his success is less than guaranteed, as African leaders are generally hesitant to relinquish significant power to the AU and its affiliated organisations. The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) released a report in March 2022, which revealed that as of July 2021, just 7 percent of its judgements had been fully complied with, 18 percent had been partially complied with, and a substantial 75 percent had not been complied with at all. Additionally, the report mentioned that several African countries have made it clear to the Executive Council that they will not adhere to the Court's decisions. Perhaps this explains why last year's ACHPR report omitted these statistics. Most African leaders resist the imposition of rigorous external oversight measures – critical interventions that their countries sorely need to prevent war and instability. Hence, it is less than certain what Youssouf might accomplish in the next four years. The successes and failures of his predecessor, Moussa Faki Mahamat, may offer some clues as to what the new AUC chair could expect to achieve in the coming period. At a ceremony to mark the official start of his term on March 14, 2017, Mahamat was oozing with confidence. He had pledged to 'make the Commission a tool capable of translating into reality the vision of our leaders and the aspirations of our peoples', and 'to silence the guns and realise an Africa free of conflicts by 2020'. Eight years later, his administration's performance has been marked by a combination of limited accomplishments and many unresolved challenges. Mahamat was instrumental in the mediation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), a landmark peace treaty signed between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) on November 2, 2022, in Pretoria, South Africa. This accord brought an end to the devastating 2020-2022 Tigray war. Despite this crucial achievement, however, he was unable to 'silence the guns' in the conflicts in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia and Mozambique – although it was not for lack of effort. In his address to the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on February 17, 2024, Mahamat voiced his profound frustration with the illiberal actions of African leaders, who he chose not to name, seemingly in a spirited attempt to rationalise his various failures. He pointed to the ongoing conflicts on the continent, the resurgence of military coups in Central and West Africa, and the overwhelming unwillingness of certain AU member states to conduct elections that are regarded as credible. On the latter, he rightly said, 'Instead of being joyful modes of peaceful transfer or maintenance of power, elections have become, through the extent of their irregularities, factors for deepening crises.' At the same time, he emphasised that many African leaders have largely ignored the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AU's blueprint for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and its counterpart, the African Governance Architecture (AGA). The purpose of the AGA is to foster and defend human and people's rights, enhance democratic institutions and culture, and guarantee good governance and the rule of law. Mahamat also bemoaned the fact that institutional reforms within the continental union have not effectively tackled the issues related to the powers of the AUC and its chairperson. 'Although the Chairperson of the Commission is recognised in the texts as the Legal Representative and 'Chief Accounting Officer' of the organisation, he is paradoxically deprived of sufficient margin of manoeuvre to act urgently on strategic questions.' Then, he offered a sharp critique of African leaders, alleging they possess 'the frantic tendency to make decisions without real political will to implement them'. This has resulted in the woeful and unworkable scenario where, according to Mahamat, 93 percent of decisions made in 2021, 2022, and 2023 were not acted on. Such systematic defiance, he added, is noticeable at both the level of member states and regional communities, with member states often disregarding and carelessly violating the resolutions established by continental bodies. Alarmingly, he warned that without transformative changes, the organisation would be unable to effectively respond to the sociopolitical challenges present on the continent. African leaders are, without a doubt, a significant barrier to the sociopolitical and economic advancement of the continent. They take pleasure in witnessing the AU develop into a consciously weakened entity that primarily caters to their self-centred, unscrupulous aims. It is therefore imperative that Youssouf, in his role as Mahamat's successor, be granted ample independent authority and resources to enforce strict compliance with the organisation's conventions, particularly with respect to APSA and AGA. Without that, he may sadly be as powerless to resolve the continent's most pressing problems as his predecessor. In 2002, the AU introduced the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to allow member states to voluntarily evaluate their governance practices. However, its effect has been minimal. Given the ongoing conflicts and inadequate governance that persist across the continent each year, Africa clearly requires a comprehensive regulatory framework for yearly and impromptu national assessments. Consider the situation in Sudan. For three decades, the AU turned a blind eye to the unlawful, autocratic and deeply inhumane actions of President Omar al-Bashir's regime – actions that slowly paved the way for the coup of April 11, 2019. The removal of al-Bashir in the coup subsequently set the stage for another military takeover on October 25, 2021, and the present civil war. AU inaction and inability to impose good governance set the scene for similar failings in Mozambique. The ruling Frelimo party's profound inability to establish an inclusive democracy, ensure economic stability, and deliver fundamental services has made the gas-rich province of Cabo Delgado fertile ground for insurrection. Beginning in October 2017, an armed rebellion in the province has led to the displacement of more than 1.3 million people, compromised the healthcare infrastructure, and resulted in a critical humanitarian crisis. The AU and its various bodies did little more than watch these tragedies unfold. Indeed, in both scenarios, the AU had the opportunity to implement decisive and timely governance interventions to advance peace, stability, and socioeconomic well-being. It didn't, or, more accurately, it couldn't. Unfortunately, Addis Ababa has historically been stripped of the requisite authority to analyse and respond to bad leadership. Mozambique and Sudan are just two examples among many. The AU has also been unable to deal with the plight of political prisoners in Eritrea, democratic backsliding in Tunisia, and the years-long brutal repression of opposition leaders in Uganda, to name but a few. Given the persistent disdain for essential AU protocols that prompts unrest across the continent, it is crucial that the new chair of the AUC does not take on a passive stance in the coming four years. His office must be endowed with the unequivocal power to hold African leaders accountable for their political excesses and failings. Youssouf can forge a legacy of peace and socioeconomic transformation in his new role, but first he must get the AU to start working in the best interests of its primary stakeholders: Africa's 1.5 billion people.
MTV Lebanon
18-02-2025
- Politics
- MTV Lebanon
Rajji informed by Johnson of continued US aid to army, receives ambassadors of Iran and Jordan
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants Youssef Rajji received US Ambassador to Lebanon Lisa Johnson, who informed him of the "continuation of US aid to Lebanon, especially to the Lebanese Army." Minister Rajji thanked the United States, stressing "the importance of American support to enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces." Rajji discussed with Ambassador Johnson "the importance of a comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from all of southern Lebanon in implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement that entered into force on November 27, 2024, and UN Security Council Resolution 1701." Rajji also met with Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani, whereby they held a frank and clear discussion on bilateral relations. They also discussed how to resolve the issue of the Lebanese passengers stranded in Iran. Separately, Minister Rajji received Jordan's Ambassador to Lebanon, Walid al-Hadid, with whom he discussed the developments in Lebanon and the broad Arab region.
