Ethiopia's national dialogue and transitional justice: competition, or complementarity?
The dual peacebuilding processes are equally important — and can run simultaneously through coordination and sequencing.
As Ethiopia navigates its complex and fragile political transition, indications are that the transitional justice process is experiencing delays. A public consultation on draft transitional justice laws, initially scheduled for earlier this year, has not occurred.
Unofficial but widely circulated claims in the public domain suggest that transitional justice is informally on hold until the National Dialogue Commission concludes its mandate.
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
From the outset, tension has surrounded the coexistence of these two processes, with stakeholders expressing concern that one may steal the spotlight or undermine the urgency and relevance of the other.
Transitional justice actors feared the national dialogue would monopolise institutional and political attention. Proponents of national dialogue viewed transitional justice, with its rapid process and victim-centred agenda, as potentially polarising and ill timed. They contended that transitional justice should be delayed — approached instead as a downstream outcome of the dialogue process.
However, the relationship between the two processes hasn't been adequately clarified or publicly debated. Furthermore, anonymous sources say the government's failure to establish the Transitional Justice Institutional Coordination Mechanism may have contributed to tensions and the lack of a system to manage institutional and process politics.
Forging inclusive agreements
While transitional justice focuses on acknowledging harm, providing redress for victims and reforming institutions, national dialogue aims to forge inclusive agreements on fundamental national issues like governance, identity and peaceful coexistence.
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
Globally, various peacebuilding models involving both processes exist in post-conflict settings. Transitional justice can result from dialogue, occur before it, or alongside it. In Ethiopia, transitional justice is an independent process supported by legal and political mandates. It is not just an aspirational ideal — but an established policy commitment.
The impetus for pursuing transitional justice didn't arise from the national dialogue; it was motivated by public demands, empirical evidence, international legal obligations and the government's political promises. These were detailed in the Green Paper prepared by the Transitional Justice Working Group of Experts, constituted by the Justice Ministry following the 2022 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front.
Momentum for addressing past abuses through transitional justice emerged even before the Tigray conflict. However, these pre-war efforts were fragmented and poorly coordinated.
In response to the violations committed during the war, a joint investigation of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended transitional justice as essential in 2021. The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement requires the government to establish a comprehensive, national and victim-centred mechanism that aligns with international human rights standards and the African Union Transitional Justice Policy.
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
In line with the policy adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2024, draft laws have been prepared establishing the Special Bench, Special Prosecution Office, Truth and Social Cohesion Commission, and Vetting Commission.
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
Components of truth-seeking and social cohesion in transitional justice may intersect with the national dialogue's efforts to identify the root causes of violence and instability. Both may examine the structural aspects of violence, reconstruct narratives and clarify history.
Tensions
Sources suggest that this overlap contributes to tensions between national dialogue and transitional justice. Without a framework to coordinate these overlapping mandates, there is a risk of duplication, confusion and public participation fatigue.
The issue calls for a participatory and transparent discussion to clarify how truth-telling, historical inquiry and reconciliation under both processes can be synchronised. What is needed is strategic alignment — not establishing a superficial institutional hierarchy.
One way to resolve the confusion is to temporarily pause both processes. This could allow for potential intersections to be examined and addressed through coordination or mandate revisions. That would help ensure complementarity and enable transitional justice and national dialogue to progress concurrently, reinforcing rather than undermining one another.
A temporary pause could also be justified by the current conflict situation. For instance, if a peace process is initiated to end hostilities in Amhara or Oromia, a temporary deferral of justice initiatives may be pragmatic.
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
The same holds for national dialogue. Insecurity, displacement and distrust have obstructed public engagement in certain areas, resulting in major opposition political parties withdrawing. Given that the National Dialogue Commission is struggling to finalise the first of its five major activities, it is unlikely to conclude its work within the remainder of the recently extended deadline of February 2026.
Delaying transitional justice in favour of national dialogue incorrectly suggests that transitional justice is secondary to national dialogue and that the pursuit of justice must wait for political consensus. This is wrong for at least four reasons.
First, postponing transitional justice risks reinforcing perceptions — both domestically and internationally — that the government was never fully committed to the initiative, and is retreating as the process gains momentum. That could undermine public trust and international credibility, making it difficult to rebuild momentum or mobilise the political, institutional and financial resources necessary to pursue the process credibly.
Delays
Second, the need for transitional justice is expressed in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, public consultations and national surveys, which predate and stand independently from future recommendations of the national dialogue process. Delays would amount to holding justice hostage to processes that are neither substitutes for nor prerequisites to redress — potentially deepening victims' perception of prolonged neglect and impunity.
advertisement
Don't want to see this? Remove ads
Third, postponing transitional justice is premature. The anticipated overlap with the national dialogue and the proposed truth-seeking and social cohesion commission has not materialised as the transitional justice process is still in its preparatory phase.
Fourth, Ethiopia doesn't face an either/or dilemma. The transitional justice process does not overburden institutional capacity or divert public attention. It could continue while the two processes are aligned.
Even if, following an assessment of overlaps and tensions, a decision is taken to delay implementation of certain transitional justice components, such a decision must be selective rather than blanket. A careful sequencing strategy should pinpoint which pillars might be temporarily paused or adjusted to enhance complementarity between the two processes.
Equally essential is that any such decision be communicated through an official and transparent process to safeguard both initiatives from damaging speculation and erosion of public trust.
Ultimately, any approach to resolving tensions must preserve the integrity and objectives of both processes. Transitional justice does not obstruct national dialogue, and national dialogue should not obstruct justice. DM
Tadesse Simie Metekia is a Senior Researcher, Special Projects, at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
First published by ISS Today.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Eyewitness News
3 days ago
- Eyewitness News
BOSA unhappy Justice Ministry won't grant it access to the National Register of Sex Offenders
JOHANNESBURG - Build One South Africa (BOSA) is displeased with the Justice Ministry's rejection of their request to gain access to the National Register for Sex Offenders (NRSO). The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Mmamoloko Kubayi, had committed to releasing the list in February this year but retracted, citing legal concerns. In response, the party submitted an application in the form of a Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) to the department, which grants individuals access to information held by public or private bodies. ALSO READ: BOSA says public sexual offenders list important for parents to protect children A day after Child Protection Week started last week on Friday, the Department of Justice wrote back to the political party rejecting their application for the release of the sex offenders list. BOSA initially made the application for the release of the list in March, calling for the protection of children against predators. The department says Section 52 of the Sexual Offences and Related Crimes Act says anyone found to have disclosed the contents of the NRSO can be fined or jailed for up to three years. BOSA spokesperson Roger Solomons says it is disappointing as the country keeps seeing a rise in the abuse of children. "As BOSA, we note with great frustration and anger the Justice Ministry's rejection of our Promotion of Access to Information Act, where we requested to gain access to this highly secretive register of sex offenders, which government is hellbent on keeping under wraps." He says there is public interest in the matter, which should trump privacy laws.
IOL News
25-05-2025
- IOL News
Little to celebrate as conflicts overshadows continental progress
Ghana's founder and first President Kwame Nkrumah (left) and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie (centre) at the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 25, 1963. The formation of the OAU is celebrated as Africa Day. Image: AFP Dr Sizo Nkala The occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the adoption of the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, provides an opportunity to reflect and introspect. Probing how and why Africa has dismally failed to live up to the promises of the OAU Charter six decades after its proclamation is a pertinent undertaking. Africa remains trapped in the neocolonial structures of the global political economy that continue to undermine the continent's development potential. The continent is struggling to shake off the colonial legacy of occupying a dependent and very vulnerable position in the global economy. Between 2 and 3 per cent, Africa's share of the world trade is disappointingly paltry despite its population making up 17 per cent of the global population. The content and quality of this trade are even more problematic as over 75 per cent of Africa's exports to the world are primary commodities like oil, coal, chrome, platinum, cocoa, cotton and tobacco to mention a few of which are exported in raw and unprocessed states. The trade model that was imposed on Africa in the colonial era remains intact. These trade dynamics reflect the failure to move from commodity and agro-based to industrialized and diversified economies. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 83 per cent of African countries are dependent on the extraction and export of commodities. In Angola, South Sudan, and Nigeria, oil accounts for 95 percent, 92 percent and 80 percent of the export revenues respectively. Botswana, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) minerals make up between 70 and 99 percent of the countries' export revenues. Further, more than any other region in the world, the share of the agricultural sector in Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) stands at 35 per cent and supports the livelihoods of 50 per cent of the population. Even then productivity is still very low with the continent still spending a staggering US$50 billion annually in food imports. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ The share of the manufacturing sector in Africa's GDP decreased from 18 per cent in 2000 to 13 per cent currently – reflecting failed transformation and industrialization efforts. The lack of industrialization, coupled with infrastructure deficiencies, has severely limited the potential of intra-African trade which still stands at a paltry 15 percent. The unsustainable structure of many African economies has exposed African countries to global commodity price fluctuations which have precipitated a devastating debt crisis with 21 African countries being classified as being at risk of or in debt distress. Many countries now spend more of their revenues on servicing debt than on essential public services such as education, health, and water and sanitation. It is no wonder that Africa has the embarrassing opprobrium of being the poverty capital of the world with over 400 million of its people living in conditions of extreme poverty. As such, we commemorate the 62nd anniversary of the OAU under conditions of continued economic servitude and exploitation. Further, 62 years of political independence has done little to end Africa's marginalization in global governance institutions. The continent still has no permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its calls for inclusion in the UN's most powerful organ have gone unheeded for decades. Thus, despite being home to over 30 armed conflicts, Africa has a limited say in the body that makes decisions on global security. Africa's 54 states share a total of 6.5 percent of the voting rights in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and only 11 percent of voting shares in the World Bank. This means that African countries exercise limited influence in the decisions of the institutions that determine the direction of the global economic policy. Even in the World Trade Organization (WTO) which formally uses a one country one vote system, decisions are often imposed by big economies at the expense of smaller ones. Moreover, because of perceptions and actual conditions on the ground in Africa, the continent attracts only 3-5 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI) which is not nearly enough to stimulate the required levels of economic growth. As such, although Africa is slowly discovering its agency on the international stage, its independence and autonomy remain compromised by its economic weaknesses. The continent has not fared any better politically. In recent years we have witnessed the erosion of democratic institutions and the increasing frequency of military and constitutional coups. The raging conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the DRC, Mozambique and the Central African Republic (CAR) have killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions with continental institutions like the AU seemingly hapless to do anything. While the continental body has been 62 years in the making, it is still largely weak and ineffectual in addressing the challenges facing African people. As such, the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the OAU brings little to celebrate. Africa urgently needs visionary and effective leaders who will confront the challenges facing the continent head-on. * Dr. Sizo Nkala is a Research Fellow at the University of Johannesburg's Centre for Africa-China Studies. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
Daily Maverick
23-05-2025
- Daily Maverick
From conflict to cooperation: Rethinking security strategies in the Kenya-Ethiopia borderlands
Kenya's police have achieved some positive results, but lasting solutions require ongoing cooperation between the two countries. In February, Kenyan police launched Operation Ondoa Jangili ('remove the criminals') as part of security measures to drive the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) out of hideouts in Isiolo and Marsabit counties. The OLA is an informal militia fighting for self-determination for Ethiopia's Oromo ethnic group in the south of the country. Owing to its political orientation and culture of violence, it has frequently escaped Ethiopian authorities by crossing into Kenya. Marsabit and Isiolo are home to the Borana and Gabbra communities, both of which speak Oromo, thus providing cover for the OLA through ethnic affinity. Ethiopia's National Intelligence and Security Service says the armed group broke away from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) after the OLF renounced the armed struggle in 2018. Ethiopian intelligence says the OLA has established ties with the terrorist group al-Shabaab in Somalia and is involved in illicit activities such as arms trafficking and illegal mining. The Kenya Police Service has also accused the group of engaging in arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal mining, kidnapping for ransom and instigating tribal conflicts. In August 2024, two South Koreans were abducted from their Odda Mission Church residence in Moyale and allegedly handed to al-Shabaab in what Ethiopian intelligence says was an OLA-al-Shabaab collaboration. The OLA denies the claim. Kenya-Ethiopia cross-border insecurity The OLA says it has no presence in Kenya. This contradicts the country's National Intelligence Service Director-General Noordin Haji, who told a parliamentary oversight committee that the OLA was occupying Kenyan territory. The group has reiterated its commitment to ensuring the safety of Kenyan communities living along the border, pledging to respect Kenya's territorial integrity and expressing willingness to cooperate with authorities. The OLA accused Ethiopia's army and intelligence of facilitating transnational criminal networks and cautioned Kenya not to be misled and to maintain its balanced approach to regional stability. Kenyans living along the border are caught in the crossfire, often being detained by security forces for allegedly harbouring OLA fighters. Community members also face harassment by the OLA, which accuses them of spying for Kenya and Ethiopia's governments. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights says the ongoing police operation has sparked an outcry from those affected, who report human rights violations by the security forces. A lack of coordinated Kenyan-Ethiopian security force patrols along their porous border, marginalisation of border communities by both governments, and weak state institutions lacking the capacity to respond to distress calls have all worked in the OLA's favour. A resident told ISS Today that previous efforts by both Kenyan and Ethiopian security agencies to contain the OLA's activities were disjointed. That allowed the group to easily melt into the Kenyan population across the border when escaping Ethiopian authorities. As a result of OLA's incursions and a mismatch in Kenya and Ethiopia's firearm policies, the border region has suffered an influx of small arms. Kenya controls the licensing of arms, while in Ethiopia, civilians can legally own guns after registering them with the federal government. This fuels a cycle of insecurity as border communities acquire illicit arms for self-defence, creating a ready market for arms traffickers and the OLA. Memorandum of understanding In August 2024, in the build-up to the current police operation, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation through intelligence sharing and coordinated operations. The countries also had a security defence pact ratified in 1964, which, among other things, allowed them to support each other if a third party attacked them. However, the pact lost significance as the Somalian threat at that time waned. Kenya's operation has uncovered 14 makeshift camps believed to be used by OLA members, 10 firearms, ammunition, fake US dollars and Ethiopian birr, and propaganda literature in Oromo. Several people with alleged links to the group were arrested, and the police claim to have disrupted human and arms trafficking networks while curtailing cross-border incursions and kidnappings. These are positive achievements. But as with all security force operations, the successes can generally only be sustained while the operation is active. Once it ends, illicit activities could resume. Longer-term measures and prevention strategies are also vital. For example, coordinated and ongoing joint cross-border security patrols, combined with state investment in infrastructure such as roads and education facilities in border areas, are needed. That would protect border communities and facilitate trade and investment, bringing stability after decades of upheaval. Kenya and Ethiopia should also establish a permanent joint border security management framework, including a 24-hour one-stop border post at Moyale and formal border posts in Forolle, Elhadi and Dukana. This would encourage trade and check the movement of criminal actors and contraband across the border. Also, while factionalism within insurgent groups makes engaging in meaningful peace talks hard, Ethiopia's government should consider dialogue with the OLA, as happened in 2023. Ironing out contentious issues and building trust could help settle the disputes among parties to the conflict. Lastly, security forces must adhere to the law when carrying out operations, particularly concerning human rights. This would build trust between them and local communities, with knock-on positive effects for intelligence sharing, and tracking and arresting suspects. DM
