Latest news with #China-plus-one
CNBC
31-07-2025
- Business
- CNBC
India emerges as an attractive investment in China-plus-one manufacturing strategy, says strategist
Rana Gupta of Manulife Investment Management discusses how the diversification arising from the China-plus-one strategy benefits India and presents a long-term buying opportunity.
Mint
24-07-2025
- Business
- Mint
India-UK FTA: Experts are bullish on these sectors, recommend top stocks that can benefit from the agreement
India-UK FTA: Various sectors and stocks from the Indian stock market will likely hog the limelight on Friday, July 25, when trading resumes on the bourses following the landmark free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the UK. The FTA, which covers a wide array of sectors, will cut tariffs for various British imports while 99% of Indian exports to the UK would see duties eliminated to zero, including for segments like textiles, leather goods, agri products, medical devices and drugs, as per the documents shared by Indian officials. Additionally, the India-UK FTA will make it easier for British firms to export whisky, cars and other products to the country. The FTA signed by the two countries is expected to boost bilateral trade by around $34 billion annually. The deal was signed by Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal and his British counterpart Jonathan Reynold in the presence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his British counterpart Keir Starmer. Analysts believe that the India-UK trade deal is a lesson in global economic diplomacy and India's growing prominence in global trade. It assumes even more importance for India as it negotiates a trade deal with the US amid tariff threats. Moreover, with the China-plus-one policy gathering steam, India has emerged as an alternative. Analysts said that for India, the FTA could lead to more exports and greater foreign investment. Harshal Dassani, Business Head, INVasset PMS, said the zero-duty access to UK markets for textiles, gems, jewellery, seafood, engineering goods, and pharmaceuticals comes at a time when global supply chains are seeking China+1 partners. The agreement isn't just a diplomatic milestone—it's a targeted economic catalyst for multiple Indian sectors, Dasani added. Meanwhile, Pallavi Bakhru, Partner and UK Corridor Leader, Grant Thornton Bharat, believes the India–UK free trade agreement marks a pivotal moment - not only for boosting bilateral trade volumes, but for sparking employment and industrial renewal across both economies. She added that this FTA could unlock £25.5 billion in annual trade. Analysts largely remain bullish on sectors like textiles, gems and jewellery, and seafood as the deal opens direct market access in these export verticals. Additionally, they are also bullish on the sectors like auto, pharma and agriculture that could benefit. According to the FTA, Indian farm products will get the same low-tax treatment as products from top European countries like Germany, with India securing zero duties on 95% of agriculture and processed food items. Against this backdrop, Mahesh Ojha of Hensex sees agriculture-related stocks seeing an upside. "Duty-free access is expected to increase agri exports by over 20% in the next three years, contributing to India's goal of $100 billion agri-exports by 2030," the official said. The CETA eliminates UK tariffs on India's marine products. Despite the UK's $5.4 billion marine import market, India's share remains at just 2.25%, underscoring a significant untapped opportunity. Against this backdrop, Dasani said marine exporters such as Avanti Feeds could scale volumes rapidly with tariff barriers lifted. Under the FTA, there will be no import duties on Indian textiles and leather, which will make India more competitive with other exporting countries like Bangladesh and Cambodia. Dasani said for labour-intensive sectors like textiles, companies such as Vardhman Textiles and Arvind will benefit from an 8–12% cost advantage over global peers, unlocking new export orders. Meanwhile, Ojha recommends Welspun India and Arvind. India's total gems and jewellery exports to the UK are valued at $941 million, with $400 million coming from jewellery. The FTA opens up a huge market as the UK imports approximately $3 billion worth of jewellery annually. According to officials, tariff relaxations under the FTA are projected to double India's gems and Jewellery exports to the UK within the next 2-3 years. Jewellery and gems players like Titan and Kalyan Jewellers will gain from duty-free access in a high-margin market like the UK, where Indian craftsmanship is already well regarded, Dasani recommended. From 16% to zero, tariffs have been eliminated on India's leather and footwear. Ojha expects Relaxo and Bata India to benefit from this agreement. Engineering and auto component firms, notably Bosch India and SKF India, will ride on increased machinery and precision equipment exports, aided by a trusted trading framework, said Dasani. India will cut duties to 10% from over 100% under a quota system that will be gradually liberalised. In return, Indian manufacturers will gain access to the UK market for electric and hybrid vehicles, also under a quota system. Meanwhile, Ojha recommends looking at Tata Motors, Bharat Forge and Sona Comstar. Under the trade agreement, tariffs on Scotch whisky will drop to 75% from 150%, and then slide to 40% over the next decade, according to the British government. This, according to Ojha spells good for United Spirits, a subsidiary of UK-based Diageo PLC. Further, the focus on services, defence, education, and climate opens up avenues for IT giants like Infosys and TCS through greater mobility and cross-border contracts, Dasani said. "As tariffs fall and credibility rises, Indian exporters gain pricing power, scale access, and long-term visibility—key ingredients for rerating export-heavy portfolios in 2025 and beyond," he added. (With inputs from agencies) Disclaimer: This story is for educational purposes only. The views and recommendations made above are those of individual analysts or broking companies, and not of Mint. We advise investors to check with certified experts before making any investment decisions.
The Hindu
18-06-2025
- Business
- The Hindu
Resetting the India-U.S. partnership in uncertain times
Just a few months ago, India and the United States appeared poised to deepen what had been described as the defining partnership of the 21st century. Prime Minister Modi had met President Donald Trump early in his second term. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was present at the inauguration. There was bipartisan goodwill in Washington and strategic optimism in New Delhi. The relationship seemed to rest not on convenience, but on a grander wager: shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and a mutual ambition to shape the emerging world order. A drift that is serious Today, however, there is growing unease in New Delhi. Not a rupture, but a perceptible drift; subtle yet serious. A series of tactical and rhetorical signals from Washington suggest a partnership at risk of being undermined by volatility, policy incoherence, and a disconcerting return to older habits of mind. The sense of strategic convergence is dimming. In this context, Mr. Trump's decision to host a lunch on June 18 for Field Marshal Asim Munir, the chief architect of Pakistan's praetorian politics and sectarian rhetoric, has sent a disquieting signal to India, not least because it blurs the line between counter-terrorism partnership and political expediency. This drift, however, is not irreversible. The structural logic of the partnership remains robust. What is required now is a reset, not of fundamentals, but of tone, clarity, and mutual commitment. Several recent developments have triggered India's discomfort. Perhaps most jarring has been the return of outdated 'hyphenation': treating India and Pakistan as equivalent strategic concerns. In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, Mr. Trump spoke of India and Pakistan in the same breath, offered mediation on Kashmir, and warned of nuclear escalation. For Indian policymakers who have invested years in decoupling India's rise from the India-Pakistan binary, such language was diplomatically regressive. On the economic front, signals have been equally disconcerting. Even as Mr. Trump announced that 'our deal with China is done', he reportedly discouraged Apple's CEO from expanding manufacturing in India; warning that companies that 'go to India' may face difficulties in accessing the U.S. market. For Indian officials advancing a 'China-plus-one' strategy and projecting India as a manufacturing hub, the message was undermining. Immigration policy, too, has become a point of friction. The H-1B visa regime, long a cornerstone of India-U.S. technological cooperation, now appears vulnerable to political posturing and protectionist rhetoric. The consequences risk fraying the connective tissue that binds Silicon Valley to Indian innovation ecosystems. Most concerning is the apparent warming in Washington's approach toward Pakistan. When the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General Michael Kurilla, described Pakistan as a 'phenomenal partner' in counterterrorism, it represented an extraordinary characterisation of an institution long associated with nurturing cross-border terrorism. Why is this drift occurring? First, the Trump administration's transactional approach places short-term gain over long-term alignment. India's strategic culture — patient, layered, and civilisational — sits uncomfortably with Washington's preference for the quick deal. The American impulse to monetise diplomacy can often jar with India's more strategic-based lens on geopolitics. In addition, Mr. Trump's diplomatic style remains as intriguing as ever: part showman, part salesman, and unpredictable. He may dazzle one moment and denounce the next, making it difficult for partners, even the closest, to navigate the terrain of trust and expectation. Second, a segment of the U.S. national security establishment continues to view Pakistan as a familiar, if flawed, partner, especially in the context of Afghanistan and counterterrorism. Despite a history of duplicity, there remains a deep-seated nostalgia for the 'known devil', whose strategic utility, however diminished, is still overstated. Meanwhile, India's strategic autonomy is often misconstrued as fence-sitting rather than a principled assertion of sovereignty. Third, structural asymmetries in influence and communication persist. India's rise is real, but its institutional footprint in Washington lags behind its ambitions. This is reflected in a troubling misunderstanding of India's strategic intentions. Critics such as Ashley Tellis argue that India suffers from 'great-power delusions' and that the relationship falters because India's ambitions outstrip its capabilities. This diagnosis is flawed. India does not suffer from delusions of grandeur; it suffers from the patient weight of becoming. Its desire to chart an independent course reflects not confusion but strategic clarity shaped by history and sovereignty. The real risk lies not in India's aspirations but in Washington's impatience with partners who do not mirror American methods or priorities. India must take the lead What then must be done? Both countries must act decisively to prevent further drift. India should not overreact. Tactical irritants must not obscure deeper strategic alignment. Defence cooperation, Quad initiatives, intelligence sharing, and convergent interests from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific remain strong foundations. But dramatic responses will only exacerbate misunderstanding. Quiet, persistent, and calibrated diplomacy must remain the preferred method. India should broaden and deepen its engagement in Washington beyond traditional diplomacy, leveraging Congress, policy think tanks, and Indian American diaspora as vectors of strategic advocacy. Domestically, India must accelerate internal economic reforms, not to satisfy any foreign expectations but to reinforce the logic of investment, manufacturing, and long-term confidence. Regulatory clarity and infrastructure modernisation remain the best arguments for India as a global production hub. On the trade front, officials on both sides are cautiously exploring a modest but meaningful bilateral arrangement before the July 9 deadline. Immigration concerns must be reframed as shared opportunities. The H-1B regime is not a concession to India, but an instrument of mutual innovation. The movement of skilled talent, the collaborative ecosystems of tech entrepreneurship, and the potential for co-creating the next generation of frontier technologies should be at the centre of the India-U.S. conversation. The need to rediscover the basis of ties For the U.S., the burden is equally significant. Washington must abandon Cold War framings and recognise that treating Indian manufacturing and talent mobility as threats is self-defeating. If the Indo-Pacific strategy is to endure, it must be matched by concrete investments in India's regional capacity-building initiatives. More fundamentally, both countries must rediscover the moral purpose of their partnership. This is not merely about balancing China or accessing markets. At its best, the India-U.S. relationship is about shaping a democratic, pluralist, and rules-based world order. The arc of India-U.S. relations has never been linear. In 1998, after the Pokhran tests, who could have imagined the level of alignment achieved just a decade later? By 2005, the two countries had stunned the world with the landmark civil nuclear agreement: an audacious act of strategic trust that rewrote the rules of global diplomacy. That moment reminds us of what is possible when political courage meets mutual respect. As U.S. President Bush once said, 'The world will see what two great democracies can do when they trust each other.' It is precisely that spirit we must summon again today. As this writer wrote in the introduction to Engaged Democracies (co-edited, more than two decades ago), the 'real test of the partnership is not how it behaves in moments of celebration, but how it endures in times of stress'. The question then is not, as Walter Russell Mead provocatively asked recently, will Trump lose India? The better question is: will both countries squander a generational opportunity to build a democratic concert in Asia? The answer must be no. This turbulence should serve not as an epitaph, but as a summons to renewal. If clarity, commitment, and candour return to the conversation, the arc of the India-U.S. relationship can still bend — not just toward engagement, but toward enduring partnership and, perhaps once again, toward history-making trust. Amitabh Mattoo is Professor and Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has served on India's National Security Council Advisory Board
Business Times
18-06-2025
- Business
- Business Times
Singapore, Thailand may see negative growth by 2026 as Asean reels from tariffs: economists
[SINGAPORE] The full impact of the escalating US tariffs on Asean's growth will likely emerge in 2026 – when the region is expected to face a sharp slowdown. Bloomberg Economics projected on Tuesday (Jun 17) that gross domestic product growth across the Asean-5 economies – Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia – is expected to fall from 4.5 per cent in 2024 to 3 per cent in 2025. The research unit added that growth could even fade to 1.5 per cent in 2026 if the tariffs stay in place. Among the five, Thailand and Singapore are likely to be hit the hardest because of their exposure to global trade, said Bloomberg's senior economist for South-east Asia Tamara Henderson. Thailand, the exports of which account for nearly 70 per cent of GDP, faces potential tariffs as high as 36 per cent. She warned that the country's growth is likely to slip below 2 per cent in 2025, and may contract outright in 2026 if the tariffs remain. 'Over 11 per cent of Thailand's GDP comes from merchandise exports to the US, particularly in electronics and chips,' she noted. 'Auto-supply chains are also affected, and tourism recovery has faltered.' A NEWSLETTER FOR YOU Friday, 8.30 am Asean Business Business insights centering on South-east Asia's fast-growing economies. Sign Up Sign Up Although Singapore faces the minimum 10 per cent baseline tariff, it is arguably the most exposed in the region because of its export-oriented economy. About 6 per cent of its GDP depends on exports to the US, with significant trade in semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, for which the likelihood of additional duties remains unclear. This could drag Singapore's 2025 growth sharply below the strong 4.4 per cent recorded in 2024. If the tariffs remain in force, Singapore's economy could contract by around 1 per cent in 2026, Henderson projected. 'Singapore is likely to take the largest hit to growth in the near-term from the tariff shock. However, its agile and well-resourced government may allow the city-state to emerge with less scarring over the medium term,' she added. Economies such as the Philippines and Indonesia are expected to weather the tariff storm better, given that their growth is more led by domestic demand. In Indonesia, US-bound shipments account for only around 10 per cent of exports. 'Exports in Indonesia are about 25 per cent of overall GDP, compared to household spending, which makes up around 50 per cent,' said Henderson. Likewise, the Philippines' tight labour market and strong household sector are likely to support domestic spending, shielding the country from heavy tariff shocks. She noted, however, that the tariffs could hit both economies in areas beyond trade, given that weak global demand and weaker pricing power along supply chains could dampen the region's investment and hiring opportunities. Balancing acts Heavy US tariffs on South-east Asian economies mean that the region's attractiveness as an alternative 'China-plus-one' destination is slowly fading. Asean countries must therefore find new opportunities to remain resilient, said Priyanka Kishore, lead economist at the policy consultancy Asia Decoded; she was speaking at the launch of a report on the region's economic outlook by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales on Jun 12. China's role in the changing global order will be difficult to navigate, she said, because its improvements in manufacturing could be damaging to the region's economies, even as it offers an alternative trade destination to the US. She noted that the region's labour productivity has lagged at half the pace of China's in recent years. 'China is capital-intensive and mechanised; it is producing items at a fraction of the cost of that in a factory in Indonesia. 'Regional cooperation will have to include reform in infrastructure and human capital development, such as training of skills and digitalisation,' she said. Henderson added that Asean's resilience will depend on identifying new competitive niches. 'Finding these gaps will be the challenge. Perhaps, these will be in services. Countries such as Singapore, with its many Mandarin speakers, could see an advantage in its ability to understand both the West and China,' she suggested. But China's place in the Asean story is not entirely damaging, analysts say. The Chinese government's efforts to boost its ailing economy have been widespread, and aimed at making domestic demand the main engine and anchor of its economic growth. If successful, a wealthier Chinese middle class could spark opportunities in trade and investment for certain sectors in the region. Gary Tan, portfolio manager at Allspring Global Investments, said: 'These include tourism, logistics and e-commerce; regional hubs like Singapore could see increased cross-border activity.'
Business Times
17-06-2025
- Business
- Business Times
Singapore, Thailand may see negative growth by 2026 as Asean reels from tariffs: Bloomberg
[SINGAPORE] The full impact of the escalating US tariffs on Asean's growth will likely emerge in 2026 – and Bloomberg projects a sharp regional slowdown. Gross domestic product growth across the Asean-5 economies – Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia – is expected to fall from 4.5 per cent in 2024 to 3 per cent in 2025; Bloomberg Economics projected on Tuesday (Jun 17) that growth could even wilt to 1.5 per cent in 2026 if the tariffs stay in place. Among the five, Thailand and Singapore are likely to be hit the hardest because of their exposure to global trade, said Bloomberg's senior economist for South-east Asia Tamara Henderson. Thailand, the exports of which account for nearly 70 per cent of GDP, faces potential tariffs as high as 36 per cent. She warned that the country's growth is likely to slip below 2 per cent in 2025, and may contract outright in 2026 if the tariffs remain. 'Over 11 per cent of Thailand's GDP comes from merchandise exports to the US, particularly in electronics and chips,' she noted. 'Auto-supply chains are also affected, and tourism recovery has faltered.' Although Singapore faces the minimum 10 per cent baseline tariff, it is arguably the most exposed in the region because of its export-oriented economy. About 6 per cent of its GDP depends on exports to the US, with significant trade in semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, for which the likelihood of additional duties remains unclear. A NEWSLETTER FOR YOU Friday, 8.30 am Asean Business Business insights centering on South-east Asia's fast-growing economies. Sign Up Sign Up This could drag Singapore's 2025 growth sharply below the strong 4.4 per cent recorded in 2024. If the tariffs remain in force, Singapore's economy could contract by around 1 per cent in 2026, Henderson projected. 'Singapore is likely to take the largest hit to growth in the near-term from the tariff shock. However, its agile and well-resourced government may allow the city-state to emerge with less scarring over the medium-term,' she added. Economies such as the Philippines and Indonesia are expected to weather the tariff storm better, given that their growth is more led by domestic demand. In Indonesia, US-bound shipments account for only around 10 per cent of exports. 'Exports in Indonesia are about 25 per cent of overall GDP, compared to household spending, which makes up around 50 per cent,' said Henderson. Likewise, the Philippines' tight labour market and strong household sector are likely to support domestic spending, shielding the country from heavy tariff shocks. She noted, however, that the tariffs could hit both economies in areas beyond trade, given that weak global demand and weaker pricing power along supply chains could dampen the region's investment and hiring opportunities. Balancing acts Heavy US tariffs on South-east Asian economies mean that the region's attractiveness as an alternative 'China-plus-one' destination is slowly fading. Asean countries must therefore find new opportunities to remain resilient, said Priyanka Kishore, lead economist at the policy consultancy Asia Decoded; she was speaking at the launch of a report on the region's economic outlook by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales on Jun 12. China's role in the changing global order will be difficult to navigate, she said, because its improvements in manufacturing could be damaging to the region's economies, even as it offers an alternative trade destination to the US. She noted that the region's labour productivity has lagged at half the pace of China's in recent years. 'China is capital-intensive and mechanised; it is producing items at a fraction of the cost of that in a factory in Indonesia. 'Regional cooperation will have to include reform in infrastructure and human capital development, such as training of skills and digitalisation,' she said. Henderson added that Asean's resilience will depend on identifying new competitive niches. 'Finding these gaps will be the challenge. Perhaps these will be in services. Countries such as Singapore, with its many Mandarin speakers, could see an advantage in its ability to understand both the West and China,' she suggested. But China's place in the Asean story is not entirely damaging, analysts say. The Chinese government's efforts to boost its ailing economy have been widespread, and aimed at making domestic demand the main engine and anchor of its economic growth. If successful, a wealthier Chinese middle class could spark opportunities in trade and investment for certain sectors in the region. Gary Tan, portfolio manager at Allspring Global Investments, said: 'These include tourism, logistics and e-commerce; regional hubs like Singapore could see increased cross-border activity.'
